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This dissertation begins by contrasting hope with optimism and pessimism, the two 
‘principal categories of public debate’ that have allowed a particular political ‘culture of 
critical discourse’ to settle into place (Lasch 1990: 13). It brings together a great variety of 
perspectives (classical republicanism, liberalism, conservatism and religion) and reflects 
on the works of Hannah Arendt, Simone Adolphine Weil, William James, John Milton, et 
al. In agreement with Lasch, the present study claims that only populism can satisfy the 
criteria of hope, conceived as a probability for justice, truth and beauty. This populism 
(henceforth it will be called the ‘vita civile’) advocates self-government. It opposes the 
centralisation of power and the arbitrary imposition of rule, which political pessimists 
consider the only safe remedies for lawlessness and aggression, from the consequences of 
the (potentially) inherent human hubris (see the glossary). At the same time, the vita civile 
questions the quasi optimistic assertions of modern liberalism, which project the 
impersonal market pattern as the sole arbiter of all human affairs, seeing history as a steady 
trajectory towards a destination of assured happiness. However, the vita civile does not 
consider active participation in government a recipe for perfect happiness. Instead, it seeks 
to adjust the classical republican/democratic view of popular sovereignty to James’ idea of 
meliorism and pragmatism. It questions the rosy view of human nature but instead of 
surrendering to the fatalism of pessimism, meliorism (or hope) sees justice and common 
decency as open possibilities and shares the unshakable conviction that hubris and conflict 
could be more effectively tackled through active citizenship, when (in other words) the 
‘common people’ concentrate power as close to home as possible, and instead of being 
locked out from the political structures and hierarchies, can access and reshape them. 
Through this process an ethos of political experience and virtue is acquired. Furthermore, 
this populist synthesis, following Arendt’s insights, is centered in logos—implying speech, 
dialogue, open public debate and persuasion—as a means of political action and 
participation. In addition, the vita civile shares a high respect for tradition, religion and 
heritage. Common memories and lore shape a popular identity that unify heterogeneous 
crowds, allowing them to function as political agents. Transcendent archetypes and 
religious insights can on certain occasions inspire prudence over aggression. Finally, 




Revolution, the agrarian revolt in the American South and West (in the late nineteenth 
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Action, agonal and narrative: According to Hannah Arendt (1990; 1998), the term action 
confers political action. Together with work and labour, action constitutes the third 
element of the vita activa (see Chapter 2). To a degree Arendt’s political action, also called 
agonal action, is synonymous with direct democracy, with open participation within a 
political realm, like the ancient Athenian polis. The term narrative action belongs to Seyla 
Benhabib (2000), referring to political discussions and open conversations that take place 
not within a political realm but in public spaces not designed specifically for political 
purposes, such as churches, pubs, theaters, et al. These discussions gradually alter public 
perceptions. 
 
Anthropocentrism: This term is widely used by the Hellenist scholar Georges 
Contogeorgis. It has nothing to do with the anthropocentrism of ‘evolutionary biologists’ 
which ‘neglect species more removed from us’ (Breithaupt 2019: 21). For Contogeorgis 
(Κοντογιώργης 2006; 2014; 2020) the term anthropocentrism points to political and 
economic freedom. In my view, it has to do with the ability of every human being to 
contribute to common decency. It does not, however, imply that human ability is boundless. 
 
Common decency: This points to a set of moral rules and obligations that have to be 
followed by everyone, inasmuch as economic and political justice, transparency, mutual 
understanding and the right to life are effectively protected. Common decency also refers 
to the Platonic triad of beauty, truth and justice. 
 
Chain of equivalence: this term belongs to Ernesto Laclau (2005). An equivalential chain 
is a bridging discourse, a political discourse, more precisely, which attempts to unify 
heterogeneous groups for a specific common purpose.   
 
Cosmosystem: According to Georges Contogeorgis (Γιώργος Κοντογιώργης 2014; 2012: 
133-5), the term cosmosystem to refers to social and political models with a) common 




economy, communication, et al.), and b) common values and ideological or cultural 
worldviews. Contogeorgis identifies two cosmosystems: the anthropocentric (which 
emerged during the Greek antiquity, the Hellenistic and the Byzantine age) and the despotic 
cosmosystem. According to Contogeorgis (Κοντογιώργης 2006; 2014; 2020), the despotic 
cosmosystem, as opposed to the anthropocentric, points to the organisation of political and 
social systems of the non-Hellenic ancient world. It also refers to the political organisation 
of absolutist Western European and Asian empires, princedoms and kingdoms (the Roman 
empire, during the pagan and Christian age is included).. 
 
Cultural decomposition: inspired by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche’s (2001: 120; 2006) 
view on nihilism, and by Simone Weil’s (1987a) notion of ‘uprootedness’, cultural 
decomposition stands for the destruction of one’s culture, the eradication of old folkways 
and traditions.  
 
Deep emotions: This points to cases of intense sentimentalism which obstruct our capacity 
for rational thinking, making our mind unable to pass good judgment. Deep emotions (as 
opposed to our serene emotions) are not dialectic. They are acute and chimerical; they 
cannot be easily put under the surveillance of the empirical mind, which has the capacity 
to erect moral fences against selfishness and/or against rampant anger (else called mēnis). 
Martha Craven Nussbaum (2013) uses the term ‘emotional foundationalism’ to describe 
the process whereby deep emotions obstruct judgment. 
 
Democratic or classical republicanism:  The term ‘democratic republicanism’ (or 
classical republicanism) has to do with the political thought of Aristotle and Cicero (Nelson 
2006: 196). Drawing on the polis (or the res publica), it proposes a polity consisting of 
representative and participatory institutions at the same time. Often authors associate 
classical republicanism with modern republicanism and liberalism. This has been the case 
of Margeret Canovan, see The People (2005). Modern republicanism refers to 
representative systems of government tout court (Gustafson 2011: 41-70). Unless emphasis 
is required, the adjective ‘classical’ or ‘democratic’ could be omitted, making the text 





Eucosmia: This term has a twofold meaning. First, it refers to the obligation of every 
human being to recognise the worth and value of others, id est., their ability to overcome 
their natural inclination towards sin and error through speech, memory and spiritual 
enlightenment.  At the same time, it stands for cosmopolitanism: it points to the ability of 
every member of a nation to recognise members of other nations as equal, capable of 
contributing to humanity as a whole. Eucosmia is a profound enunciation of 
anthropocentrism. 
 
Fido amor: Types of friendship that rely on deep emotions (emotional foundationalism) 
are enunciations of the fido amor, as opposed to the friendship of eucosmia, which brings 
emotions and reason together, without allowing excessive sentimentalism to hijack rational 
thinking. 
 
Homo Hellenicus: the type of being that corresponds to ancient Greece (particularly of 
ancient Athens), the Hellenistic and the Byzantine age. The homo hellenicus is a mixture 
of the anthropocentric elements that sprung from these three different historical periods 
(according to Contogeorgis [Κοντογιώργης 2006; 2014; 2020]). These elements are: a) 
democracy and political participation, which characterises ancient Athens (Arendt 1998), 
b) economic participation, a main trend Contogeorgis (Κοντογιώργης 2014) has identified 
in the Hellenistic and Byzantine age, and c) spiritual enlightenment, which is linked to the 
Christian age of Byzantium (Contogeorgis 2020 [Κοντογιώργης 2020]). 
 
Hubris: According to Castoriadis (2007a [Καστοριάδης 2007α]), hubris points to the 
frantic impulse for exaggeration (177) and for the violation of moral limits (Καστοριάδης 
2008: 210 [Castoriadis 2008Q 210). It also refers to major injustices and atrocities (e.g. the 
concentration/extermination camps and/or the enslavement of peoples) (Castoriadis 2007c: 
123). Most of all hubris refers to the exaggeration of the demos (the people), to its possible 
slip towards insanity, to its abandonment of prudence (111). In short, hubris and common 
decency are opposites. From a Christian point of view, hubris refers to ‘the root of all evil’, 




‘the sin of sins’ (ibid).  
 
Katabasis: This derives from the Greek word κάθοδος (kathodos) or (verb) καταιβαίνω 
(kataibaino), translated as ‘descend’ or ‘climb[ing] down’, according to the Oxford 
Dictionary (2008: 102). It is a symbolic process of introspection, where one dives into the 
dark realms of his/her mind, into the underworld (I will shed more light on this term later 
on), in order to identify the exact forces (the passion for lust, greed, revenge and 
domination) that influence one’s attitude and personality. The aim of katabasis is self-
purification, id est., the removal of perceptions and settled ways of thinking (incited by 
such passions) from one’s personality. 
 
Idolatry: This refers to the friendship between human beings and lifeless objects. Idolatry 
lies at the bottom of the hierarchy of friendship, beneath the fido amor and the friendship 
of eucosmia (see above). 
 
Liberalism; possessive and permissive: the term possessive liberalism or possessive 
individualism, according to Crawford Brough Machperson (1983), points to the emphasis 
the theory of economic liberalism (developed during the eighteenth century) on individual 
improvement as well as in the unlimited accumulation of property and capital. I consider 
permissive liberalism a mutation, an evolution, of possessive liberalism itself. The term 
permissive liberalism is widely used by Christopher Lasch (1991b) to describe the post-
war socio-political model of American liberalism, which exalts individual self-expression 
against culture, tradition and sexual/moral hindrances. 
 
Logismikon: Also called the empirical mind, it is the aspect of the human mind 
empowered with the capacity to exercise good judgment, to reject acts that do not comply 
with the basic principles of common decency (truth, beauty and justice).  
 
Metakénosis: According to Adamantios Korais, a major figure of the Greek 
Enlightenment, metakénosis stands for the process whereby elements of a culture are 




and  the historical course of the former (Mytilinaki Kennedy 2018: 25). 
 
Memory; ethical and bonding: the former stands for experience, namely, for the capacity 
to avoid repetition of morally deplorable acts through remembrance. In turn, bonding 
memory (or connective memory) speaks about the sum of common characteristics that bind 
groups together in membership. Bonding memory is divided into civil memory, which deals 
with aspects of the common political history of a nation or group of nations and cultural 
memory, referring to a set of values, ideas, gestures and folkways that ascribe to groups a 
precise cultural identity. From a different angle: bonding memory (civil and cultural alike) 
is also divided into material and immaterial bonding memory. The former refers to 
physical objects, that is, to statues, monuments, buildings and open spaces, in short, to 
objects that symbolically represent aspects of a common historical past (civil memory) or 
to aspects of a common culture, such as common religion (cultural memory). The latter, 
according to Pierre Nora (1996), revolves around non material means of remembrance, 
such as rituals and/or worldviews that spring from a particular culture and ‘revamp the 
foundations of historical memory’ (xvi).  
 
Public and political realm: For Arendt (1998), the political realm (or the polis) refers to 
the public assembly of direct democracy in ancient Athens. In Arendt’s works the political 
realm is identical with the public. Although the political realm is public in the pure sense 
of the word, not all aspects of public life per se deal with political participation (albeit they 
can influence politics through non-political means of public engagement). For more in 
regards to this see the second chapter. 
 
The underworld: It is the aspect of the mind which is dominated by iniquitous passions 
(lust, greed, selfishness, ruthlessness, passion for revenge, et al.) and deep emotions.  
 
Serene emotions: as opposed to deep emotions, serene emotions are moderate and, 
therefore, tamable. They can be put under the command of the logismikon, of its capacity 





Social (or collective) institutioning: This term was coined by Cornelius Castoriadis 
(2005) and describes the complex process whereby human collectivities gradually create 
and re-shape their own cultural and social norms, and political procedures that follow, 
































1.1 Hypothesis and objectives 
Christopher Lasch, a historian, and a cultural and social critic, set out to persuade 
his readers ‘that reconstructing a populist vision … might point a way out of our troubled 
politics’ (Brandt 2020: 2). Lasch’s view of populism, as it is outlined in one of his most 
representative works, The True and Only Heaven (TTOH) (1991a), is synonymous with 
participatory democracy (which I also term self-government) and springs from a tradition 
sceptical towards the eighteenth-century Anglo-American idea of progress, which (he 
thought) is profoundly engraved within the foundations of American liberalism (1991a; 
1995a). To a degree, Lasch’s understanding of democracy has been influenced by Hannah 
Arendt’s republican thought, and more importantly, by her emphasis on direct involvement 
in the process of decision-making (action), taking place within a political realm, a political 
space of open participation (Lasch 1991a: 133; 376; 457, ff; 1995a: 88)1. According to De 
Ste Croix (1999), Lasch’s ‘populistic’ democracy ‘is squarely in line with American 
notions of a democratic republicanism’ (305), notions that had also inspired Arendt (1990; 
1998). His critique on the doctrine of economic progress, a doctrine that advocates faith in 
reforms in favour of economic expansion, which (according to its advocates) could elevate 
the living standards of all Americans, rests on the following assumption: economic 
progress itself does not only increase social and political inequality that Lasch loathed and 
despised. Simultaneously, it leads to erosion and destruction of the institution of family 
and religion (Lasch 1991a: 63), capable of preserving social cohesion and stability. More 
importantly, the optimism of economic progress, its belief in the maximisation of economic 
expansion, resting ‘securely on statistical charts and tables certifying the steady upward tilt 
of economic production’ (Goodwyn 1976: vii) that would (ostensibly) eradicate poverty 
and social conflict (Lasch 1991a: 13-4; 39), leads to the intensification of political 
disenfranchisement so long as it results in the rapid concentration of wealth by a small 
ruling elite of capitalists and large landowners (Lasch 1991a; 1991c; 1995a). Lawrence 
 
1 Also, in an interview with Beggy Brawer and Sergio Benvenuto, Lasch (1993) mentions Arendt’s 




Goodwyn (1976), another notable historian (cited above) of American Populism that had 
decisively influenced Lasch, pursued a similar understanding of democracy as a grassroots 
political activity of direct engagement. Like Lasch (1991), Goodwyn (1976) associated 
democracy with populism, which draws on the political tradition of classical republicanism 
that (as mentioned earlier) is linked to self-government, active citizenship, economic 
independence and civic virtue (Lasch 1991a: 172-180; 1995a: 92-116). Lasch (1993) 
juxtaposes the optimism of economic progress with hope, which does not advocate ‘blind 
faith’ in endless betterment that somehow things will automatically ‘work out for the best’ 
(14).  
A review of Lasch’s TTOH, published by James Kloppenberg (1992), calls for 
further elucidation on the dividing lines between progress (or optimism) and hope (1402). 
As a matter of fact, Lasch’s TTOH is not a philosophical work but (mainly) a general 
review of the hitherto published literature on populism, hope, progress and optimism. This 
dissertation takes into account the works of several authors mentioned mainly in TTOH 
and elaborates further on them. It sheds further light on Lasch’s juxtaposition between 
optimism (as well as pessimism) and hope from a philosophical/theoretical angle. 
Additionally, as De Ste Croix (1999) argued, Lasch ‘refers to classical republican thought 
only tangentially’ (305). By reflecting on republican thinkers discussed by Lasch (such as 
Arendt, Niccolò Machiavelli et al), while identifying errors and filling in gaps and 
omissions in their thought, this dissertation digs deeper into concepts of classical 
republicanism, upon which Lasch’s populism and democracy, the ‘hopeful’ democracy (to 
use his terms), is partially predicated. Prima facie, this dissertation strives a) to identify the 
key arguments upon which the advocates of political optimism (as well as pessimism) base 
their position. Thereupon, b) it addresses the impasses of both categories, evaluating 
simultaneously the practical results of the implementation of political programmes (or 
initiatives) that rely on pessimistic and/or optimistic worldviews, and finally c) it rigorously 
explains how (and to what extent) a populist project, predicated on hope could respond to 
such impasses, creating conditions within which justice, truth and beauty are more 
effectively promoted. In order to respond to these problématiques we must initially attempt 
to sharpen our definitions of pessimism, optimism and hope accordingly. Thereupon, 




classical republicanism, upon which the idea of hope is (partially) predicated, could offer 
practical solutions to the impasses of pessimism and optimism alike. Put otherwise, what 
are the main objectives of this (hopeful) democracy, inspired by classical republicanism? 
What particular problems does it attempt to solve? What makes systems of thought, built 
upon pessimistic and/or optimistic predictions about politics and society, unable to identify 
such problems, offering viable responses in return? 
1) Pessimism, optimism and hope: definitions and clarifications 
Another significant influence for Lasch was the psychologist and philosopher 
William James (Eric Miller 2010: 228). In the latter’s work Pragmatism: A New Name for 
Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907/1968), one finds clear and precise definitions of 
pessimism, optimism and hope (or meliorism). Such definitions seem to be in agreement 
with the weltanschauung Lasch spotted in the philosophical thinking behind these three 
categories. In short, pessimism is the state of mind of those who ‘think the salvation of the 
world impossible’ (James 1968: 137; emphasis added), of those who see no escape from 
troubles and injustices (Lasch 1990: 13). Let us clarify that for James the term ‘salvation’ 
is open to multiple interpretations. ‘You may interpret [it] in any way you like, and make 
it as diffuse and distributive, or as climacteric and integral a phenomenon as you please’ 
(ibid). We are, therefore, allowed to associate ‘salvation’ with all sorts of victories and 
triumphs against social injustices and conflicts brought forward by means of self-
government and democratic participation (populism). In addition, by acknowledging 
James’ definition on pessimism, we may reckon pessimistic a perception that considers the 
salvation of the ‘common people’ (namely their endeavours to build up self-organized 
republics) futile and impossible. A good example of pessimism in political philosophy is 
Hobbes’ (1994; 1998; 2006) anti-populism. Upon questioning the moral capacities of 
human beings, Hobbes dismisses self-government and active citizenship as a ticket to 
social chaos and disarray. In response, he proposes authoritarianism and coercion. 
On the other hand, optimism, a ‘regnant doctrine in European philosophy’, 
considers ‘the world’s salvation’ inevitable (James 1968: 137). Optimism manifests itself 
as a form of ‘cheerful fatalism’ and approaches the future with confidence, assuming that 
certain procedures or political moves will automatically generate prosperity and happiness 




Perfectibility of Man (2000) identifies a wide spectrum of political ideologies advocating 
optimism. From eighteenth-century economic liberalism (the matrix of modern optimism, 
according to Lasch) to Marxist (or Leninist) communism (374; 376) and (to a degree) social 
anarchism (272-89), from modern evolutionary theories of positivism (295-331) to certain 
variants of the Christian Reformation (5-7; 174-225), including Christian millennialism 
(220-1). Among the plethora of existing ideologies and philosophical currents that exhibit 
overt political optimism this dissertation will focus exclusively a) on variants of optimistic 
populism, which reckon self-government a ticket to ‘inevitable salvation’ and b) on the 
optimistic worldview of the eighteenth century economic liberalism, which derives from 
the philosophy of thinkers, such as Adam Smith (Lasch 1991a: 13-4; 52). These two 
different types of optimism will be examined separately. The primary objective behind the 
examination of populist trends exhibiting ardent optimism, like (for instance) those brought 
forward by some leaders of the French Revolution (see Chapter 6), rests on the following 
assumption: while rejecting the anti-populism of the Hobbesian pessimistic 
weltanschauung, namely its negative stance towards initiatives that push forward reforms 
in favour of popular participation in government, one has to avoid the impression that 
projects inspired by the republican idea of self-government strive towards an earthly 
kingdom of heaven. Also, the reason this dissertation (apart from optimistic populism) 
examines economic liberalism rests on the following factors: first, economic liberalism has 
been the main subject of Lasch’s critiques, from the early stages of his career until his very 
late writings (Eric Miller 2010: 57-8). Second, optimism, ‘the state of mind encouraged by 
a belief in progress’, in boundless economic and scientific expansion (Lasch 1993: 13), lies 
deep in the underpinnings of our contemporary (western) world (Barndt 2019: 8). 
Notwithstanding the horrors of the twentieth century, the rise of totalitarian movements 
(more particularly), the Second World War and the Holocaust forced many ‘l]iberally-
minded Western intellectuals’ to abandon ‘their belief in the inevitability of progress’, 
claims Passmore (2000: 441), in Lasch’s view, this blind faith in endless betterment has 
been salvaged (1991a: 13; 41; 1991c; 1993: 13). It lies deep in the underpinnings of the 
Western liberal world (as the next chapters will claim). The way our societies function and 
operate owe much to this idea (Malliaris 2017a). In other words, the concept of progress is 




administered in rapid succession by twentieth-century events’ (Lasch 1991a: 78). 
Optimism and pessimism still ‘remain the favorite categories of political debate’ (39). For 
Lasch, this indicates that ‘the theme of progress is not yet played out’ (ibid). Liberal 
optimism is ‘sustained not by any objective evidence but by the belief that the only 
alternative is [pessimism, that is] “to abandon hope, all ye who enter here”’ (Lasch 1993: 
13). Οr as Sydney Pollard put it, ‘“the only possible alternative to the belief in progress 
would be total despair”’ (quoted by Lasch 1991a: 42). The ultimate objective of economic 
expansion today is the pursuit of ‘painless progress toward the celestial city of 
consumerism’ (Seaton 1994).  
To avoid misunderstandings, Lasch (1991a) was not an advocate of the ‘widely 
accepted interpretation’ (40) of liberal optimism, that its adherence to the idea of progress 
(economic expansion) rests ‘on the promise of an ideal society’ (48). Such an approach on 
liberal optimism can be found in John Gray’s Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the 
Death of Utopia (2007). Christianity (Puritan cults, more precisely) injected messianic 
expectations into the heart of western civilization (16; 30; 39). Liberalism (and, more 
importantly economic liberalism) has secularised such expectations, predicting that an 
ideal world could through the endless expansion of the market forces rather than through 
God’s Grace come about. Consider, also, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground 
(according to John Carroll’s interpretation). Carroll believed that Dostoevsky linked the 
idea of (liberal) progress to the desire to build up ‘[c]rystal Palace[s], eternally 
indestructible’, that is, a new world free of suffering, ‘destruction and chaos’ (Dostoevsky 
2009: 32). But for Lasch (1991a), the (eighteenth century) liberal idea of progress does not 
promise a brand new world, emancipated from all miseries and sorrows (40; 78). 
‘Millennial expectations are [not] the only grounds on which to base a belief in progress’ 
(41, ff). Instead of proposing an ideal society, liberal optimism promises ‘steady’ and 
‘open-ended … improvement with no foreseeable ending at all’ (47), ‘linear social 
progress’ and unlimited capitalist expansion, according to the ‘utilitarian model of homo 
economicus’ (Carroll 2020: 2). In the process of endless betterment there is no telos, no 
‘natural end’, namely, no historical point of absolute satisfaction, to use Passmore’s (2000: 
12) terms. Fukuyama’s liberal theory, on the other hand, elaborated in his book The End of 




to the millennial belief in some new world, standing in its perfection, according to 
Bijukumar’s (2008) and Gray’s (2007: 6) interpretation. Human history, claims Fukuyama 
(1992), is on a steady trajectory towards an end-point of assured peace and stability. 
Setbacks will not halt the inevitable victory of humanity against political oppression and 
barbarity. Fukuyama interpreted the triumph of capitalism, the victory of liberal democracy 
(over communism) and the rapid improvement of the living standards in most countries of 
the western world as signs indicating the linear direction of history (Bijukumar 2008: 30; 
34)  towards a final moment (xi), a telos, where most fears and injustices would have 
disappeared (Popkin 2019: 558). The Greek word telos stands for the inevitable (and) 
natural end of a ‘goal or purpose that a process can serve’ (Gray 2007: 6). Etymologically 
speaking, it also derives from the (Greek) word teleios, ‘commonly translated as “perfect”’ 
(Passmore 2000: 15). Hence, Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ could (at least implicitly) point 
to teleological perfection of humanity, to a certain moment where most serious competitors 
to liberal (representative) democracy and capitalism would have disappeared (Bijukumar 
2008: 29). 
Such as optimism, the category of pessimism is broad and can include ideologies, 
political movements and trends from all across the political spectrum: from fascism, 
unconstitutional royalism, religious fundamentalism and traditionalism to deep ecology, 
anarcho-nihilism and so on. This dissertation casts a critical eye on Hobbes’ theory, which 
(to a degree) rests in the underpinnings of the philosophical thinking behind the optimism 
of economic liberalism (or progress). As I explain in what follows (and more importantly 
in Chapter 3), strong indications permit us to treat the philosophy of economic liberalism 
as an evolution of Hobbes' absolutist royalism. Furthermore, behind the latter’s tendencies 
to exchange political freedom, that is, active participation in (self)government with the 
security promoted by coercive institutions, lies the conflation of populism and self-
government with the so called lawlessness and irrationality of the ‘common citizen’, with 
his/her proclivity to follow mob leaders ‘who are hard to distinguish from demagogues’ 
and who also make ‘any kind of promise … tweak[ing] legal procedures and institutional 
arrangements’ (Arditi 2005: 76). The same anti-populism is also echoed in the philosophy 
of liberal optimists (economic liberals), who (borrowing Hobbes’ scepticism concerning 




impractical (if not dangerous). The latter’s primary objective is the implementation of 
programmes pursuing automatic and unlimited economic growth through procedures 
involving little or no human (political) intervention (see Chapter 3). Such programmes 
could bring endless innovation and ‘ever-expanding abundance’ (Lasch 1991c), giving 
‘mankind mastery over its own destiny’ (Lasch 1991a: 120), overcoming major conflicts 
(Lasch 1991c).   
Eventually, (Hobbesian) pessimism and (liberal) optimism can be seen as 
ideological twins. Seemingly at odds with each other they have a good deal in common. 
Both (liberal) optimists and (Hobbesian) pessimists discourage political participation to a 
great extent, producing anti-populism (in response). Moreover, as Malliaris (2017a)  
pointed out, while elaborating on Lasch, the idea of progress has ‘nothing to do with 
democracy and freedom’. It was ‘in the name of this same Progress that American society 
gradually came to be dominated by oppressing and alienating forces that crush the 
individual and dismantle communities, forces such as industrial capitalism, technology, 
state bureaucracy, and the corporate and public organizations that serve these Believers in 
liberal optimism’ (ibid). In Lasch’s (1991a) words, ‘[b]elievers in progress’ so long as they 
think ‘they have history on their side’, are in no need of hope (81), if we think of it as ‘a 
belief in justice’ (80), which presupposes continuous and determined exertion with no 
guarantees of absolute triumph against defeats and disappointments (81). Their lack of 
hope, which also constitutes the central manifestation of the weltanschauung of the 
pessimists, ‘incapacitates them for intelligent action’ (ibid). This ‘intelligent action’, in 
Lasch’s (1991a) view, refers to political action and, more precisely, to ‘Arendt’s suggestion 
that political life represents the institutionalization of the capacity for action’ (457, ff), for 
self-government (in my terms). It is coextensive with democracy, whose  ‘most authentic 
voice … [is] populism’ (Lasch 1995a: 106). Before discussing further the way hope (or 
meliorism, to use James’ vocabulary), in relation to populism and action, could respond to 
the impasses of both pessimism and optimism alike, let us shed more light on the 
melioristic cast of mind. Αccording to James (1978), meliorism stands as a medium 
between optimism and pessimism (137). As with Arendt (1978), ‘[e]very hope carries 
within itself a fear’ (2: 35). But contrary to what the author suggests, that ‘every fear cures 




redemption from all anxieties. As John Milton’s poem Paradise Lost (1667/2004) suggests, 
the only reinforcement ‘we may gain from hope’ is ‘resolution from despair’ (17), rather 
than complete annihilation of fear itself. Through acts of self-government this resolution 
becomes the duty of the 'common people’. More precisely, hope draws on a tradition which 
‘is quite un-utopian, often anti-utopian’ and ‘tends to be skeptical of programs for the 
wholesale rehabilitation of society’ (Lasch 1993: 125). Hope (or meliorism) does not turn 
a blind eye on what Brené Brown (2012) called ‘inherent human imperfection’ and 
‘vulnerability’ (2). The latter term derives from the Latin word vulnerare, ‘meaning “to 
wound”’, or ‘“capable of being wounded”’ (39). It points to all sorts of moral 
transgressions, to our exaggerated passions that stimulate rapacity and aggression, causing 
psychical and/or physical harm. Vulnerability implies susceptibility to our own innate 
frailties and rapacious pursuits. The existence of frailty and vulnerability deem absolute 
victory unattainable. Nonetheless, such an assertion by no means reinforces pessimistic 
convictions, assuming that life is nothing but a permanent defeat. Frailty and vulnerability 
consider both defeat and victory open possibilities (2).  
The melioristic weltanschauung ‘treats salvation as neither inevitable nor 
impossible’ (James 1978: 137). ‘[I]in the face of the world’s irrefragable hardships’ 
meliorism rejects the belief in ‘society’s innate, inexorable tendency toward improvement’ 
(or perfection) (Kahn 2009: 37). It values the potential (James 1978: 137; Lasch 1990: 11-
3) of ‘intelligent action’, to use Lasch’s (1991a: 81) terms again, that is, ‘political action’, 
as also Arendt (1990; 1998) understood it. It points to the potential of active citizenship 
and self-government to bring ‘victory’ over vulnerability and aggression. This victory, as 
we can understand, is not a certainty. Action and self-government do not promise a 
secularized utopia, an end (telos) of history. Or as Lasch (1991a) conveys, political projects 
inspired by the idea of hope do not prevent us ‘from expecting the worst’ (81). In other 
words, a melioristic mind does not underestimate the (potentially) tragic consequences of 
human involvement (in politics), due to the abrupt explosion of rapacity and aggression.  
2) Hope/meliorism: its relation to populism, action and ‘common decency’ 
Action and self-government, as Arendt (1969a; 1990; 1998) pointed out, are 
connected with the political realm, which (in Arendt’s thought) points to the ancient 




space proper’ (Arendt 1990: 31). The political realm is the self-governed sphere of decision 
making, ruled by individuality and equality (Arendt 1990: 41; 1998: 41; Deneen 2018: 
163). ‘Arendt’s desire to restore to political action the glory it obtained in ancient Greece’ 
(Klein 2014: 858) is expressed through her intense sympathy for the council system of 
democracy, ‘of democratic republicanism’, being both participatory, federal, representative 
and (to a moderate degree) hierarchical (Disch 2011: 352). The council system (in Arendt’s 
thought) embodies the idea of action and it is well represented in the American Revolution 
(Arendt 1990; Gustafson 2011: 34). Αction allows every individual to ‘become an acting 
member of the common government, transacting in person a great portion of its rights and 
duties’, in terms borrowed by Thomas Jefferson (1999: 385). Αction is the sine qua non of 
the populism of the vita civile, elsewhere called vivere civile, to use Pocock’s (1975) terms, 
referring to a life committed to the ‘(ultimate political) activity of citizenship’ (56), to the 
populism of the vita civile (in my terms). 
According to Bruce James Smith (1985), political action values public life as 
‘appropriate and worthy of human dignity’ (xi); it is the life ‘that of the citizen who, having 
entered the political process in pursuit of his particular good’ joins forces with others, 
directing ‘the actions of all in pursuit of the good of all’ (Pocock 1989a: 86), in the pursuit 
of what we could briefly label as ‘common decency’. This term (common decency) 
officially belongs to George Orwell, implying warmth, dignity, responsibility, and (more 
importantly) the common good (Rodden 1989: 174). The ‘common people’, he asserted, 
that is, the plebeian workers, the ‘underdogs’, are better exponents of common decency 
than most of the intellectuals of the political left, whom Orwell accused of ‘impractical 
theorizing’ (175). For the same author, the moral clarity and dignity of the former is far 
superior to that of the latter (Orwell 2001: 165). Making the term ‘common decency’ more 
specific: we could associate it with the Greek ευπρέπεια (eu-prēpeia), a compound word, 
formed by the prefix εὐ (eu)—denoting the ‘descent’, the morally ‘just’, the 
‘good/beautiful’ and/or the ‘true’—that all individuals are obliged—πρέπων (prēpon)—to 
follow in order to master their aggression, protecting their common world from falling 
apart. ‘Justice, truth, and beauty’, as Weil (2005) put it, ‘are sisters and comrades’ (93). 
‘Truth, and goodness, and beauty, are but different faces of the same All’ (Emerson 2000: 




time, truth is a fundamental prerequisite for justice: nobody can be fair to a person who 
falsely accuses him/her. Thus, common decency (the eu-prēpon) is synonymous with 
commitment and obligation. For Weil (1987a), the notion of obligation is superior to that 
of rights, for the latter becomes recognized ‘not from the individual who possesses it, but 
from other men who consider themselves as being under a certain obligation towards him’ 
(3). In other words, ‘the foundation of common right or interest’ (Harrington 1992: 8) rests 
upon the ‘just’, the ‘good/beautiful’ and/or ‘true’ that all individuals are obliged to follow 
in order to serve and protect the common good.  
In agreement with Orwell, I argue that popular attitudes could be better  examples 
of the eu-prēpon than the attitudes of professional politicians (or organic intellectuals). 
‘[P]opular attitudes contain … common sense’, notwithstanding ‘[t]hey are often 
ambivalent’, argues Lasch (1995a: 111). We could acknowledge these claims as indications 
in support of the participation of the ‘common people’ in politics, in the process of 
decision-making (potestas in populo). This assertion will be further substantiated through 
a deeper investigation of action. Initially, some important clarifications must be made: my 
understanding of common decency differs from that of  Orwell (2011: 165) in one aspect: 
it is not associated with socialism. Since the eu-prēpon derives from action, from the open 
process whereby the ‘common people’ join forces in order to decide what is good and just 
for their common affairs, it does not prefigure a fixed social reality. For example, members 
of a collectivity may either consider eu-prēpon—good and just for all—to implement 
policies inclining towards the free market or towards socialism and economic equality. 
Consider also the American cooperative movement, whose democratic self-organized 
communes and production networks combined mutualism and cooperativism with free 
market ideas based on economic competition. The Populists, argues Lawrence Goodwyn 
(1976), were neither socialists nor capitalist reformers. They saw ‘man as a cooperative 
being’ but also accepted the idea of man ‘as a competitive being’ (xiii) Populists ‘cannot 
conveniently be compressed into the narrow ... categories of political description 
sanctioned in the capitalist creed, nor can they be compressed into the ... categories of 
political description sanctioned in socialist thought' (ibid). More importantly, the Populists 
were not optimists. They believed in ‘possibility’ (ibid; emphasis added), in hope, in the 




conveys a ‘hopeful view of democratic possibility’ (ibid; emphasis added). It does not 
strive towards an end of history and, instead, emphasizes the idea that the ‘common people’ 
as sovereign, through commitment to democracy and active citizenship, can achieve good 
standards of common decency.  
As it seems, the melioristic vita civile must be dissociated from optimistic populist 
trends, which assume that the complete removal of absolutist institutions, which restrict 
political participation, will automatically lead to the emergence of a brand new world of 
absolute happiness and brotherhood. As Chapter 6 explains (while reflecting on the French 
Revolution), these types of populism often unleash threatening tendencies. They can shape 
conditions within which nihilism, rampant political violence and aggression are justified 
and glorified2. Democratic regimes (like the ones promoted by the vita civile) promise ‘no 
surgical miracles’ but keep ‘the patient alive’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 18) to struggle against 
all sorts of indecencies caused by human selfishness and exaggeration. They reject 
optimistic estimates around popular sovereignty and do not consider active citizenship a 
means for perfect justice and brotherhood. As Kloppenberg (2016) suggests, democracy is 
‘the power (kratos) of the people (the demos)’ (3). Where, however, ‘does that power end?’ 
(Castoriadis 2007c: 122). Who, in other words, will impose limits to a public whose 
freedom to posit its own (even unjust) laws is not restrained by coercive central 
governments? At this stage it should be made clear that democracy is not simply the regime 
of self-rule. A democratic polity also confronts the issue of individual and collective self-
discipline and self-limitation (Castoriadis 2007c: 93; Deneen 2018: 174-5). ‘Fulfilling the 
promise of democracy depends on individuals’ internalizing limits on the freedom that 
democracy gives them’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 710). Therefore, democracy is ‘a tragic 
regime, subject to [ὕβρις] hubris’ (Castoriadis 1997a: 93)3. In Kloppenberg’s (2016) words, 
 
2 In the same chapter, following Arendt’s (1990), Wood’s (2003), Kloppenberg’s (2016) and 
Israel’s (2017; 2019) interpretations, I contrast the optimism of the French Revolution (1789) with 
the relative meliorism of the American (1776). What does, nonetheless, revolutions have to do with 
populism per se? Revolutions are widely concerned with popular sovereignty; revolutionaries often 
set up networks of popular participation, networks of active citizenship, against absolutism, 
nepotism, monopolism, or any other form of arbitrary rule that restricts popular sovereignty and 
freedom of expression. Hence, they could be construed as populist events. 




‘popular rule can be a rationale for cruelty’ (10). The majoritarian rule, so ardently praised 
by populists as ‘supreme over every other standard’ (Canovan 1981: 4), can be arbitrary 
(Pettit 1997: 8) and ‘potentially tyrannical’ (12). It is ‘far from perfect’ when it comes to 
certain groups (minorities, as an example) (Matsusaka 2020: 207). 
In my view, the reasons anti-populism (either supported by political models 
founded upon Hobbes’ pessimism or even upon the optimistic idea of progress, that is, 
upon models of eighteenth century economic liberalism) is less effective than the populism 
of the vita civile in combating hubris, promoting a culture of self-limitation, safeguarding 
common decency in return, rests on the following reasons: the latter employs a) the power 
of logos and b) the strength of ethical memory, the strength of experience, ‘of the social 
construction of knowledge by people who define themselves in terms of what they know’, 
to use Winter’s (2006: 115) terms. The populism of the vita civile assumes that logos 
(public speech) and ethical memory have the capacity to optimise our ability for good 
judgment and self-limitation. Through the exercise of public speech (logos) and through 
collective remembrance, the chances for popular attitudes to become exponents of common 
decency can improve. In short, collective (ethical) memories, collective past experiences, 
are often treated as moral benchmarks. Their primary objective is to discourage repetition 
of acts and decisions with allegedly destructive implications. Consider, for example, a 
populace within a democratic assembly making a decision whose practical implementation 
has disastrous consequences. As I explain more rigorously in Chapter 3, the remembrance 
of such a devastating experience may prompt the same body politic at some point in the 
future to refrain from making a similar decision. Thus, memory and collective 
remembrance point to the moral capital, which improves the ethical resources that regulate 
exaggeration, highlighting the necessity of acting prudently. ‘In a democracy memory is 
the best institution of self-limitation’ (Καστοριάδης 2007α: 452 [Castoriadis 2007a: 452]; 
my translation). One could, however, object the sufficiency of the use of (ethical) memory 
alone in safeguarding prudence and self-limitation. A past experience may, indeed, contain 
moral lessons. Nonetheless, such a lesson in order to be fully understood ‘[t]here must be 
discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted’, claims John-Stuart Mill (1998: 
23). There must be logos, that is, speech ‘in which words are put together to form a sentence 




sentences are ‘“composed of nouns and verbs”’ (117). As Chapter 6 argues (while 
reflecting further on Arendt and Mill), speech and public dialogue, logos and rhetoric 
(ρητορική), which–according to Contogeorgis (2006 [Κοντογιώργης 2006])–was a sine qua 
non of the existence of the (ancient) Athenian democracy (446), allows dissimilar opinions, 
perspectives and interpretations to be expressed in the political realm. Because of this, 
logos can illuminate different aspects of a past experience. In the event such aspects contain 
important moral lessons, absence of public dialogue would leave these moral messages 
concealed. Logos is the means through which the ‘common people’ constantly strive to 
identify what is ‘decent’ (eu-prēpon). As Aristotle pointed out, ‘in public [political] life 
hearing becomes the dominant sense’ (quoted from B. J. Smith 1985: 19).  
This is not to say that moral messages concerning past experiences cannot be passed 
through other means, for example, through civic education or even through lore and 
custom. The main advantage of the vita civile, with its emphasis on logos, ‘the most 
characteristic political activity’ (B. J. Smith 1985: 19), rests on its capacity to constantly 
promote logos (public dialogue) in the political realm4. However, as it has been already 
made clear, one should not conflate the populism of the melioristic vita civile with 
optimistic populist trends. In fact, action itself is never fully sealed from hubris. As with 
Castoriadis (Καστοριάδης 2007), democracy erects fences against hubris. It does not, 
however, promise complete annihilation of hubris itself (457). More precisely, opinions 
concerning the moral lessons one obtains from past experiences do not always converge. 
Simply put, whether the practical implementation of a past decision was devastating or not 
sometimes is a matter of interpretation. In turn, not every interpretation is correct (from a 
moral point of view). In the event logos becomes too impotent and, consequently, incapable 
to safeguard common decency and when memory loses its effectiveness in bridling 
rapacious pursuits, what else could positively contribute to this endless battle against forces 
that make life seriously unbearable? Clearly, an additional problématique has emerged 
here. Large sections of this dissertation attempt to respond to this problématique, arguing 
that common decency does not derive from secular/classical republican sources alone.  
 
4 Of course, emotions (apart from logos and memory) can stimulate action for justice, as Nussbaum 
(2013) made clear. More extensive discussions concerning the contribution of emotions (love, 




3) Transcendent morality and the impasses of action 
According to the hopeful/melioristic cast of mind, only ‘[s]ome conditions of the 
world’s salvation are … extant’ (James 1978: 137; my emphasis). To put it in my terms, 
some probabilities for political projects, influenced by logos and memory, to inspire 
common decency, exist. Hence, the probabilities for such projects, the probabilities of 
popular sovereignty (in other words), to offer a rationale for hubris, are also extant. When, 
however, logos and experience (ethical memory) cannot guarantee ‘salvation’ (common 
decency), when action cannot safeguard decency, when a populace has lost its capacity for 
self-limitation and its will takes precedence over morality and prudence, its hubris, to use 
Castoriadis’ terms, could be denounced through acts of civil disobedience. Castoriadis 
(2007) considers works of ancient drama as means of civil disobedience against the hubris 
of the majority (of the demos)5. Religion could also offer a similar potential. For example, 
Lasch in the ninth chapter of TTOH, ‘The Spiritual Discipline against Resentment’ (1991a: 
369-411), discusses Martin Luther King Jr’s religious philosophy and, more importantly, 
the way his Christian thinking became a source of inspiration both for himself as well as 
for other African Americans of the Old South to defy the laws of racial segregation, that 
(as he believed) conflicted with higher divine (moral) laws of racial brotherhood and love.  
For King (as Chapter 2 and 6 will further explain), religion was a fountain of 
psychical enlightenment and moral clarity that led him to choose the path of (peaceful) civil 
disobedience against the hubris of racism, which for centuries was accepted as a norm by 
large sections of the American populace (particularly of the American South).  
 For Lasch (1995a), ‘King was a liberal in his social gospel theology but a populist 
in his insistence that black people had to take responsibility for their lives and in his praise 
of the petty bourgeois virtues: hard work, sobriety, self-improvement’ (83), as well as in 
his praise of the Southern petty bourgeois ways of living, integral aspects of which are the 
institutions of religion and family (Lasch 1991a: 393-8). It does not follow, of course, that 
King was an advocate of direct democracy in the classical republican sense of the term 
(self-government). His insistence that blacks must ‘realize that, in a democracy, their 
chances for improvement rest on their ability to vote’ (quoted by Garrow 1986: 97) was 
 




proper. But this understanding of democracy does not imply ‘direct democracy’. Instead, 
it mainly refers to a genuine representative system, in which no racial barriers would exist. 
The main reasons I take King as a case-study rests on fact that his high-flown eloquence 
and his methods of civil disobedience (deriving from religion, as noted earlier) offer 
inspiration in terms of how individuals can persuade large sections of a populace that has 
lost its capacity for self-limitation.   
As a matter of fact, Lasch (1991a) shared the fears of William James and Thomas 
Carlyle regarding the ‘desiccation’ of religion as a far ‘greater danger to the modern world 
than religious fanaticism’ (16). By elaborating on King he attempted to shed light on the 
human face of religion, namely, on its healing powers, on its capacity to halt resentment 
and vengeful passions, improving our inner strength, opening up pathways for psychical 
enlightenment and, subsequently, for prudence and common decency. To avoid 
misunderstandings, psychical enlightenment does not derive from the Christian religion 
alone. Consider Buddhism, for example. The Buddhist weltanschauung (unlike the 
Christian) does not share the belief in natural malevolence. It is, however, profoundly 
concerned about the consequences of human selfishness (Huston Smith 1991: 103) and, as 
an antidote, proposes introspection (112), striving to identify inner realms of calmness, 
inner realms of light and knowledge. Other religions, including Hinduism (12-81) and 
Sufism (Islam) (Huston Smith 1991: 257-268; James 2004: 348-351), can open up 
pathways for psychical enlightenment too. However, to elucidate the process whereby 
Buddhism or Sufism enhance self-enlightenment, inspiring civil disobedience (potentially), 
requires extensive analysis. Such an analysis can take place in another project. For the time 
being, we limit our scope to King’s Christian agape. 
As it has become obvious, only one-half of the theoretical basis of the vita civile is 
concerned with the way action (logos and ethical memory) improves the conditions for 
justice, truth and beauty. The other half examines the process whereby the transcendent 
morality of Christianity could elevate prudence and mental clarity, stimulating common 
decency in return. Hence, apart from King it takes into consideration a) Milton’s, Weil’s 




archetypes6. Such insights will shed light on the ‘sinful’ aspects of human nature, the main 
cause of frailty, vulnerability and hubris. To a degree, transcendental benchmarks and 
religious archetypes (gods, saints and other divine symbols that oppose deviation from 
moral rectitude) embodied in lore and popular traditions, far from being hallmarks of 
superstitious thinking as liberal modernists and optimists tend to believe (Lasch 1991a: 
16), strengthen prudence and modesty without which a populace becomes too licentious. 
Historically speaking, religious archetypes inspired civil disobedience amongst slaves in 
the American South and promised them ‘deliverance as a people in this world as well as in 
the next’ (Lasch 1990: 13). In addition, religiously-inspired political movements and 
campaigns (including the Civil Rights Movement, under King’s leadership) contributed to 
the spread of ideas the project of the vita civile will acknowledge as compliments to 
classical republicanism7.  
Consider, for example, King’s praise of love (agape) and nonviolence, his rejection 
of resentment and revenge (according to the moral injunctions of his Christian faith), in 
conjunction with his charming civic eloquence. These are, perhaps, among the finest 
virtues that not only those who are involved with acts of civil disobedience could consider, 
but also charismatic populist leaders in government. More importantly, King had ‘faith in 
the common people’, as Nikki Giovanni (2018) argues. This faith springs from the 
Christian the friendship of agape, which I also link with the notion of eucosmia. As I 
explain in Chapter 2, eucosmia is synonymous  with friendship. In Greek, friendship—or 
philia (φιλία)—derives from the verb philo (φιλῶ), signifying ‘to love’ (Καστοριάδης 
2008: 266 [Castoriadis 2008: 266]). Apart from eucosmia, I have identified two additional 
types of friendship. These are: a) idolatry and b) the fido amor (faithful love). Idolatry is 
located at the bottom of the hierarchy of this triad, as opposed to eucosmia, which rests at 
the top of the pyramid. The motivational idea behind the conception of this schema, as well 
as behind the hierarchisation of this triad, derives from Aristotle’s view of friendship being 
 
 The reason we focus on Weil has to do primarily with her emphasis on psychical enlightenment 
through different forms of religious experiences, as she explains in her essay On Human 
Personality (1943), included in Weil’s Anthology (2005). The perspectives offered in this work, 
along with William James’ and Reinhold Niebuhr's perspectives, can shed light on the way King’s 
Protestant faith became a spiritual cresset for mental clarity and inner wisdom. 




possible only between human beings (Αριστοτέλης 1993β: 60 [Aristotle 1993b: 60]). 
Friendship (or philia), argues Aristotle, cannot exist between a human being and a slave 
who is considered a ‘soulless’ (or ‘lifeless’) object (ibid). From a moral point of view, we 
deem such an assertion unacceptable, so long as it exhibits elitism and violates the moral 
principles of common decency, for which justice (as well as truth and beauty) ‘consists in 
seeing that no harm is done to men’ (Weil 2005: 93), irrespective of their race or class. 
However, the basic conception behind Aristotle’s axiom, that friendship cannot exist 
between human beings and lifeless objects, seems valid. If love is ‘a free act of will’ that 
cannot be ‘enforced’ (Nash-Marshall 2003: 47), and if lifeless objects (idols) are incapable 
of free will and thinking, eventually such idols have no capacity to form relationships of 
true friendship with us. As opposed to idolatry, the fido amor is a form of philia expressed 
towards living objects, towards other human beings (for example). The main reason it has 
to be located below eucosmia rests primarily on its excessive adherence to emotions, which 
can obstruct good judgment (see Chapter 2). As Nussbaum (2013) rightly stressed, 
emotions (love, pity or disgust) do have the ability to promote moral decency by 
stimulating the feeling of aversion towards social injustices. However, the intensity of 
emotions may convert an object, with which one feels emotionally attached, into an object 
of absolute value that escapes criticism8. Thus, idolatry and (to a lesser extent) the fido 
amor can incorporate threatening proportions: both have the capacity to incite narrowness, 
confusion, political extremism and violence.  
Thus, I consider eucosmia the most advanced form of friendship (philia). Eu-
cosmia, like eu-prēpeia, stands for the εὐ (eu) (the ‘descent’, the ‘good’) and the cosmos, 
from the Greek word κόσμος, implying the ‘world’, the humanity (as a whole) and/or the 
‘worldly’ affairs of the ‘common people’ of society (Δημητράκος 2008, τόμος H 
[Dimitrakos 2008, 6: 4069]). Τhe meaning of eucosmia is twofold: on the one hand it comes 
with a quasi-cosmopolitan outlook (‘love’ for humanity). On the other, it prompts us 
towards democratic forms of populism (like the vita civile), since it advocates ‘love’ 
(philia) for the ‘ordinary people’. The love of eucosmia, so long as it draws on King’s 
Christian agape, acknowledges aspects of his religious philosophy, highlighted by Lasch 
 
8 More extensive discussions on the negative implications of idolatry and the fido amor in politics 




(1991a), his belief in the so-called original (or ancestral) sin, in the inherited corruption of 
the human soul (386-398). But instead of encouraging pessimism, considering the world’s 
damnation inevitable, to use James’ terms. eucosmia, is anchored to ‘anthropocentrism’, 
which according to Georges Contogeorgis [Γιώργος Κοντογιώργης 2014]), a historian of 
ancient Greek and Byzantine political thought, implies freedom for action and inclusion. 
In my view it refers to worldviews (partially shared by King) centred around the capacities 
of every anthrōpos (human being), regardless of race or class, to combat hubris (the 
possible effect of the original sin), contributing to the common good as long as he/she is 
capable of a) conveying thoughts into the public-political realm (logos), b) of memorising 
and remembering (ethical memory), or c) passing judgments by exercising reason and 
critical thinking, and d) of experiencing psychical enlightenment. To a degree, eucosmia 
incites action. However, it approaches action from a Christian standpoint, which raises 
awareness concerning man’s vulnerability and capacity for hubris. Eucosmia acclaims 
life’s inexorable suffering as a given condition and inspires awareness concerning the 
necessity for human beings to join forces, to act in concert, exercising reason, dialogue and 
memory. Because of this, eucosmia discourages optimism and sees no pathway of 
automatic progress toward a brand-new dawn of absolute happiness. It adopts a melioristic 
(or hopeful) belief in common decency that we could think of it as the product of a long 
and constant struggle against our inherent hubris rather than the inevitable outcome of the 
direction of human history9. 
4) Further aims and objectives. 
As Bockmuehl (2012) pointed out, ‘[h]ope, in any philosophically … serious sense’ 
has long ago ‘disappeared as a topic of public discourse in Anglo-American societies’ (7). 
Instead, optimism and pessimism have become the ‘principal categories of public debate’ 
(Lasch 1990: 13). We understand, therefore, the reasons public conversations that revolve 
around the notion of hope (or meliorism) in politics must be initiated. To avoid 
misunderstandings: this dissertation does not offer a blue-print for the construction of a 
participatory republic that would embody the notion of hope. It does not view historical 
creations (like the Greek polis, for example) as models for political action today. It builds 
 




upon the ideas of distinguished republican and Christian thinkers. It acknowledges 
interpretations of major historical events, as (for instance) the American Revolution or the 
American cooperative movement, which led to the emergence of political realms similar 
to the Greek polis. The primary objective is to offer general inspiration to those who 
attempt to push forward political reforms closer to a more participatory model of 
democratic (active) citizenship, beyond the system of ‘“representative democracy” where 
the people’s role is restricted to choosing their representatives’ (Matsusaka 2020: 5). 
Eventually, this dissertation will call into question the anti-populist tenacity of those who 
reject the possibility of direct democracy, expressing fierce doubts concerning the moral 
capacities of the ‘ordinary citizen’ to achieve good standards of common decency through 
active citizenship. As it has already become obvious, this dissertation does not 
categorically assume that all these doubts are unreasonable and totally unjustifiable. Quite 
the contrary. It will, however, argue that a belief in the so-called ‘inherent vulnerability’ 
and hubris is not necessarily a ticket to anti-populism. Politics could, indeed, become more 
open and participatory. Furthermore, a populist and melioristic tradition, from which one 
could draw inspiration in order to create initiatives that could push forward such democratic 
reforms, already exists. On this tradition, Lasch, as well as Goodwyn and Arendt, have 
already reflected upon and engaged with. 
Consider also Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work The Government of Poland 
(1772/2005). Here the author offers crucial insights in terms of how open political bodies, 
popular assemblies (in other words) such as in another context, the Town Hall meetings in 
New England and Massachusetts, could play a dominant role in the process of decision-
making: representatives in the national parliament should change with a high frequency. 
For Rousseau (2005), such a move could ensure that no central power holds sway upon 
popular councils (188-9), given the decrease of the maximum time a representative spends 
in office. Additionally, it is necessary for all the elected representatives to stay as close as 
possible to the electorate, as it happened during the early days of the American Revolution, 
according to Gordon Wood (2003: 41) and Lisa Disch (2011: 352-3). In that case, their 
roles are becoming primarily executive. On the other hand, most legislative duties are 
attributed to the popular councils. To make a long story short, the vita civile emphasises 




(albeit marginalised) in most liberal western countries. It also makes the case for a 
spiritual/religious reawakening.  
 
Combined Methodologies 
Since most of the topics and themes of this dissertation are philosophical and use 
abstract ideas, the basic methodology has to be qualitative, which ‘emphasizes words rather 
than quantification in the collection and analysis of data’ (Bryman 2008: 366). From the 
variety of different qualitative methodological frameworks I will have to rely on 
interpretivism, that is on impartial analysis of influential opinions, considering also 
commentary and discussion on these opinions by others (Turner, Hoque & Gerson 2015: 
21). Interpretivism appears as the most applicable methodology for such a dissertation that 
bases itself largely upon analytic explanations, presented in philosophical books, 
pamphlets, monographs and academic journals. In order to triangulate data, cross-checking 
information and confirming to what extent a theoretical assumption accurately represents 
the reality to which it refers (Hammersley 1992), several techniques are brought into 
consideration. Apart from phenomenology (as it has been employed by Arendt), I resort to 
a) syllogism (or else logicism), b) genealogy (as it has been understood by Friedrich 
Wilhelm Nietzsche or Michel Foucault), and more importantly c) to William James’ 
pragmatic method.   
1) Syllogism/logicism 
Syllogism/logicism was initially ‘discovered’ by Aristotle and the Stoics (Mueller 
1978: 2). Instead of defining and describing philosophical viewpoints, syllogism generates 
theories and constructs arguments by acknowledging premises and conclusions through 
propositioning. For example: ‘If A implies B, and C and B imply D, then C and A imply 
D’ and ‘if C and A imply D, and D implies E, then C and A imply E’ (5-6). ‘This is the 
core of Stoic logic’ (6) where an argument is a system of premises (7). More precisely, let 
us consider war against our neighbors as something objectively reprehensible (argument 
A). Additionally, war by Athens against Thebes is a war against neighbors (Argument B). 
Arguments A and B are premises which lead to the following conclusion: war by Athens 
against Thebes is reprehensible (axiom) (3). Primarily, some conditions have to be met for 




B are valid (4). Hence, we must clarify what the lekton, the term ‘war’ (or the term 
‘neighbor’ respectively), signifies. Further experience and evidence must be taken into 
account: do the actions of the Atheneans (against the Thebeans) include all the elements 
that could allow us to classify them as ‘acts of war’? Second, a proposition is said to be 
‘logically true’ only if the premises are not anapodeiktoi, that is, ‘undemonstrated’ or 
‘undemonstrable’ (11). For example, if among two premises that lead to a conclusion the 
one is incorrect (undemonstrable), the same conclusion will not be taken as ‘logically true’. 
It cannot be used as a premise for further reasoning and analysis.  
2) Genealogy, contextualism and universalism 
Broadly speaking, genealogy comes from the Greek word γενεά (genea, in English: 
generation) and λόγος (logos), which (on this occasion) does not indicate vocal 
communication (speech) but general commentary and research. A genealogical research 
seeks a) to trace the causes of current affairs in the process of history, and b) to investigate 
how past generations have disseminated through time certain ethical codes, values and 
ideals to successors (heritage). It has been formally developed by Nietzsche who in Τhe 
Genealogy of Morals (1887/2003) identifies the origins of modern ideals and perceptions 
in the linguistic systems of antiquity. Nietzschean genealogy seeks to trace ideas or 
institutions ‘back to a sort of founding era or moment when their essential meaning was 
first revealed’ (Shiner 1982: 387). Unlike Nietzsche, Foucault’s genealogy rejects the idea 
of ‘origin’ (ursprung) ‘as presupposing an essence or truth which has either unfolded or 
degenerated’ (ibid), proposing instead ‘descend’ (herkunft). Through this method one can 
identify in the long past not simply the accidents, the errors, ‘the false appraisals, and faulty 
calculations that gave birth to things that continue to exist and have value for us’ (Foucault 
1977: 81), but also positive and inspiring elements that remain enshrined in some sort of 
collective memory. These elements emerge (and re-emerge) at the surface of certain forms 
of public life from time to time, giving birth to new political phenomena of high historical 
significance. As it seems, genealogy involves a historical sense,that is ‘a perception not 
only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence’, to use T. S. Eliot’s (1964: 4) words. 
In particular, genealogy rejects the belief that a concept can suddenly emerge out of the 
blue. Instead, it strives to understand morals, ideas and modes of being in relation with 




influential philosophical notions that emerged in the deep past. Therefore, analysis of 
philosophical texts produced by certain theorists considered as the most influential figures 
of the modern liberal paradigm, like Hobbes and Locke, will show that political pessimism 
is not simply a stance. It is not an ursprung but a perception that reverberates concepts and 
ideas of the deep past (henkfurt), expressed by philosophical systems of the previous 
centuries, which proposed solutions that would (ostensibly) defend a rational social order.  
The limits of genealogy: contextualist thinkers have raised intense objections as to 
what degree one can accurately interpret issues afflicting the contemporary world by 
simply relying on ideas and viewpoints offered by philosophers and political orators of the 
distant past, by authors who lived and worked within socio-political contexts 
fundamentally different from the current reality. For example, ‘[e]very philosophy is the 
expression of its own and only its own time’ and hence, ‘[t]here are no eternal truths’, 
claims Oswald Spengler (1961: 54). Bryman and Burgess (1994) argued that ‘[c]oncepts 
are, of course, the building blocks of theories, but they do not constitute theories in their 
own right’ (220). Pocock (1989a) juxtaposes the method of contextualism, which treats 
‘the phenomena of political thought strictly as historical phenomena’ with the idea that text 
itself is self-sufficient (11). Skinner in his essay Meaning and Understanding in the History 
of Ideas (1988), identifies also two systematic approaches that historians of ideas should 
regard in order to interpret a text-work: one insists that ‘it is the context “of religious, 
political, and economic factors” which determines the meaning of any given text, and so 
must provide “the ultimate framework” for any attempt to understand it’ (29). Those who 
claim that the autonomy of the text itself is sufficient for understanding what the author 
conveys, focus exclusively on the universality of ideas deriving from the particular 
theoretical approach which is under examination (ibid), on its ‘“dateless wisdom”’ (30) 
considering the historical and cultural background of the author an irrelevant subject (29). 
In fact, the understanding of an idea or a philosophical concept, presupposes ‘an 
understanding of all the occasions and activities in which a given agent might have used 
the relevant forms of words’ (57), that is, in what sort of society the given author was 
writing. Hermeneutic philosophy has insisted that the interpretation of a text requires 
knowledge of the historical and cultural context ‘in which it was originally created as well 




conditions under which a human act took place’ (Patton 2002: 113). In the end, by 
concentrating solely on the text itself, on the development of a sovereign idea, we are 
crediting the author with a meaning he/she would not intended to convey (Skinner 1988: 
33). Consider, at this stage, the following assertion: according to the contextualist point of 
view Hobbes’ pessimistic theory and Locke’s optimistic liberalism are products of 
particular socio-historical contexts. However, if convergences exist between Hobbes’ and 
Locke’ worldviews (as Chapter 3 will argue), we can assert that a genealogy, a connection, 
between these historical contexts exists as well. In other words, what motivated Hobbes to 
embrace absolutism and anti-populism was also present in Locke’s experience. We can, 
therefore, assume that conceptual convergences between pessimism and liberal optimism 
can be traced, since both attitudes are products of theories of socio-historical contexts 
characterised by conceptual connections.  
Without acknowledging that viewpoints are (to a degree) products of a particular 
cultural and historical context, without acclaiming society as the matrix of some of the 
ideas an author expresses and a reference point for understanding what exactly the same 
author attempts to say, we risk interpreting a philosophical text from a standpoint that meets 
our own expectations about what the thinker may have said (Skinner 1988: 31). In addition, 
the universalist approach is susceptible to the miscalculations of the so-called socio-centric 
judgement. For Castoriadis (2005) socio-centrism refers to the condition where societies, 
or even individuals who are members of the same society, consider themselves ‘the centre 
of the world’ and construe all others from their own standpoint (34). Thus, philosophical 
texts (products of an older socio-historical age) are approached as if they are the fruits of 
our contemporary society. The reader assigns to the same texts elements of the present 
socio-political environment the author had never experienced. More importantly, by 
assuming that a genealogy of concepts and ideas between the present and the deep past 
exists, without cross-checking if, indeed, there are connections between motives, 
perceptions, and cultures produced within these distinct historical periods, we risk 
extracting elements of the present to the same past we strive to examine. Thus, all the 
current impasses depart from errors of the deep past, which hypothetically have remained 
with us ever since. Consider, for example, Nietzsche’s abhorrence of liberalism and 




called ‘uncultivated masses’, overwhelmed by the slavish moral of re-sentiment. For the 
same thinker, re-sentiment was nothing but a legitimate offspring of the ‘herd mentality’ 
introduced by Christianity (Nietzsche 2001; 2003; Williams 2001: xiii). In fact, most 
radical movements in the non-Anglophone western world regarded the French Revolution 
as an exemplary movement against oppression and absolutism, as Arendt explained in On 
Revolution (1963/1990). The thinkers and leaders of the French Revolution were inspired 
by Rousseau’s notion of compassion and lumped together the destitute into an aggregated 
depersonalized crowd (23; 85), into a ‘herd’, to use Nietzsche’s terms. Nietzsche assigns 
to the whole history of democracy elements that belong solely to the socio-political 
consensus within which he lived and wrote (socio-centrism). His polemics against 
liberalism and democracy echo the hostility of the German social consensus towards 
liberalism and, more importantly, towards the extravagances of the French Revolution. It 
is even more remarkable that he associates democracy itself with the ‘slavish morality’ of 
the so-called Judeo-Christian weltanschauung, praising the Apollonian (ancient Greek and 
Roman) civilisation for its insistence on fortitude and heroism, but (curiously enough) 
ignores that democracy and politics (the polis) were central ‘in ancient Greek creation’ 
(Castoriadis 2007c: 3) he so ardently admired. In the same way, he systematically 
disregards the individualism of the Anglo-American Protestant weltanschauung and its 
contribution to the American Revolution.  
In order to minimise such risks we have to think of  genealogy in terms of 
metharmōsis. In brief, metharmōsis derives from the Greek μεθαρμόζω (metharmōzo). The 
prefix μεθ (meth) is the prefix ‘with’ (in English). In turn, armōzo implies ‘to befit’ (to suit) 
(Oxford Dictionary 2008: 29). Thus, metharmōsis implies ‘synthesis’ or (more precisely) 
the process of ‘bringing two concepts together in order to make one suitable for another’.  
Consider the following example: on the one hand, the spirit of an ‘enlightened 
individualism’ in the modern liberal and republican tradition  is identified by Arendt (1998) 
in the realm of democracy, in the political realm of the ancient Athenian polis, namely, in 
the realm of (political) action. For Arendt (1998), the political realm was the space where 
each free Athenian citizen could express his individual views (41). As Chapter 7 will make 




and liberal thought10. Consider, for instance, Tocqueville’s (1994) praise for individualism, 
which (in his view) is of ‘democratic origin’ (2: 98),  or John Milton’s Areopagitica 
(1644/2016) for its apparent defense of individual expression (5; 27) and freedom of choice 
(18)11. Furthermore, when Machiavelli in the Discourses on Livy (1517/1992) evinces the 
capacity of the ‘common people’ to make ‘far superior’ judgments than princes do, 
suggesting that a government by the populace is more preferable than a 
despotic/monarchical government (254), he indirectly stresses the importance of individual 
expression. As the previous section argued, public speech (logos), exercised in the 
(republican) political realm where the ‘common people’ gather in order to make decisions, 
is a means through which good judgments can be made. In this respect, notable republican 
thinkers, such as James Harrington, who (like Machiavelli) in The Commonwealth of 
Oceana (1611–1677/1992) speaks of the superiority of popular judgment (as opposed to 
the judgment of a prince or a king), indirectly accept the notion of ‘enlightened 
individualism’. These thinkers are continuators of a tradition whose possible origins are 
located in ancient Greece, according to Arendt (1990;1998) and Castoriadis (1997).  We 
can label this genealogy ‘case A’.  
As opposed to the political realm, which was reserved for individuality, the spirit 
of the private realm corresponds to the monarchical/despotic organization of the Athenian 
household (Arendt 1998). The metakénosis of the Greek democratic paradigm to the 
Roman world led to the distortion of the distinction between the political (or the public) 
and the private realms (28; 37). As we will see in the next chapter in a review of Arendt’s 
Human Condition (1958/1998), this gradually led to a metharmōsis of the democratic 
political realm to the despotic/oligarchic environment of Rome, which resembled the 
monarchical Athenian private realm (the household/family). In simple terms, this led to a 
 
10 This responsible individualism, otherwise called ‘republican individualism’, must not be 
conflated with the ‘rugged individualism’ of economic liberalism which Chapter 3 criticises.  
11 Milton (2016) in this polemic against censorship condemns book burning and defends individual 
expression on religious grounds. As he asserts, ‘books are not absolutely dead things’ and ‘do 
contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they 
do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them’ (5). 
Thus, those who destroy a book deprive this potency of life. To use a more vernacular language, 
those who destroy a book ‘kill a man’ and those he ‘[w]ho kills a man kills a reasonable creature, 




synthesis, to the emergence of a new realm, the realm of society (genealogy ‘case B’). In 
Arendt’s (1990) view, the French Revolution took place within a cultural environment 
nurtured under the dominance of the realm of society (as Chapter 2 will also discuss in 
more depth). We can, therefore, assert that (to a degree) the French Revolution, is a 
henkfurt of this metharmōsis which brought into existence the ‘amorphous, anonymous, 
uniformizing reality’ of the social realm (Benhabib 2000: 23). Arendt’s (1990) views on 
the American Revolution, in conjunction with that of Gordon. S. Wood’s (2003), Bernard 
Bailyn’s (1967) and James Kloppenberg’s (2018), along with Tocqueville’s (1994) 
testimonies from America, reveal the existence of a political tradition in the New World 
dissimilar to the one within which ideas that gave birth to the French Revolution were 
nurtured. The American Revolution was the offspring of a tradition (or genealogy) more 
decisively influenced by democratic (enlightened) individualism in comparison to the 
philosophical tradition  behind the French Revolution. This tradition is predicated on the 
idea that every free citizen has the right to express his/her views within the political realm, 
within the popular councils, the town-hall meetings (in our case), without acting as if he is 
a ‘herd’, a unanimous crowd of an undifferentiated sum of persons. Let us not forget that 
the notion of individualism is central to the populism of the vita civile (see Chapter 7).  
Eventually, by identifying different genealogies to which particular historical 
events correspond, the chances to avoid  interpretive errors due to sweeping generalisations 
are increased. We can, thus, rescue both republicanism, populism and Christianity itself 
from negative connotations, such as those attributed by Nietzsche’s socio-centrism, or by 
the pessimistic anti-populist polemics (of Hobbes and Le Bon). If republican genealogy 
corresponds to case A and the social realm to B, the existence of these two distinct 
genealogies implies that elements corresponding either to A or to B exist in the modern 
world. Hence, it is essential to identify which particular genealogy each political 
manifestation expresses and, simultaneously, which elements of this genealogy are 
prevalent in such manifestations.  
3) William James: pragmatism 
Before discussing pragmatism in depth, let us return to the method of universalism. 
In spite of its tendency to ‘commit philosophical mistakes’ (Skinner 1998: 29), distorting 




example, one may criticise the American Founding Fathers who ‘were products of an 
eighteenth-century culture quite different from our own’ and this culture resonates in their 
unacceptable (according to the current standards) beliefs (enunciated in some of its 
writings) about African Americans and Native Americans (Breen 2019: 9). Such an 
assumption, albeit expressing an indisputable truth, does not imply that one cannot extract 
from the writings of the American Founders ideas of positive value in the process of 
shaping and disseminating viewpoints that favour the political emancipation even of 
African Americans (see Chapter 6). For Skinner (1998) this particular approach, which 
reflects on (even incidental) remarks and phrases of a certain text in order to construct a 
precise viewpoint, leads to ‘absurdities’ and ‘mythologies’ (32). Furthermore, such an 
attempt obscures and neglects the actual aspirations of the author (31). While this assertion 
seems valid, let us not turn a blind eye to cases where such ‘mythologies’ have contributed 
positively to political causes that inspire common decency. A reader (in other words) can 
extract from philosophical texts ideas that strongly emphasise the importance of self-
limitation in politics (regardless of the actual intentions of their author). The influence the 
ideas of the American Founders had in the destruction of black slavery in the American 
South (as mentioned above) is such an example. Terms like practical contribution (or 
practical value) are central to the whole idea of pragmatism. It is time to elaborate further 
on James’ pragmatic method, upon which the primary theoretical foundations of the vita 
civile have been laid.  
Pragmatism is ‘a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be 
interminable’ (James 1978: 28). James brings the following example: a man ‘tries to get 
sight of a squirrel by moving rapidly around the tree’ (27). Although he goes fast, the 
squirrel keeps moving even faster ‘in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree 
between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught’ (ibid). The 
‘metaphysical’ dispute that emerges is summarised in the following question: ‘Does the 
man go round the squirrel or not?’ (ibid; emphasis original). The man, indeed, ‘goes round 
the tree’ but so does the squirrel. Does, therefore, the man ‘go round the squirrel?’ (28). 
Axiom A: if, by the term ‘going around’ we imply that a man passes ‘from the north of 
[the squirrel] to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of [the 




successive positions’ (27-8). Axiom B: if the man is first in front of the squirrel, then ‘on 
the right’, then behind the animal, ‘then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as 
obvious that the man fails to go around [the squirrel]’ (28). Obviously, there is no clear 
answer concerning which axiom (A or B) is more accurate. However, what James would 
consider important in this case is to offer a concrete definition regarding what the lekton 
‘going around’ signifies. In addition, James’ pragmatic method interprets assertions and 
viewpoints ‘by tracing their respective practical consequences’ (ibid). It examines, first and 
foremost, the practical impacts of A and B in one’s life (regardless of which axiom is right 
or wrong). More importantly, the practical value of certain ideas is also determined ‘on 
their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged’ (41). For example, 
what practical value may axiom A have for a particular idea or project? In order to shed 
further light on these queries we will need to take into account the following examples:  
First, as mentioned earlier, the present study builds upon the idea of vulnerability, 
upon the Christian conception of original sin, upon the belief in  the so-called natural 
human propensity towards hubris, towards sin and evil, which is conveyed in the Christian 
philosophy of Saint Cyprian, Saint Ambrose, Saint Augustine, Bishop Iraneus, et al (Cross 
1966: 994-5)12. A similar view conception of human wickedness deriving exclusively from 
the nature of man and woman (Passmore 2000: 258) is also echoed in the realist thought 
of Hobbes (2006) and Niebuhr (1960). Or as Iris Murdoch (1970), from a different angle, 
argued, ‘human beings are selfish’ and this ‘seems true on the evidence, whenever and 
wherever we look at them, in spite of a very small number of apparent exceptions’ (76). 
‘The psyche’, says the same author, ‘is a historically determined individual restlessly 
looking after itself’ (ibid). In contrast, a more optimistic view of human nature is shared 
by the followers of Rousseau (2004), who consider ‘compassion and altruism’ inherent 
aspects ‘of our animal heritage’ (Nussbaum 2013: 113). Human beings in their default 
position are benevolent, ‘capable of altruism and emotional concern’, predisposed to 
sympathy towards the suffering of their fellow humans (ibid). Locke in his Thoughts 
 
12 To suggest that the notion of original/ancestral sin is central in Christianity does not imply that 
there have never existed Christian thinkers who rejected this idea. Consider, for example, the social 
gospel movement with its ‘excessively optimistic view of human nature’ (Lasch 1991a: 381) or the 
case of Pelagius, for whom ‘[s]in is not inherent in man’s nature’ and only begins ‘to grow upon 




Concerning Education (1693/1968) shares a quite similar view: here the thinker rejects the 
doctrine of original sin and insists that there are no inbuilt moral deficiencies in men and 
women. For the same author, ‘there are secular processes, controllable by men, by which 
they can bring about moral improvement of their fellow-men’ (Passmore 2000: 249)13. This 
‘metaphysical’ (in James’ terms) dispute on whether human nature exists or not (and if it 
exists, to what degree it is characterised by rapacity or benevolence) remains largely 
unresolved. In fact, no fully conclusive research has been published hitherto. In response, 
many have adopted a more ‘agnostic’ stance: nothing really ‘entitles us to assume that man 
has a nature or essence in the same sense as other things. In other words, if we have a nature 
or essence, then surely only god could know and define it’ (Arendt 1998: 10). From a 
pragmatic point of view, the validity of these assertions should not be our primary concern. 
First and foremost, one should look at the practical consequences of realism, of Rousseau’s 
optimism  and.or of Arendt’s agnosticism in the process of shaping the conditions within 
which common decency is better served and protected. As Chapter 3 will stress, optimistic 
convictions of human nature may cultivate perceptions that unwittingly turn a blind eye on 
sthe potentially disastrous consequences of the abrupt explosion of rapacity, jealousy and 
aggression. Optimistic populist trends,  the ones espoused by the most prominent leaders 
of the French Revolution, partially anchored to Rousseau's notion of original benevolence, 
instead of establishing commonwealths free from oppression and violent conflict, have 
many times stimulated political extremism and violent conflict(as mentioned in the 
previous section)14. To avoid misunderstandings: while a great deal of democratic 
 
13 Of course, Locke’s view on human nature in his Second Treatise (1689/1998) (discussed in 
chapter 3) is dissimilar. Herein Locke considers human beings rational by nature, however, aspects 
of Hobbes’s realist view are indirectly echoed. 
14 It goes without saying that while optimistic populist trends can often draw on Rousseau, at the 
same time, not every ‘optimistic’ political ideology relies on his notion of original benevolence. 
Consider, for example, the optimistic republicanism of the fourteenth-century Florentine civic 
humanists (like Pietro Pomponazzi), who saw ‘the attainment of the maximum possible civic 
goodness’ a ticket to perfection (Passmore 2000: 227) and strived to ‘remake the world in the image 
of universal benevolence, to perfect it in secular charity’ (239). Or (more importantly) the 
genealogical connections between economic liberalism and Hobbes’ pessimistic realism. To a 
degree, the latter’s scepticism regarding human nature is partially echoed in variants of eighteenth 
century economic liberalism (as Chapter 3 will discuss more thoroughly). However, the responses 




enthusiasm ‘descends from the ideas of people like Rousseau, who believed in democracy’ 
because he thought mankind to be ‘wise and good that everyone deserves a share in 
government’, as  Clive Staples Lewis (1986: 7) claims, the rejection of his idea of original 
benevolence and the acknowledgment of frailty and vulnerability, the consequence of 
‘man’s first disobedience’ (Milton 2004: 10), as an inherent human condition, is not a ticket 
to anti-populism, nor does it lead to a pessimistic paralysis of the political will. The realist 
perception raises awareness concerning the possible sudden emergence of evil and hubris 
and the need for self-limitation as a means of ‘salvation’. In Lewis’ (1986) words, 
‘[m]ankind is so fallen that no man can be trusted with unchecked power over his fellows’ 
(7). Logos (dialogue), experience and the transcendent morality of religion are among the 
most essential means through which power is checked and human aspirations are 
effectively measured. Let us not ignore that ‘[t]he belief in human sinfulness was a staple 
of both Calvinism and classical republican ideology’ (Kidd 2012: 7), an ideology that 
springs from the republics ‘of ancient Greece and Rome’, and emphasised ‘the importance 
of checks and balances in political power and the need for a virtuous people to preserve 
liberty’ (7). To a degree, this approach converges with the (Greek) Orthodox Christian 
view of the original sin. Orthodoxy, according Antony Hughes (2004), holds a more 
moderate position (than that espoused by Saint Augustine). Orthodoxy never speaks of the 
original sin per se. Instead, it is the ‘ancestral sin’ with what the Orthodox fathers are 
concerned (ibid). The Augustinian point of view (claims Hughes) associates the ‘original 
sin’ with the ‘original guilt’ for Adam and Eve's transgression, in which humanity 
continuously participates (ibid). Evil, for Augustine, is ‘a permanent feature of the world’ 
(Gray 2007: 10). According to the Orthodox weltanschauung, sin has been transmigrated 
to Adam and Eve from Satan and, thereupon, from Adam and Eve to successive generations 
(Hughes 2004). In this respect the (Greek) Orthodox fathers, much like Augustine, accept 
the ancestral inheritance of sin, which (in their view) constitutes an essential aspect of the 
nature of men and women. For the latter, nevertheless, humanity does not continuously 
 
and conflict rely on ‘optimistic’ socio-economic reforms (Lasch 1991a: 13-4). More precisely, their 
basic remedy was the rapid and constant expansion of production and consumption of goods that 
would (ostensibly) gratify never ending human wants. The outcomes of this process would end up 




participate in Adam and Eve’s transgression and, hence, sin and evil do not manifest 
themselves in every single human deed (ibid). Thus, in the Greek Orthodox 
weltanschauung, hubris constitutes a possibility rather than a certainty. This modest 
realism does not necessarily foster pessimism; it does not consider every human deed a 
literal manifestation of the ancestral sin that will somehow lead to wretchedness. It does 
not destroy any hope in free will and action, that is, in the mastering of evil and hubris 
through logos and memory, or through means of psychical enlightenment (religion, art, et. 
al.).  
Of course, to acknowledge the practical contribution of this hopeful realism in the 
process of shaping and sustaining an ethic of common decency against the threats of 
extremism (deriving from variants of political optimism) should not automatically force us 
to treat Rousseau’s original benevolence with complete disdain, considering all viewpoints 
justified on Rousseauian grounds destructive and futile. The aim of this dissertation is to 
highlight the advantages of the realist approach over the optimistic/Rousseauian (or 
Lockean) without discarding cases where optimistic views on human nature contributed to 
political enfranchisement and social equality15. For sure, this preference for the realist 
weltanschauung should not come at the price of neglecting other worldviews that share a 
quasi similar conception about life and human nature, like (for instance) Gandhianism, 
which assumes that the source of evil is ‘man's will to power (his ego) and his insatiable 
greed for more and more material possession’ (Doctor 1992: 152), or systems of thought, 
such as Buddhism or Sufism (mentioned in the previous section), which are also concerned 
about the consequences of human rapacity and hubris on human nature itself. Nonetheless, 
in order to shed light on the (potentially) positive contribution of these belief systems to 
common decency, more extensive analysis is required. Such an analysis can only take place 
in another study.   
Second: philosophically speaking, republicanism and Christianity (especially the 
most mystical and monastic ends of the latter) are often seen as opposites. According to 
 
15 Consider, for example, Mary Wollstonecraft’s (1993) feminist cause, grounded upon the radical 
belief in the so-called inherent rationality of men and women alike. Instead, for the populism of the 
vita civile rationality and goodness are not given to men and women by nature. These virtues can 
be acquired through experience and/or through means of spiritual enlightenment (psychical 




Machiavelli, civic virtue had little use for Christianity  (Pocock 1975: 49-54; 214; 492; B. 
J. Smith 1985: 43; 45), precisely because Christians give ‘“strength to suffer rather than 
strength to do bold things”’ (quoted by Lasch 1991a: 174)16. For Pocock (1975), 
Christianity (and mainly Catholicism) turns to the inside world in the pursuit of truth. It 
prioritises the vita contemplativa, ‘the abstract world of unmotivated contemplation’ (56) 
and inner reflection (Arendt 1998: 316), as opposed to the vita activa. Christians 
emphasised ‘divine judgment rather than political justice’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 40). 
Classical republicans, in contrast, acclaimed as the highest human achievement the worldly 
life of the public-political realm, which is founded upon common appearance and open 
dialogue (rather than introspection in isolation). In contrast, ‘[t]he end of Christian 
education’, says B. J. Smith (1985), is the abandonment of the political realm, the 
renunciation ‘of the world of men and the vanity of the flesh’ (43). ‘A customary 
community in one corner of an eternal order is not a republic of citizens’ (Pocock 1975: 
49). Having renounced worldliness tout court, Christianity looked for salvation in 
immaterial and immemorial realms situated above this world, into what Arendt (1998) 
called ‘uncompromising otherworldliness’ (251). Instead, political communities preserve 
immortality by giving chances to every individual to be remembered by his words and 
deeds (B. J. Smith 1985: 41). Perhaps this explains Arendt’s (1990)  admiration for the 
leaders of the American Revolution, who ‘remained men of action from beginning to end, 
from the Declaration of Independence to the framing of the Constitution’ (95). More 
precisely, in the view of an open rebellion against the Coercive Acts of 1774 (imposed by 
Great Britain), new forms of popular governments, ‘from the bottom up’ emerged (Wood 
2003: 47). ‘Mass meetings that sometimes attracted thousands of aroused colonists 
endorsed resolutions and called for new political organizations’ (ibid). These local 
committees, assemblies and gatherings spread across the colonies until the days of the 
Revolution of 1776. For Arendt (1990) the American Constitution sought to consolidate 
the power of the Revolution’ whose main objective was freedom (154). It sought to give 
to these political spaces ‘formal recognition and foundation’ (239). Thus, it ‘came to be … 
Constitutio Libertatis, the foundation of freedom' (154). The leaders of the Revolution, by 
 





acting within such spaces, while they were shaping the Constitution, preserved their names 
to be remembered forever. As opposed to immortality rooted in remembrance through 
heritage and history, the (mystical and/or medieval)  
 Christian worldview, claims Arendt (1998), associated immortality with is 
otherworldliness (13). Or as B. J. Smith (1985) noted, immortality ‘in time’ was replaced 
‘with an immortality beyond time’ (44).  
How could pragmatism establish a common ground between these two opposite 
trends? Despite the existing divergences between Christianity and republicanism, nothing 
indicates that the former does not incorporate elements of practical significance for projects 
inspired by republican ideas. Do both systems oppose self-centrism, championing mutual 
love and altruism instead? Do they emphasise prudence in one way or another? Are both 
currents preoccupied with the notion of judgment and free will? A positive response to 
these questions does not immediately end the dispute. Soon another question arises: is the 
‘prudence’ advocated by Christian mysticism similar to the one exalted by classical 
republicanism? Obviously, for Christianity prudence and decency spring from 
contemplation and asceticism. In the republican weltanschauung prudence is, strictly 
speaking, obtained through our mundane experiences. Notwithstanding the Christian 
‘prudence’ is not fully identical with what the Greeks or Romans had in mind, one has to 
consider its effects, its actual contributions, in short its practical consequences (positive or 
otherwise) to projects inspired by political systems that draw on classical republican ideas. 
Consider, as an example, the case of the American Revolution, which had been influenced 
by unique synthesis of ideas revolving around the republican notion of self-government on 
the one hand, bridging classical Enlightenment concepts and religious viewpoints 
(originating from variants of the Christian Reformation), on the other (Kloppenberg 2016: 
353; 362).  
In short, the project of the vita civile embraces the legacy of political leaders and 
philosophers who applied Christian ethics not exclusively for the purpose of eternal 
salvation, but in order to overcome social and political injustices in this world, seeking to 
combat hubris and corruption, and therefore inspiring self-governance and prudence, 
should be given consideration. This includes influential Christian leaders like the Baptist 




to the earlier  English Puritan and the revolutionist republican John Milton, to name one 
example. King was no less a ‘man of action’ than Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin 
were. In his speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize (1965) he insisted that ‘[t]he most 
important feature of the civil rights movement … was the “direct participation of masses 
in protest, rather than reliance on indirect methods which frequently do not involve masses 
in action at all”’ (Lasch 1991a: 404). His praise of the Christian agape opened up pathways 
for the creation of alternative public realms in churches and squares (as Chapter 5 will 
discuss more thoroughly), of spaces of action, which brought black and white communities 
together, allowing them to collectively discuss the future plans of the movement. King 
emerged as a leader while acting and speaking within such spaces. His words touched 
millions of hearts and minds. Thus, he became immortalised as a true historical legend 
whose legacy will always be remembered.  
To conclude: whether Plato, or Jung, or Hobbes, or Dostoevsky (et al) were 
opponents of the vita activa (the life of political action) or not, whether ‘[i]t is difficult for 
those … who believe in … democracy to follow Nietzsche very far from down the road 
that he takes’ (Fukuyama 1992: 313) or not, are questions of minor significance. 
Pragmatism allows us to trace and extract from philosophical texts (written by these 
authors) viewpoints of real value in our attempts to examine the structure of the human 
soul, identifying the underlying reasons the latter produces energies that stimulate 
selfishness, hubris and passion for revenge, which the democratic and anthropocentric (but 
melioristic) populism of the vita civile attempts to master (through logos, memory and 
through methods of ‘psychical enlightenment’).  
Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 offers a general review of certain published works in the fields the present 
study seeks to cover, coupled with explanations concerning gaps and omissions that exist 
in the same works. By reflecting on John Milton’s Paradise Lost and Hannah Arendt’s Life 
of The Mind (LOM) (1978), on the three faculties of the vita contemplativa (thinking, 
willing and judging), a psychoanalytic investigation of human nature will be offered. 
Psychoanalytic insights, produced out of such critical reflections and reviews will be used 
as explanatory models in the successive chapters, where the socio-political impasses of 




a clear rationale concerning the notion of Original Sin, which links to my approach to the 
question of populism and politics. 
Chapter 3 opens up with a discussion on Hobbes’ tribute to pessimism and 
absolutism. In Hobbes’ view, human beings without being under the subservience of a 
coercive government cannot restrain their desire for pride, possession of power, property 
and goods. This leads to a catastrophic war of all against all (Hobbes 2006: 72). Hobbes’s 
solution to this menace is subjection to the unquestionable commands of an absolute 
Sovereign, who directs everyone’s actions towards the common benefit (Hobbes 2006: 72, 
95; 121; Furedi 2013: 182). Locke’s response to Hobbes’ pessimism and anti-populism 
was the ideology of possessive individualism. Locke (1998) rejects Hobbes’ obedience to 
absolute governments, seeing the principle of ‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex’ as a ‘just and 
fundamental’ rule that ‘he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err’ (373). 
Notwithstanding Locke constantly points out the necessity to restrain the Sovereign's 
powers, stressing that civic authorities should first and foremost acknowledge majoritarian 
consent, at the same time he partially reproduces certain aspects of the Hobbesian 
philosophy, most of all, his fear of violent death (due to lack of protection and order). 
Solutions to this problem had to be found not through absolutism but through the market, 
through the unlimited exchange of goods that would ‘turn universal selfishness to universal 
benefit’ (Pocock 1975: 465), ‘liberating desire from all constraints on acquisitiveness’ 
(Fukuyama 1992: 333). The unlimited economic expansion, which aims to gratify the 
insatiable desire (pathos, in my terms) for possession, becomes the ultimate purpose of all 
collective enterprises. Economic liberalism, a henkfurt of the Hobbesian absolutism, 
substitutes the political pessimism of the latter with an overt optimism. Both models share 
one common feature: the exclusion of the ‘common people’ from the decision-making. For 
the Lockean model all social relations must be put under the dictates of the market, whose 
tendency to generate wealth through the constant increase of the availability of consumable 
objects would (supposedly) generate stability and prosperity, emancipating mankind from 
all fears.  
Sections of this chapter call into question this liberal (optimistic) weltanschauung. 
They rely on the psychoanalytical schemas developed in Chapter 2 and, simultaneously, 




Hobbesian and the Lockean model with the melioristic populism of the vita civile, centred 
around the idea of political participation (action). As mentioned earlier, ethical memory, 
one of the main ingredients of action, is prominently pedagogical. It has the capacity to 
cultivate an ethic of self-limitation by raising awareness concerning the devastating 
outcomes of past decisions (collectively taken). Hence, through action, that is, through 
political participation, the ‘common people’ can become cognizant  of their vulnerability. 
They become aware of their capacity for evil. They obtain the necessary experience, which 
averts the repetition of hubris. 
Chapter 4 elaborates on aspects of economic liberalism briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 3. It focuses on the phenomenon of social nihilism, on the social implications of 
the ‘Lockean’ model with its emphasis on economic expansion and modernisation (at the 
expense of religion and tradition). More precisely, the rise of permissive liberalism can be 
interpreted as the consequence of post-war liberalism, which was influenced on the one 
hand by certain countercultural currents of the 1960s and 1970s17, and (on the other) by 
neoliberal economists and theorists, such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich August von 
Hayek, who, as Gray (2007) claimed, subscribed to the belief in the ‘free market’ as ‘the 
most productive economic system’, as ‘the most efficient’ and ‘peaceful’ way of 
‘organizing the economy’ (120) To a degree, (neo)liberalism constitutes a genealogical 
evolution of the ‘Lockean’ and ‘Smithian’ (optimistic) liberal model, which thinkers from 
Marx and Engels (2013) and Karl Polanyi (2001) to Eugene Dominic Genovese (1994), 
John  Gray (2007) and Patrick Deneen (2018), including Lasch (1991a; 1991b), considered 
also to be solvent to tradition and culture. In other words, neoliberalism can accelerate 
cultural decomposition, contributing to the liquidation of social bonds and old-fashioned 
conventions. As Lasch (1984; 1991a; 1991b), Zygmunt Bauman (2000), Panagiotis 
Kondylis ([Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης] 2007), et al., have argued, ‘neoliberalism’ champions 
material abundance and rampant consumerism, which intensified the process of social 
nihilism. As Nietzsche (2006) believed, social nihilism was prevalent almost everywhere 
in the liberal world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, resulting in the (partial) 
 
17 Mainly I am referring to trends promoting boundless social liberalization, rather on the Civil 
Rights Movement or cultural currents in support of the latter, like, for instance, the Folk Revival 




loss of tradition and common (collective) identity. It erased from the collective memory 
cultural elements and wore away the rigid common world of the national community, 
within which individuals could obtain meaning and common purpose. To a degree, cultural 
decomposition points to Weil’s (1987a) notion of of ‘uprootedness’, signifying the 
destruction of the past in toto.  
As a reaction to this process of social nihilism (or cultural decomposition), traits 
that boost nostalgic trends rapidly emerge, encouraging the blind idealisation of the past, 
of the old disappeared world. The term nostalgia, the ‘νόστιμον ἦμαρ’ (‘the day of return’) 
according to Homer (1966: 2), derives from the word νόστος (nostos, translated as ‘going 
back’) and ἄλγος (álgos, signifying affliction and sharp psychical pain) and signifies 
despair, hopefulness and an overwhelming defeatist view on both the present and/or the 
future. The nostalgic mind idealises this golden age of a lost carefree world that used to 
offer ‘delights no longer obtainable’ (Lasch 1991a: 83). Lasch in TTOH speaks of the rising 
tide of nostalgia during the nineteenth century as a reaction to the cultural changes, and 
(more importantly) to the loss of traditional ways of life, brought forward by the spread of 
Industrial Revolution and the consolidation of urbanization, the consequences of economic 
progress. In the chapter Nostalgia: The Abdication of Memory’ (82-119) of TTOH, Lasch 
reflects on literary and philosophical works of the nineteenth century, through which the 
pessimistic/nostalgic is often expressed through a deep ‘regret for [an] innocence no longer 
accessible’ (90), that is, for the lost idyllic and pastoral world (100-5), supposedly 
emancipated from all the hardships of the present (83). The ‘pessimistic nostalgia’ of today, 
to use Eelco’s and Harteveld’s (2018) terms, is quite similar: it finds expression through 
various right-wing populist movements, which incite a desire (pathos) to resurrect the dead 
old (common) world, that is, the pre-1960s world. Unlike the present world, which (in the 
nostalgic mind) lacks meaning, cultural cohesion and community, the old disappeared 
world was capable of sustaining togetherness, common fellowship and purpose. .In short, 
nostalgia converts the old disappeared world into an idol18. To avoid misunderstandings: 
arguments concerning the cultural superiority of the past and the quasi ‘emotional appeal 
 
18 In Chapter 4, psychoanalytic insights will allow us to understand the mental processes through 
which nostalgic appeals (incited by uprootedness) incite idolatry, the so-called ‘idolatry of the past’, 




of happy memories’, which does not depend on any pessimistic disparagement for the 
present, neither on the idealisation of the past as a whole, must not be conflated with 
nostalgia (82). The nostalgic appeal does not draw ‘hope and comfort from the past in order 
to enrich the present and to face what comes with good cheer’ (83). As opposed to the 
populism of the vita civile, which approaches the past with gratitude and sees tradition and 
heritage as a source of inspiration, the populist right and its nostalgic idealization of the 
past apromises a new social reality that could resemble this old disappeared world. By 
acknowledging as explanatory models the same psychoanalytical and phenomenological 
themes of Chapter 2, Chapter 4 will attempt to shed light on the precise reasons one 
should approach this nostalgic populist desire to turn the wheel of history backwards 
with scepticism and caution.  
On completion of Chapter 3 and 4 the reader will have obtained a concrete 
understanding a) on the impasses of the main theoretical foundations upon which political 
systems relying on pessimism and (liberal) optimism rest, b) on their evident philosophical 
convergences (anti-populism), as well as c) on the negative impacts of the implication of 
political programmes (or initiatives) predicated on pessimism or, on the contrary, rely on 
optimistic liberal doctrines. In addition, discussions revolving around the role of ethical 
memory (the primary ingredient of action) in politics will elucidate the process through 
which the human potential capable of making common decency a true living experience is 
unleashed. 
 Chapter 5 elucidates the way logos, the second premise of action, promotes 
decency through dialogue and viewpoint diversity. As B. J. Smith (1985) argued, ‘[i]n 
action … different persons may see different things’ (262). In the public-political realm 
experiences and memories are constantly discussed. Interpretations and opinions are 
scrutinised and judged by individuals who hold different worldviews and see ‘different 
things’, who (in other words) interpret these experiences and memories from different 
angles, shedding light on different aspects of them. This plurality of expressed judgments 
and ideas increases the chances for hidden aspects of a given reality to be unveiled. 
Consequently, logos brings us closer to the truth. But as it has been already stressed, the 
vita civile offers no guarantee that logos and memory will always promote truth over 




are never fully sealed from demagogic infiltrations, whose public speeches deceive a great 
portion of the citizenry. Thus, we have arrived at the fourth major problématique: when 
neither logos, nor ethical memory can safeguard decency, what could protect publics from 
deception and hubris? As mentioned earlier, religious insights (as well as art and drama) 
can inspire civil disobedience, though which a populace that has thrown off prudence and 
moral decency can be influenced, in order to rectify its stance.  
The ninth chapter of Lasch’s TTOH, ‘The Spiritual Discipline Against Resentment’ 
(369-411), in which Martin Luther King Jr’s case is discussed, the author identifies in the 
latter’s life and philosophy elements that have enabled him to lead a successful campaign 
of civil disobedience against the hubris of racism, widely embraced by sections of the 
Southern American white populace. These elements are: resilience, patience, inner clarity 
and, above all, faith in the ‘common people’, which springs from the belief that every 
human being holds the means of salvation (eucosmia). For Lasch, it was King’s exposure 
to the religious tradition of the black church (391-3), ‘the most stable institution of the 
southern Negro community’ (394), what converted his suffering, ‘inflicted by membership 
in a persecuted racial minority’ (391, ff), into an opportunity for introspection, through 
which he acquired the psychical enlightenment and the eloquence to inspire and motivate 
large numbers of black and white southerners to mobilize for racial justice. Chapter 2 sheds 
more light on the way this process of introspection connects us with what Weil would have 
called ‘the impersonal realm’ and stimulates self-purification. In simple terms, self-
purification refers to the process whereby negative prejudices, biases, resentments and 
selfish pursuits are effectively removed from thinking. Furthermore, those who come 
through this process (of self-purification) increase their  vigour, excitement and mental 
clarity. Chapter 5 explains how this self-purification leads to the dramatisation of the 
injustices and indecencies the hubris of the demos has caused, primarily due to its (passive 
or active) endorsement of negative prejudices.  Finally, it should be mentioned that apart 
from being a remarkable example of civil disobedience, King’s  eucosmia (faith in ‘the 
common people’) could be acknowledged as a valuable quality that democratic/populist 
leaders could adopt. Discussions on leadership (in relation to eucosmia) are further 
advanced in Chapter 6, which elaborates on aspects of the French and the American 





As it has been clarified in the first section of this Chapter, a federal and participatory 
political system must first and foremost allow—if not demand—its grassroots constituent 
bodies (the political realm, in other words) to always remain capable of constituting. It 
must, therefore, ensure that none of these ‘elementary republics’ are under the sway or 
influence of a higher order. This, according to Arendt (1990: 267), was the main idea 
behind the American Revolution, whose leaders were modest and their aspirations 
relatively melioristic. In the Federalist Papers they view government ‘as a means of coping 
with human imperfection rather than an instrument for re-creating society’ (Gray 2007: 
46). To a degree this could be attributed to their ‘common sense’, which had not been 
exposed to highly optimistic assertions concerning man’s perfect natural benevolence, 
claims Arendt (1990: 95). Consider, also, Thomas Jefferson, perhaps the most optimistic 
among the American Founders (after Thomas Paine). Through a close reading on his 
political writings one may see the hesitancy through which he approaches the belief in the 
so-called human perfectibility (see chapter 5). John Adams, in addition, ‘never had an 
optimistic view of human nature’ (Wood (2017). Both the American and the French 
Revolution were driven by basic Enlightenment anti-absolutist strands (Israel 2019: 256). 
They pushed forward identical popular demands, championing freedom of speech and the 
expansion of education, condemning religious autocracy (Israel 2019: 5-6; 256). But the 
leaders of the latter, profoundly inspired by Holbach, Diderot and Rousseau (Chartier 2004: 
88; Israel 2010: 225), went one step further: they denounced Christianity and substituted 
original sin with Rousseau’s notion of man’s natural benevolence. If the notion of 
original/anchestral sin, the notion of human frailty and vulnerability, raises awareness 
concerning man’s ‘sinful nature’, concerning man’s capacity for evil (Passmore 2000: 17), 
discouraging optimistic (utopian) aspirations for a new brand world, sealed from injustices 
and disappointments, attempts that denounce this notion could, unwittingly, open up 
pathways for the acceptance of all sorts of optimisms for a perfect future world. Therefore 
(as Chapter 6 will discuss in more detail), the abandonment of original sin was one of the 
main reasons the leaders of the French Revolution accepted, according to B. J. Smith (1985: 
230), Tocqueville (2011: 42) and Kloppenberg (2016: 458), the optimistic conviction of 




in his virtue’ (Tocqueville 2011: 142). They summoned all their efforts to regenerate not 
only the French society but the entire human race simply by eradicating all absolutist 
institutions’ (ibid). If the public sphere—initially created by the revolution itself—was 
entirely destroyed, if the revolution ‘failed to establish a viable democratic republic’ (Israel 
2010: 230), this (to a degree) is attributed to the implications of this optimistic populism, 
which glorified  extreme violence, justified under the principle of original benevolence). 
More precisely, the notion of original sin, this Chapter argues, was treated as a pretext for 
the moral legitimisation of the institutions of the ancien régime (for instance, the Catholic 
Church), whose ultimate objective (in the eyes of the revolutionaries) was the consolidation 
of its own despotic rule. As I have already explained in the previous section, the realist 
emphasis on the so-called inherent human hubris and vulnerability must not automatically 
encourage political pessimism and absolutism. While defenders of absolutism uphold the 
notion of ‘original malevolence’ in order to justify anti-populism, the vita civile begins 
with this notion but comes with different objectives: it values the potential of every human 
being to join the political realm, act in concert, in order to minimise the consequences of 
hubris. However, the existence of such a natural proclivity towards evil and destruction 
leaves no room for optimism, for an ideal future world. The French revolutionaries saw the 
oppressive power of the ancien régime as the main obstacle against the erection of such an 
ideal world within which man’s natural benevolence could be unleashed. This (along with 
other factors mentioned in Chapter 2 and 6, such as poverty and material destitution, the 
dialectics of foreign invasion or the acceptance of Rousseau’s controversial idea of the 
‘general will’ by the leaders of the Revolution) contributed to the conversion of anger and 
social discontent against the ancien régime itself into an epidemic of uncompromising 
hatred  and political terrorism. The leaders of the Revolution defended the Terror as a 
necessary means against ‘internal and external enemies’ (Gray 2007: 36) and as a 
‘technique of civic education’, as an ‘instrument of social engineering’ (37). But while in 
France political optimism contributed to a spread of extremism, resulting in the destruction 
of the political realm, in the New World the blindness of those who laid down the 
frameworks of the American Constitution for the democratic experience of the townships 
and the town halls (self-government) condemned the political realm itself to 




substitute for direct political action’ (Arendt 1990: 236). Thus, ‘[o]nly the representatives 
of the people, not the people themselves’ (235), ‘who constitute the republic’ (251) ‘had 
an opportunity to engage in those activities of “expressing, discussing, and deciding”’ 
(235).  
To have modest goals, to be apprehensive towards optimistic (utopian) goals, could 
be a step towards meliorism (or hope). In Lasch’s (1993) view, hope shares the steadfast 
belief in justice, the deep-seated conviction that wrongs can be made right through 
persistent efforts and mutual sacrifices (13), and most of all, through political engagement, 
that is, through action. In that sense, a melioristic leadership should be limited inasmuch 
as ‘the ordinary person’ is not deprived of his/her capacity to act (to constitute and to make 
political decisions). A leader, more precisely, who bestows faith to the ‘common people’, 
who sees in every human being a capacity to serve the common good, would stand against 
measures that force direct political participation on pain of disappearance. The American 
Founders shaped a particular political school of thought, emerging as a metharmōsis of 
classical republicanism to modern republicanism, liberalism and Protestantism 
(Kloppenberg 2016: 311-12). They emphasised the practical benefits of direct participation 
in politics, without bestowing unlimited faith to the moral capacities of human beings. 
Nonetheless, their preference for the system of representation and their ambiguous stance 
on the institution of slavery (based on race) would be deemed morally illegitimate should 
the ideas close to the notion of eucosmia had been adopted by the same school of thought. 
Consider also another case-study: the American cooperative movement and the rise of the 
People’s Party in the Great Plains (almost a century after the Revolution). As Goodwyn 
(1976) claims, Populism became the ‘mass movement of anonymous people’ (51). It 
opposed monopolistic capitalism, corporate greed, bureaucratic management and proposed 
direct participation (action) (Goodwyn 1976: 68-9; 185; 197; 612; Postel 2007: 18 
Matsusaka 2020: 70). However, it lost its momentum when the leaders of the People’s 
Party detached themselves from the grassroots and joined forces with the Democratic Party, 
pushing its supporters (the ‘anonymous people’) back to the party of the financial 
monopolies, whose power and influence they had initially opposed.  
On completion of chapter 5 and 6 the reader may come across a series of conceptual 




4 (ostensibly) clash with ideas enunciated in sections of Chapter 5. More precisely, Chapter 
5 (while elaborating on King’s campaign against racial segregation) raises awareness 
concerning cases where particularism becomes demonic, incorporating provincialism, 
narrowness, racism and anti-intellectualism. In contrast, Chapter 3 and 4 expressed 
concerns regarding the loss of tradition, the significance of pastness, the value of 
particularism and traditionalism, and the need ‘[t]o be rooted … perhaps the most important 
and least recognized need of the human soul’, according to Weil (1987a: 41), the need to 
preserve a common world within which individuals feel naturally included. This common 
world (that protects us from nihilism) is the national community. According to Canovan 
(1996), nations preserve the conditions through which individuals obtain ‘the capacity to 
act as a collective people, to undertake commitments and to acquire obligations’ (44). 
‘[N]ations are political phenomena’ (51) and their identities underpin ‘the recurrent drive 
for popular sovereignty and democracy’, according to Anthony Smith (1991: 143). As B. 
J. Smith (1985) argued, political action and past remembrance are related (5). The republic 
is ‘a tissue of relations between citizens in space and time, and it is this which permits us … 
to speak about a public existence’ (6). Such relations and interactions (as the next chapter 
will explain) shape common memories, that is, ‘a set of … traditions … and institutions 
which buttress public life’ (ibid). They are founded upon ’a [common] founding myth that 
remains a point of moral reference and recalls men and women to an awareness of their 
civic obligations’ (Lasch 1991a: 131).  
In short, we deem particularism an important reservoir of constructive energy for 
democratic populism as well as a source of protection from the morbid threats of nihilism 
and uprootedness. Chapter 7 explains thoroughly how the vita civile makes a positive use 
of particularism itself, minimizing the chances to arouse demonic forces (pathos) that incite 
idolatry and hubris. As it turns out, the vita civile is relatively conservative in its general 
outlook. However, this neolithic conservatism, as Paul Goodman (1970) would have called 
it19, proposes a type of patriotism/particularism that relies on one of the primary principles 
of eucosmia, the strong faith that every human being can make positive contributions 
through action, that the ‘common people’ can be good exponents of common decency 
 




through logos and memory. Logos is associated with (responsible) individualism, freeing 
patriotism from the vices of extreme collectivism. Second, logos promotes dialogue and 
disagreement. It has the potential to hedge aggressive forms of nationalism by making 
inherited memories and cultural norms subject to public debates. Put otherwise, a political 
realm is a worldly space where inherited ideas, popular perceptions, narratives and 
concepts are brought under public scrutiny. They can be discussed and re-evaluated, 
‘adjusted to new [emerging] conditions’, instead of being absorbed and internalised as rigid 
and lifeless static images, ‘cast in stone’ and ready to be worshiped as idols (Genovese 
1994: 5). In sum, through action the chances for the ultimate objectives of eucosmia to be 
fulfilled increase: once forms of nationalist aggression are hedged, a nation acquires the 
capacity to become ‘decent’ (‘good’) in concert other nations and peoples, ‘good’ and ‘just’ 





























Populism and the Vita Civile: Theoretical foundations and Classical Arguments 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to build upon the main philosophical thinking behind 
Lasch’s distinction between hope from optimism (and pessimism respectively). First, it 
borrows insights from Hannah Arendt (who, as mentioned in the beginning of the previous 
chapter, has influenced Lasch’s political views). Second, it takes into account Lasch’s 
interest in religion and spirituality (Eric Miller 2010: 47; 256; 308; 400-2) and attempts to 
discuss further the potential benefits of religious thinking for the politics of civil 
disobedience. Thus, it elaborates further on Martin Luther King Jr and, reflects on the 
philosophy of Simone Weil (whose thought, along with that of Reinhold Niebuhr and 
William James, can shed light on the practical impacts of religion in the process of 
psychical enlightenment). Third, by examining Arendt and Weil, it will identify potential 
omissions and theoretical gaps in the theories of both thinkers. Fourth, in the course of 
expanding Lasch’s thinking, as well as reviewing and correcting Arendt’s and Weil’s ideas 
by considering alternative viewpoints, new perspectives are shaped. These perspectives, 
which (in fact) are a synthesis of ideas, will function as the primary theoretical foundations 
in debates concerning the impasses of optimism and pessimism respectively. 
Simultaneously, they can be seen as the main philosophical pylons of the weltanschauung 
upon which the melioristic cast of mind of the vita civile is predicated. The process of 
building up these foundations begins with a general re-examination of Arendt’s vita 
contemplativa (the faculties of thinking, willing and judgment), outlined in the Life Of The 
Mind (LOM) (1978)20. This re-examination (see the first section of this chapter) brings into 
the discussion psychoanalytic interpretations on Milton's Paradise Lost (especially 
concerning the fall of man and Original Sin) and on Homer’s Odyssey.  
Milton’s PL is discussed in Lasch’s TTOH (1991a): ‘[a] close reading of Paradise 
Lost … introduce[s] a rich conception of virtue’, which in modern republicanism is 
synonymous with vigor, courage and heroism (233), as well as with the ‘Homeric virtues’ 
 




of  simplicity and frugality (306). Moreover, ‘in the republican tradition, virtue and grace 
stood sharply opposed’, because ‘virtue enabled men to challenge fate in absence of faith’ 
(234). Nonetheless, in Milton’s Puritan republicanism ‘virtue and grace became closely 
entangled’ (ibid). The ability of men and women to challenge fate itself, in order to enjoy 
the gift of life, comes through vigour and through God’s grace (ibid). Therefore, Milton’s 
PL links republicanism with Christianity (Protestant/Puritan Christianity, more 
particularly), offering a perspective upon which the present study can reflect while striving 
to bridge the republican tradition with aspects of the Christian weltanschauung. 
Furthermore, in the last chapter of The Revolt of The Elites (1995a), Lasch brings into his 
discussion Jung’s psychoanalytic thought. For Jung, ‘spiritual needs [are] too urgent to be 
ignored’ (236) and ‘those needs … are analogous to hunger’ (236). Herein Lasch refers to 
Jung’s essay ‘collected in 1933 under the inevitable title Modern Man in Search of a Soul’ 
(237). In this work Jung expresses profound scepticisms concerning the abandonment of 
religion and tradition by the ‘modern individual’ (ibid). As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the fierce rejection of spirituality by the pioneers of modernity, namely by ‘those 
who believed that progress’ could ‘enable man to outgrow his childish need for religion’, 
was also among Lasch’s (1991a: 16) greatest concerns. Citing Tocqueville and Orestes 
Brownson, Lasch believed that religion and spirituality stimulate frugality, 
counterweighting rugged individualism and obsessive materialism (60; 189-194), which 
undermine civic virtue and ‘the old republican idea of citizenship’ (59). However, a more 
rigorous study of Jung’s psychoanalytic thought (than that made by Lasch) could allow us 
to identify additional reasons that constitute religion so valuable (apart from its practical 
contribution to active citizenship). First, religious texts, as well as works of art and 
literature inspired by religious concepts, contain archetypes (Jung 1960: 122). For Jung 
(1960), archetypes ‘are primordial images’ (112) that have the capacity to bring hidden 
aspects of the human instincts, of the most primeval human drives (that often operate 
unconsciously), to the surface of our conscious process of thinking (48). They are 
depictions of these drives which shape and influence our behaviour (often unconsciously) 
(115-125). Hence, if we approach Milton’s PL (a work profoundly inspired by the Old 
Testament) from the Jungian perspective, we can shed light on aspects of the functioning 




the PL, ‘which Milton [himself] completed after the failure of the revolution and the 
restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660’ (Skinner 1978). In his disillusionment about 
the English Revolution, claims Frey (2005), about the failure of the English people to 
establish a commonwealth emancipated from the yoke of absolutism, Milton was 
compelled ‘to find the true revolution within the individual’ (110). He was driven to 
identify within the human mind dark ‘inner kingdoms’ of envy, of megalomania and greed, 
the rapacity of willing, to use Arendt’s (1978) terms. Milton sought to overthrow first and 
foremost (by means of reason and prudence), dark ‘psychical empires’, what Martin Luther 
King Jr (1986) later on called as the ‘internal violence of spirit’ (13), which prompt men 
and women to resentment, but also to exploitation and despotism. In short, Milton’s PL 
calls attention to the effects of our inner world in public action.  
 Thus, one way of looking at Milton’s PL, as well as on Homer’s Odyssey, is through 
Jung’s theory, which can shed light on the process whereby archetypal stories and allusions 
(included in myths and religious texts) depict and expose the devastating outcomes of some 
(often unconsciously processed) ‘indecent’ human thoughts (hubris) that spring from our 
instincts. Arendt’s notion of judgment, the third premise of the vita contemplativa, refers 
to the human ability to reject such thoughts, products of ‘willing’ (the second premise), or 
pathos, a term also used in Lasch’s TTOH (1991a) in order to describe the arbitrary 
tendency of the human mind to revolt against gratitude (87), or according to its Greek 
origins (πάσχειν), the suffering (Adam Smith 2006: 5), the illness of the human mind itself, 
its proclivity to transgress limits21. Making sense of Arendt’s judgment requires rigorous 
analysis of the other two premises and, more importantly, of thinking, which constitutes a 
by-product of judgment itself. Furthermore, in the process of reviewing Arendt’s vita 
contemplativa, philosophical insights of thinkers who evolved from a tradition similar to 
that of Milton (I am referring to Locke’s and Hobbes’ epistemological empiricism) will be 
taken into account. Through this re-examination a new (psychoanalytic and 
phenomenological) schema has been formed; this schema divides the human mind into the 
following categories: the empirical and the underworld mind (a term borrowed by 
 
21 Πάσχειν (paschein) also implies being άρρωστος (arrostos), that is, physically and/or mentally 




Homer)22. The empirical is associated a) with ethical memory, referring to the ‘moral 
capital’, to the sum of memorable ideas, concepts and events we experience, in short to 
objects that produce some moral value (see Chapter 1). Upon these objects the human mind 
(through thinking) reflects in order to produce judgment, making itself capable of telling 
right from wrong, according to Arendt’s (1978) definition. Additionally, b) the empirical 
mind also refers to the common world of shared meanings, ideas, concepts, gestures and 
values. These notions are lodged in the individual and collective storehouse of memory 
(bonding memory)23. They ascribe to groups of people who embrace and internalise them 
a precise identity, which allows them to exist as a collectivity distinct from all others, 
defined by a common (be it political, or otherwise) purpose and orientation. On the other 
hand, the mind of the underworld is mainly dominated by the will (or pathos) to deceive, 
oppress and dominate, or (in other words) by rapacity and hubris.  
To avoid misunderstandings: the underworld must not be conflated with Jung’s 
‘unconscious mind’. The unconscious is ‘habitual’ (Jung 1960: 96), intense and explosive. 
As the third section of this chapter will explain, disagreeable elements of the deep 
underworld can be passively reproduced through the unconscious mind, and (according to 
the Jungian point of view) not all unconscious energies are disagreeable. Furthermore, 
through the underworld one does not simply approaches pathos. It is the mind through 
which one can also access the impersonal realm, from where individuals (and political 
leaders) obtain the necessary vigour and mental clarity (psychical enlightenment) in order 
to heal a populace that has thrown off self-limitation (as the previous chapter explained)24. 
 
22 Consider what the previous chapter conveyed, concerning the necessity of interpreting modes 
of collective action (including populism) by establishing a concrete view on the way psychical 
energies give rise to particular social phenomena, identifying simultaneously the reasons precise 
socio-political realities developed such energies. For example, the rise of right-wing populism is 
understood (in chapter 4) as the consequence of the spread of permissive liberalism and, precisely, 
of its tendencies to generate pessimism and nostalgia. Permissive liberalism creates the conditions 
through which negative psychical impulses are emancipated, cultivating a social climate which 
right-wing populists exploit for their own political benefits.  
23 The terms ‘bonding’ or ‘cultural memory’ are developed by Jan Assmann. See his work Religion 
and Cultural Memory (2006).  
24 The reasons impersonality is connected with the underworld (rather than with the empirical) 
are partially explained at the end of the first section of this chapter; they are more thoroughly 




The concept of impersonality and its practical value in this process of civil disobedience 
will be construed by bringing together Weil’s and James’ theories, as well as Reinhold 
Niebuhr's emphasis on the significance of religion.  
The second section of this chapter focuses on Arendt’s Human Condition 
(1958/1998). Herein Arendt discusses the vita activa and highlights the benefits of political 
action. However, as Arendt proceeds to elaborate on the vita activa, she concludes in 
favour of detaching political action and citizenship from issues related to wealth 
distribution, poverty and economic necessity. For Arendt (1990; 1998), economic necessity 
and poverty often contribute to the creation of social environments within which violence 
explodes and leads to the destruction of the political realm. Through this position Arendt 
interprets major historical events (such as the American and the French Revolution). By 
taking into account the psychoanalytic schema of the first section and by bringing into the 
discussion critiques and evidence from contemporary historiography, Arendt’s position 
will be called into question. In brief, mass poverty alone cannot not explain the eruption of 
the extravagant violence that sent the Revolution to its doom. As I have already clarified, 
violence and political extremism can be also attributed to the ideological optimism that had 
largely influenced the leaders of the Revolution. In addition, the second section shows that 
wealth (re)distribution is not at odds with action per se. For the vita civile, debates 
revolving around economic justice constitute an integral feature of all political and public 
life. Finally, the third section of this chapter juxtaposes the vita civile with other types of 
populism, particularly with the top-down (hegemonic) populism of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe. It employs Castoriadis’ theory of social institutioning, which (along with 
Jung’s psychoanalytic viewpoints) elucidates the human capacity for hubris, or to use 
different terms, on the sudden infiltration of will (pathos) into the empirical world, which 
renders human behaviour unpredictable. The vita civile, with its emphasis on hope 
(associated with eucosmia and action) can create environments through which the chances 
for pathos to explode are minimised. In general terms, the vita civile is a synthesis of the 





The empirical and the underworld mind: memory, pathos and impersonality 
This section begins by examining the notion of curiosity (or wonder), taken as the 
core function of the human mind. According to Kidd and Hayden (2015) studies have 
revealed that curiosity is inscribed in human genetic make-up (1). Wonder constitutes ‘a 
basic element of our cognition [and] a basic component of our nature’ (ibid). From a 
philosophical point of view curiosity, the spirit of inquiry and inquisitiveness and the 
‘Desire, to know why, and how’, the unceasing tendency of the human mind to accumulate 
knowledge (Hobbes 2006:31) is universal and common to every human being (43). First, 
psychologist Daniel Berlyne, ‘among the most important figures in the 20th century study 
on curiosity’ (Kidd and Hayden 2015: 3), has divided curiosity into two groups: a) 
perceptual versus epistemic and b) specific versus diversive (Berlyne 1954). Perceptual 
curiosity stimulates organisms to search for new motivations and constitutes the primary 
drive for exploration in infants but also in non-humans (ibid). Epistemic curiosity, on the 
other hand, does not strive for objects-bearing stimulation but for scientific, empirical 
and/or philosophical knowledge (1954; 1966). The latter applies predominantly to (adult) 
humans (1966). In turn, specific curiosity refers to the ‘desire for a particular piece of 
information’ (Kidd and Hayden 2015: 3). ‘[R]ats exhibit diversive curiosity when, devoid 
of any explicit task, they robustly prefer to explore unfamiliar sections of a maze’ (ibid). 
This dissertation is exclusively concerned with the former group, and more importantly 
with perceptual curiosity, which we will heretofore call ‘wonder’ (the primary drive for 
exploration). Second, as George Loewenstein (from a different point of view) suggests, 
curiosity is ‘“a cognitive induced deprivation that arises from the perception of a gap in 
knowledge and understanding” and … functions like other drive states, such as hunger, 
which motivates eating...’ (quoted by Kidd and Hayden 2015: 4). From this it follows that 
curiosity, including perceptual and epistemic curiosity (wonder), could be considered an 
indispensable element of the existence of the human mind itself. From a different angle, 
hunger is ‘an expression of the instinct of self-preservation’ (Jung 1960: 116). If curiosity 
functions like a hunger and if hunger is the alpha and omega-existence itself’ (ibid), the 
instinct of (perceptual) curiosity (wonder) constitutes sine qua non of the existence of 
human life itself. As with Arendt (1978), the human mind only in the state of absolute 




volitions (Arendt 1978, 2: 144). Wonder passes into the state of quietness only once the 
biological functions that effectively sustain a human brain in life permanently stop.  
Consider, at this stage, Jung’s (1960) collective unconscious, an amalgam of 
archetypes, which ‘like the instincts, are common to all mankind’ and ‘probably represent 
typical situations in life’ (122). They are unknowingly ascribed to the individual’s mind 
some of them by his/her ‘remote and immediate ancestors’ during his/her birth (Odajnyk 
2007: 3). As mentioned in the previous section, these archetypes, whose ‘presence can be 
proved wherever the relevant literary records have been preserved’ (Jung 1960: 122), are 
mythological figures  and have ‘universal [or] … regular occurrence’ (Odajnyk 2007: 134). 
They can illuminate the moral implications of the influence of human instincts in our 
everyday life25. For Castoriadis (2007b [Καστοριάδης 2007β]), works of art (poems, 
paintings, plays, et al) are depictions of the inner forces of the human mind, and more 
precisely, of the Chaos and the Abyss, the matrix of creation and/or destruction (135-7; 
164). Art is influenced by archetypes (by mythological motifs and by symbols, religious or 
otherwise). Thus, art highlights the existence of human instincts and, thus, the existence of 
human wonder, which is either capable of generating conditions within which common 
decency can flourish (creation), or (on the other hand)  conditions within which hubris 
spreads like a wildfire (destruction). With this in mind, let us discuss Milton’s epic poem 
Paradise Lost.  
In Book VII Adam, whilst still in heaven, requests from Archangel Raphael to relate 
‘how and wherefore this world was first created’ (Milton 2004: 211). As the poet recounts: 
‘but the evil soon / Driven back redounded as a flood on those / From whom it sprung, 
impossible to mix / With blessedness. Whence Adam soon repealed / The doubts that in 
his heart arose: and now / Led on, yet sinless, with desire to know’ (231). A few scenes 
before Satan (disguised as a sleeping serpent) returns to heaven, in order to deceive Adam 
 
25 ‘[T]he growth of culture’, writes Jung (1960), has brought ‘with it so many restrictions of a 
moral and a social nature’ in order to moderate the excesses of the influences of instincts, like for 
instance, the instinct of sexuality (116). Archetypes, that is, ‘far-fetched mythological motifs and 
symbols’ that ‘appear autochthonously at any time, often, apparently, as the result of particular 
influences, traditions, and excitations working on the individual, but more often without any sign 
of them’ (112), incorporate condensed moral lessons for the potentially destructive consequences 




and Eve to ‘Eat freely with glad heart’ (246) from the ‘wisdom-giving plant’ (285), from 
‘the interdicted tree’ (212) that brings ‘Knowledge of good and ill…’ (247), the tree they 
had been ‘[c]harged not to touch…’ (213), we encounter the first expression of the human 
possibility (to use Jung’s terms) of wonder, of the inherent perceptual curiosity, in short, 
of the inherent human (psychical) ‘hunger’ to inquire and explore randomly, to strive for 
forbidden knowledge ‘which Adam should never have had in the first place’, 
notwithstanding ‘God is willing to give him’, according to Frye’s (2005: 45) interpretation. 
Thus, Raphael issues a clear warning against Adam. Despite that he received a positive 
response from God to answer his ‘hunger’, at the same time the knowledge he was going 
to supply should ‘remain within bounds; beyond abstain / To ask, nor let thine own 
inventions hope / Things not revealed, which the invisible king / Only omniscient, hath 
suppressed in night / To none communicable in earth or heaven’ (Milton 2004: 216). 
However, Eve’s decision to eat the forbidden fruit, from the tree of knowledge which 
should have remained secret to humans, entails that wonder itself cannot be restricted 
‘within bounds’.  
As Arendt (1990) argued, ‘the human mind stands in need of concepts if it is to 
function at all’ (220). As explained in the previous section, the human mind does not cease 
functioning in the absence of concepts. However, a stable empirical world, within which 
such concepts are produced, is needed for the mechanism of wonder to reflect upon. As the 
the above analysis (based on Milton’s interpretation of the archetypal story of the Old 
Testament) indicates, wonder is a restless mechanism. Eventually the eclipse of such an 
empirical world could allow the same mechanism to begin reflecting on the underworld. 
This could allow raw passions and self-destructive psychical energies (products of pathos) 
to explode in real life. On the one hand, such concepts that keep human wonder 
preoccupied, concepts of the empirical world, apart from encompassing norms that shape 
a common life for those who embrace them (bonding memory), incorporate moral lessons. 
They shape ethical memory, as I will explain in what follows by reflecting on Hobbes’ 
Leviathan (1651/2006), on Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding (1689/1978) and, 
more importantly, on Arendt’s LOF. 
1) The empirical dimension: ethical memory (thinking and judgment) 




proposition that every human creature arrives into this world with no truth imprinted on 
his/her mind (18). ‘The senses at first let in particular ideas’ to furnish the human mind, 
‘the yet empty cabinet’, the ‘unwritten paper’, a tabula rasa on which no innate practical 
principles exist (22). Hence, in the Lockean mind, human attitude and personal identity are 
purely related to our experiences with the external world. However, as Jung (1960) argued, 
‘[t]he existence of the collective unconscious means that individual consciousness is 
anything but a tabula rasa and is not immune to predetermining influences … [to] inherited 
presuppositions, quite apart from the unavoidable influences exerted upon it by the 
environment’ (112). If the collective unconscious is an amalgam of archetypes that 
influence conscious thinking (predetermining influences), as Jung stated, and if such 
archetypes, else called ‘primordial images’, are related to our instincts (which they attempt 
to illuminate) and pre-exist sense perception simultaneously (ibid) we arrive at the 
following conclusion: instincts pre-exist sense perception itself. The instinct (the ‘hunger’) 
of wonder, more specifically, pre-exists sense perception and conscious thinking. We could 
therefore assert that thinking, our capacity to reflect upon past experiences (Arendt 1978, 
1) is motivated by wonder. Another theory emphasises the internal organs of the human 
mind, such as the language organ, specialised in solving problems (Chomsky 2002: 64). 
‘The growth and development of these specialized organs, sometimes called “learning,” is 
the result of internally directed processes and environmental effects that trigger and shape 
development’ (ibid). The theory concerning the initial states of the faculty of internal 
language is called universal grammar (ibid). Internal language is ‘not manifested at birth, 
as in the case of other organs, say the visual system’ (ibid; emphasis added). Thus, instead 
of being an empty vessel (by birth), the human mind, claims Chomsky, incorporates 
mechanisms capable of producing language. Or (as the above analysis indicated) the human 
mind can include mechanisms of primary motivation, the instinct of perceptual curiosity 
(or wonder), in other words In what follows, more extensive analysis will take place about 
Arendt’s faculty of thinking (with the concept of human wonder in mind). 
According to Locke (1978), experience is the knowledge deriving from our mind’s 
capacity to elaborate on objects and ideas it perceives through sensation. Ideas and objects 
are depended ‘wholly upon our senses’ (42-3). But when sensed objects are removed from 




(Hobbes 2006: 9). This is what ‘the Latines call Imagination, from the image made in 
seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses’ (ibid). For Locke 
(1978), this power of reviving such objects (disappeared from our senses) is related to ‘the 
storehouse of our ideas’ we call memory (79) which reveals the meaning of what is absent 
‘in the form of a story’ (Arendt 1978, 1: 133). Memory signifies the ability of every mind 
to retrieve immovable or moving objects when they disappear from our senses, according 
to Arendt (1978, 1: 51; 76; 193; 2: 11) and Hobbes (2006: 9-10). In short, memory ‘collects 
and re-collects what otherwise would be doomed to ruin in oblivion’ (Arendt 1978, 2: 12). 
For Jan Assmann (2006), re-collecting implies the retrieval of ‘things that have been 
dispersed’ and re-membering evokes ‘the idea of putting “members” back together’ (11). 
Objects re-collected from memory have been ‘absent from consciousness altogether’ but 
are ‘revived anew’, claims William James (1980, p.275). In short, memorised objects 
become invisible and imagined. They are lodged deep into the storehouse of our memory. 
Imagination is, thus, considered to be a reflection of re-presentation, of the process through 
which these objects are brought back into the present time by our so-called thinking ego 
(Arendt 1978, 1: 12). 
For Arendt (1978, 1), thinking and judgment are interrelated: the former deals with 
representations of objects one has experienced and memorized. At the same time it applies 
the attitude ‘of examining whatever happens to come to pass’ (Arendt 1978, 1: 5). In other 
words, thinking is associated with nóēsis, with ‘the soundless dialogue we carry on with 
ourselves’ (6). This silent dialogue evaluates past experiences and gradually dissolves 
cemented ideas and viewpoints. To put it in my terms, motivated by our proclivity to 
endlessly inquire (wonder), thinking dives into the storehouse of our memory in order to 
identify objects for reflection. First, those objects the thinking ego brings back into the 
present potentially incorporate moral precepts. They may refer to events (or experiences) 
whose evaluation discourage repetition of activities with negative impact on others. Thus, 
thinking and nóēsis ‘the soundless dialogue of me with myself’ (31), are preoccupied with 
the endless re-interpretation of the moral value these memorial objects incorporate. In other 
words, thinking constitutes ‘among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing’ 
(5), and prepares the way for judgment, for discerning right from wrong (Arendt 1969b: 




‘between what needs to be done and what needs to be avoided’ (Esposito 2017: xiii). From 
this it follows that judgment itself (in Arendt’s thought) ‘realizes thinking’ and ‘makes it 
manifest in the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always too busy to be 
able to think’ (Arendt 1978, 1: 193). Second, these memorable moral objects (experiences) 
are the products of prolonged collective interactions (Winter 2006: 139) of groups and 
individuals who congregate in public spaces, but often ‘on the borderline between the 
private and the public, between families, civil society, and … state[s]’ (150). Often such 
interactions, being political or otherwise, take place within  an empirical world, within a 
common shared space, as Pierre Nora (1996) and Margaret Canovan (1996) argued. The 
common space of the nation as the primary basis for collective engagement and, 
simultaneously, a vehicle for action and remembrance (Nora 1996; Canovan 1996). Jay 
Winter, in Remembering War (2006), criticises Nora’s exclusive emphasis on France and 
‘adopt[s] a pluralistic approach to cultural history’ (136) from ‘the angle of small-scale, 
locally rooted social action’ (150). His aim is ‘to approach the regional, the local, the 
particular, and the familial realities of loss of life in wartime’ (139), so when ‘we speak of 
collective remembrance, we … recognize that different collectives, within the same state, 
socially frame their memories in very different ways’ and that ‘[t]he nation is not the place 
where collective remembrance begins, though the local, the particular, and the national 
frequently intersect’ (150). If the collectivity of the nation (or the town and the village) 
constitutes the primary basis for interactions, from which collective experiences are shaped 
(ethical memory) and if, as Anthony Smith (1991), nations are constituted by groups and 
individuals whose cultural identity is shaped by gestures and norms (cultural memory), 
commonly shared by those who share membership (71-98), we arrive at the following 
conclusion: cultural memory comes before ethical memory. The concept of cultural 
memory, in conjunction with civil memory (the two ingredients of bonding memory) will 
be discussed more thoroughly in what follows.  
2) Bonding memory: the construction of the empirical world 
According to Winter (2006), ‘[h]istory and memory overlap, infuse each other, and 
create vigorous and occasionally fruitful incompatibilities’ (6). Historical events (election 
results, political movements, civil unrests and wars) often include moral lessons (ethical 




and the extermination camps (Winter 2006: 27; Arendt 1969a: 14), or, as Arendt (1969a) 
argues, the ‘revulsion against … [political] violence’ (partially) shared by generations that 
grew ‘under the shadow of the atom bomb’ (14). Or even the anti-slavery crusades in 
America, which exposed the suffering of the African Americans (Genovese 1976; Douglas 
1991; Walker 1993), raising awareness against racism. More often, such events shape new 
perceptions, common for large portions of a population. Consider also the case of the 
American Revolution (see Chapter 7), which is revered and celebrated by a great 
percentage of the American people as the ultimate milestone of the birth of the American 
nation. Remembrance of such events refers to civil bonding memory.  
Historical events are retrievable objects: they disappear from our experiences, from 
sight or hearing (especially since they have limited duration) but can always be retrieved 
by our thinking ego. As Winter (2006) suggests, ‘[h]istorical remembrance is a discursive 
field’ (11). Historical events are not directly experienced by everyone. They are, 
nonetheless, re-presentable through narration, through songs, poems, artistic works, 
ceremonies, commemorations, etc., which links the past with the present. Narration (110) 
and teaching are methods of re-presentation used by institutions of civic education (such 
as schools, universities, etc.). Re-presentation (through narration) involves discourse and 
language. Discourse constructs images of occurrences for those who have not witnessed 
them. It constitutes these objects/images subjects of indirect perception (indirect since they 
are not sensed at the exact time when they have occurred, but they can be heard or seen 
through sources that record and recount such historical events). In addition, the power of 
photography (79), ‘[t]he expansion of the print trade, the art market, the leisure industry, 
and the mass circulation press, allied to developments first in photography and then in 
cinematography, created powerful conduits for the dissemination of texts, images, and 
narratives of the past in every part of Europe and beyond’ (24).  
Heritage and bonding memory do not exclusively connote the ability of 
memorialising (and re-presenting) events of political significance (such as wars and 
revolutions). They may also refer to accepted cultural norms and codes of everyday life 
(including unwritten laws), to the so-called ethimiko dikaio or dimodes (δημώδες), to use 
Pantazopoulos’ (1995: 9 [Πανταζόπουλος 1995: 9]) terms, from the word ‘demos’ (the 




the perception of justice of the societas civilis (Κονδύλης 2015: 63-81 [Kondylis 2015: 63-
81]). We can compare it with Aristotle’s (1993a: 120 [Αριστοτέλης 1993α: 120]) ἔθεσι 
(ethesi), implying the good traditions (ethics) that shape and improve (ἐπικοσμηθέν) the 
moral character of each citizen. According to Deneen (2018), this sum of cultural 
characteristics of a collective (empirical) life (of a cultural bonding memory, in my terms) 
are the consequences of collected practices passed down through generations (tradere) 
(190). Hence, they define what we call common heritage, which ascribes to heterogeneous 
groups a certain identity, allowing them to exist as a collectivity, bound by a common 
purpose and orientation. As Pocock (1989a) argued, societies and communities envisage 
their own continuity through elements of their structure ‘of which it is sufficiently aware 
to consider them continuous’ (234). These elements become images, symbols (objects) 
and/or archetypes, which are stored in our memory. They shape the ‘formed ways of acting’ 
and ‘living’, what we call tradition (ibid) and, gradually, define the identity of the same 
collectivity as a whole (B. J. Smith 1985: 262). Tradition, writes Genovese (1976), is the 
embodiment of elements, ‘recovered in each generation, and adjusted to new conditions’ 
(4-5). It transmutes into the present memorised objects through ‘symbolic forms of 
[cultural] bonding memory’ (Assmann 2006: 17), anchored in our yearning for belonging 
and ‘to develop a social identity’ (6).  
At this stage we will discuss further Aristotle’s ἔθεσι (in relation to tradition and 
custom). Let us consider, initially, Lasch’s (1991a) analysis in ‘The Sociological Tradition 
and The Idea of Community’, where he distinguishes between memory and custom26. For 
Lasch what is memory for custom is action for behaviour (133). Behaviour and ‘custom’ 
are immemorial, habitual, unconscious, ritualistic and repetitive (B. J. Smith 1985: 15-7; 
Pocock 1989a: 237; Lasch 1991a: 133); they fall ‘into patterns that repeat themselves in a 
predictable fashion’ (Lasch 1991a: 133). Action, on the other hand, ‘is unique and 
idiosyncratic’ (ibid). It is linked to judgment and free will, while behaviour and custom are 
automatic (ibid). Burke, for example, in the Reflections on the Revolution in France 
(1790/1982), defends conformity to custom and habit against the ‘untrustworthy memory’, 
writes B. J. Smith (1985: 118). Habits do not depend upon reflection or action which in 
 




Burkean philosophy constitutes the biggest source of instability (119; 130). The ‘pleasing 
illusions’ of habits and customs, not only ascribe to certain populations a common identity, 
but more importantly keep them in awe and harmonise ‘the different shades of life’ (Burke 
1982, 171). The spread of the philosophy of radical Enlightenment, according to the same 
author, of ‘this new conquering empire of light and reason’ (ibid), would wipe away 
customs, these ‘[p]rejudices guided conduct more reliably than reason’ itself (Lasch 1991a: 
129). Eventually, ‘[all] the super-added ideas furnished from the wardrobe of a moral 
imagination’ that cover ‘the defects of our naked shivering nature and … raise it to dignity 
in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion’ 
(ibid) would fade away, tearing off ‘the decent drapery of life’ (Burke 1982, p.171), 
unleashing ‘man’s animality’ in return (Kloppenberg 2016: 507). 
Nonetheless, to suggest that the ‘people’ should passively (habitually) reproduce 
concepts and norms in order to avoid destruction indirectly reveals the pessimism and a 
form of elitist bias, so typical in various forms of conservative thought, especially in the 
anti-egalitarian philosophy of the European nobility of the sixteenth, seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (Κονδύλης 2015: 181-1 [Kondylis 2015: 180-1]). In order to explain 
this, consider Nietzsche’s genealogy: when the origins (ursprung) of the values of ideas 
and concepts—once praised for being (hypothetically) ‘altruistic’, ‘good’ and ‘useful’—
are entirely ‘forgotten’, the same ideas are reproduced ‘as a sheer matter of habit’ 
(Nietzsche 2003: 10). By the same token, concepts reproduced habitually (or 
unconsciously) in our daily life can include ‘indecent’ perceptions (products of pathos). 
Those who passively reproduce such perceptions may find themselves unable to understand 
where their daily attitudes and deeds derive from and if they mask major injustices. In 
short, custom makes normal negative prejudices, inasmuch as it decreases awareness 
concerning the origins (and the seriousness) of the ‘indecencies’ they potentially 
incorporate. Mary Wollstonecraft (1993), for instance, speaks about ‘the leading 
prejudices … in the present constitution of society’ that are either ‘tolerated’ or ‘reckoned 
sacred’ (347). But if tradition creates and sustains a common empirical world that keeps 
the human mind preoccupied with meaningful objects, stalking civilisation by obstructing 
the passages to the dark forces of the underworld, and since republics are unthinkable 




‘between citizens in space and time’ (B. J. Smith 1985: 6), we understand that Burke’s 
conservatism and traditionalism may have some positive practical value (to use James’ 
terms). His theory, however, must be re-interpreted. Tradition must not be synonymous 
with the unconscious/behavioral reproduction of (potentially) false concepts and 
appraisals.  
In order to be able to recognise which elements of the past have to be conserved as 
long as they have value for us, and which must be thrown away respectively, it is important 
to treat the common past not as ‘custom’, but to associate it with (bonding) memory, which 
allows thinking and public judgment. Memory is related to Aristotle’s ἔθεσι (ethesi): «ὁ δέ 
λόγος καί ἡ διδαχή μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἃπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλά δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τοῡ 
ἀκροατοῡ ψυχήν πρός τό καλῶς χαίρειν και μισεῖν» (‘logos and education do not always 
bring the desired effects. Primarily the soul of a student must be accustomed to love things 
that cause happiness and to despise things that cause harm’) (Αριστοτέλης 1993α: 196 
[Aristotle 1993b: 196]; my translation). Ethesi must not be conflated with the modern 
understanding of ἔθος (ethos) as εθίζω (ethizo), referring to habit and addiction. Ethesi 
involves memory, from which our thinking ego retrieves valuable objects—perceived by 
sensation and experience or through narration—and (subsequently) wonder reflects upon 
them. To be able to distinguish between objects that ‘cause happiness’ (to use Aristotle’s 
terms again) or cause harm requires thinking and judging, in short, ability to evaluate their 
possible (moral) consequences. The vita civile, with its emphasis on logos, has the capacity 
to prevent (cultural) bonding memory from becoming a mere custom (as Chapter 7 will 
explain). In brief, the public-political realm, the marketplace, the agora, the space of 
dialogue and consultation, increases the chances for absorbed norms and ideas to be re-
evaluated through logos, through public dialogue and open debates (as the previous chapter 
stressed).  
So much for the empirical mind and the role of judgment. It is time to explore the 
dark realms of the underworld. It is time to shed light on the evilness of pathos, the primary 
human vice the vita civile attempts to bridle. This requires extensive analysis of Arendt’s 
notion of willing (the second premise of the vita contemplativa). 
3) The underworld: willing and pathos  




historical passages on philosophical conceptions of the will fail to make transparent what 
Arendt was trying to say about this “faculty”’ (121-2). In general terms, after reading LOF 
and the Chapter What Is Freedom (143-171) from Arendt’s Between Past and Future 
(1961/1968a), one briefly senses the main reasons the author associates willing (or pathos) 
with all sorts of solipsistic and self-centered human impulses. It is necessary, nonetheless, 
in order to offer a clear understanding of this faculty to acknowledge, compare and contrast, 
similar viewpoints. Thus, Plato’s and Nietzsche’s ideas are given consideration, coupled 
with further relevant discussions of  Milton’s PL.  
Unlike thinking and judging, willing deals ‘not merely with things that are absent 
from the senses and need to be made present through the mind’s power of re-presentation’ 
(Arendt 1978, 2: 13). First, willing (I-will) is incapable of generating political freedom 
(Arendt 1968a: 162), the raison d'être of the political realm (151), of the human capacity 
to initiate, ‘an inherent quality of the I-can’ (159). Political freedom, the ‘I-can’, is totally 
paralyzed by the ‘I-will’ (162). The latter Arendt conflates with the notion of ‘free will’, 
with the boundlessness liberum arbitrium (Arendt 1968a: 163), the urgency and the need 
of possessing what the mind views as highly desirable (15)27. As we, however, see in 
Milton’s PL, ‘free will’ is not necessarily arbitrary and boundless; ‘free will’ does not 
undervalue the importance of self-limitation and the responsibility our freedom to act bears. 
In Milton’s PL Adam’s happiness is ‘[l]eft to his own free will’ (152). In another verse: 
‘God left free the will, for what obeys / Reason, is free, and reason he made right’ (247).  
Second, for Arendt (1978, 2) ‘[t]he will always addresses itself to itself; when the 
command says, Thou shalt, the will replies, Thou shalt will as the command says’ (69). 
What Arendt conveys here is that an ‘internal contest’ exists, an internal conflict between 
the ‘I-will’ and the ‘counter-will’ the ‘nil-will’ (ibid). The latter forces the mind to create 
‘delusions’ that our desires are, indeed, the commands of the eu-prēpon and that our 
‘wants’ are always in line with orders, written or unwritten laws and injunctions that 
preserve truth, beauty and justice. There exists a conflict ‘between velle and nolle’, claims 
the same author (ibid). In this respect, the phenomenon ‘I do not do the good I want, but 
 
27  For Spengler (1961), the Faustian (or modern) Western civilization is dominated by the 
unflattering belief in the so-called unlimited human potential, in short by optimism, by the will-to-




the evil I do not want is what I do’ (The Bible, Romans 7:19) implies that the ‘nil-will’ has 
become too impotent to cancel the ‘I-will’, the ‘evil-will’, the ‘evil I do’, which is the evil 
‘I do not want to do’ but implicitly something ‘urges me to do’. Arendt uses the following 
phrase from Euripides’ Medea in order to describe this phenomenon: ‘stronger than my 
deliberations [bouleumata] is my thymos … which is the cause of the greatest evils among 
mortals”’ (ibid). In other words, stronger than the ‘nil-will’ is the ‘I-will’, the primary 
source of evil. Thus, willing (or thymos) points to the ‘passionate drive of desires’ (of 
pathos, in my terms) that weakens reason (70). Plato’s (2014 [Πλάτων 2014]) notion of 
thymos is quite similar. Thymos is activated by the ἐπιθυμητικόν (epithimitikon), deriving 
from ἐπιθυμία (epithimia, translated as ‘will’ or ‘desire’), which «ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον» 
(‘rules like a beast’) (314). In short, the  epithimitikon the most irrational and destructive 
part of the soul (for Plato), activates the θυμοειδές (thymoeides), which produces rampant 
anger or rage (thymos). In my view, thymos is not always irrational, bestial and 
catastrophic. Thymos, according to Fukuyama (1992), is triggered when one’s sense of 
worth is systematically deprived (xvii; 302). This type of anger, nevertheless, does not 
spring from the epithimitikon, from the underworld mind, as is the case of μῆνις (mēnis), 
the extreme, prolonged, vengeful and irrational thymos, the most extreme expression of the 
‘I-will’, which in any case is deemed catastrophic. The word mēnis appears in the Homer’s 
Iliad: «Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά, Πηληιάδεω Ἀχιλῆος οὐλομένην» (1924: 2), ‘baneful wrath which 
brought countless woes upon the Achaeans’ (translated by A. T. Murray) (3). Mēnis 
suppresses the logismikon (the rational) aspect of the soul (from the word λογίζομαι, 
logizomai, that is, being able to exercise reason, to pass judgment), the empirical, the 
judgmental mind (in my terms). For Plato ([Πλάτων] 2014), the logismikon «τά δέ ἂγοντα 
καί ἕλκοντα διά παθημάτων τε και νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται» (‘halts the drives and 
motivations incited by irrational desires’) (316). In short, mēnis can deactivate the 
empirical mind.  
As also Fine (2007) put it, Arendt’s willing is ‘about domination’ (123). Willing 
does not preclude dialogue or communication (ibid). In order to shed further light on this 
rationale it is worthwhile to look at Quint’s Inside Paradise Lost (2014). As opposed to  
Lasch (1991a), for whom Milton’s Satan is an  ideal hero-rebel (233-6), and to Albert 




dictatorial rule, an ‘aggressive’ and ‘unworthy’ authority of ‘divine injustice’ (26), Quint 
(2014), views (Milton’s) Satan himself as the archetype ‘of universal envy’ (131). In the 
same way, for Jung (2009), Satan personifies ‘the sum of the darkness of human nature’ 
(323), It is the darkness of ‘envy, as much if not more than pride [what] triggers the original 
sin against God…’ (Quint 2014: 122). Adam and Eve, by yielding to Satan’s temptation, 
embrace evil after eating the forbidden fruit and make envy part of their own existence. 
Thus, the envy that had forced Satan to build his own monarchical kingdom, to create ‘a 
kingdom in hell which is a close parody of the kingdom of heaven’ (Frye 2005: 14), has 
been transmigrated to human beings. We can assert that this envy finds expression in 
pursuits striving to erect and defend worldly monarchical, dictatorial, and/or theocratic 
regimes in the pursuit of absolute power. From a contextualist point of view, it was 
common among seventeenth and eighteenth century Anglo-American liberal or republican 
thinkers of Christian origin (including Milton) to associate Satan with oppression and 
despotism. For example, Paine (1995) considered monarchy idolatrous and un-Christian. 
Monarchy is ‘introduced into the world by the Heathens’ (11). For Paine (1995), monarchy 
was ‘the most prosperous invention the Devil ever set on foot for the promotion of idolatry’ 
(ibid). In the mind of the American Founding Father, writes Kidd (2012), the British 
‘oppression was wrong in the eyes of God’ (253).  
In the event one attempts ‘to imitate God through power’, argues Vető (1994) 
(while discussing Weil), through brute force rather than love, he/she (like Satan) revolts 
against God (23). At the same time, he/she places him/herself ‘at the center’ of ‘this revolt 
against God’, masking his/her pathos (will) to reign supreme, to accumulate wealth 
(without restriction), to corrupt, exploit and oppress others (ibid) for his/her own personal 
benefit. Hitherto, we have examined the republican/liberal interpretation of this archetypal 
story (of Satan’s ‘revolt against God’). Nonetheless, does our ‘inherent’ envy, our 
‘inherent’ will (or pathos) for domination, only cause despotism and oppression? Is not 
political optimism (as it is enunciated  in  millenarian interpretations of the eighteenth 
century idea of progress and, more importantly, in revolutionary proposals advocating, 
directly or indirectly, the erection of some utopian society) another expression of the same 
envy that initially had prompted Satan to rebel against God’s kingdom of heaven? The 




resembling God’s heavenly perfection, could be interpreted as an expression of the same 
pathos for domination transmigrated by Satan himself to human beings. As Philo of 
Alexandria, a Jewish thinker who studied the Christian religion ‘in the light of Greek 
philosophy’ (Passmore 2000: 83) argued, ‘[o]f the passions, the most fatal … is spiritual 
pride, the lust to be equal to the gods–the Greek hubris’ (85). The sixth book of Milton’s 
PL (where the battle between the army of the apostate angels and the soldiers of God takes 
place) , issues a stem warning against the pathos for perfection. ‘Of rigid spears, and 
helmets thronged, and shields / Various, with boastful argument portrayed, / The banded 
powers of Satan hasting on / With furious expedition; for they weened / That selfsame day 
by fight, or by surprise / To win the mount of God, and on his throne / To set the envier of 
his state, the proud / Aspiter, but their thoughts proved fond and vain…’ (180). In the same 
book Raphael (an angel of God) recounts ‘how Michael and Gabriel were sent forth to 
battle against Satan and his angels’ (179), and how the former struck the latter ‘with horror 
backward, but far worse / Urged them behind; headlong themselves they threw / Down 
from the verge of heaven, eternal wrath / Burnt after them to the bottomless pit’ (207). Like 
Dostoevsky (2009), who fears the collapse of the ‘eternally’ and supposedly 
‘indestructible … Crystal Palace’28, precisely because it is ‘made of crystal’ (32), Milton’s 
verses could be interpreted from a similar standpoint, expressing profound concerns 
regarding the potential disastrous consequences of optimistic (human) pursuits. In short, 
the pursuit of earthly perfection (or endless betterment) defies one crucial rule: there is only 
one kingdom standing in absolute perfection, and this is the kingdom of God, as the major 
official trends of Christianity–for instance, Augustinianism, Calvinism, Lutheranism 
(Passmore 2000: 124-5; 127; 135; 155; 157; 163; 224) and/or Orthodox Christianity 
(Hughes 2004)–support. Thus, to strive for worldly perfection is to revolt against God’s 
divine monarchy, attributing to men and women divine characteristics, neglecting their 
wordly–and, hence, imperfect–nature, or (to use Dostoevsky’s terms) that they are ‘made 
of crystal’, that they are susceptible to their own lust, envy, resentment and mēnis. As a 
matter of fact, ‘[t]he main tendency of Christianity remains resolutely Hebraic in its 
separation of God from his creatures’ (119), that is, in its emphasis on the distinction 
 
28  We are reminded again that in Dostoevsky (2009) the ‘crystal palace’ is used allegorically as a 




between the human and the divine nature. Thus, ‘[t]o ask whether man is perfectible … is 
to ask how far man can be “like God”’ (23). Or as Karl Barth and Niebuhr believed, the 
aspiration to ‘to become like God’ is a form of hubris, ‘the root of all evil’ (Passmore 2000: 
169). Like Satan, who was forced to suffer down in ‘the bottomless pit’ of hell (Milton 
2004: 207) for his arrogance and ingratitude, in the same way optimistic pursuits, so long 
as they turn a blind eye on the (potentially) inherent vulnerability of men and women 
(pathos), can lead to more suffering and destruction, as our analysis on the French 
Revolution will partially reveal.   
Of course, one could easily conflate optimism with political movements seeking to 
improve the living standards of a population but do not subscribe to the millenarian belief 
in a perfect future world. Consider, for example, Gray’s (2007) sweeping claim that ‘faith 
in a condition of future harmony’, which is of ‘Christian inheritance’, is nothing but ‘a 
utopian faith … and so is the modern idea of progress’ (29). But the desire for a better 
future is not necessarily ‘utopian’, ‘optimistic’ (and, thereby, hubristic). Movements 
advocating reforms in favour of fairer wealth (re)distribution, calling for universal suffrage, 
et al., do not necessarily strive towards ‘perfect harmony’. More importantly, such reforms 
do not always derive from our will to erect ‘crystal palaces; they are not necessarily part of 
some grand project promising a brand-new ideal society, or of political proposals 
advocating ‘salvation’ through progressive and ‘open-ended’ amelioration, to use Lasch’s 
(1991a: 47) terms again. Presumably, the pursuit for ‘improvement’ could incline either 
towards optimism or meliorism (hope) respectively. Consider, for example, Aeschylus’s 
(Αισχύλος) Prometheus Bound (1992). In this literary work, Prometheus appears as the 
archetype of the «πυρός βροτοῖς δοτῆρ» (‘the one who bestowed fire on mortals’) (78), the 
one who stole the fire of Zeus for «κοινόν ὠφέλημα θνητοῖσιν» (‘the common benefit  of 
the mortals’) (ibid). What prompted the Gods of Mount Olympus to chastise Prometheus 
is not simply his act of theft as such. More precisely, the gift of fire, an archetypal symbol 
of god-like power, knowledge and intellectuality, according to Bachelard’s (1964), allowed 
humanity not simply to overcome the dread of suffering and violent death. Simultaneously, 
it shaped the illusion of human perfectibility, that (for instance) knowledge and common 
effort could constitute men and women capable of living the eternal and indestructible life 




«θνατούς ἅγαν» (72), excessive, or limitless (āgan) for the (thnatous) mortals.  
In modern history, a good example of how initiatives, knowledge and common 
efforts proposed not worldly perfection (as historical records permit us to assume) but 
economic relief and better living conditions (meliorism) through political participation is 
offered by the case of American Populism (Goodwyn 1976; Lasch 1991a: 217-225). 
Drawing on American republicanism, the Populists pushed forward a series democratic 
proposals (I will shed light on them later on). As a matter of fact, classical republicanism 
in America (especially its more agrarian offshoots) has always been at odds with the 
(liberal) idea of progress, claims Lasch (1991: 203). Thus, movements inspired by 
American republicanism (during the nineteenth century in America), including Populism 
itself, approached the idea of unlimited industrial expansion and economic growth with 
scepticism (Lasch 1991a: 217; 1991c). Goodwyn’s position, outlined in The Democratic 
Promise (1976), is quite similar: the Populists expressed their ardent enthusiasm for 
reforms based on political and economic justice. However, their deep yearning for justice 
and equality did not force them to look forward to the perfectibility of man, nor to consider 
their proposed reforms parts of a plan advocating ‘salvation’ through never-ending 
improvement. Robert C. McMath Jr’s American Populism: A Social History 1877-1989 
(1992), and Gene Clanton’s Populism, The Humane Preference in America (1991), which 
emphasises the pro-Enlightenment aspects of the movement, and Charles Postel’s Populist 
Vision (2007), where Lasch’s approach on Populism is criticised, as the author associates 
Populism with liberalism and, simultaneously, discusses the interest the front leaders of the 
movement demonstrated for technological education, do not give us the impression that 
Populism itself was an ‘optimistic’ movement. 
4) The underworld: impersonality: individual and collective self-purification 
Returning to our analysis concerning pathos and the underworld: not all aspects of 
the underworld fuel pathos, exhibiting rapacity and desire for domination. Through the 
underworld one can also trace psychical energies that connect us with the impersonal 
realm, instead of inciting idolatry, envy, selfishness and mēnis, these energies incite self-
purification and common decency. According to John of the Cross, men and women, in 
their pursuit for purification, where lust and passion for domination are mortified, must 




hell before he could ascend into heaven (196). In Milton’s PL, as Frye (2005) explained, 
the Garden of Eden is also ‘internalized, transformed from an outward place to an inner 
state of mind’ (109). The Garden of Eden corresponds to the small portion of the human 
soul, the so-called impersonal realm, according to Weil (2005), which can be discovered 
by everyone who seeks to escape from the collectivity (77). More precisely, ‘[o]ur 
personality is the part of us which belongs to error and sin’ (75). Redemption from sin, for 
the same author, is offered when one raises above the personal and the collective level, 
approaching an anonymous dimension (the impersonal realm) where ‘the highest things are 
achieved’ (ibid) and where ‘there is no part left in his soul to say “I”’, and when the ‘I’ 
itself is given to God altogether (99). ‘Weil speaks early on of the necessity, first, to adopt 
an ‘“attitude of supplication’” (Freeman 2015: 163). ‘I must necessarily turn to something 
other than myself since it is a question of being delivered from self’ (Weil 2002: 3). Hence, 
the self, ‘directly suggesting egotism, egocentrism … and rapacity’ (Vető 1994: 18), must 
be de-created. It must be dissolved and annihilated (Vető 1994: 11; Freeman 2015: 164), 
‘pass[ed] into nothingness’ (Weil 2002: 33). Instead, attention must be directed ‘outward, 
toward the other-than-self;. only then will one receive the existential nourishment and 
inspiration required for true creation to come forth’ (Freeman 2015: 164). Similar insights 
(common in Christian mysticism) can be also found in Saint John’s (of the Cross) poem 
The Dark Night (1991): ‘I abandoned and forgot myself, / laying my face on my Beloved 
[God]; / all things ceased; I went out from myself / leaving my cares / forgotten among the 
lilies’ (52).  
Freeman rejects such calls for the total de-creation of the self, as the only way of 
purification from all sorts of biases, earthly temptations and sinful appetites (products of 
pathos). When one elevates him/herself above the personal and the collective, accessing 
the impersonal realm, he/she still passes through his/her memory, through his/her 
personality and biography (165). In this respect, the complete annihilation of the ‘I’, by 
exhorting us to destroy the negative aspects of our personality (biases, egoism, negative 
prejudices, etc.) may (even unwittingly) force us to annihilate our own memory, biography 
and personality or, in simple terms, our own physical existence. The same idea was ‘alleged 
to push Weil toward the desire for self-destruction’ (Vető 1994: 154). As James (2004) 




excess’ (297), including ‘fanaticism or theopathic absorption, self-torment, prudery, 
scrupulosity, gullibility, and…  morbid ability to meet the world’ (321) and/or optimism29. 
Weil’s case exemplifies some of these limitations of the mystical experience, spotted and 
criticized by Niebuhr (1960), with the most severe being the association of selfishness and 
egoism with the will-to-live, which inevitably leads towards the total physical annihilation 
of the latter (55-6). Drawing on James’ and Niebuhr’s views concerning the moral value 
of spiritual discipline, we could approach Weil’s (2005) idea about the ‘sacred’ impersonal 
realm (75) from a perspective that allows us to discover a safer path towards self-
purification. For James (2004), the condition of saintliness, this ‘friendly continuity’ with 
some ‘ideal power’, with the impersonal realm (to use Weil’s terms), shifts ‘the emotional 
center’ towards harmony, activating inner psychical energies that purify thoughts and 
perceptions (241). Martin Luther King Jr’s (1986) theology, which associates hope with 
the unfaltering conviction that psychical enlightenment comes through agape, which 
descends from the divine order ‘to “something deep down within”’, to something that 
dwells deep inside the human soul (260) is an example of such a case. For King, this ‘inner 
voice’ is not dissociated from personal experience. It is not an ‘abstract metaphysical idea’ 
but a moral incentive through which human beings overcome resentment and aggression 
(Branch 1988: 162). King’s pacifism widely echoes Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy 
(Raboteau 2017; Ashcroft 2018: 470), and (more precisely) his policy of satyagraha, which 
is pledged to non-violence (Gandhi 2018: 586; 717). Gandhi’s thought has also received 
influences from Leo Tolstoy’s Christian philosophy of love, non-aggression and mutual 
respect (87; 162; 179; 243; 274; 515-8). King saw the Christian notion of agape as a 
method of non-violent civil disobedience and reconciliation. Agape, more importantly, 
made him aware of the divine and liberating aspects of the human self (Hunt 2006: 233). 
As Chapter 5 will discuss more extensively, agape encourages descent (katabasis)30 into 
the underworld. Such as Ulysses (in Homer’s Odyssey) voluntarily descends into the 
underworld of Hades in order to identify the causes of conflict and suffering he experienced 
in life (namely, the selfishness of his fellow human beings, their envy, their mēnis and their 
appetite for domination), in the same way agape through katabasis allows us to come into 
 
29 In regards to optimism and mysticism, see Chapter 5 (the Conclusion). 




contact with our internalised vices, with the pathos that dwells in the underworld of our 
mind, which (sometimes unknowingly) influences our attitudes and modes of being. 
Through this voluntary submergence into our inner darkest realms fallible patterns of 
behaviour are identified and purged from the ‘I’31. The most profound types of religious 
introspection, claims Niebuhr (1960), ‘encourage judgment of past actions and attitudes in 
the light of an absolute moral power’ (60). This high moral power, so long as it stands in 
opposition to the corruptive ‘I-will’ (pathos), activates our ‘nil-will’. Thus, it boosts nóēsis, 
the silent inner dialogue (between the purifying ‘nil-will’ and the pervasive ‘I-will’), 
constituting the mind capable for judgment. 
For James (2004), saintliness allows the splendid excellences of ‘blissful 
equanimity’ (241) as well as ‘[f]elicity, purity, charity, patience, self-severity’ to take place 
(321). Thus, one can expose him/herself to the absolute moral ideal, to the impersonal 
realm, one can reach the stage of purification, throwing away egoism and all sorts of biases 
without necessarily disqualifying the ‘will-to-live’ (Niebuhr 1960: 63). Eventually, the aim 
of ‘impersonality’ is re-personalisation rather than the physical destruction of the ‘I’. 
Impersonality entails the emergence of a ‘new self’, purified from negative surrounding 
influences, traumatic memories as well as from self-destructive energies. In other words, 
by connecting ourselves with the highest good, we sense the moral boundary-lines, the 
laws of nature, invoking the ‘the highest virtue’ of love, which ‘gives transcendent and 
absolute worth’ to human life (57). The individual who connects him/herself with the 
impersonal realm and ‘purifies’ his/her own mind (individual purification), the same 
person who temporarily withdraws from the public world, recognises his/her duty toward 
his/her peers. He/she becomes an eloquent leader (or civil disobedient). Through his/her 
words and deeds he/she strives to inspire others, encouraging a populace to abort the hubris 
that has poisoned its own mind (collective purification).  
From a different angle, according to the Quaker George Fox, the ‘inner light’, the 
inward Christ dwelling within ourselves, the light that illuminates the darkness, shatters 
misery, leads to salvation (Ingle 1994: 49; 65) and has the power to ‘convict and convince’ 
 
31  This voluntary katabasis into the underworld mind must not be conflated with the involuntary 
intrusion of pathos into the empirical world. (For more regarding the way pathos invades the 




(111). It empowers individuals to resist pathos and hubris. First, as mentioned earlier, 
impersonality connects us with the higher good (God), with a high moral power. If the 
same power dwells (according to Fox’s weltanschauung) in every human being, this 
connection with God entails connection with the ‘common people’ as well. Furthermore, 
if the individual who approaches ‘something from God’ within him/herself can also sense 
God in others, and if God symbolises moral prudence (the laws of nature), the same 
individual can sense how a populace could have been if its members have not thrown off 
decency. Thereupon, the same person projects the image of a prudent populace in stark 
juxtaposition with what the populace has finally become. Thus, he/she inspires collective 
purification. Such an attempt requires public deliberation and spaces of open 
communication. As Arendt (1968a) put it, truth is inconceivable without communication, 
without a form of re-connection (and interaction) with our peers (85). Hence, the eloquent 
orator, the civil disobedient, the ‘purified’ leader and his/her followers, attempts to inspire 
prudence in the public according to the image the high moral ideal (the impersonal realm) 
has provided to him/her. The process of public deliberation and communication (for the 
purpose of collective self-purification) results in the re-activation of the silent dialogue of 
the collective ‘me’ with itself. In short, it re-actuates collective nóēsis and public judgment, 
by making the members of the unified body of ‘the people’ speaking with each other, 
shattering cemented perceptions.  To avoid misunderstandings, purification does not come 
solely through religious sources.  Murdoch in The Sovereign of Good (1970/2001) speaks 
of the way art, the ‘only spiritual thing which we love by instinct’ (83), ‘reveals what we 
are usually too selfish and too timid to recognize, the minute and absolutely random detail 
of the world, and reveals it together with a sense of unity and form’ (84) (for more see 
Chapter 5).  
To recapitulate: this section delved into Arendt’s vita contemplativa. By 
acknowledging the concept of human curiosity (wonder) it focused on the faculty of 
thinking and judging, on the logismikon (or empirical) aspect of the human mind, as well 
as on willing (the epithimitikon). Finally, by exploring the impersonal realm, it emphasised 
the practical benefits of religious thinking, which (as also Diderot explained) far from 
imprisoning the mind to irrational superstitions, ‘curbs human passions’ (Israel 2010: 168) 




incapable of stimulating decency and prudence. More importantly, this section focused on 
the significance of ethical and bonding memory in safeguarding stable forms of common 
life, protecting human collectivities and individuals from their own impulse to hubris and 
destruction (pathos). Finally, it placed emphasis on the faculty of willing, which incites 
moral transgression. With this in mind, the following section will re-evaluate Arendt’s 
(1998) vita activa, namely the three ‘basic conditions under which life on earth has been 
given to man’ (7). These are: labour and work, which is mainly associated with our private 
life and action, a public/political activity.  
The vita activa 
1)  Labour, work and action; the Athenian polis and the Roman metharmōsis 
For Arendt (1998) labour revolves around ‘the biological process of the human 
body’ (7). It is bound up with activities through which human life is sustained, with the 
inevitable necessities of life, with the production or consumption (or both) of food, ‘that 
can neither be abandoned nor terminated, but repeats itself, day after day, year after year’ 
(Straume 2012: 5). Labour is the characteristic of the despotism of the private realm, which 
corresponds to the (ancient) Athenian household. Within the household the task of 
safeguarding the means through which the necessities of life are fully covered were often 
appointed to slaves, considered part of their master’s (the economon) property (Arendt 
1998: 27; 45). The main distinction between ‘a political community (the πόλις) and a 
private household (οἰκία) is that the latter constitutes a “monarchy,” a one-man/woman-
rule, while the polis, on the contrary, “is composed of many rulers”’ (116). Etymologically 
speaking, the word economon—οικονομών (in Greek)—signifies the oikos-ecos (οἰκία: 
translated as house) and nomos (νόμος: the law). It refers to the individual who could set 
up laws and rules regarding the material supply of the household or other matters of private 
life in ancient Athens. On the other hand, action is located in the higher ranks of the vita 
activa (above labour and work), and presupposes the existence of an open space, of the 
public (or the political) realm. It is the only space where human beings can become 
political animals (zōon politikon, in Aristotle's terms), interacting with one another in a 
continuous dialogue (Canovan 1994: 143; Arendt 2005: 117), exercising the virtue of 




and to be ruled, ‘know[ing] both sides of [political] power’ (Arendt 1998: 177). As we see, 
‘action is never possible in isolation, since to be isolated signifies the deprivation of the 
capacity to act’ (118). Action, what makes “man a political being” (Arendt 1970: 82), ‘is 
surrounded by and in constant contact with the acts and words of other men’ (Arendt 1998: 
118). Logos (speech), as Canovan (1994) puts it (in her discussion of Arendt), ‘was the 
meeting point which united action and thought, giving objective and memorable form both 
to hidden ideas and to fleeting deeds, and therefore, containing within itself 'the whole 
meaningfulness of human existence’ (143). Hence, action is essentially synonymous with 
inter-action (Canovan 1994: 131) and judgment. It is associated with the political 
discussions taking place within an open space (the political realm), and, subsequently, with 
the critical evaluation of all opinions expressed within the same space.   
As opposed to action, labour is characterised by intense philistinism, and does not 
require the presence of others. Labour is a necessity (imposed by nature), without which 
no life could ever be sustained. Since the only interaction in labour is between man and 
nature (Arendt 1998: 13) rather between human beings, we arrive at the following 
conclusion: the temporal dimension of this condition is limited within our personal affairs 
(personal time). Contrary to labour, the condition of work—located in the middle of the 
vita activa hierarchy (above labour and below action)—is an unnatural process that 
provides an ‘“artificial” world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings’ 
(7). One of the primary features of work is the intense instrumentality through which the 
homo faber, ‘the fabricator of the world’ (117) constructs and produces goods, tools (such 
as tables or buildings) and/or pieces of art out of raw material. These goods are not offered 
for immediate consumption. Usually they have no expiration date (Arendt 1998: 94; Klein 
2014: 858-9). ‘During the work process, everything is judged in terms of suitability and 
usefulness for the desired end, and for nothing else’ (Arendt 1998: 153). Work, in contrast 
to labour, guarantees permanence and durability (167). The homo faber ‘does not merely 
follow the dictates of a natural deed’ (Canovan 1994: 56) in order to sustain human life, 
which is this is the task of the animal laborans. On the contrary, he/she subordinates nature 
to his/her ends and desires (Arendt 1998: 144), and instead of safeguarding the material 
conditions for the preservation of life, enriches the world with his/her artificial products.   




signaled the emergence of the realm of society (see the previous chapter). The social realm 
‘blurred the old borderline between private and political’ and subordinated the latter to the 
extreme intimacy of the former (Arendt 1998: 38). Lucius Annaeus Seneca, for example, 
misinterpreted the zōon politikon (political animal) as homo socialis (23). The theorists of 
societas civilis, writes Kondylis (2015 [Κονδύλης 2015]), placed more emphasis on the 
private sphere and the right to privacy, against the political superiority of the public realm 
(67; 82). As a matter of fact, the word societas was unknown to the Greeks. Aristotle 
(1993a) in The Politics makes it explicit that when he talks about ‘πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν 
κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν’ (‘every koinonia [society] constitutes a city’) (48) he is mainly 
interested for the «κοινωνία τῆς πολιτικῆς» (‘the political koinonia [society]’) (104). In 
other words, «πασῶν κυριωτάτη ... ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική» (the most important society is 
the political society’) (48]). The original meaning of the Greek koinonia (more accurately 
translated as ‘community’) has very little in common with the Roman societas (a 
misinterpretation of the former), indicating ‘alliance between people for a specific purpose, 
as when men organize in order to rule others or to commit a crime’ (Arendt 1998: 23). On 
the other hand, the Greek koinonia derives from the word koinos, ‘“common to all”’ 
(Arendt 2005: 14). In that sense, the lekton ‘political koinonia’ in Aristotle’s Politics 
describes a community whose rules and laws that shape and determine all aspects of 
common (koinos) life are the products of (political) action, of negotiations and open 
discussions. The modern understanding of society is an amalgam of the oikos and the polis 
(Arendt 1998: 28), or (to stress it more accurately) a metharmōsis of the polis to the 
bureaucratic/oligarchic, according to Castoriadis (Καστοριάδης 2008; 2011), Roman 
world, whose political structures resembled the monarchical and authoritarian rule of the 
Athenian household. The social realm extends the private realm in public life (Arendt 
1998: 118), which during the antiquity existed as distinct entities.  
The realm of society descends from ‘the “shadowy interior of household” into the 
public life’ (Benhabib 2000: 23) and ‘demands that its members act as though they were 
members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest’ (Arendt 
199: 39). In short, the servility of the private realm has taken over the political. Since then, 
politics have become totally preoccupied with economics and with procedures of material 




of management of production and consumption of goods through political measures, plans 
and legislation, a ‘canonist  doctrine’ deriving from Adam Smith, completely unknown 
during Antiquity as well as during the Middle Ages (Arendt 1998: 42, ff.35). The sweeping 
expansion of the realm of society during the age of modernity (and, more essentially, 
during and after the prevalence of the Industrial Revolution) led to the rise of mass culture 
(Benhabib 2000: 29), dominated by predictable everyday tasks (Klein 2014: 858). Mass 
society is ruled by unanimity, egocentricity, conformity (Canovan 1994: 117), uniformity 
and ‘homogenization of tastes, attitudes, manners, and lifestyles’ (Benhabib 2000: 28), by 
passivity and ‘herd mentality’, by a consumer-like behaviour.   
2) The ‘social question’ further considered 
 As we see, Arendt’s explicit antithesis between labour and action, reflects the 
opposition of the zōon politikon with ‘the natural association experience in [the Athenian] 
household life’ (Arendt 1998: 27). Simply put, the sphere of necessity (labour) excludes 
action (Straume 2012: 7). For this reason Arendt argued against what one of the most 
radical leaders of the French Revolution, Jean-Paul Marat, had previously endorsed 
(Hampson 1983: 209), the liberation of ‘mankind from poverty by political means’, 
considering this move ‘obsolete’, ‘futile’ and ‘dangerous’ (Arendt 1990: 114). In On 
Revolution (1990) Arendt attributes the failure of the French Revolution to poverty, which 
‘opened the political realm to the poor’, and converted this realm into ‘social’, 
overwhelmed ‘by the cares and worries which actually belong in the sphere of the 
household’ (91). But while mass poverty turned the malheureux into enragés, given that 
poverty and necessity themselves incites ‘primordial violence with which man pits himself 
against necessity’ (114), and sent the French Revolution to its nemesis, the American 
Revolution took place in a country whose laborious classes were not as (materially) 
exhausted as the French populace. Although poverty ‘was still very much present on the 
American scene and preoccupied the minds of the founders’, the poor were ‘not miserable’ 
(68). According to Tocqueville’s (1994), ‘in America, the most democratic of nations … 
complaints against property in general, which are so frequent in Europe, are never heard, 
because in America there are no paupers’ (1: 245). ‘In the United States … public officers 
[had] no class interests to promote’ (241), while the vast spending of the French monarchy 




about the millions of beggars in French towns and villages where food was running short 
and famine had set its grip, becoming unbearable and almost chronic (16; 46; 435). As 
other historians suggest, in the Old Regime France ‘the poor made up over a third of the 
total population’ and without a good harvest the peasants were forced to live below the 
subsistence level (Scurr 2006: 63). It is not that economic deprivation in the United States 
was inexistence, considering ‘the abject and degrading misery was present everywhere in 
the form of slavery and Negro labour’ (Arendt 1990: 70). However, economic disputes 
were of minor political significance during the Revolution (72). Arendt acknowledges the 
Hungarian councils (during the Revolution of 1956) and the ‘prestigious’, according to 
Bryan (1995: 36), direct democratic political institution of the American Town Hall 
meetings, as legitimate offspring of the polis, a genealogical henkfurt of the ancient 
Athenian self-governed body politic in modernity. The council system has ‘always been 
primarily political, with social and economic claims playing a very minor role’ (Arendt 
1990: 274).  
However, the impossibility for ‘a collective spirit’ to emerge around political 
interactions concerning the laboring process, writes Benhabib (2000), ‘is fairly 
unsubstantiated anthropologically as well as historically’ (141-2). Returning to Arendt’s 
scepticism concerning the marriage of economics and politics, we have to consider Steven 
Klein’s ‘"Fit to Enter the World": Hannah Arendt on Politics, Economics and the Welfare’ 
(2014). The author sets out ‘to recover the worldly dimension of economic activity’ (863) 
explaining that ‘institutional mediations’ do exist within a welfare state, capable of 
restoring ‘the stable worldly locations’ (864). Modern welfare states offer ‘worldly, 
institutional channels through which accumulation always flows’ (865). In his attempt to 
defend the welfare state on Arendtian grounds he misinterprets Arendt’s viewpoints: 
according to Klein (2014) the real danger (for Arendt) is not ‘the invasion of politics by 
economics but rather the reduction of economic matters to instrumental calculation’ 
introduced by capitalism and late modernity (857). Nonetheless, Arendt’s (1990) position 
is crystal clear when it comes to the engagement of politics with economics, which she 
deems ‘dangerous’ tout court (114). For Arendt (1990) necessity (deriving from labour) is 
primeval and, therefore, appeals to the ‘urgency of the life process’ (60). Necessity cannot 




which reflects the condition of ‘acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing 
force’ (ibid). Extreme poverty releases brute passions from the moment it subjects all 
human beings to the appetites of their bodies (60). It subordinates human beings to the 
dictatorship of their bodies, ‘that is, under the absolute dictate of necessity as all men know 
it from their most intimate experience and outside all speculations’ (ibid), inciting extreme 
violence in return (111). In simple terms, necessity urges immediate relief. The more 
intense this urgency for relief becomes, the more the chances for individuals to resort to 
pre-political forms of action (violence and/or physical aggression) increase. This assertion 
led Arendt to adopt the following position: the invasion of the animal laborans into the 
political realm undermines the latter, which relies not on violence and coercion but on 
persuasion, the raison d'etre of logos and rhetoric (Κοντογιώργης 2006: 400 [Contogeorgis 
2006: 400).  
First, Arendt’s theory, with its tendency to exalt action (political participation) as 
opposed to work and labour, should not indirectly prompt us to neglect the importance of 
participation in the economic life of a city (or nation), in short, the value work and labour 
per se in the process of building up ‘anthropocentric’ communities, which emphasise 
common decency. Consider, for example, Contogeorgis’ observations concerning the 
spread of partnership-based (cooperative) economy after the decline of the Greek city-
states, which (as he asserts) gradually led to the shrinking of economic dependency (slave 
labour) (Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 2006; 45; Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 2014: 
115; 197; 670; 688), especially during the Byzantine age (Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 
2014: 33; 200; 205; Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 2020: 50; 57; 74; 250; 371). The worker 
(or the labourer) instead of being a parcel of property of those who hold the means of 
production, could sign contracts with the latter and, thus, he/she could safeguard his/her 
personal freedom (Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 2020: 172-3). Although political 
participation (after the decline of the city-states) became less important (275), there existed 
an «εν δήμω δομημένη εταιρική οικονομία» (‘a partnership-based economy, rooted in the 
demos’) (621; my translation). In that way it would appear that economic participation and 
cooperation, by minimising economic exploitation, which, as the example of ancient 
Athens partially shows, can lead to political disenfranchisement, can safeguard democratic 




eucosmia, apart from placing attention to the capacity of each anthrōpos to contribute to 
the ‘common good’ through his/her logos and ethical memory (action) exclusively, we 
must acclaim the value of economic involvement and cooperation.  
Second, the total subordination of the political realm to the animal laborans, which, 
according to Arendt (1998), allows all forms of (‘pre-political’) violence to emerge and 
prevail, is one thing. However, the management of economic necessity through acts of 
popular participation, the supremacy of politics upon economics (to stress it differently), 
is another. With this in mind we could credit Klein (2014) for arguing in favour of resolving 
disputes concerning wealth distribution within the political realm itself. In order to be saved 
from its own flaws, Arendt’s theory must be re-examined and corrected, making space for 
the inclusion of economics. First, since acquisition of property in certain cases is driven by 
pathos, personified by the archetype of Satan (in Milton’s PL) who incites the passion of 
envy and struggle for possession of ‘as many temporal goods as possible’ in a ‘zero-sum 
game of politics’ where ‘one’s gain is the other’s loss’ (Quint 2014: 51), to leave pathos 
unrestricted puts the entire republic at stake. Instead, mutual collective agreements and 
political decisions concerning legal restrictions against theft and/or unlawful accumulation 
de-motivate these passions for rampant material gain. Second, by suggesting that issues 
concerning wealth distribution must be mastered politically, through debates and process 
of public deliberation, I do not share Klein’s (2014) view in support of the welfare state. 
First, the welfare state cannot function as a space of public mediation, as a political realm. 
It comprises methods of top-down administration and is restricted to a small caste of 
‘experts’ (Fine 2014: 227).  
The main ideology upon which the welfare state has been founded is that of 
compassion (Lasch 1995a: 105; Nussbaum 2013: 135), which constitutes ‘a subversion of 
civic life’ (Lasch a: 105). Compassion reduces the victim into an object of pity (ibid). The 
would-be-benefactor finds it easier to pity their victims ‘than to hold them up to impersonal 
standards, attainment of which would entitle them to respect’ (ibid). In addition, 
compassion shuns the ‘wearisome process of persuasion, negotiation, and compromise, 
which are the process of law and politics’ (Arendt 1990: 86-7). Compassion is an 
enunciation of the fido amor. It springs from our deep emotions, which (as opposed to 




suffering (for the destitute and the excluded). Therefore, compassion is ‘ignorant of the 
argumentative reasoning’ (logos) by which human beings escape evil (87). It is, in other 
words, ‘incapable of learning the arts of persuading and arguing’ (ibid). Persuasion through 
dialogue implies judgment and disagreement. In turn disagreement creates a gap between 
two or more expressed viewpoints32. Thus, compassion, by depriving logos, deprives 
disagreement, judgment and impartiality. Compassion ‘abolishes the distance, the in-
between’ which always exists in political debates (Arendt 1990: 86). Thus, compassion 
undermines the political realm (175)33. More extensive discussions concerning the 
weaknesses of compassion (in relation to the fido amor and in juxtaposition to eucosmia) 
will take place in the next section. Let us return, at this point, to Arendt's scepticism 
concerning the marriage of politics and economics, relying on historical events.  
Considering again the case of the French Revolution: economic inequality and, 
more importantly, high bread prices, played a significant role in triggering revolts and mass 
uprisings in France (Israel 2014: 7; Popkin 2019: 103-4; 132; 175). Nonetheless, ‘the vast 
upheavals’ do not directly derive ‘from class conflict or new economic forces’ (Israel 2012: 
256). Israel (2014) considers the royal crisis as one of the main prime causes (9). Along 
with Chartier (2004), he recognises the incontestable influences of the ideas of a 
philosophical elite in the gradual formation of a revolutionary public attitude (Israel 2006: 
21; 2019: 255; 261; 265). It is, therefore, necessary to examine these widely disseminated 
ideas, striving to establish whether they incorporate elements that contributed to the total 
demise of the revolution itself or not. For the same author, while ‘[p]hilosophy made the 
Revolution’, the populace itself, ‘in its ignorance, misled by demagogues and rendered 
ferocious by famine and civil war, made the Terror’ (Israel 2012: 931). In contrast, Chapter 
6 will emphasize the reasons aspects of these philosophical ideas contributed in the Great 
Terror, partially due to their optimistic aspirations to erect worldly ‘crystal palaces’, that 
is, to shape a new utopian perfect world (Gray 2007: 36-7; Bianchi 2017). From a Christian 
 
32  Similar to Arendt’s idea of the political realm as an ‘in-between’ space is Weil’s (2002) notion 
of metaxu that will be further discussed in Chapter 7.  
33  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the fido amor stands in the middle of the hierarchy of 
friendship, between idolatry and eucosmia. It relies on deep emotions, which paralyse judgment 
and impartiality. Serene emotions, on the other hand, can stimulate action for decency. For more in 




perspective (as the previous section claimed, while reflecting on Milton), such moves may 
incubate conditions within which social chaos and destruction suppress common decency.  
Furthermore, Arendt’s negation of economic necessity as a political issue leads her 
to neglect cases where debates around the problem of unequal material distribution 
motivated genuine political action, inspiring the creation of political realms (Klein 2014: 
856; Fine 2014: 228). For example, American Populism initially emerged as a response to 
severe economic difficulties. Inspired by Henry George (Goodwyn 1976: 102; McMath 
1992: 100; 112-3), whose theories cultivated a belief in freedom as being tied to economic 
justice (Clanton 1991: xvi-xvii; Postel 2007: 231), the movement pushed forward demands 
for economic relief and wealth redistribution (McMath 1992: 10; 100). Later on, the 
Populists shifted ‘beyond the subject of money’ (Goodwyn 1976: 241), proposing instead 
democratic alternatives and political reforms (Müller 2016: 90). American Populism was 
a political and democratic grassroots endeavour against experts and self-serving elites, 
advocating popular control over common affairs (Canovan 1981: 58). This ‘bloodless 
revolution’ (Clanton 1991: 41), this ‘breathtaking new hope’ (Goodwyn 1976: 51), is a 
clear example of how politics (action) and economics (labour) can coexist, as long as the 
former dominates the latter, as long as issues related to wealth (re)distribution are put under 
the commands of logos.  
In brief, the vita civile, which draws   on Arendt’s idea of action (without, however, 
discarding) is best exemplified by the agrarian American Populism. What, however, has 
American populism achieved? In spite of its failure to transform the American political 
system according to the principles of self-government (practiced by anonymous farmers 
and labourers), due to ‘mistakes … [and] tactical errors’ of some of the prominent leaders 
of the People’s Party (Goodwyn 1976: xiii), Populism ‘fueled and animated the brooding 
social introspection that … created a culture of hope and self-respect among the voiceless’ 
(xxii). ‘[I]t ‘injected into American political consciousness’ a ‘belief in possibility’ in 
justice (xxiii; emphasis added). For others, political and economic reforms pushed forward 
by the agrarian cause ‘found their way into the political mainstream, to be enacted during 
the progressive era by the major parties’ (Lasch 1991a: 218). Or as Müller (2016) put it, 




Progressivism’ (Müller 2016: 90-1)34. Of course, the movement was not immune to white 
supremacy and Sinophobia that had saturated American life (McMath 1992: 11; 92; Postel 
2007: viii; Müller 2016: 88), or to anti-Semitism, as Richard Hofstadter explains in The 
Age of Reform (1955).  The persistence of white supremacy (mainly expressed by the 
Democratic Party)in the Old South, contributed to the demise of of the Populist momentum 
by driving  millions of supporters of the People’s Party back to the Democratic Party35. On 
the other hand, Hofstadter and many other ‘interpreters of American Populism’, who 
‘sought to explain it’ exclusively ‘as an irrational phenomenon’, swamped by nativism, 
and reactionary anti-modernism, produced by a variety of dark bucolic urges’ (Canovan 
1981: 18), do not base their conclusions upon direct references to the discourses published 
by those involved in the movement per se (Goodwyn 1976: 602; McMath 1992: 13). They 
pay little or no attention to the background events at the heart of the populist revolt. 
According to Müller (2016), the Populists ‘respected the Constitution’ and ‘rarely ever 
claimed to be the people as such’ (90). American Populism, he explains, has more in 
common with ‘“Social Democracy”’ (ibid) than with types of populism that prone to 
authoritarianism and ‘antipluralism’ (36), distorting democracy (57) and repressing civil 
society (44)36. For Canovan (1981), ‘[a] closer look at the origins of the Populist 
movement’ shows that the vast majority of the farmers were not irrational (18). They were, 
instead, ‘[m]embers of the sovereign [American] people’ who saw their democratic 
freedoms threatened by large financial corporations (ibid). If the cooperative movement 
was ‘a democratic phenomenon’ (Clanton 1991: 125) and a populist triumph, it was 
because these degraded ‘bucolic’ farmers of ‘the rural hinterlands’ (127), of the 
impoverished and long forgotten provinces, became engaged with political action by 
creating open public-political spaces (cooperatives, as well as clubs and networks of mass 
communication), without relying on vanguard leaders, without even having any of the 
 
34  For more, concerning the Populist emphasis on self-government and direct democracy see 
Chapter 6.  
35   For more on this matter see Chapter 7. 
36  Here Müller (2016) refers to the ‘illiberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ populism’ of Hugo Chavez, 
Viktor Mihály Orbán and Donald Trump. For the same author all types of populism are ‘illiberal’ 
and ‘undemocratic’. In his view, not all movements that denounce ‘the elites’, advocating political 
reforms in favour of the ‘common people’, fit in the category of ‘populism’. In this respect, 




necessary education and intellectual skills that would help them to grasp complex theories 
about democracy and republicanism.  
3) The public and the political realm: agonal and narrative action 
After calling into question Arendt's view on economic necessity (in relation to 
action), we will move ahead, enriching and correcting other aspects of her thought. Let us 
focus on the multidimensional nature of the public realm. More precisely, the political 
realm (the polis), often described by Arendt as ‘the public-political’, is a proper space of 
common appearance, where ‘action … goes on between persons’ (Arendt 2005: 52) and 
everyone’s words are judged in the presence of others (14). It should be made clear, 
however, that the political realm constitutes only one dimension of public life. Not all 
activities that involve judgment and common appearance are political (in the Arendtian 
sense of the term). Not all aspects of public life are related to government (Introduction; 
Chartier 2004: 30). Public spaces of common appearance, while not dealing with the 
process of political decision-making, offer chances for open dialogue through which 
conventional ideas are challenged and new perceptions are gradually shaped, shifting the 
direction of public opinion, influencing the whole direction of a collectivity and, finally, 
its stance on a series of political issues. They offer chances for individuals to be seen and 
to judge the words and deeds of others. Consider Benhabib’s (2000) dichotomy between 
agonal and narrative action. Agonal action refers to persuasion (πείθειν) that ‘works 
through a process of argumentation’ (Arendt 1968a: 93). It presupposes a political space 
similar to that of the Athenian polis (Arendt 1990: 30). Narrative action (largely 
downplayed by Arendt) is ‘immersed in everyday web or narratives’, even in ‘private-
intimate’ circles (Benhabib 2000: 127), including the family and gatherings of relatives. 
But it is more visible in conversations taking place within public realms/spaces that are not 
political, strictly speaking, ‘in churches and parish meetings, in people's drawing rooms, 
in semi-public meetings of artists and intellectuals, in political cabarets’ (128) and spaces 
where open ceremonies (including events of national celebrations) occur. These realms 
often become alternative spheres of (narrative) action (129), especially during totalitarian 
terror, whose aim is to annihilate the political realm (Arendt 1976). As Chapter 5 will stress 
(by reflecting on the Civil Rights Movement), these public (but not, strictly speaking, 




emerge in the foreground of public life (more often, voices of abused and scorned social 
groups), voices that call into question commonly accepted indecent attitudes. The aim of 
this process is to awaken the dormant collective nóēsis, that is, to bring a collectivity into 
a dialogue with itself by inciting public debates. More specifically, public debates offer 
chances to such dissident voices to persuade portions of a population swamped by hubris, 
activating the collective ‘nil-will’, that is, the will to erect moral fences against the 
collective ‘I-will’ (pathos).  
Cabarets, cafés, churches and salons, for instance, are such ‘public’ spaces. They 
allow people to make ‘use of their reason’ via informal political debates and conversations 
(Chartier 2004: 20). Pubs and coffee shops, ‘which at first appear to have nothing to do 
with politics or civic arts, make their contribution to the kind of wide-ranging, free-
wheeling conversation on which democracy thrives’ (Lasch 1955: 117). As an example, 
salons in Paris, during the pre-Revolutionary era were ‘forum[s] for public opinion’ 
(Popkin 2019: 133). They brought together people from various literary circles, who ‘met 
to share pastimes such as gaming, conversation, reading, and the pleasure of the table’ 
(Chartier 2004: 155). Theaters served as spaces for the dissemination of political ideas 
(Popkin 2019: 56). Cafés, cabarets, and salons distributed republican pamphlets (Chartier 
2004: 160; Israel 2014: 73; 2019: 256; 284; Popkin 2019: 48; 54), including journals 
‘which devoted a large amount of space to aesthetic criticism’ (Chartier 2004: 157) and 
projects like the Encyclopédie, which propagated secular and pro-Enlightenment ideas 
(Popkin 2019: 48-50). Artistic criticism constitutes another form of public judgment as 
long as it promotes public dialogue (Chartier 2004: 162; Nussbaum 2013: 7-8), through 
which individuals learn ‘to think for themselves’ by evaluating ‘works and ideas freely’ 
(Chartier 2004: 162; emphasis added). Through this process public attitudes are evaluated 
and new perceptions are shaped (36) once readers construct ‘a common opinion from the 
clash of competing viewpoints’ (162). Furthermore, such non-political public spaces of 
narrative action are shaped and preserved by lore, oral tradition and religion, in short by 
elements previously incorporated within the societas civilis. They are not, however, social 
spaces (in the Arendtian sense of the word), id est, spaces that impose conformity and mass 
uniformity. Tradition (as the previous section stressed) is also associated with bonding 




aspects of common life. For example, the Athenian agora was not exclusively dedicated to 
procedures of self-government. It was the meeting point for artistic, athletic, religious 
activities, civic commemorations, celebrations (including celebrations and carnivals) and 
economic exchanges (Καστοριάδης 2010: 29 [Castoriadis 2010: 29]; 2017: 124), the space 
where people could come together, discussing and exchanging views.  
To recapitulate: this section completed the process of re-evaluating Arendt’s vita 
activa and vita contemplativa. It pursued a practical understanding of political action (the 
main antidote to hubris and moral transgression), practical in the sense of making active 
citizenship able to respond to immediate and real challenges (to the injustices of economic 
inequity and political disenfranchisement). As it has been already made clear, not all forms 
of populism advocate action. The next section will elucidate the main theoretical 
divergences between the vita civile and schools of thought that have proposed a type of 
populism which instead of focusing on grassroots’ participation and active citizenship, seek 
solutions to the crisis of representation primarily through methods of top-down political 
administration. More importantly, I consider the works of post-structuralist thinkers (such 
as those of Ernesto Laclau). More precisely, Laclau’s work On Populist Reason (OPR) 
(2005)—which continues the philosophical and political insight initiated in Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1981/2001) (co-authored with Mouffe)—has left a great impression on 
scholars and academics. His thought is cited by many authors working in the field of 
populism (such as Stavrakakis, Arditti, et al). 
Top-down populism and the vita civile 
1) Theories of populism: a general review  
According to Laclau (2005), the identity of ‘the people’ is constructed through the 
process of discursive articulation; every populist configuration is centred around the notion 
of popular demands (also called signs), or the ‘heartland’ as defined by Taggart (2002), 
referring to an aggregate of ideals that ascribe ‘meaning to constructions and invocations 
of the people by the populists’ (3). Signs, therefore, are empty signifiers. They are signifiers 
without a concrete signified. They are vague and imprecise inasmuch as every political 
discourse can capitalise on them. More importantly, their semantic emptiness allows the 




sections and groups of a society. These groups see their demands as equivalent and realise 
the need to join forces for the common good. In order to fully understand the mechanism 
of constructing popular identities we need to consider the following hypothesis: in a 
country hit by poverty, a group of citizens (group A) who have seen their wages slashed 
organize protests, demanding drastic solutions. If their demands are not satisfied they may 
begin to perceive that they have something in common with another group (B), which is 
also affected by poverty. Thus, an equivalential relation exists between these two different 
groups. For Laclau (2005) what defines each political cause is the exact political rhetoric 
(discourse) that strives to express the demands (empty signifiers) of both A and B 
simultaneously.  
The aim of a political discourse is to become hegemonic in the expression of these 
demands. It must become, in other words, a principatum autem, a force that represents all 
the differentiated groups that embrace such demands, striving to unify them against a 
‘common enemy’, minimising at the same time all internal divergences. A hegemonic 
discourse transforms amorphous crowds into homogeneous collective entities by ascribing 
to them a popular identity. Hence, each popular identity is dependent on the exact discourse 
that occupies non-linguistic concepts (including popular demands) and converts them into 
a political project. Empty signifiers, therefore, can be floating signifiers as long as they are 
subjects of discursive antagonisms, of different political spaces seeking to express them, 
promoting a certain political agenda. Therefore, populism can be evil-intentioned only 
when demagogic discourses that form equivalential chains, in order to unify different 
groups express similar demands (floating signifiers), rely (let us say) on anti-Semitism (or 
other forms of hatred). Let us assume, for instance, that a society is divided into three 
groups (A, B and C). The discourse of a political leader, who mainly represents group A 
responds to a demand (eg. strengthening of national sovereignty) shared by the rest. The 
moment A has won over the B and C is the moment where a chain of equivalence has been 
successfully established. In addition, the primary objective of A’s discourse is to become 
hegemonic, id est, to cancel all discursive antagonisms by persuading these groups a) about 
the rightfulness of his/her approach on the primary causes of loss of national sovereignty, 
and b) about the effectiveness of its proposed solutions. In addition, the leader must 




these groups, of a common heritage (in other words). If A’s discourse incorporates anti-
Semitic remarks then all these groups to some degree will attribute the loss of national 
sovereignty to some ‘powerful Jewish elite’.  
In short, attention must be paid to the exact discourse through which leaders strive 
to capitalise on popular demands (signs). ‘A Fascist regime can absorb and articulate … 
[popular] demands as much as a liberal one’ (Laclau 2005: 125). To claim, however, that 
populism becomes threatening only when illiberal discourses absorb popular demands in 
order to establish equivalential chains obscures another weakness in Laclau’s theory. Pro-
establishment charismatic (even liberal) leaders often employ a quasi-populist rhetoric in 
order to express democratic demands pushed forward by grassroots anti-establishment 
movements (as we will see in Chapter 6, by reflecting on American Populism). Top-down 
appropriation undermines the political realm. The ‘common people’ instead of acting in 
concert, become passive. They bestow faith to party leaders who supposedly represent their 
demands but, in fact, put them in alliance with the same power-structures the movement 
had initially rejected and condemned as sources of political injustice and 
disenfranchisement. As, Andrew Arato (2013) claimed, in certain cases, plebiscitarian and 
quasi-Hobbesian leaders employ discourses (in order to unify heterogeneous crowds) that 
theologise ‘non-theological concepts’, such as the ‘people’ or the ‘"sacred homeland"’ 
(143). But for Laclau (2005), ‘the construction of a chain of equivalences out of a 
dispersion of fragmented demands, and their unification around popular positions 
operating as empty signifiers, is not [necessarily] totalitarian’ and ‘the very condition for 
the construction of a collective will which, in many cases, can be profoundly democratic’ 
(166).  
However, the threat of extreme authoritarianism, even in cases where political 
leaders attempt to construct equivalential chains by simply articulating democratic 
discourses, must not be downplayed. First, leaders rely on discourses that portray ‘the 
people’ as ‘pure’ and incorruptible, who deserve to be saved from the oppression of a 
powerful and self-serving elite that devours its dignity, prosperity and freedom. Inevitably, 
the same ‘people’ end up sanctified and hallowed (Arato 2013; Müller 2016). In fact, 
‘purity’ is synonymous with perfection, which nobody is allowed to question. Once the 




the latter ends up ‘sanctified’. All critiques against the leader him/herself could be falsely 
regarded as acts that undermine the ‘purity’ of ‘the people’. This has been the case of 
Robespierre’s ‘authoritarian populism’ (Israel 2014: 249; 261; 2019: 259) (further 
examined in Chapter 6). Second, as with Kondylis (2007 [Κονδύλης 2007]), the ultimate 
purpose of ‘mass democracy’ is equality of conditions (240). Financially speaking, mass 
democracy regards the strict and quasi authoritarian work relationships counterproductive 
(ibid). In response, it shapes a new perception through which the worker and the boss 
instead of seeing each other as antagonists and hierarchical rivals consider themselves 
friends and vital allies (240; 243). Mass democracy hides profoundly hierarchical 
relationships under the guise of egalitarianism. Populist leaders take advantage of this 
universal demand for equity and articulate the appropriate discourses in order to gain 
popular traction. They denounce political disenfranchisement and accuse the elites of 
betraying the ‘the will of the people’ with whom they claim to be ‘flesh of its flesh’ (242). 
By projecting themselves as ‘friends of the common people’ populist leaders, effectively, 
conceal their actual role as a new ascending elite, not less remote from the ‘common 
citizen’ than the pro-establishment elites they so ardently denounce. Such as the worker 
who convinces him/herself that his/her boss is not a hierarchical rival but a partner, 
similarly the populist leader in the popular imagination is not a distant vanguard but a 
brother or sister, and a friend. In short, populist leaders hide their actual aspirations under 
the friendly mask of equality and ordinariness. To a degree, this explains the betrayal of 
the American cooperative movement (outlined in Chapter 6). 
The populism of the vita civile acknowledges these objections. It values the 
significance of individualism (Chapter 7), democratic leadership and (as it has become 
clear) the role of grassroots interactions in the creation of popular demands (signs) and 
identities. These three elements make the relationship between the vita civile and top-down 
intervention/appropriation (or articulation) mutually exclusive. As Weil (2005) put it, 
‘those who speak for the people and to them are incapable of understanding either their 
distress or what an overflowing good is almost within their reach’ (85). What, moreover, 
explains the impotence of top-down (discursive) articulation to produce solid popular 
identities is precisely the non-instrumental and relatively contingent way through which 




identity and the unification of heterogeneous crowds into one entity is not entirely subject 
to some top-down discursive articulation. Indeed, ‘the people’ is not a natural entity. It is 
an artificial construct. Such an entity, however, is never created at will, through planning 
and programming, as if it is a piece of furniture shaped out of raw wood by a homo faber. 
Making sense of this rationale requires further analysis of human wonder, on the empirical 
and the underworld mind (more precisely), in conjunction with Castoriadis’ two modes of 
collective institutioning: the ensemblist-identitary, (the rational and/or instrumental mode) 
and the magmatic (non-rational/non-instrumental), as outlined (mainly) in The Imaginary 
Institution of Society (1975/2005). 
2) Spontaneity and unpredictability 
For Castoriadis, the ensemblist-identitary mode is the primary mechanism that sets 
up a web of collective institution-building. In brief: 'a large part of the significations … 
those that are, or can be made, explicit—are ... instituted, directly or indirectly, through its 
language' (Castoriadis 2005: 238). This theory suggests that the primary institutions of 
communal life rests in logic-ontology: 'its core is the identitary or ensemblist logic, and it 
is this logic that rules sovereignly and ineluctably over two institutions without which no 
social life can exist: the institution of the legein, the ineffaceable component of language 
and of social representation, and the institution of teukhein, the ineffaceable component of 
social-doing' (175). '[L]egein is the ensemblist-ensemblizing dimension of social 
representing/saying, just as teukhein (assembling-adjusting-making-constructing) is the 
ensemblist-ensemblizing dimension of social doing' (Castoriadis 2005: 238). Legein is the 
language-code dimension and it is not separated from the langue, from speaking just as the 
case of teukhein is not separated from making, from the social doing, from social activity 
tout court (248; 334; 360; 370).  
Thus, on the one hand, we see that legein and teukhein are interdependent. They 
operate together, they are part of the same mechanism and, hence, they are inseparable. On 
the other, we understand language is a code which signifies. As Hobbes (2006) put it,  
words signify what we conceive, or think and also what we desire and fear (17). Language, 
according to Arendt (1978), is 'a 'meaningful sounding out' of words that in themselves are 
already 'significant sounds' that 'resemble' thoughts (1: 108). Hence, to bring  legein and 




of an effect, to transmit knowledge (id est to teach and counsel), and to reveal personal 
volitions and desires, determines the ‘making’ of (social) things. Language determines 
what should be done, what should be designed, what should be ‘made’. Eventually, the 
ensemblist-identitary mode is characterised by an implicit instrumentality. Language itself 
is not merely a means of expression but a tool that shapes order out of chaos, bringing into 
life a new social reality. Logos refers to the phonological expression of thoughts and 
judgments (an essential component of the political animal, of the public-political realm, 
ruled by spontaneous exchange of ideas). The ensemblist-identitary mode of collective 
institutioning converts logos into an instrument in the hands of a homo faber, who attempts 
to construct social realities simply by visualising an ideal community, and subsequently, 
by ordering and commanding his/her followers to implement certain policies that would 
bring this community into existence.    
Castoriadis also spoke about the magmatic mode of collective ‘institutioning’. This 
perception formulates an understanding of community (or society) as a magma, as a web 
of plural, indefinite, contingent and unpredictable factors that intersect and gradually shape 
reality per se, as Caroline Williams (2010: 100) noted. It could be, therefore, argued that 
this process of shaping political realities may resist programming and rational planning so 
long as it is ruled by forces whose outcome is not always predictable. In Castoriadis’ (2005) 
thought radical imagination, the human drive for creation, the central function of the 
human psyche that 'pre-exists … every organization drive…' (287), is 'a permanent flux of 
representation’ and is not ‘subject to determinacy' (Tovar-Restrepo 2012: 41). But it is 
important to note: as opposed to Castoriadis, I argue that wonder, the restless ‘Desire, to 
know why, and how’ (Hobbes 2006: 31) pre-exists imagination. Wonder motivates, 
energises and influences imagination per se. In addition, memory encompasses a 
‘permanent flux’, a multiplicity of (faded) objects. Thus, imagination—which apart from 
creation, points to re-presentation, to the process through which our thinking ego dives into 
the storehouse of our memory in order to bring into the present memorised objects—is 
defined by a chimerical multiplicity of such concepts and ideas. Furthermore, the role of 
the imagination 'appears in Freud by means of the central importance of phantasy37 [italics 
 




added] in the psyche and the relative independence and autonomy of “phantasizing”. 
“Phantasizing” is discovered as an unexplungable [sic] component of deep psychic life' 
(Castoriadis 2005: 282). ‘Phantasizing’ derives from 'the phantasma, the phantasy, the 
“image'’', which for Aristotle represents 'a multiplicity of sensuous, generic 
representations' (246). Castoriadis’ analysis allows us to understand that imagination is a 
product of ‘an unconscious combination of things experienced and of things heard' (285). 
Phantasising (or imagining) is a combination of experiences ascribed to our memory. A 
product of phantasy is the magma (281), the mingling of memorised objects, of archetypes 
and representations.  
Let us see, at this point, how Castoriadis’ viewpoints, in conjunction with Jung’s 
psychoanalytic theories, shed more light on the impasses of top-down populism. When our 
ability to control our unconscious is lost, the conscious is influenced by the former, even 
without knowledge (Jung 1960: 71; 79). An untamed unconscious mind orders from our 
thinking ego to dig up from the storehouse (of our memory) a magma of memorised objects. 
Since our thinking ego is not directed by our conscious mind, these objects are brought into 
the present abruptly, without our knowledge38. Moreover, our civilised age demands 
‘conscious control of everything’ (Hayek 2007: 78). ‘Civilized life … demands … 
conscious functioning’ which entails detachment from the unconscious, to use Jung’s 
(1960: 71) terms. In addition, the more we detach ourselves from the unconscious ‘through 
direct functioning’ the more ‘a powerful counter-position’ can be built up there. The more 
explosive and uncontrollable the unconscious becomes (ibid). We can, therefore, assume 
the following: the attitude, the manners and the reactions of civilised individuals are not 
always predictable. They are exposed to the abrupt explosion of their own unconscious, 
which brings random memorised concepts and ideas (magma) into the foreground of 
individual or collective action. Since a civilised collectivity is made up by such individuals, 
by human beings whose modes of conduct cannot be programmed and pre-ordered, we 
could assume that the process of collective institution building is contingent and 
unpredictable. It follows, therefore, that collectivities (including nations) cannot be easily 
put under the demands (and commands) of (the instrumental) legein. They cannot be 
 





shaped according to what a particular political discourse visualises and orders.  Or, to use 
Arendt’s terms, a collective reality is not simply the work of a homo faber.  Peoples and 
nations are the contingent outcome 'of uncontrolled mobilization[s]', claims Canovan 
(2005: 54), which result to a synthesis of ideas and perceptions 'Peoples may come into 
existence not by being built … but by being mobilized’ (55). Peoples and nations emerge 
as a consequence. Such mobilisations are ‘a much more open-ended business than 
“building”' (ibid).    
Furthermore, detachment from the empirical world, as the first section of this 
chapter argued, increases the probability of the restless wonder to intrude into the 
underworld, approaching pathos, awakening mēnis. This could prompt individuals to 
interpret memorised events, occurrences and/or ideas (objects) from a standpoint that 
indulges their own pathos (I-will). In their mind the real meaning of these memorised 
objects is blurred and corrupted. Worst of all, these objects, misinterpreted and deprived of 
their actual meaning, are stored back into the reservoir of our memory. They become part 
of the magma of memorised representations which, once they are retrieved (even 
consciously) are reproduced in the present time. They are projected in public life as valid 
and influence members of the collectivity. Thus, pathos invades the empirical world. 
Furthermore, when corrupt objects are (consciously) retrieved by our thinking ego, they 
become subjects of evaluation (nóēsis). Through this process the logismikon identifies and 
removes fallible elements. The logismikon prevents the manifestation of such desires 
(judgment) in public life. But the effectiveness of our mind’s capacity for judgment and 
purification is radically dependent on the intensity of such fallible elements that are re-
presented when the same objects that have been corrupted are brought back into the present 
time. The higher the intensity becomes the more impotent ends up the logismikon against 
these elements. Consider again Jung’s (1960) notion of ‘conscious functioning’, which 
effectively takes away all hindrances and controls against the unconscious mind that 
‘continually produces problematical situations’ (72). As stated in the previous paragraphs, 
conscious functioning allows our thinking ego to be swayed by our unconscious mind. It 
brings such corrupt (by pathos) objects into the present. Αs long as the logismikon is too 
impotent to exercise control over these objects, the latter can be reproduced passively 




consequences’ (71). By removing hindrances that prevent the unconscious from 
influencing the conscious (and, more importantly, the logismikon/empirical), the same 
objects (reproduced as habits) are morally normalised. They become part of our daily 
experiences. One way to minimise the moral implications of the passive reproduction of 
such elements in our daily life is through the gradual awakening of the dormant public 
nóēsis, of the dormant ‘nill-will’, of the capacity for judgment. As the previous chapter 
made clear, public judgment (and nóēsis) is (potentially) stimulated through logos and 
public dialogue. Through (public) judgment (logos), through open conversations, indecent 
norms can become subject of dispute by the populace itself. They are judged by a public 
which, in return, acquires the capacity to increase its awareness of the vices a percentage 
of its members habitually (or behaviourally) reproduce. 
So far, we have examined the reasons human collectivities are constantly invaded 
by pathos. At the same time, we have shed light on the magmatic mode of collective 
institution-building, characterised by contingency and unpredictability. In simple terms, 
the outcome of most interactions between individuals within such collectivities is not 
always predictable. Consequently, pathos can abruptly explode at any time without our 
knowledge. To a degree, one could assign to these collectivities elements of what Aristotle 
in the Poetics (2013) called ‘tragedy’. Let us elaborate further on this term: in ancient 
tragedies the suffering actors are ‘incapable of intervening on the scenario which has been 
already set before them’ (Theodosiadis 2019: 107). They are hostages to circumstances 
where the pathos for power, fame and property, could lead to the prevalence of hubris 
(Aristotle 2013). In the same way, collectivities can be hostages to the unconscious 
infiltration of pathos, whose sudden detonation is not foreseeable and, therefore, 
controllable. To a degree, tragedy and ‘vulnerability’ (in Brown’s terms) are 
interconnected. Human beings are ‘tragic’ as long as they are frail and vulnerable, capable 
of tearing each other's eyes (vulnerare), driven by passions and all sorts of raw 
emotions/desires (products of pathos). As mentioned earlier, the meliorism of the vita 
civile, due to its emphasis on action, soothes pathos and minimises the impacts of tragedy. 
In addition, action is prompted by eucosmia, which I consider to be the most advanced type 
of friendship (see the previous chapter). As it becomes clear, an in-depth analysis on 




compassion (an ardent enunciation of the fido amor). This prompts us to move back to 
Arendt, acknowledging at the same time the religious/spiritual insights of Martin Luther 
King Jr. Eventually, we will have to move away from Laclau, Jung and Castoriadis for the 
time being. 
3) Tragedy, vulnerability and eucosmia 
We can compare the concept of tragedy with Machiavelli’s (1970: 371) and 
Cicero’s (1961: 345) notions of fortuna, represented by the archetype of a goddess 
symbolising unpredictability, namely the unforeseeable outcomes of human action. 
Fortuna controls ‘half our actions, and yet leaves the control of the other half, of little less, 
to ourselves’ (Machiavelli 1992: 66). She brings success or becomes the source of misery 
and disasters (Machiavelli 1970: 371). Fortuna makes human existence tragic and 
vulnerable. As Brown (2012) explains, vulnerability is synonymous with uncertainty, 
emotional exposure and risk (34; 45). Brown reckons the conscious recognition of our 
inherent vulnerability as an act of bravery, notwithstanding the unpleasant taste this 
experience may have (2; 33). Furthermore, for Machiavelli (1992), the haphazardness of 
fortuna brings disaster when ‘there is neither barrier not embankment to confine her’, when 
there is no virtù (virtue) (66), or excellence (arete) according to the Greeks (Arendt 1998: 
48; 153). For the vita civile the meaning of virtù is twofold: on the one hand, we could 
associate it with the fortitude and resilience one obtains in order to combat moral 
transgression, with what Brown (2012: 1) called ‘daring greatly’39. On the other, it stands 
for love and friendship (philia), which (for the Greeks) was one of the most reliable 
safeguard against civil wars (Arendt 1990: 34): ‘η γαρ τοΰ συζην προαίρεσις φιλία’ (‘the 
desire and necessity of living together is guaranteed by friendship’) says Aristotle (1993a: 
52 [Αριστοτέλης 1993α: 52]), implying the necessity of forming robust community 
connections, as the most effective means of protecting the city-state (the polis) from falling 
apart.  
The love (philia) of eucosmia acknowledges the importance of commonality. It 
creates and sustains the appropriate conditions within which strong and lasting bonds 
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between citizens can be formed. In more concrete terms: consider the Christian notion of 
agape, the ‘animating ideals of modern democratic movements in the Atlantic world’, 
according to Kloppenberg (2016), implying unselfish ‘love for all humans because all are 
created in God’s image’ (16; emphasis added). Similar to the republican interpretation of 
the Christian agape, according to Georges Contogeorgis (Γιώργος Κοντογιώργης 2014: 
592), is Aristotle's (1993 [Αριστοτέλης 1993]) notion of «ἀγαπῶσι» (to be friend, or philos, 
with someone), which stands for «εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις» (‘mutual well-being’) and rejects 
«χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς», id est., the type of friendship from which one seeks only material gains, 
abundance and hedonism (20). Just as Aristotle’s ἀγαπῶσι advocates ‘charitable 
friendship’, in the same way King’s agape implies dutifulness towards the ‘common 
people’ (the cosmos) and unselfish devotion for the ‘common good’ expressed through the 
anthropocentric belief that that every anthrōpos (human being) holds the means (logos and 
memory) of ‘salvation’, to use James’ (1978: 137) words again, the means to master pathos, 
the means to cut across corruption and selfishness, to serve the common εὐ (eu, the ‘good’). 
It borrows the central argument of King’s philosophy, his unquestionable respect ‘in the 
value of the human person on our common identity as children of God, made in God’s 
image and so worthy of respect’ (Raboteau 2017). Eventually, agape implies eucosmia. 
The reasons the love of  eucosmia is considered less susceptible to deeply sentimental 
expressions that spring from the fido amor–like the intense sentimental expressions we 
often find in by the love of compassion, which in Arendt’s (1990) mind, obstruct reasoning 
and persuasion through logos (87; 89) (see also the previous section)–will be examined 
below. 
According to Zembylas (2018), Arendt feared the consequences of sentimentalising 
politics, but at the same time, she made a case against heartlessness, being a ‘serious 
political pathology’ that undermines action and leads to apathy (7). According to Max 
Weber (1946), ‘politics is made with the head, but it is certainly not made with the head 
alone’ (127). Politics can be also made with the heart. Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759/2006) speaks in favour of the healing powers of the ‘consolation of 
sympathy’ as an antidote to the ‘bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment’ (2006: 
10). In the same way Nussbaum in Political Emotions (2013) emphasises the benefits of 




‘civic compassion’ (314) against hatred, envy and fear. Strong emotions ‘directed at the 
general welfare’ could inspire and support action for the common good ‘in ways that 
involve sacrifice’ (209). Nussbaum (2013) criticises those who focus exclusively on the 
pernicious effects of public emotions in politics. By attributing the rise of National 
Socialism, fascism and religious fundamentalism to the arousal of public sentiments, she 
writes, one misses out the positive confluence of the latter in ‘the abolition of slavery, [in] 
the civil rights movement’ as well as in ‘the cause of greater economic justice … [and] the 
enfranchisement of women’ (213). Eventually, strong public emotions ‘can actually work, 
without removing and indeed while enhancing liberal freedom’ (203).  
For Nussbaum (2013), sentiments like disgust towards disenfranchisement or 
exploitation and compassion for the underdog can stimulate action for justice (23; 125). 
Compassion, or empathy, as Fritz Breithaupt (2019) calls it, can motivate ‘humanitarian 
aid workers, donors, peacekeeping soldiers, and those who work for organizations like 
Doctors Without Borders’ (8). More often compassion makes us ‘sensitive to … subtle 
forms of oppression and masked forms of violence’ (ibid). Compassion has been initially 
introduced in political theory by Paul-Henri Baron d'Holbach. For the same author, 
compassion is easily aroused in those who know destitution (Israel 2010: 101). Then it was 
Rousseau (Arendt 1990: 81), who insisted ‘that man should be primarily guided by moral 
instinct and “feeling”’ (Israel 2014: 21). Compassion is an ‘emotion that responds to the 
misfortunes of others’ (Nussbaum 2013: 261), ‘a painful emotion directed at the serious 
suffering of another creature or creatures’ (142), such as the poor, the excluded, the 
‘unprivileged’, etc. Of course, Nussbaum (2013) was not unaware of the way sentimental 
reactions often  lead to ‘emotional foundationalism’, to the complete reliance on emotions 
alone (as the only true incentives for justice), or (in my terms) to the absolute prevalence 
of deep emotions, to the domination of intense sentiments (intense love, fear or aversion, 
for instance), in the process of conscious thinking. Emotional foundationalism is as 
pernicious as the total neglect of the positive role of emotions (ibid). Thus, the sentiment 
of compassion ‘should never be an uncriticized foundation’, she concludes (317). Instead, 
‘it should always be in dialogue with principles and general moral norms’ (318). As, 
however, the previous section argued, intense sentimental reactions and affectionate 




will discuss more thoroughly in what follows).  
Compassion, or empathy, in Breithaupt’s (2019) words, ‘plays a central part in a 
variety of highly problematic behaviors’ (including political violence and terrorism) (1). 
More precisely, sympathy (the Greek equivalent to compassion) derives from syn (συν, 
implying ‘with’ or ‘together’) and passion (πάσχειν, ‘to suffer’) (Adam Smith 2006: 6). 
The etymological roots of the Latin word ‘compassion’ are quite similar: compassion 
derives from (cum) and (passus), implying the ability to acknowledge ‘the suffering of the 
other’ (Arendt 1990, p.81). The compassionate, in other words, ‘coexperience[s] … 
another’s situation’ (Breithaupt 2019: 10; emphasis added). ‘Coexperiencing means 
projecting oneself into another’s situation emotionally and cognitively, typically with a 
clarity not available to the other’ (16).  Thus, ‘[t]he suffering of others is our suffering; 
their happiness can be ours as well (8). For Breithaupt (2019), the negative side of empathy 
(and co-experiencing) is best described through the case of the Stockholm Syndrome, 
which results to a form of (let us call it) pathological confluence or over-identification: an 
innocent victim sees the world through the eyes of his/her predator, whose aggression is 
often considered to be a reaction to some social injustice the latter had experienced. Thus, 
for the victim the predator is also a victim, with whom he/she begins to sympathise 
(empathise). If this sympathy is too strong the innocent victim may bit-by-bit develop a 
form of emotional attachment with the predator/victim him/herself. The intensity and depth 
of such an emotional identification/attachment (this is a form of emotional 
foundationalism) may force the innocent victim to excuse and justify the behavior of the 
predator/victim (37; 59). For Breithaupt (2019), the first who described the pathological 
confluence between the empathetic victim and his/her predator was Nietzsche. In paragraph 
207 of his work Beyond Good and Evil (1886/1967) Nietzsche speaks of the objective (the 
empathetic or the compassionate) man, being ‘depersonalised’ and, hence, ‘an instrument’ 
in the hands of others (140). The objective person is receptive (rather assertive) (Breithaupt 
2019: 43). He/she is passive and ‘[t]his passivity … proceeds from observation and 
perception. The person who perceives, according to Nietzsche, cannot judge’ (ibid; 
emphasis added), he/she cannot make ‘decisions between good and evil’ (44) nor he/she 
can ‘show strength, lead, act, or show passions’ (43). ‘The habitus of receptivity makes it 




such thing as the self’ (ibid). Instead, empathy ‘allows them to recognize a strong self in 
others’ (46). The empathetic person transplants his/her own self onto the other (81), to the 
observed object (48). In this respect, Arendt (1990) was not entirely wrong to suggest that 
the justification and glorification of the violence of the French Revolution was due to 
compassion for the poor, that is, due to the justification of the violence to which the poor 
(the animal laborans) themselves resort as a consequence of material necessity40.  In other 
words, this glorification of (revolutionary) violence was (to a degree) the consequence of 
pathological confluence, where observers co-experience the desperate poverty of those 
affected by it,  and become emotionally attached with the poor themselves. The intensity 
of this emotional bond between the observer and the victim forces can lead to the 
deprivation of the former's ability to judge, that is, to understand when the actions of the 
latter should be rejected (rather than justified). 
As an antidote to compassion Brown (2012) introduces the concept of empathy (not 
to be conflated with Breithaupt’s or Nietzsche’s empathy). For Brown (2012), empathy   
connects the actor ‘with the emotion that someone is experiencing’ (81). However, 
empathy means ‘listening, holding space, withholding judgment, emotionally connecting, 
and communicating that directly healing message of “You’re not alone”’ (81; my 
emphasis). Notice that (Brown’s) empathy is ‘conveyed without speaking a word’ (Brown 
2012: 41). Thus, like compassion, empathy abolishes the ‘in-between … distance’, to use 
Arendt’s (1990: 86) words again. As a substitute to compassion (and pity, its ersatz 
equivalent), Arendt (1990) speaks of ‘solidarity’, implying the active sacrifices that benefit 
‘not only the multitude of a class or a nation or a people, but eventually all mankind’ (88). 
Nonetheless, solidarity (such as pity and compassion) is easily corrupted by extreme 
sentimentalism (Zembylas 2018: 7). Instead of compassion Lasch (1995a: 105) and 
Kloppenberg (2016: 26) stress the value of ‘mutual respect’ and reciprocity as the 
fundamental precondition of civic life. However agreeable it may sound, ‘respect’ seems 
too vague and imprecise. For Nussbaum (2013) only love ‘matters for justice’ (380), not 
however ‘[t]he love of parents for children, the love of comrades, and romantic love’, she 
considers ‘capable of inspiring a public culture in different ways’ (2013: 380-1), which 
 
40  Of course, this particular position lacks equilibrium and ignores other factors, as the previous 




confers a type of affectionate and emotive love (see deep emotions or the fido amor), but 
the serene love of eucosmia. Arendt (1998), of course, denies the practical value of love in 
politics (242). ‘Arendt’s insights about the emotions in politics are valuable because they 
remind us that emotions cannot be reduced to words or automatically “translate” into 
actions’ (Zembylas 2018: 7). For Arendt, love does not rely on reason. It is triggered by 
sentiments, by personal sympathies and strong emotional attachments. Hence, it 
undermines objectivity and deprives our ability to tell right from wrong (ibid). However, 
this type of love points to deeply romantic and sentimental types of love springing from 
the fido amor, inciting pathological confluence (as I explained earlier). As opposed to this 
deeply sentimental love, the love of eucosmia can stimulate public emotions in favour of 
action. This type of love is more capable of resisting emotional foundationalism than the 
love of compassion and/or (Brown’s) empathy. Eucosmia (as opposed to compassion) 
seems to be more in line with Nussbaum’s (2013) suggestion to allow emotional reactions 
(against social injustices) in politics to find expression whilst keeping them in moderation 
so that they will not eschew the surveillance of reason. Eucosmia recognises the positive 
contribution of emotions (in stimulating awareness for justice, for instance) but keeps such 
emotions serene. Unlike deep (or raw) emotions, serene emotions are flexible and 
dialectical; they can be kept under the supervision of the logismikon; they can be evaluated 
(nóēsis) and judged. Let us shed more light on the main reasons the love of eucosmia can 
keep  emotional reactions  calm and serene. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the love of eucosmia is linked with Martin 
Luther King Jr’s notion of agape, which values the ‘human unity’ and the worth of every 
individual (1986: 122). It shares Locke’s liberal/universalist position that  every human 
being as a ‘thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places’ (Locke 1978: 188; emphasis 
added)41. Furthermore, according to George Duke (2017), ‘the common good’ (or common 
decency, in my terms) offers ‘a reason for action’ (877). Eucosmia puts at the center of its 
mission, the unfaltering faith that every anthrōpos is a distinct individual who can serve 
the common good through his/her personal thinking, judgment and logos (through action) 
 
41  This emphasis on thinking aims to drive attention on the need to interpret this term from an 




(Chapter 1). Hence, eucosmia is profoundly anthropocentric. First, the love of eucosmia so 
long as it focuses on the human potential for nóēsis and judgment, can improve our ability 
to recognise (that is, to judge) whether one’s reactions and anger (including our own) 
against injustices are justifiable or not. When, for instance, our anger is so extreme and our 
enemy’s worth as a human being (as a zōon politikon), capable of acting and thinking, is 
undermined (that is, when our anger encourages revenge and, in turn, revenge incites 
extermination or unlawful punishment and deprives someone’s ability to contribute to the 
common good), the love of eucosmia prompts us to reckon this particular anger 
unjustifiable. In short, eucosmia reinforces the logismikon, which has the capacity to hold 
the ‘I-will’ and all sorts of emotional dispositions under its surveillance. Thus, emotions 
are neither exaggerated nor suppressed. Instead, they become open to ‘politics with the 
head’ (in terms borrowed by Weber). Second, eucosmia emphasises action and grassroots 
cooperation, self-government and participation, public dialogue and communication (as the 
case of American Populism exemplifies). Thus eucosmia is at odds with political projects 
advocating top-down identity construction. In short, eucosmia does not appear to be on the 
same page with Laclau’s ‘hegemonic’ populism. It opposes political centralisation and 
authoritarianism42 and values individualism (as mentioned earlier) rather mass behaviour, 
which, for several authors (Hayek 2007), constitutes one of the most significant incubators 
of totalitarianism43. Finally, eucosmia raises awareness concerning life’s tragic 
dimensions. But, on the other hand, acclaims the potential of every human being to resist 
the arbitrariness of fortuna by serving the common εὐ (‘good’) out of truthfulness. 
Conclusion 
By re-evaluating Arendt’s philosophy and by bringing together viewpoints from 
Milton, Weil, James, Castoriadis, Jung, et al., this chapter built up theoretical themes upon 
which the next chapters will rely in order to expand my analysis of populism and meliorism. 
Briefly, a melioristic weltanschauung refutes the ‘optimism’ and the ‘romantic 
 
42  Of course, insights from religions other than Christianity (like, for example, Buddhism, 
Judaism, Hinduism and Sufism) could possibly offer an understanding concerning the human 
capacity for action that (to a degree) is similar to my notion of eucosmia’.  




overestimates of human virtue' (Niebuhr 1960: 78). It rejects the blind trust to man’s moral 
resources as being (supposedly) sufficient to guarantee the emergence of a ;crystal 
palace’, , ‘in which there will be … perfect peace and justice’ (22) and ‘civilization … 
[will] continue to be infinitely perfectible’ (Carroll 2010: 8) In this chapter, the ‘belief that 
social institutions can be redesigned according to principles accessible to human reason’ 
(Lasch 1997: 25) and that ‘God has a plan for the world’s gradual improvement’ which 
will not be fulfilled through divine action but through ‘the ordinary processes of nature and 
society’, according to Wollestonecraft (Israel 2010: 3), has been called into question. 
Notwithstanding «ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, εἰωθυῖα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν» that (‘human 
nature always rebels against justice’), as Thucydides (2011: 458 [Θουκυδίδης 2011: 458]) 
noted, political initiatives and movements inspired by the vita civile show that in the very 
depths of suffering and despair there is hope. There is redemption and salvation. By sharing 
unequivocally the necessity of ‘embracing vulnerability’ (Brown 2012: 12) the populism 
of the vita civile seeks to adjust Arendt’s thought to the Laschian spirit of meliorism. By 
expanding political participation, opening up opportunities for the ‘common people’ to 
access the hierarchies, the vita civile creates conditions for justice to flourish, conditions 
‘in which coercion will be sufficiently non-violent’, preventing the common world ‘from 
issuing into complete disaster’ (Niebuhr 1960: 22). The next chapter will advance 
discussions of this melioristic type of populism (vita civile), concentrating on the 















     Chapter 3 
Pessimism, Optimism, Economic Liberalism and Ethical Memory 
 
 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is, a) to discuss the philosophical elements of pessimism in 
absolutism (as it is enunciated mainly through Hobbes’s theories), b) to trace the existence 
of absolutist philosophical elements in economic liberalism through a genealogical 
analysis, and c) to explain the reasons the optimism of economic liberalism per se is 
founded upon the same anti-populist bias endorsed by the absolutist theories of Hobbes. 
The reasons the rational mastery of economic liberalism, the hallmark of the idea of 
progress, this ‘forward march of [liberal] capitalism’ (Bockmuehl 2012: 9), has not fulfilled 
its initial promise, to redeem societies from their intense insecurities, of delivering 
‘prosperity or peace or justice’ (10), will be thoroughly discussed. This takes place in the 
third section which utilises the theory of tragedy, magma and fortuna (developed in the 
previous chapter).   
In short, this chapter offers an initial taste concerning the role of hope through the 
vita civile. Simply put, the ‘great Leviathan’, the ‘Mortall God’ to whom ‘wee owe … our 
peace and defense’ (Hobbes 2006: 96), the political authority from which all political 
powers and decisions originate, is distributed to the ‘common people’ (see the third 
section). More precisely, the Biblical symbolism of Hobbes’ Leviathan refers to the Nile 
River, to the source of life in ancient Egypt, according to Frye (1982: 189). Consider an 
allegory that appears in The Bible (Ezekiel 29:4-5): God put hooks into Leviathan’s jaw 
and ‘cause the fish of thy rivers to stick unto thy scales’, leaving finally Leviathan, and 
‘and all the fish of the rivers … thrown into the wilderness’. Leviathan is given ‘for meat 
to the beasts of the field and to the fowls of the heaven’. Therefore, the catching of the 
leviathan is ‘followed by the fertilizing of the desert he is thrown into’ (Frye 1982: 190). 
God ‘didst break in pieces the heads of leviathan’ and ‘gavest him to be meat to those that 
people the desert’ (The Bible, Psalm 74: 14) and to the common people of Israel (Frye 
1982: 190). Such as God dispenses Leviathan to the inhabitants of the desert, similarly 
common decency (personified by ‘God’, by the ‘laws of nature’) requires the distribution 




section focuses on Hobbes’s and Filmer’s pessimistic absolutism and anti-populism, 
deriving from their ‘radical distrust of the moral capacities of human beings’ (Michea 2009: 
59). At the same time, it traces similar anti-populist perspectives in Plato, ‘the best 
philosopher of the Greeks’, according to Hobbes (2006: 381).  
 
3.1 Pessimism, optimism and anti-populism: the absolutist model 
Plato holds a prominent position in the genealogy of pessimism in Western thought. 
In fact, it was Plato who first denounced democracy as a regime that bases its principal 
foundations upon the rule of the uncultivated, ignorant multitude. While the laws of the 
polis, in Castoriadis’ (1997) thought, always began with the famous preamble: edoxe tē 
boulē kai tō dēmō’ recognizing the decision of the collectivity of the demos (the ‘people’) 
as the only source of political power, Plato proclaimed the professionalisation of politics 
as the domain of epistēmē (science) or technē (skills), requiring specialised knowledge 
from all those who are involved with decision making (92). This particular axiom derives 
from the following assumptions commonly shared by all the participants of the dialogues 
in Plato’s Republic (Πλάτων [2014]): the good judge obtains the capacity to understand 
what is (άδικο) adiko (unjust). Ηe is an expert in prosecuting and punishing offenders; the 
good doctor is skillful in providing the right medicines; and similarly, the rightful hegemon 
has acquired the wisdom to impose policies that safeguard the city (Kloppenberg 2016: 7). 
Hence, for Plato, governments are run by men ‘who are only in doxa, and it was he who 
conferred the politeia and the conduct of its affairs to the possessors of “true” knowledge, 
the philosophers’ (Castoriadis 1997: 92). In other words, Plato emphasised the necessity 
for experts, the so-called ‘guardians’, ‘to be in charge of the government, because 
democracy easily degenerates into rule by the mob’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 152). 
For Plato (2014 [Πλάτων 2014]) the multitude has no capacity to espouse philosophy and 
cannot emancipate itself from the dictates of passions over wisdom, law and justice (453). 
In Plato’s (2014 [Πλάτων 2014]) thought, human beings are overwhelmed by rapacity 
(108), id est, by bouleumata, by the Faustian pathos—elsewhere called pleonexia, 
πλεονεξία, from the Greek πλέον (pleon) and έχω (echo)—to desire more than what they 
already have obtained, in Hobbes’s (2006: 86) definition. As with Plato (Πλάτων 2014), 




proclivity of every living being’) (108]). 
As a matter of fact, during the ‘first period of his life (up to 1629)’, the ‘humanist 
period’, according to Leo Strauss (1963: 31)44, Hobbes’s main philosophical interests were 
centred around Homer’s poetry and Aristotle’s moral thought (32-3). Aristotle was (for 
Hobbes) ‘the highest authority in philosophy’ (33). Hobbes’s break with humanism is 
evident in the Leviathan, as well as in De Cive, where he rejects Aristotle’s claim 
concerning the primary objectives of the State to promote the so-called ‘good life’ (ibid), 
‘the life of the citizen’ who had ‘mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from 
labor and work’ in order to join the realm of the polis (Arendt 1998: 36-8). In Hobbes’s 
post-humanist thought, the ultimate role of the State is protection from violent death 
(Strauss 1963: 33). More precisely, in the Leviathan Hobbes calls Plato ‘the best 
Philosopher of the Greeks’ (Hobbes 2006: 381). He shares Plato’s concerns about the 
consequences of pleonexia, the ‘perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power [that] 
ceaseth onely in Death’, the ‘generall inclination of all mankind’ (55). In the anarchic 
condition of natural liberty, in the so called State of Nature, where no State and no 
organised commonwealth, no common power or other artificial body exists in order to 
coerce and bind human beings together, directing them towards the common benefit, 
everyone strives to fulfill his/her (innate) ‘restlesse desire’ (ibid), pathos ((in my terms), 
for possession and domination for power, riches, fame, prestige and honour (Hobbes 2006: 
40; 55; Schmitt 1996: 361).  In the state of nature, competition for property and power 
easily escalates into conflict as long as there is no authority to impose justice, repressing 
aggression (even through extreme coercion), ensuring that possession is acquired through 
peaceful means. In the state of nature, where ‘every man has a Right to every thing; even 
to one anothers body’, the ‘condition of Warre of every one against every one’ becomes 
permanent (72). This war cannot be brought to an end since all forms of enmity are 
perpetual; neither victors (the strongest who survived the battle) can escape the possibility 
of losing their lives in a potentially forthcoming conflict (Hobbes 1998: 30).  
Hence, in the state of nature, in the state of perfect insecurity where everyone is a 
 
44  Among scholasticism, aristocracy and Puritanism, humanism was the most decisive Hobbes’s 
influence during his youth, claims Strauss (1963: 31). For the same author, this is evident through 




potential enemy, human lives become ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes 
2006: 70). Individuals ‘as soon as they arrive to understanding of this hateful condition, do 
desire (even nature itself compelling them) to be freed from this misery’ (Gaskin 1994: 
xvii). In order to avoid violent death, they form alliances ‘so that if we must have war, it 
will not be a war against all men nor without aid’ (Hobbes 1998: 30). In exchange for 
security they seek to relinquish certain liberties and transfer them to an absolute sovereign 
power, a de facto ruler, contracting thus with each other and forming a state (Hobbes 1998: 
50; Macpherson 1983: 20-21; Furedi 2013: 184; 187)45. Only under this process individuals 
free themselves from the insecurity of the state of nature, ‘whereof they may be compelled 
both to keep the peace amongst themselves’ (Hobbes 1994:106). The laws of nature are 
preserved only when the multitude appoints one man, or an assembly of men ‘to beare their 
Person; and every one owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that 
so beareth their Persons, shall Act, or Cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne 
the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Will, and their Judgements, to 
his Judgment’ (Hobbes 2006: 93-94).  
According to Hobbes’s Social Contract, all liberties are passed to the 
unquestionable statesman/Sovereign—to the only ‘sword’ and soul of the Common-
Wealth (Hobbes 2006: 122-123)—who undertakes the task of decision making (or for 
approving decisions made by his officials) and, in return, is obliged to take all necessary 
measures in order to defend public and individual well-being. And this is how the great 
Leviathan emerges, holding down Behemoth, another Biblical archetype used by Hobbes 
as a symbol of the proclivity of the revolutionary masses to cause havoc (Schmitt 1996: 
21; Furedi 2013: 182). Thus, the body whose Salus is Suprema Lex is not the Populus but 
the Rex (the monarch), who makes all political legislation and asserts the knowledge of 
what is just for his/her subjects, preventing wrongdoing through force and coercion. 
Without ‘this gigantic mechanism in the service of ensuring the physical protection of those 
governed’ (Schmitt 1996: 35), human beings are exposed to a condition of self-
perpetuating enmity where knowledge, arts and society disappear (Hobbes 2006: 70). The 
 
45  For Hobbes a mutual transferring of rights upon consideration of reciprocal benefit, according 
to which both parties perform what they have been agreed upon, is called a contract between 




power of the Sovereign is, however, indisputable; his unchallenged authority safeguards 
‘the conditions for commodious living…’ (Macpherson 1983: 71). To resist the Sovereign 
‘in defense of another man, guilty or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, 
takes away from the Sovereign, the means of Protecting us’ (Hobbes 2006: 122).  
For Hobbes and Filmer (1991), three common types of sovereignty exist. These are: 
a) aristocracy – ‘the government of “the better people”’ (Hobbes 1998: 92), of the better 
men chosen by the multitude itself, b) democracy, or Popular Common-Wealth, consisting 
of an assembly of ‘the people’ that must contract with themselves, bound to the decisions 
of the majority (Hobbes 1994: 119; 1998: 94; 117), and c) monarchy, the will of a single 
man, coming from the words ‘μόνος and ἀρχεῖν; ἀρχεῖν is imperare, to govern and rule; 
μόνος signifies one alone’ (Filmer 1991: 135). As Hobbes states in De Cive (1642/1998), 
monarchy is the most preferred type of commonwealth (115-126), converging thus with 
the Filmer (1991), who argues about the disastrous consequences of democracy, favouring 
at the same time a coercive and fatherly royal power, without which love for liberty would 
lead to anarchy (Sommerville 1991: xxii-xxiii). Moreover, since monarchy is the most 
coercive type of sovereignty, it has to be endorsed, especially from the moment the 
passions of the multitude, of the ‘common people’, can result in more violence than the 
passions of one man, as Hobbes states in De Corpore Politico (1655/1994). ‘The greatest 
inconvenience that can happen to a commonwealth, is the aptitude to dissolve into civil 
war; and to this are monarchies much less subject than any other governments’ (Hobbes 
1994: 140). By denouncing democracy tout court as the incubator of the most savage 
tyranny, the tyranny of the multitude, according to Filmer (1991: 31), the absolutist  
weltanschauung showcases anti-populism, which exemplifies best what Contogeorgis 
(Κοντογιώργης 2014) has labeled as ‘despotic cosmosystem’, in juxtaposition to  the 
‘anthropocentric cosmosystem’46. If the anthropocentric worldview advocates freedom 
and, simultaneously, if the anthropocentric worldview appeals to the notion of eucosmia, 
bestowing ‘faith’ (a conditional and/or restrained ‘faith’, nevertheless) in the ‘average 
person’, based on the assertion that every human being through action can achieve good 
standards of common decency, the illiberal despot neglects the moral capacities of the 
 





‘common people’ and their ability of passing sound judgment in order to bridle their 
proclivity towards self-deception, rugged self-interest, exaggeration and moral 
transgression. The ‘ordinary citizens’, according to Filmer (1991), ‘are not led by wisdom 
to judge of anything, but by violence and by rashness, nor put they any difference between 
things true and false. After the manner of cattle they follow the herd that goes before’ (28).  
Furthermore, deliberations of large assemblies endanger public safety, since they 
are sources of factions; open assemblies can disclose policies of utmost importance to 
foreign enemies, policies that only a monarch could keep in absolute secrecy (Hobbes 
1998: 123-124). The monarch can receive superior counsel, being surrounded by skillful 
executives. But above all, he/she cannot disagree with himself out of envy or greed (which 
are innate to all human beings), whilst ‘an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may 
produce a Civil Warre’ (Hobbes 2006: 105). The monarch transforms mutual fear of violent 
death into fear of punishment ‘defined or prescribed by law, as it is laid down in explicit 
words: he who does this will suffer this, or may be defined in practice, as when a penalty 
[...] is discretionary at first, and then defined by the punishment of the first offender’ 
(Hobbes 1998: 151). Fear is the only way for the Sovereign to provide security and win the 
conformity of his subjects; fear subjects everyone to the laws that envisage retribution as a 
consequence of disobedience in the philosophy of Hobbes (Schmitt 1996: 19). Fear of 
punishment, for Hobbes (1994), is the most effective way to uproot once and for all 
revolutionary ideas from the popular mind; fear removes from the human conscience 
opinions that justify rebellious actions (176). This constitutes the highest priority of the 
Sovereign (ibid).  
As we see, Hobbes’s philosophy emphasises ‘the need for some security of the 
individual, who feels himself menaced by all his fellow-men’ (Arendt 1976: 140). The 
individual, ‘[e]xcluded from participation in the management of public affairs that involve 
all citizens … acquires a new and increased interest in his private life and his personal fate’ 
(141; emphasis added). Hobbes’s  insistence on privatisation, id est., on the radical 
withdrawal from the public-political realm into our own individual (private) world (in the 
name of ‘security’ and ‘protection’ from social chaos and disarray), is probably one of the 
strongest indicators of anti-populism in his absolutist thought.. As a matter of fact, Hobbes 




were the interest of the body politic as well’, claims Arendt (1976: 139, ff). Or to use his 
own (2006) words, the private and the public interest ‘are most closely united’ (104). In a 
monarchical state, however, which is Hobbes’s most preferred State, ‘the private interest 
is the same with the publique’ (ibid). If (according to Hobbes) the private interest benefits 
the public, the constant improvement of one’s personal affairs would also benefit the 
common good and the interests of the entire commonwealth. Hayek’s (1980) economic 
liberalism rests on a similar assertion: individuals by focusing on their own private affairs 
‘contribute as much as possible to the needs of all others’ (13). Therefore, if, as Arendt 
(1976) stressed, ‘Hobbes was the true, though never fully recognized, philosopher of the 
bourgeoisie’ (146), this cannot be only attributed to his awareness concerning the 
‘acquisition of wealth conceived as a never-ending process’ (ibid) but also to his insistence 
on individual improvement, which later on became the primary theoretical starting point 
for eighteenth century liberal economists, such as  Adam Smith (2012),  who championed 
the pursuit of private interest that (in his view) ‘frequently promotes [the interest] of the 
society’ (445). All these may indicate the existence of a genealogy between the (eighteenth-
century Anglo-American) liberal emphasis, according to Deneen (2018), on the res idiotica 
(the private concerns) with Hobbes’s absolutist/despotic philosophy. Macpherson (1983) 
considers Hobbes’s insistence on private improvement (as opposed to political 
engagement) one of the main principles upon which aspects of Locke’s and Smith’s 
thought have built their foundations (as I will further explain in the next section). Hence, 
Arendt’s (1976) assertion that Hobbes himself was a philosopher who gave ‘an almost 
complete picture, not of Man but of the bourgeois man’ and that ‘[t]here is hardly a 
bourgeois moral standard which has not been anticipated by the unequaled magnificence 
of Hobbes’s logic’ (139), seems quite plausible. Furthermore, Hobbes’s emphasis on the 
res idiotica, according to Arendt (1976), deprives friendship and mutuality, encouraging 
harsh competition: ‘[d]eprived of political rights’, absorbed by his/her private concerns, 
the individual ‘loses his rightful place in society and his natural connection with his 
fellowmen’ (141). He/she judges his/her ‘individual private life only by comparing it with 
that of others’ while his/her relations with his/her fellow-men ‘inside society take the form 
of competition’ (ibid). Macpherson (1983), while reflecting on Hobbes’s  thought, 




the so-called possessive market society (else called possessive liberalism). The social and 
political obligations of ‘market men’, he writes, are based on ‘a full appreciation’ of what 
is ‘most to their own interest, most consistent with their true nature as competitive men’ 
(105). In sum,  economic (possessive) liberalism and absolutism  share principles and ideas 
that justify anti-populism, namely, the marginalisation of the political realm and the 
removal of the ‘common people’ from the process of political decision-making. However, 
before going over outlining the reasons active citizenship could lead to higher standards of 
common decency than absolutism and/or possessive liberalism, it would be necessary to 
shed more light on the genalogical links between these (ostensibly opposite) trends. More 
accurately, it would be vital to lay emphasis on existing convergences between possessive 
liberalism and Hobbes's despotic weltanschauung, explaining how the former has 
subverted the latter’s pessimism into a manifest optimism. Such a process requires rigorous 
analysis of Locke’s  thought, which has been regarded the most practical and humane 
alternative to Hobbes’ absolutism, according to Neocleous 2008). 
Liberal optimism and possessive individualism 
1) Locke contra Hobbes and the liberal genealogy   
Locke’s (1988) anti-absolutist philosophy derives from his understanding of the 
state of nature as the state of perfect freedom, equality and independence (rather than 
enmity and aggression) (291; 330). For Locke (1988) ‘force without Right, upon Man’s 
Person’, that is, force without a real purpose, ‘makes a State of War’ (281). Since men in 
their default position are capable of making rational calculations, extreme and arbitrary 
force and coercion (that is, force without right and consent) lacks substantial purpose and 
justification. In fact, no one can be ‘subjected to the Political Power of another, without his 
own Consent’ (330). To make a long story short, government by consent and majority rule 
are for Locke (as opposed to Hobbes and Filmer) the key elements upon which his Social 
Contract has been founded (Macpherson 1983: 194). ‘The Liberty of Man, in Society, is to 
be under no other Legislative Power, but that established, by consent, in the Common-
wealth, nor under the Dominion of any Will’ (Locke 1988: 283). In the same fashion, 
Montesquieu, who views the State as the highest of all authorities, acknowledges its power 




the public to impose its own will, rather than forcing individuals to obey uncontrollable 
despots. Every legislative act that suppresses public and private liberty violates the Social 
Contract; such acts must be encountered even through the use of physical force (popular 
rebellions and civil uprisings), claims Locke (1988: 370-410). Thus, ‘it is for the people 
only to decide whether or when their government trustees have acted contrary to their trust, 
or their legislative has been changed, and for the people as a whole to act as umpire in any 
dispute between the governors and a part of their body’ (Laslett 1988: 109).  
Although (in Locke’s mind) human beings in their default position are capable of 
making rational decisions, at the same time, they are liable to error and deceit. As 
mentioned earlier, in the anarchic state of nature, in the state of absolute liberty, no 
organised commonwealth exists; no executive power, no official body, can implement 
policies in defence of civil peace. Thus, natural liberty leaves everyone exposed to the 
consequences of the vices of the misjudgments of others and, subsequently, to all forms of 
aggression. For this reason human beings should ‘enter into Society to make one People, 
one Body Politik under one Supreme Government’ aiming to preserve their lives and 
property mutually (325). Through these passages we find Locke’s anti-Hobbesian position 
(concerning the state of nature as the state of perfect freedom and independence) suddenly 
overturned. Here Locke, for good or ill, seems to have accepted Hobbes’s realism in part, 
as he associates natural liberty with insecurity, which leaves everyone unprotected from 
harm and violence. In other words, Locke’s Second Treatise has always been viewed as a 
milestone in the development of the theory of popular sovereignty, taken to be the consent 
of the majority (Canovan 2005: 24). As Macpherson (1983) argued, Locke shares Hobbes’s 
main fear concerning the state of nature as the state where violent death lurks like a 
venomous snake hidden in the bushes (1983: 241; 247). According to Laslett (1988) 
pointed out, Locke’s thought did not fully escaped ‘the shadow of the Leviathan’ (72). 
Other liberal thinkers, such as James Mill and the anti-egalitarian Jeremy Bentham, share 
more profoundly the Hobbesian viewpoint: human beings are power-hungry machines; 
they strive to maximise their own pleasure without acknowledging moral limits (23-43). 
For Locke the primary focus of a (liberal) government is civil peace and security of 
property (Macpherson 1977: 27; 30; Macpherson 1983: 247; Laslett 1988: 102; Israel 




(2015), ‘implies the desire of the power necessary to accomplish the object’ (17). This 
desire ‘of that power which is necessary to render the persons and properties of human 
beings subservient to our pleasures is a grand governing law of human nature [...] Power … 
therefore, means security for the conformity between the will of one man and the acts of 
other men’ (ibid).  
The most advanced form of security exercised by the State (the Sovereign) is that 
of prerogative; according to Locke (1988), prerogative assumes ‘nothing, but the Peoples 
permitting their Rulers, to do several things of their own free choice, where the Law was 
silent, and sometimes too against the direct Letter of the Law, for publick good’ (377). This 
stance conflicts with his notion of political virtue, mutual trust and friendship, the highest 
ideals that safeguard the body politic by holding human beings together (Laslett 1988: 88; 
111; 115). Evidently, Locke returns to the Hobbesian position, especially when in the 
second volume of the Treatises resorts to the usage of the term ‘Leviathan’ (Neocleous 
2008: 17). As also Fukuyama (1992) argues, ‘Locke agreed with Hobbes that self-
preservation was the most fundamental passion’, Indeed, Locke appears closer ‘to adopting 
some of Hobbes’s claims and categories rather than refuting them, and we are reminded 
that in the early 1690s many people suspected Locke of leaning in a Hobbesian direction’ 
(Neocleous 2008: 17). Of course, Locke rejected absolutism arguing that ‘absolute 
monarchs could violate man’s right to self-preservation, as when a king arbitrarily stripped 
a subject of his possessions and life’ (Fukuyama 1992: 158). In short, Lockean liberalism 
encompasses, on the one hand, the notion liberty and consent while stressing the need for 
emergency measures (that limit liberty itself) to be implemented by governments once 
deemed necessary.. Such measures, argues Neocleous (2008), could open the back door for 
the acceptance of all sorts of authoritarian laws, killing off once and for all the same liberty 
Locke’s theory championed (against despotism) (12).  
Unlike Hobbes’s and Filmer’s justification of absolute rule as a permanent refuge 
against the war of all against all, Locke’s authoritarian’ prerogative points to all temporary 
emergency measures, imposed by governments, only under exceptional circumstances. 
Notwithstanding Locke’s prerogative justifies the use of illiberal means, it is not arbitrary 
and/or tyrannical. It is exercised (always as a last resort) strictly within the framework of a 




freedom’ (Hayek 2007: 85). In brief, the rule of law determines how the coercive powers 
of a state can be used in given circumstances (Hayek 2007: 75; 86, ff.1). It prevents 
governments ‘from stultifying individual efforts by ad hoc action’ and preserves liberty of 
each individual to pursue his/her ‘personal ends and desires’ (76). In this respect, coercion 
(under the state of prerogative) ‘can be foreseen how it will be used’ (87) and it must 
become fully evident such emergency measures are clearly in the interest of people’s 
liberty and property. Its ultimate objective is a) the effective removal of threats posited by 
unlawful rebellions, which strive to violently overthrow a government that fully respects 
the rule of law, and b) the defense of personal safety and security from rampant aggression 
(large scale crime, terrorism, etc.) (Locke 1998: 377; Macpherson 1983: 104; 247; 255)47. 
A government that takes advantage of prerogative, acting contrary to the rule of law, that 
is, doing ‘what it thinks fit to do’ (Hayek 2007: 86, ff.1), is arbitrary and, therefore, 
illegitimate; in Locke’s weltanschauung, such a government would have violated the 
Social Contract. In fact, ‘[t]he end of Law is not to abolish or restrain but to enlarge 
Freedom: For in all the states of created beings capable of Laws, where there is no Law, 
there is no Freedom’ (306). Absolute rule will not guarantee protection from man’s 
inherited tendencies towards self-destruction. Absolutism is synonymous with oppression, 
which fuels civil unrest and drags humanity back to the state of war. To a degree, Locke’s 
liberalism is a synthesis of Hobbes’ pessimistic essentialism and democratic 
republicanism. iI places emphasis on private property, security and coercion (prerogative) 
on the one hand, while stressing the value of tolerance, popular consent and the right to 
rebel, on the other. Hence, Locke’s theory does not seem to posit a challenge to the anti-
populism absolutism of Hobbes. This is not simply due to his insistence on prerogative 
but, more importantly, because limited government, constitutionalism, the rule of law and 
popular consent alone do not entail active citizenship and direct involvement in decision-
making.    
 
47  According to the Lockean viewpoint, we may consider as unlawful unrest (or rebellion) every 
act that does not aim at overthrowing an absolutist force, which is deemed arbitrary, coercive, and, 
consequently, illegal. Unlawful rebellions undermine political regimes founded upon the consent 
of the majority, protecting privacy and liberty. Such rebellions ‘bring back again the state of War’, 
since they take away the decisive power of the Legislative, a decisive power appointed by the 




Consider, at this stage, the distinction between liberty and freedom. Liberty is ‘[t]he 
deepest commitment of liberalism’ (Deneen 2018: 21). It points to ‘the liberty of the 
individual in possession to do what he liked with himself and with his own’ (Keynes 2009: 
16). Liberty signifies non-interference; ‘[w]hen a person is free in the sense of negative 
liberty they are exempt from interference in the things they do— exempt from intentional 
coercion or obstruction’ (Pettit 1997: 25). Liberty has been ‘won as a result for liberation’ 
(Arendt 1990: 33) a) from cultural norms that erect fences against personal ambition 
(Deneen 2018: 101), from the restrictions against individual self-expression imposed by 
the moral/cultural codes (ethimikon) of the societas civilis (Κονδύλης 2007: 216 [Kondylis 
2007: 216]), or b) from absolutism and arbitrary rule (Deneen 2018: 27). It is understood 
‘in terms of the opposition between liber and servus, citizen and slave’ and ‘is explicated 
as the status of someone who, unlike the slave, is not subject to the arbitrary power of 
another’ (Pettit 1997: 31). Hence, liberty points to the Lockean notion of minimum 
government (limited by consent). Liberty, according to Arendt (1990), ‘do[es] not tell the 
whole story of freedom’ (33), which is equivalent to active citizenship (Pettit 1997: 36-7), 
being coextensive to the political realm (Arendt 1968a: 149). Freedom, or in Deneen’s 
(2018) words, ‘the ancient conception of liberty’, the (classical) republican liberty, points 
to the ‘self-governance of both city and soul, drawing closely together the individual 
cultivation and practice of virtue and the shared activities of self-legislation’ (37). 
‘Eleutheros, Greek for “free,” derives from the Indo-European †leudh-, meaning 
“belonging to the people.” (De Dijn 2020: 6). For Arendt (1968a), rreedom refers to the 
capacity of moving, of getting away from the private sphere and going out into the world, 
‘meet[ing] other people in deed and word’ (148). A person is free not when he/she compels 
a government of experts to make decisions that do not violate his/her individual rights but 
only when the same person is an active member in government. Freedom is the raison 
d'être of active citizenship (146; 151). It points to action; ‘for to be free and to act are the 
same’ (153).  
According to De Dijn (2020), ‘[t]his democratic conception of freedom’, initially 
developed in ancient Greeks, ‘was revived in modern times by Renaissance humanists and 
their pupils, such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Etienne de la Boétie, and Algernon Sidney’ that 




century (2). The shift to a new understanding of freedom (as liberty) was the consequence 
of such revolutions that influenced the course of political liberalism (6), particularly in the 
Anglophone world (10). Thus, eighteenth-century (Anglo-American) liberalism, and (more 
importantly) Lockean liberalism (with its utilitarian overtones), conflated liberty 
(government limited by consent) with freedom (active citizenship). As, for example, when 
John Stuart Mill (2008) claimed, ‘[t]he struggle between Liberty and Authority’ was central 
in ancient Greece (5). Nonetheless, by the term liberty he implies ‘protection against the 
tyranny of the political rulers’ while the rulers themselves ‘were conceived (except in some 
of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the 
people whom they ruled’ (ibid). Liberty and freedom originate in the popular governments 
of the Greek polis and the Roman civitas (Arendt 1990: 30). However, the polis was not 
solely the body of protection against usurpation and/or arbitrary rule. It was the center of 
action (as aforementioned), the sphere of freedom, which—for Arendt (1968a)—is a fact 
of everyday life in the political realm (p.146)48. Classical liberal theorists (as well as late 
liberals), anchored to the Lockean tradition of ‘limited government’ and to the Smithian 
quasi utilitarian weltanschauung, emphasised the need for government to preserve order 
and liberty, without allowing government to end up a ‘Frankenstein force’ that devours 
liberty per se (Friedman 2002: 2; 1980: 22). They understood freedom solely as ‘absence 
of coercion of a man by his fellow man’ (Friedman 2002: 15). Liberalism, in the words of 
Hayek (1980), ‘does not deny the necessity of coercive power but wishes to limit it—to 
limit it to those fields where it is indispensable to prevent coercion by others and in order 
to reduce the total coercion to a minimum’ (16). In the same way Joseph Townsend argues 
that although human beings are ‘beasts’, they need no despots but only a minimum of 
government (mentioned in Polanyi 2001: 119).  
 
48  When Arendt (1990: 32-33) juxtaposed liberty with freedom, she mainly refers to Locke’s 
liberalism with its emphasis on ‘liberation’ from absolutism, with its insistence on government 
limited by consent (and, finally, on the ‘sacredness’ of private property) rather (for instance) on 
Rousseau’s liberalism (with its emphasis on positive liberty). This ‘Lockean’ liberalism had 
partially inspired the men of the great revolutions of the eighteenth century (Arendt 1990: 32-3; 
Fukuyama 1992: 186) and, according to Contogeorgis (Κοντογιώργης 2012) contributed to the 
consolidation of so-called ‘representative democracy’ (as opposed to direct democracy, or to 




Since, however, in the liberal mind a) Hobbes’ fear of perpetual war (which springs 
from our innate tendencies toward rapacity and unlimited possession) is widely echoed, b) 
prerogative is only a temporary measure (and, thereby, no permanent coercive Sovereign 
exists in order to repress moves that alienate someone’s life and property), and c) the 
‘common people’ are not allowed to join forces in order to decide (by means of memory 
and logos) which laws could better preserve decency over hubris and rapacity, what could 
safeguard human beings from destruction? The main response of eighteenth century 
economic liberalism to this impasse was the idea of economic progress (or productivism), 
the constant satisfaction of the insatiable human desire for possession through the unlimited 
production of goods (as property to be bought) and the constant increase of their 
availability in the capitalist market. ‘[E]ighteenth-century moralists like Bernard 
Mandeville, David Hume, and Adam Smith’, writes Lasch (1991a), broke decisively ‘with 
older ways of thinking’, which assumed the limitation of pathos for boundless possession 
one of the main causes of war and conflict (52). For Hayek (1980), eighteenth century 
economic liberals acclaimed ‘man's "self-love," or even his "selfish interests,"’ as the 
ultimate ‘"universal mover", and … by these terms they were referring primarily to a moral 
attitude, which they thought to be widely prevalent’ (13). They considered the constant 
increase of production (in order to gratify these so-called ‘selfish’ desires) and the ‘supply 
of material comforts’, necessary means for the improvement of the general standards of 
living (Lasch 1991a: 52). According to Mandeville, ‘[e]nvy, pride and ambition made 
human beings want more than they needed, but these “private vices” became “public 
virtues” by stimulating industry and invention’ (quoted by Lasch 1991a: 53). Smith and 
Hume endorsed the principle that ‘a growing desire for material comforts, wrongly taken 
by republicans as a sign of decadence and impending social collapse’ could generate ‘new 
wealth’ and ‘a constantly rising level of productivity’ (ibid). As I will stress in what 
follows, economic progress, which the eighteenth century Anglo-American 
liberal/utilitarian philosophy (profoundly inspired by Locke’s theories) treats as its bedrock 
value, has threatened the active citizenship with the pain of disappearance.  
2) Optimism and economic progress: the decline of public time 
If, according to eighteenth-century economic liberalism, the insatiable pathos for 




follows that once the desire for a certain amount of an object (X) is gratified, a renewed 
desire for a larger quantity of the same (or a similar) object/property is going to emerge. 
Yet, those who manage to secure a larger quantity (X2) of the same object through the 
market,  may soon desire an even larger (X3). The expansion of production and, 
subsequently, the increase of the supply of goods (to be purchased) in the market 
guarantees the availability of X3 (or of X4, X5, etc.). Eventually, our Faustian desires 
(pathos = rapacity = ∞) are satisfied through the increase ad infinitum of the availability of 
goods for possession. Thus, a) through the constant (and peaceful) gratification of the 
pathos for acquisition of property, and b) through the endless improvement of the 
purchasing power of every consumer (for the purpose of acquiring what the same consumer 
desires), the fear of perpetual war and destruction (due to scarcity), which so intensively 
haunted (eighteenth-century) economic liberals, is halted. More precisely, if as Goodwyn 
(1976) argued, in the capitalist world ‘an unconscious presumption’ has been ‘settled into 
place that the present is “better” than the past and that the future will bring still more 
betterment’ (vii), this can be partially attributed to the prevalent, according to Lasch 
(1991a: 41), belief in ‘progress’, in the constant and steady expansion of production, whose 
primary objective (according to eighteenth-century economic liberalism) is the immediate 
gratification of the increasing desire for possession (13), and, therefore, to the annihilation 
of the fear of perpetual war caused by material scarcity. The more the human pathos for 
possession is fulfilled the more the fear of perpetual war dwindles. As Chapter 1 argued, 
hope does not imply complete annihilation of fear. Instead, it considers fear the sine qua 
non of human existence itself. In this respect, economic (possessive) liberalism, with its 
linear approach on history (Lasch 1991c) towards endless progressive improvement with 
very little possibility of retrogression (Goodwyn 1976: vii; Lasch 1991a: 48), so long as it 
results in the progressive reduction of the fear of conflict and destruction (caused by 
scarcity), acquires an optimistic outlook. One could assume that while economic liberalism 
never ‘rested … on the promise of an ideal society’, (Lasch 1991a: 48), its emphasis on the 
endless ‘pursuit of wealth’, which ‘fills the vacuum at the heart of Lockean liberalism’ 
(Fukuyama 1992: 160), and its pretension for constant and gradual betterment through 
productivism, proposes the erection of a ‘crystal palace’, in Dostoevsky’s (2009) 




of a brand new age,, emancipated from the specter of scarcity and, hence, from the dread 
of war (ibid)49. ‘In a global free market’, writes Gray (2007), ‘war and tyranny will 
disappear. Humanity will advance to unprecedented heights’ (120).  
The gradual increase of the demand for production presupposes extensive devotion 
to labouring and, therefore, excessive devotion to personal time. Consider, for example, 
the following decreasing functions:  
A. labour = personal - common/public time (political and/or public). In short, from a 
fixed amount of a given daily time, the more one dedicates in work and labour the 
more the potential availability of his/her time (to be dedicated in other activities)  
decreases. Let us assume, for instance, that the total amount of one’s waking hours 
is 15 (17 hours and 2 hour of intermediate breaks are excluded). In the event one 
decides to dedicate 8 hours in activities involving work or labour, seemingly he has 
7 hours available to spend with his/her fellows in the public-political sphere. The 
increase of private time (for work and labour) to 9 hours leads to the shrinkage of 
public-political time from 7 to 6 hours. To avoid misunderstandings: apart from 
work and labour, private time may also refer to activities revolving around family 
(children) and to all sort of activities shielded within the walls of one’s private 
household. Thus, if one decides to dedicate 8 hours in activities involving work or 
labour, he has 6 hours to spend not only on public-political activities but also on 
 
49  From a different angle: of course, Locke’s philosophical relevance to perfectibilism must not 
escape our attention. While (as the mentioned in the beginning of this section as well as in the 
previous chapter) passages of Locke’s Second Treatise (1689/1998) echo Hobbes’s realist view on 
human nature, in his Thoughts Concerning Education (1693/1968), one of the main assertions 
pushed forward in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689/1978), namely his view of 
human mind as a tabula rasa, an empty room to be furnished by educators (Passmore 2000: 246), 
is pushed forward. Young children, writes Locke, are ‘white paper, or wax, to be moulded and 
fashioned as one pleases’ (Locke 1968: 325). In addition, ‘few of Adam’s children … are so happy, 
as not to be born with some bias in their natural temper, which it is the business of education either 
to take off, or counterbalance’ (244). In short, men and women ‘can be morally improved to an 
unlimited degree by education’ but also through ‘other forms of social action’ (250). Notice that 
Locke rejects the doctrine of original sin, assuming (implicitly) that ‘bias’ is ‘always of a kind 
which education ‘can (and must) eradicate (Passmore 2000: 243). In this respect, this particular 
aspect of Locke’s liberalism, so long as it denies man’s inherited and deep-seated ‘bias’, can offer 
some ground for optimism, assuming that human corruption is corrigible and, hence, the idea of 




other personal activities. Likewise, the decrease of the available time to be 
dedicated in work and labour does not immediately imply ‘more’ public-political 
time. Consider, for example, Lasch’s (1991a; 1991b; 1995a: 95; 1995b) critique of 
the ‘professionalisation’ of life in postwar urbanised/industrialised America: Lasch 
sheds light on the process whereby the equitation of ‘opportunity with upward 
mobility’ (1995a: 50) and the ‘illusory hope of individual advancement’ (through 
corporate/professional work) (53), abridged the contact between children and 
parents. Careerism, the desire for individual advancement, forced men and women 
to adjust their standards and living patterns, to expand their focus on work ventures, 
at the expense of their personal (family) time or even public time as well (1991a: 
1995b). In general terms, the shrinkage of our public-political time often comes as 
a consequence of the increase of working and labouring day.  
B. action = public - personal time. The more time one consumes  dealing with issues 
afflicting the public life the more he/she reduces his/her availability for private time 
and, more importantly, for work and labor.   
 To make a long story short, the homo economicus, who withdraws into his/her 
private sphere, who becomes a cog in the machine of unlimited economic progress and 
expansion,  reduces his/her availability to interact with his/her peers in the public-political 
realm. In ‘societies of laborers and jobholders’ (Arendt 1998: 46), labour (or work) ‘has 
assumed an all-pervading role in modern life’, claims Jacques Ellul (1965: 140). ‘[M]an 
works much more nowadays than, for example, in the [early] eighteenth century’, before 
the Industrial Revolution, (ibid), which led to the expansion of the working day, according 
to Arendt (1998: 132). Of course ‘[t]hanks to [technology and] automation, the nature of 
labor and work has fundamentally changed’, and work has become ‘more productive or 
more efficient, to evoke an economic mantra’ (Alonso 2013: 123), without constantly 
demanding expansion of the working day. ‘Wealth accumulates because different 
technologies either make the usual resources more productive or they create new avenues 
for the extracting of value’ (ibid)50. But, despite the decrease of working hours during the 
 
50  ‘At the same time, financial benefit is not the only motivator for work. For many engineers, 
programmers, and media artists the main purpose is to produce exciting new artifacts or to put 




nineteenth century, claims Ellul (1965), the ‘omnipresence of the duties of … work’ and 
its intensity ‘make it weigh much more heavily on men today than on men in the past’ 
(140). Ellul’s assertion, that modern men and women work ‘more than the slave of long 
ago’ (141) could incite controversies51. Nonetheless, kernels of truth probably exist in his 
claim that ‘the slave worked only because he was forced to’ whilst modern men and women 
who believe ‘in freedom and dignity’ invent ‘justifications to make [themselves] work’ 
(ibid; emphasis added). Let us recall Lasch’s (1995a) position concerning the pursuit of 
upward mobility, sold as the ultimate escape from poverty, misery and inequality (50; 53). 
Hence, was not the ‘illusion’ (Lasch 1991a: 53) of upward mobility a ‘justification’ that 
made ‘men and women to work more’, in Ellul’s (1965: 141) terms, dedicating most of 
their time and energy in work and labour?  
The weaponisation of labour and work for and the subsequent removal of the 
‘common citizen’ from the institutions of political life is not merely a characteristic of 
modernity. Aristotle was well aware of the way labour and material abundance (personal 
time) erect barriers against public time, against political action. In Αθηναίων Πολιτεία 
(2008) [The Athenian Republic (2008)] he discusses Peisistratus’ tyrannical rule and its 
implications for Athenian public and private life. A quick note: for the Greeks, tyranny was 
not synonymous with According to Locke (2008), ‘tyranny is ‘the exercise of Power 
beyond Right” (Locke 1998: 398) that ‘we cannot … be obliged’ to follow by ‘any 
government to which we have not given some sign of consent’ (Laslett 1988: 111), or   with 
‘what contravenes basic morality and justice’, according to the definition given by the 
radical thinkers of the eighteenth century (Israel 2010: 91). It ‘was a form of government 
in which the ruler ... had monopolized for himself the right of action’ and ‘banished citizens 
from the public realm into the privacy of their households’ (Arendt 1990: 130). ‘A state … 
in which there is no communication between the citizens and where each man thinks only 
his own thoughts is by definition a tyranny’ (Arendt 1968a: 164). When Peisistratus came 
to power, argues Aristotle (2008 [Αριστοτέλης 2008]), impoverished yeomen received 
financial aid and land. Effectively, their standards of living improved. Gradually they 
became absorbed by their private labour (farming and agriculture). In effect, their available 
 
51  ‘Even the children in a modern nation’, adds Ellul (1965), ‘do an amount of work at school 




time for the public affairs [ἐπιμελείσθαι τῶν κοινῶν] effectively decreased (94-6).  
3) Optimism and liberal anti-populism: the ‘invisible hand’   
To recapitulate: unlike the Hobbesian paradigm, which constitutes the domain of 
politics exclusively the task of one man, the possessive market society eliminates action by 
expanding private time, emphasising labour and considering economic progress as ‘the 
alpha and omega of men’s political salvation’ (Michea 2009: 68). ‘If the rate of [economic] 
growth declines’ argues Michea (2009), if the supply of product is reduced, ‘the 
pacification of the social bonds will be threatened in its very foundation’ (67).  As the 
markets expand, ‘the sources of human conflict are reduced’ (Gray 2007: 120). 
As Carroll (2010) pointed out, the belief in progress did not only depend on the 
economic expansion and the unlimited expansion of production through science and 
technology. It also rested on ‘a confidence in the resources of the individual, on the 
assumption that he would flourish in a ‘liberal’ society in which there was a minimum of 
legislative constraint—that he would progress and take the society as a whole with him’ 
(10). For Hayek (1980), individualism begins with ‘John Locke, and particularly with 
Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, and achieved full stature for the first time in the 
work of Josiah Tucker, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith’ (4), ‘to whom nobody will deny 
the title of individualist,’ (5). ‘[T]he belief that individualism approves and encourages 
human selfishness is one of the main reasons why so many people dislike it’ (13)52. 
 
52  Hayek (1980)’s view of individualism is contrasted with the ‘pseudo-individualism’ (10), or 
else ‘social contract individualism’ (10), offered by French and other Continental writers, such as 
Descartes, Rousseau and the thinkers of the French Revolution. This ‘rationalistic individualism 
always tends to develop into the opposite of individualism, namely, socialism or collectivism’ (4). 
It suggests that every social design should follow the will and reason of one single individual (10). 
Instead, Hayek’s individualism derives from the English tradition and ‘regards man not as a highly 
rational and intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being’ (8). It assumes that ‘the existence 
of isolated or self-contained individuals’, acting independently from society (6), could ‘achieve 
more than individual human reason could design or foresee’ (11). Hayek considers the conflation 
of this individualism with ‘the bogey of the "economic man"’, with selfishness and possessive 
individualism, to use Macpherson’s (1983) terms, a common ‘misconception’ spread by the 
philosophers of continental rationalism (Hayek 1980: 11). However, as Arendt’s (1976) argued 
(see also the previous section), when human beings are cut off from their community and act 
independently from society, they (potentially) develop a ‘new increased interest’ in possession and 




Although Locke’s theory of possessive individualism considers capital accumulation 
‘morally and expediently rational per se’ (Macpherson’ 183: 235). it does not encourage 
selfishness, boundless material abundance, claims Kuttner (2019: 36). Locke’s thought, 
from its outset. insisted on thrift (ibid). Locke was ‘by no means a consistent utilitarian’ 
(Passmore 2000: 250) and knew very well that unlimited individual possession and 
consumption could produce scarcity due to over accumulation of goods in the hands of a 
minority (Kuttner 2019: 292). Unlike his predecessors (Mandeville and Hume, for 
instance), Locke emphasised possessive individualism and unlimited accumulation of land 
and capital not in order to justify greed and lavishness at the expense of friendship, charity 
and mutual aid. ‘Locke was no theorist of individual license’ (37). As Fukuyama (1992) 
put it, Locke’s first man strives to ‘open up the possibility of obtaining more without limit’ 
(159), not, however, in order to support a theory of individual abundance. The unlimited 
appropriation and cultivation of land could produce and, hence, supply an increasing 
number of products in the market, making possession easier even to those who are left 
without sufficient land (Macpherson 1983: 204). In addition, the unlimited accumulation 
of money, as a reward for man’s labour, allows unlimited access to property for those who 
have no land to cultivate for themselves (Locke 1988: 391; Fukuyama 1992: 204; Gronow 
2016: 228). Money ‘would take in exchange for truly useful, but perishable Supports of 
Life’ (Locke 1988: 301). It would save labour ‘from its manifest disgrace of producing 
only "things of short duration"’ (Arendt 1998: 102), things that will spoil and perish if they 
are accumulated but not immediately consumed (Locke 1988: 300).  
Of course, economic liberalism per se, as it has been articulated by Adam Smith 
and (later on by Milton Friedman), does not exclusively flow from Locke’s theory. Spencer 
and Hayek carried the idea of possessive individualism to new extremes. Both considered 
a global free market a historical terminus (Gray 2007: 105). Spencer’s ‘rational utilitarian’ 
theory (Gray 1989: 109) proposed ‘a future society based on laissez-faire industrialism’ 
(Gray 2007: 83). Spencer (1978) embraced the hedonistic value of ‘ethical theories’ that 
must lead ‘the ultimately supreme end, [private] happiness special and general’ (204). His 
‘equal-freedom principle … that each and every man should possess the greatest right to 
 




freedom consistent with every other man possessing that same right’ (Gray 1989: 112), that 
every man ‘is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom 
of any other man’ (Spencer 1978: 62), is understood in relatedness to personal pleasure. 
Individual liberty (whose primary aim is private happiness) requires limitation of State 
interference (Gray 1989: 104) and boundless maximisation of (private) happiness (108), 
even at the expense of political participation. The role of the State is to ensure that this 
maximisation of happiness does not interfere with the happiness of others (Spencer 1978: 
62). William Howard Taft (during the American Gilded Age), for example, who was 
inspired by Spencer, argued that ‘freedom was all about the protection of individual 
rights—above all, the right to property. Democracy had to be curtailed to the extent that it 
threatened these rights’ (De Dijn 2020: 327). William Graham Sumner, a professor in Yale 
University, ‘rejected the idea that freedom was to be equated with democratic self-
government’ (5). Instead, he argued that ‘liberty needed protection from democracy’ and 
restriction of universal suffrage (310). He insisted in the doctrine of ‘“laissez faire,” or, in 
blunt English, “mind your own business”’ (5), that is, on the doctrine of endless personal 
gain, individual felicity (or pleasure) and unrestrained property accumulation as the only 
antidote to social chaos. From a contextualist point of view, one could claim that Spencer 
lived and wrote within an age profoundly influenced by economic liberal (or proto-
liberal/proto-utilitarian) views, like the ones we have already spotted in Locke’s theories. 
As a matter of fact, Locke’s justification for boundless accumulation of money and capital, 
as a means to overcome the spoilage limitation, is explicitly thought by Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (1776/2012). ‘[C]onsumable commodities … are soon destroyed; whereas gold 
and silver are of a more durable nature, and were it not for this continual exportation, might 
be accumulated for ages together…’, claims Adam Smith (2012: 429). The introduction of 
money as ‘the instrument of commerce and as the measure of value’ (Adam Smith 2012: 
419) could ‘provide both the opportunity and the reason (which could not have existed 
previously) for a man ‘to enlarge his Possessions beyond the use of his Family, and 
plentiful to supply to its Consumption, either in what their own Industry produced, or they 
could barter for like perishable, useful Commodities, with others’ claims Macpherson 
(1983: 205), while reflecting on Locke’s Second Treatise. It should not be neglected that 




living even for the lower ranks of people’  (Gronow 2016: 235).  
Furthermore in the state of nature (claims Locke) what prevented human beings 
from acting rationally was primarily ‘the absence of money and markets’ (Macpherson 
1983: 205). Hence, apart from serving and protecting the rule of law, ‘limiting abuses of 
public and private power’ (Kuttner 2019: 37), a liberal state must create social 
environments within which competitive markets can thrive and prosper (Friedman 2002: 
2; Macpherson 1983: 53). Apart from exceptional circumstances, where coercive means 
(prerogative) must be used (by the state), in most cases government intervention has to 
remain as limited as possible (Keynes 2009: 20-1). The aim is to allow economic 
competition to ‘run “free and undistorted”’ (Michea 2009: 68). As a matter of fact, it was 
initially Locke who considered ‘the process of growing wealth as a natural process, 
automatically following its own laws and beyond willful decisions and purposes’ (Arendt 
1998: 111). Put otherwise, the capitalist markets constitute an autonomous, rational, self-
regulated and impersonal mechanism (Hayek 1980: 21; Adam Smith 2012: 425) that ‘rans 
according to immutable laws of its own…’ (Lasch 1977: 7). The self-regulated market, the 
laissez-faire system, is an economy exclusively directed by market prices and demand 
(Polanyi 2001: 45; Adam Smith 2012: 425). It is a system ‘capable of organizing the whole 
of economic life without outside help or interference…’ (Polanyi 2001: 45), expanding 
production and increasing the distribution of goods in the market (71). It is ‘the central 
institution of a liberal society’ (Lasch 1995a: 95); it supervises and dictates all political 
decisions. This ‘invisible hand’ harmonises the chaos of selfish acts of individuals without 
the need of coercion (Κονδύλης 2007: 81 [Kondylis 2007: 81]; Adam Smith 2012: 445). 
Notwithstanding sentiments of rapacity and selfishness are stronger in wealthy men, whose 
sole end is the satisfaction of their own convenience, which they obtain ‘from the labours 
of all the thousands whom they employ’, argues Adam Smith (2006), this invisible hand 
reduces inequalities by distributing ‘the necessaries of life which would have been made 
had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants’ (182). It always 
identifies the most useful and stable solution for society, a solution that requires no 
administrative measures nevertheless (Κονδύλης 2007: 219 [Kondylis 2007: 219]). Thus, 
the invisible hand requires no ‘human reason’ (Gray 2007: 122), no doxa, no disagreement 




create the exact conditions within which well-being and material abundance for everyone 
are safeguarded. Smith’s conception of the ‘invisible hand’ was spelt out ‘in theistic terms’ 
(Gray 2007: 122). The invisible hand was literally the hand of the divine providence, 
working for the common benefit (Adam Smith 2006: 182). It is true that Smith (2006; 
2012) never looked forward to the so-called perfectibility of anthrōpos, assuming that 
economic liberalism was ‘a utopia suited for imperfect creatures’ nevertheless, summarises 
Griswold (1999), one could easily take this ‘divine’ characteristics of the ‘invisible hand’ 
for granted as guarantors for optimism, assuming that the expansion of the market will 
naturally (and almost inevitably) lead to future perfection. As Polanyi (2001) argues, the 
whole social philosophy of economic liberalism was hinged on the conception that it 
constitutes ‘a natural development…’ (148).  
Furthermore, economic liberalism by associating private well-being with the 
common good, led not only to the demise of political time but also to the annihilation of 
all public time in general, of the time one could spend with his/her peers in religious 
gatherings and/or cultural activities. It wiped out the ‘routine phases of social interaction’, 
which according Whitehead (2009), sustains (cultural) memory and ‘binds people 
together’, demonstrating ‘the ways in which periods of apparent inactivity are filled with a 
variety of ritual and ceremonial acts of commemoration that are not only help the recall of 
particular events but also serve to hold the community together’ (128). Industrialisation 
and innovation wiped away old folkways, eroded customs, annihilated the communal sense 
of the old village life (Laslett 1965: 61; Kloppenberg 2016: 13) and ‘created a mass society’ 
(Laslett 1965: 18) of ‘fluid social arrangements’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 13), dominated by 
brutal economic exploitation and moral degradation (Thompson 1993: 9; Polanyi 2001: 
41). Marx and Engels—who sympathised with the idea of progress—in the Communist 
Manifesto (1848/2013) celebrated the disappearance of the aristocratic ideals and the 
destruction of the extended patriarchal family, the milestone of the societas civilis 
(Κονδύλης 2007: 214; 236 [Kondylis 2007: 214; 236]), by the capitalist order, dominated 
by ‘naked self-interest’ and ‘callous “cash payment”’ (Marx and Engels 2013: 61). As with 
Fukuyama (1992), economic modernisation requires ‘traditional forms of social 
organization like tribe, sect, and family’ to be replaced by ‘economically rational ones 




the gradual marginalisation of cultural institutions ‘responsible for containing … erstwhile 
vices (such as greed)’ considered ‘as enemies of economic dynamism’ (Deneen 2018: 
69)53.  
In Arendt’s (1998) thought, when objects (pieces of art, more importantly) privately 
produced, come out in the capitalist marketplace, they are measured according to the 
relativity of value-exchange (167). The process of public mediation (public time), where 
cultural objects become subjects to public debates for reasons other than money-value, 
brings individuals closer to one another; through common appearance, open debates and 
conversations, and lasting collective bonds are gradually formed (Arendt 1998: 167; Klein 
2014: 859). In contrast, (‘Lockean’) liberalism (economic) ‘teaches a people to … adopt 
flexible relationships and bonds’ and ‘encourages loose connections’ (Deneen 2018: 34), 
which are incapable of preserving worldliness. But in spite of its impotence to preserve 
permanence, in spite of its hostility for the past, stimulated by a deep seated faith in a better 
future (Hale 2011: 92; Deneen 2018: 74), the ‘Lockean’ model never went as far as to 
obliterate memory tout court, as has been the case of post-scarcity (or post-war) liberal 
capitalism. Post-scarcity capitalism, instead, and the consolidation of mass society replaced 
old-fashioned norms (Lasch 1991b: 73; 232; Frank 1997: 235; Κονδύλης 2007: 249; 255 
[Kondylis 2007: 249; 255]) with hedonism and moral indifference (Κονδύλης 2007: 249 
[Kondylis 2007: 249]). It cultivated a ‘collective consumer mentality’ (Baudrillard 2016: 
49), bringing the Western world ‘at the point where consumption is laying hold of the 
 
53  To avoid misunderstandings: Patrick J. Deneen’s work Why Liberalism Failed (2018) offers 
some valuable insights concerning the way liberalism, with its emphasis on voluntarism and 
individualism, attacks community and culture. Nonetheless, in an article published by Robert 
Kuttner for The New York Review (2018), Deneen is accused of generalising. Deneen blames 
liberalism as a whole (argues Kuttner) for legitimising personal gain at the expense of identity and 
community. By blaming liberalism as a whole, Deneen throws the baby out with the bathwater: the 
contribution of liberalism itself to the destruction of absolutism, to universal suffrage (Kuttner 
2018) and the insistence of several liberal thinkers (including Locke, Montesquie and Tocqueville) 
on thrift (as mentioned earlier) is downplayed. Deneen’s assertions, that liberalism has eradicated 
culture and tradition, are valid for specific liberal variants, and (more precisely) for ideologies that 
draw on eighteenth-century economic liberalism, which legitimises personal gain and possession, 
projecting the market as the sole arbiter of all collective life. Henceforth, when referring to 





whole life’ (46). Thus, as opposed to Hayek (1960), who believed that a successful 
capitalist society would still be ‘in large measure a tradition-bond society’, so long as the 
free market does not simply respects tradition but also relies on it (157), indications prompt 
us to treat the constant and rapid expansion of consumerism (one of the main features of 
liberal capitalism itself) with scepticism when it comes to its impact on deeply rooted 
folkways.  
Discussions concerning the implications of permissive liberalism, its impacts on 
memory due to its excessive optimism and nihilism, must be postponed until the next 
chapter. In the next section, further theoretical analysis—coupled with empirical data from 
historical case-studies (mainly from the eighteenth century England as well as from the late 
nineteenth century American South)—will shed light on the practical impacts of liberal 
optimism. Far from fulfilling its promise, to re-model the world in such a way where the 
endless expansion of the market forces will lead to ‘continuous betterment’, as Goodwyn 
(1976: vii) believed, or to the so-called telos of history, as others (Fukuyama 1982; Gray 
2007) have argue. In several cases economic progress and modernisation intensified 
existing injustices, as Henry George (2006) noted, causing political disenfranchisement. 
Instead, the brightest beam of hope for economic justice and common decency was and is 
populism and action (the vita civile). As I will explain in what follows, ethical memory 
boosts resilience and fortitude against pathos, shaping an ethic of self-limitation.  
Dispensing with the Leviathan 
1) Optimism and economic progress: facts and case-studies   
According to Canovan (1998), ‘modernization has turned out to be extraordinarily 
good at increasing production, consumption, and procreation, giving rise to a vastly 
expanded human race which is producing and consuming more than ever before’ (xiv). 
Modernisation, according to Inglehart and Baker (2000), by achieving high levels of 
security, produced a shift ‘from absolute norms’ (19) ‘toward secular values … [of] 
tolerance, trust, subjective well-being’ (42) values ‘that are increasingly rational, tolerant, 
trusting, and participatory’ (19). Free markets enhanced ‘political freedom around the 
globe’ (Fukuyama 1992: xiv); economic progress ‘during the past two centuries’ and free 




Western world (Friedman 2002: 190). In Fukuyama’s (1992) words, free markets ‘have 
succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially 
developed countries and in countries that had been … impoverished’ (Fukuyama 1992: 
xiii). Free trade has become a means of linking nations together ‘peacefully and 
democratically’ (5).  
Right at the beginning of the eighteenth century, claims Hill (1992) ‘more than one 
in five of the population was receiving poor relief’ but wages began to rise ‘for all the 
poorest’ (258). Statistics reveal that the national income and the average wage rates ‘went 
up after 1789’ (260). As Emma Griffin (2013) argued, ‘[i]ndustrial growth’ during the 
eighteenth century ‘provided the labouring poor with a degree of personal freedom’ (19); 
industrial growth increased the prospect of better wages and privacy, especially for 
navvies, notwithstanding their harsh and insecure employment conditions (45-6). The 
author challenges the conventional view, that the industrial expansion ‘heralded the 
advent … of a yet ‘darker period’” (20). Instead, industrialisation signified the ‘dawn of 
liberty’ (ibid), the ‘era of rising wealth’ (31), the era of overt optimism. Other authors 
highlight the negative impacts of economic progress (especially in the countryside) for 
men, women, as well as children, who were forced to labour on a daily basis with no rest 
(Hill 1992: 270; 272). The Industrial Revolution converted metropoles, like London, into 
‘new places of desolation’ (Polanyi’s 2001: 41), that had been converted into pools of 
unemployment and many workers were under-employed, or forced to labour long hours 
for low wages, without collective bargaining or health protection (Hill 1992: 263; Polanyi 
2001: 42; Griffin 2013: 32; 34). ‘From the age of seven children in factories had to work 
twelve to fifteen hours a day (or night), six days a week, “at best in monotonous toil, at 
worst in a hell of human cruelty”’ (Hill 1992: 264). While industrialisation resulted to the 
‘decline of the apprenticeship system’, it ‘created new opportunities for learning a skilled 
trade’ (Griffin 2013: 35); the rapid economic expansion that took place between 1750 and 
1850, led to an increase of the demand for these new skills those with skills (ibid). While 
life was difficult, claims the same author, at the same time ‘life was changing’ (ibid). 
However, no substantial evidence indicates the dawning of a new peaceful and prosperous 
era: at the beginning of the twentieth century a quarter of the population in Britain was still 




1965: 246; 254). Paupers had lower living expectancy than the whole population during 
the Stuart times (253). Income tax figures reveal that only one in twenty-five persons could 
enjoy middle class living standards, and millions were only aspiring ‘to live as only a few 
hundred thousand of people could in fact afford to live’ (260).  
In Weil’s (1987a) terms, ‘[t]he economic liberalism of the nineteenth century’ relies 
entirely on the assumption that ‘force’ must enter ‘into the sphere of human relations’ in 
order to become ‘an automatic producer of justice’, a force that ‘must take the form of 
money’ (labour), inasmuch as ‘all use either of arms or of political power’ become 
superfluous (231) (see also the previous section). This assertion leads us to the following 
conclusion: if the optimism of economic progress, which relies on the rule of money (as 
force), has led to the increase of the living standards for certain portions of the British 
population, but generated economic injustices for others, it is because force itself 
constitutes ‘a blind mechanism which produces indiscriminately and impartially just or 
unjust results, but by all the laws of probability, nearly always unjust ones’ (232). More 
importantly, since economic liberalism employs money as force and if money as a force 
excludes political action, it precludes all sorts of human intervention from issues of 
economic distribution, effectively throws off virtù and abandons society to the appetites of 
fortuna (Chapter 2), of the ‘mistress’ that either brings success or becomes the source of 
misery and disasters, indiscriminately and arbitrarily (Machiavelli 1970: 371; 1992: 66). 
In order to crystallise this point let us return one more time to the analysis concerning the 
magmatic aspect of collective institutioning: since human collectivities resist rational 
planning, they cannot be made to order according to the demands of the ‘invisible hand’, 
which (supposedly) knows what is good for all societies by simply making rational 
calculations54. This, in conjunction with the exclusion of human involvement from politics 
(mainly from issues dealing with economic distribution) leaves the society ungoverned, 
deprived of its virtù and, hence,  at the mercy of fortuna.  
 
54  The paradox of economic liberalism rests in its fierce opposition to economic planning, 
which—as, for instance, Hayek (2007) stated, is prone to lead to authoritarian forms of collectivism 
(76-79)—but, as Polanyi (2001) asserted, even the self-regulated market pattern requires the state 
to create the appropriate conditions ‘which make the market the only organizing power in the 
economic sphere’ (72). The state must set up plans that will tame and shape a society, enabling its 
members to become rational producers and consumers, shaping their attitudes according to the 




In addition, the theory of laissez-faire, according to Keynes (2009), neglects ‘actual 
facts’ and relies on hypothetical scenarios concerning the possible outcomes of the so-
called ‘organic’ (or self-regulated) ‘process of production and consumption’ (31). In my 
view, these ‘actual facts’ are not mere economic factors, like (for instance) ‘internal 
economies’ that ‘tend to the aggregation of production’ or ‘monopolies and combinations’ 
which ‘interfere with equality in bargaining’ to name a few (32) but the outcomes of human 
vulnerability, of the pathos for unlimited (and often illegitimate) acquisition. Thus, to leave 
a society ungoverned (at the mercy of fortuna) without taking action, without allowing ‘the 
common people’ to impose measures through which this pathos for illegitimate wealth 
accumulation is constrained, allows certain social groups to take advantage of this anarchic 
condition, imposing their own order in favour of their own pathos and greed (of their own 
self-interest). Consequently, if force (as money) produces ‘nearly always unjust’ results 
(Weil 1987a: 232), this is owed to the fact that the market pattern, instead of being detached 
from the state of society operates through its institutions. It is, therefore, susceptible to the 
pathos for domination, to the greed of certain groups that escape public control (especially 
since there is no popular body politic to allow ‘the common people’ exercise control over 
them) and, hence, find themselves in a position to corrupt, suppress and expand their 
monopoly through capital accumulation. We will return to this claim later on. 
Let us consider again one of the main points made in the previous chapter whilst 
reflecting on Castoriadis and Jung (especially in second half of the third section). Two 
modes of collective institutioning, the rational (legein and teuchein) and the magmatic,  
have been identified, leading us to the following conclusion: the forces (pathos) that 
determine the identity of a collectivity, as well as the reality within which members of a 
collectivity live in, cannot be always put under the control of human consciousness. 
Therefore, if human collectivities (often) defy rational planning and cannot be put under 
the dictates of the ‘invisible hand’, and if the social anarchy of economic liberalism permits 
self-interested groups to ascend into power (as long as there is no popular body politic to 
oppose and resist their objectives), these groups in order to bring a society in line with the 
standards of the market pattern that has been put under the sway of their own pathos for 
unlimited acquisition, must have its own spontaneity limited. This requires government 




dissent). Perhaps this explains the abyss between the way economic liberalism is perceived 
in theory, as a ‘natural’ and self-evolving mechanism that opposes central planning as a 
system that would constitute unleash the human potential for progress, constituting 
coercion and authoritarianism unnecessary, superfluous and obsolete (Hayek 2007: 76-9), 
with the fact that the same socio-economic model, as Polanyi (2001) observed, always 
needed the iron fist of the state (145). As he asserts, ‘the road to the free market was opened 
and kept open by enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism’ (146). ‘[F]ree markets could never come into being merely by allowing 
things to take their course’ without ‘enormous increase in the administrative functions of 
the state’ endowed ‘with a central bureaucracy able to fulfill the tasks set by the adherents 
of liberalism’ (145). Put otherwise, since political decisions precede markets, a strong state 
capable of supporting and defending the (rational) capitalist plan is always required. 
Furthermore, the modern capitalist enterprise in order to come into existence, presupposes 
‘a judiciary and administration’, a legislative power capable of acting ‘more or less overtly 
as a regulator of te market’ and as a subsidiser of the market itself (Scott 2006: 177). 
However, if (as mentioned in the previous section) the capitalist state (the one prefigured 
by the ‘Lockean’/utilitarian worldview) restricts mass political involvement (action) and if 
absence of popular involvement and control opens up pathways for powerful groups to 
hijack the body politic, imposing their own order, we could assume that the bureaucratic 
administration, which according to Polanyi (2001), sought to remodel societies according 
to the principles of the free market/capitalist economy (unlimited accumulation of capital 
through boundless expansion) was carried out by such groups, whose primary aim was the 
pursuit of their own self-interested goals. Below we elaborate on historical examples where 
greed and rampant self-interest, exercised by such powerful groups (in the name of 
economic liberalisation) led to mass pauperisation. 
The story ‘of enclosure and industrial revolution’, claims Hill (1992), revealed the 
paradoxes of economic optimism and rationality ‘the eighteenth century had inherited from 
John Locke’, which on the one hand created work and (ostensibly) increased the living 
conditions and, on the other, forced the poor to work harder ‘in unfree circumstances’ 
(273). More importantly, it failed to deliver the promise of material abundance, suggesting 




commodities’ (Polanyi 2001: 42). In the countryside, when small owners were bought out 
by large property sellers in order to facilitate the enclosure of commons, pauperisation 
rapidly increased (Hill 1992: 271). Simultaneously, the ‘small’ and ‘intimate’ parochial 
institutions of self-government in villages that traditionally ‘had considerable autonomy’ 
(Magnusson 2015: 35) disappeared, once the entire economic and social life of the village 
passed into the hands of rich landowners (Hill 1992: 271). A ‘rural democracy’ ceased to 
exist as ‘“the yeomen farmers were declining in numbers”’, being forced to move to 
industrial metropoles in order to labour in factories (ibid). While economic modernisation 
improved literacy levels (as it is commonly believed), high illiteracy in the English 
countryside during the pre-industrial era had not been an obstacle for the average villager 
(Laslett 1965: 229-31), who—while living an ‘entirely oral life’ (245)—could ‘take part in 
[local] governance at one remove’ (234). What the destruction of the autonomy of the 
English village indicates is that the triumph of liberal optimism, of industrialisation and 
modernisation, was the equivalent of the triumph of freedom and democracy. Liberal 
optimism conforms to a mode of being that, in certain cases, becomes a ticket to elitism, 
political disenfranchisement (or anti-populism) and economic hardship.  
In the same way, during the American Reconstruction era, economic reforms tied 
to the doctrine of ‘laissez faire individualism’, ‘the most dynamic and seemingly 
irrepressible force’, premised on the idea ‘that an unrestrained market economy was the 
only safe road to prosperity and future happiness’ (Clanton 1991: 5), led to the deterioration 
of economic injustice, widening at the same time the gap between political representatives 
(the elites) and ‘the common people’ (Goodwyn 1976). The main objectives of such 
reforms was economic progress through the demonetising of silver, which suited the 
country’s financial leaders and many Wall Street bankers (Canovan 1981: 24; Postel 2007: 
vii-viii). Such reforms caused ‘contraction in the money supply’ (Canovan 1981: 23) that 
benefited the banking-creditors (Argersinger 1974: 5; Goodwyn 1976: 14) who ‘had little 
or no regard for the democratic creed’ (Clanton 1991; 6). It led to a rapid increase in 
unemployment, massive reduction in food prices, depression in businesses activity and 
inflicted cruel hardships upon debtors (mainly the nation’s farmers) (Canovan 1981: 23) 
and most of all, to political disenfranchisement (Argersinger 1974: 6). Contraction, which 




1981: 23), caused indebtedness, which was ‘felt most severely in the agrarian South and 
West’ (Clanton 1991: 12). In turn, the farmer’s debt ‘was worth more to his creditors’ 
(Canovan 1981: 23). Consequently, the farmers ended up ‘paying the interest on it required 
more and more bushels of wheat or bales of cotton’ (ibid). Simultaneously, the increasing 
influence of the banking system, resulted in the rapid growth of gigantic railroad 
corporations, upon which sections of independent producers relied in order to access the 
West of the country (19). But the farmers ‘needed cheap credit and transportation to get 
their produce to the East’ (Müller 2016: 87) while ‘[w]estern freight charges were 
sometimes four times as high as the rate for the same distance in the East’ (Canovan 1981: 
19). Hence, they felt at the mercy ‘of banks and railroad owners’ (Müller 2016: 87) Others 
had to borrow in order to ‘get in on the boom in Western lands’ (Canovan 1981: 20). 
Seeking to bypass the credit system, the farmers set up cooperatives, small production units 
of production (Lasch 1991a: 219-20), ending ‘their reliance on the Eastern banking and 
railroad establishments’ (Taggart 2002: 27). They set up public assemblies and discovered 
new technologies in order to build up networks of democratic communication (Lasch 
1991a: 219-20) and ‘disciplined a lecturing system designed to mobilize grass-roots 
support for political insurgency’ (McMath 1992: 143).  
As the campaigner John Grant Otis stated, the cooperative movement emerged 
‘from an age of intense individualism, supreme selfishness, and ungodly greed to a period 
of co-operative effort’ (quoted by Clanton 1991: 47); it was ‘a moment of democratic 
promise’ (Goodwyn 1976: 542) through which a new language emerged, ‘fashioned out of 
[an] old heritage’ (xi), echoing the Jacksonian principles of universal suffrage and active 
citizenship, reflecting on certain variants of the liberal anti-absolutism in conjunction with 
republican elements of an old Anglo-American political tradition (Lasch 1991a: 219; 223; 
McMath 1992: 52). As opposed to the optimism of economic liberalism, whose only 
remedy to the problem of mass poverty is excessive reliance on large scale production and 
‘innovative industrialism’ (Lasch 1991a: 217), the cooperative movement echoed 
Jefferson’s hostility towards elitism, excessive wealth and large proprietorship, who (like 
the farmers) praised small proprietorship as the necessary foundation of all civic virtue 
(Nelson 2006: 204-5). Such an ardent defense of small business organisation and small 




Populists (partially inspired by classical republicanism) considered small property 
ownership and personal independence an essential prerequisite of (active) citizenship 
(Lasch 1995a: 92; 1991a: 219; 223)55.  
The movement was not exclusively concerned with issues revolving around the 
need for equal wealth (re)distribution. To focus only on the economic demands of the 
farmers, claims Argersinger (1974), downplays the most essential aspect of their 
grievances, namely ‘the charge of the misuse of public power and the exclusion of agrarian 
representation’ (5). For Clanton (1991), the Populists sought to enact ‘new laws based on 
the natural rights of men’ (167); they pushed forward political reforms, including women’s 
suffrage and the secret ballot (Clanton 1991: 83; 129; 131; McMath 1992: 125; 127).  
The vita civile is best exemplified by the cooperative movement, a historical case-
study that stresses the explicit interrelation of economic justice and action in the pursuit of 
common decency56. Unlike economic liberalism, which subordinates public life to the 
never-ending process of individual production and consumption (labour/private time), 
acclaiming productivism as the only valid response to material scarcity, for the vita civile 
all forms of injustices (including economic deprivation) presuppose, first and foremost, the 
equal distribution of political power to the ‘common people’ (and not just the random 
distribution of material goods). More importantly, the intense anti-populism of 
productivism not only impede economic justice but also obstruct the growth of political 
experience, id est, of ethical memory, through which moral transgressions are discouraged. 
Let us take this issue further by bringing to the discussion additional theoretical and 
philosophical perspectives.   
2) The vita civile: ethical memory and meliorism   
As Polanyi (2001) put it, ‘[e]conomic liberalism misread the history of the 
Industrial Revolution because it insisted on judging social events from the economic 
 
55  For more regarding the insistence of the weltanschauung of classical republicanism to small 
proprietorship—as opposed to the idealisation of unlimited acquisition, advocated by the ‘Lockean’ 
mode—see Chapter 7.  
56  For more concerning American Populism and active citizenship (agonal or narrative action) 
see Chapter 6, where extensive discussion about the cooperative and participatory commonwealths 




viewpoint’ (35-6). By insisting on viewing ‘social events’ and concepts as consequences 
of economic moves and money relations, exclusively revolving around the issue of 
property acquisition, financial security, competition and scarcity, economic liberalism 
construed absolutism and freedom, arbitrary rule and free will, from a standpoint confined 
within the narrow prism of materialism. Consequently, when economic liberals aspired to 
defeat absolutism once and for all, instead of associating the Leviathan, the serpent of 
fertility and life, according to Frye (1982: 189), first and foremost with political power (as 
Hobbes had initially done) that was ought to be dispensed from the monarchs and the 
aristocratic classes to the ‘common people’ (according to the principles of classical 
republicanism), they conceived it as a mere source of material supply, which was ought to 
be dispensed to the plebs, through the market pattern and through the unlimited expansion 
of heavy industry. In contrast, the vita civile, drawing on classical republicanism, prioritises 
distribution of political power. Consider again the following quote: ‘[t]hou [God] didst 
break in pieces the heads of leviathan, thou gavest him to be meat to those that people the 
desert’ (The Bible, Psalm 74:14). We should treat the word ‘meat’ as a metaphor; it does 
not imply actual meat, a source of food through which human life is maintained (labour); 
instead, it points to government and lawmaking, to political power, the source (the ‘food’) 
whereby the life of the political realm is sustained. Far from being a mere material force, 
the Leviathan symbolises the ability and potential of initiating, speaking, influencing and 
obliging others by means of persuasion, while acting prudently in the pursuit of common 
decency.   
The political realm, by liberating human beings from ‘the futility of individual life’ 
(Arendt 1968a: 56), while leaving them exposed to the potentially destructive upshots of 
their own decisions and mis-judgments, equips them with the necessary knowledge and 
self-awareness (moral memory), concerning their capability for evil. In fact, the polis was 
‘an educational institution of men’ («πόλις ἄνδρα διδάσκει») claims Simonides of Ceos 
(quoted by Castoriadis 2011: 68 [Καστοριάδης 2011: 68]). The town meetings in New 
England were ‘the school[s] of democracy’ (Bryan 1995: 36), the ‘“schools of the people”’ 
according to Emerson (quoted by Fine 2014: 226); according to Tocqueville (1994), they 
were to freedom ‘what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's 




of self-education, providing the chance for ‘the common people’ to develop preventive 
skills through participation and experience. Recall, at this stage, Tocqueville’s (1994) 
assertions that ‘the people in America obey the law … because it is their own work’ and 
the same law ‘may be changed if it is harmful’ (1: 248). Experiencing the pernicious 
consequences of a law could prompt members of the same body politic that have decided 
for its implementation (through open decision-making) to change it. More importantly, 
such a negative experience becomes part of the sensus communis, of the common 
knowledge and wisdom stored in the collective memory (Deneen 2018: 81), of the moral 
capital that effectively discourages repetition of similar fallible decisions.  
In addition, consider the following axiom: ‘the Greek word aletheia [αλήθεια], 
“truth” … combines the negative prefix “a-” with the component “-lethe”, which also 
occurs in the name of Lethe, the river of forgetting’ (Whitehead 2009: 14). Hence, aletheia 
(truth) and remembrance are part of the same parcel. Truth is pragmatic and empirical; it 
is conceivable only in relation to its effects and in relation to their practical importance for 
us (James 1978: 98). The true ‘is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as “the 
right” is only the expedient in the way of our behaving’ (106; emphasis added). That 
means, ‘the true’ in order to be understood as such must become an event (or a past object) 
sensed and lodged in the storehouse of our memory. The same event is retrieved by our 
thinking ego. Thereupon judgment takes place; the effects of this event are evaluated and, 
finally, recurrence is prevented. In certain cases such events end up part of the common 
history of a collectivity57. Furthermore, ethical memory gets into the institutions of civil 
life (educational curriculums, canons, et al.); wisdom (deriving from experience) is 
‘embodied in institutions’ and incites fear of repetition, adds Pocock (1989b: 159) while 
elaborating on Burke. Concurrently, the ‘Supreme Authority’, which inspires ‘feare of 
punishment’, in order to relieve human beings from the fear of violent death, the ‘perpetuall 
feare’ that ‘alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in Dark’ 
(Hobbes 2006: 60), is not anymore the punitive absolute government but the fear of 
memory, which stimulates awareness concerning the need of self-limitation. This sum of 
memories (moral capital) gained through political engagement contributes to the realisation 
 




of our capacity for hubris, of the potentially destructive consequences our own decisions 
and moves. 
Political experience (through participation) promotes betterment by leaving as its 
residue the intelligence of handling impasses. Psychical, moral and political evil, as 
Wollstonecraft (1993) put it, can be lessened by ‘the accumulation of experimental facts’ 
(380). Nonetheless, this amelioration is not linear; it must not be conflated with scientific 
intelligence and research, which lead into ‘the curious "better and better," "truer and truer," 
that is, into the boundlessness of progress’ (Arendt 1978, 1: 54) towards an end-point, 
towards a conclusion (perfection). Unlike Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘last man at the end of 
history’, whose moral knowledge would (ostensibly) prevent him/her from joining a new 
pointless war (307), the vita civile does not promise absolute decency due to the constant 
increase of moral capital.  
As Kloppenberg (2016) pointed out, in a democracy a collective decision, adopted 
as a solution to a problem, could generate new problems unexpectedly that could ‘plunge 
us into new conflicts with unforeseeable and sometimes tragic consequences’ (18). 
Consider, for example, the case of human unpredictability in the following hypothesis: a 
collective decision (A) is not motivated by sinful intentions; it takes into account the moral 
lessons from past (or historical) transgressions (ethical memory). However, when the same 
decision is materialised within the real world, several different groups (B and C, for 
instance) develop a type of relationship which, along the way, becomes unstable, creating 
further tensions (D), undermining the smooth functioning of the collectivity. This equation 
A = B+C = D, points to the existence of a newborn reality (see diagram below) emerging 
unpredictably (and unintentionally). Within the same reality group B is stimulated to act in 
a manner that inevitably causes negative reactions to C (or the other way around). Such a 
newborn reality can create conditions within which pathos and mēnis explode; because this 
reality is ‘new’ and has never been experienced before, there exists no known method of 
prevention. It turns out that collective decisions are to a degree experimental and enigmatic; 
their outcome, in certain cases, is concealed. It is publicly revealed only after their final 
implementation. 
 ‘[M]eliorism is properly understood as hope held in full recognition of the factors 




concerning the destructive ‘vicissitudes of Fortune’, to use Machiavelli’s (1992: 67) words, 
what prompts resistance against wretchedness through political action. Fortuna ‘displays 
her might where there is no organized strength to resist her’ (66), when there is no 
organised commonwealth whose members find the necessary courage in order to confront 
this ‘mistress’ of destruction by means of political engagement and participation (as 
opposed to consent). The fearful pessimist, who withdraws from the public sphere and 
bestows all of his/her political freedoms to a closed circle of experts or to an unquestionable 
leader, lacks the valour and patience through which he/she could minimise the 
destructiveness of fortuna. As Aristotle (1890) argues, «ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων 
δειλός» [‘weak and timid is the one who exceeds in fear’] because «πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ 
δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος» (‘he/she fears everything. On the contrary, 
the courageous person is hopeful’) (34). The pessimist is deficient in courage and fortitude; 
he/she lacks the virtù, the necessary fortitude and resilience to challenge the their fate. In 
the same way, the optimist, having expelled any sense of tragic vision from his/her mind, 
namely the idea that ‘in this world danger [and destruction] is ever-present’ (Weil 1987a: 
157), having neglected his/her frailty and vulnerability, bestows his/her faith to excessively 
ambitious plans, without being much aware of the existing possibilities for these plans to 
‘go wrong’.  
According to Aristotle, «εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς 
νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις» (‘those who are hopeful are confident because 
they have overcome numerous threats’) (58). Thus, «παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι» 
(‘the hopeful resemble the courageous share the same confidence’). But while «οἱ μὲν 
ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κράτιστοι εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν 
ἂν παθεῖν» (‘the courageous are confident for the exact reasons explained above, the 
hopeful because they assume that they are indestructible, shielded from every harm’) (ibid). 
From Aristotle’s assertion one understands that hope and optimism (especially optimistic 
populism) could be easily conflated. As a matter of fact, hope is profoundly 
anthropocentric. It rejects withdrawal and passivity and embraces courage for action, a 
type of action that promises no ‘crystal palaces’, nevertheless. Thus, to revise Aristotle, 
the optimists are certain because they assume that they are indestructible, whilst the 




fate through their knowledge and experience (ethical memory). They do not, however, 
assume they are perfectly shielded from the appetites of fortuna. The hopeful know that 
corruption, greed, lust and selfishness are too deep-seated in men and women to be entirely 
eradicated. ‘Such experience’, writes Lasch (1991a), ‘leaves as its residue the unshakable 
conviction, not that the past was better than the present, but that trust is never completely 
misplaced, even though it is never completely justified either and therefore destined 
inevitably to disappointments’ (81). The hopeful understands that ‘courage is indispensable 
for political action’, so long as it ‘stands in the sharpest possible contrast to our private 
domain, where, in the protection of family and home everything serves and must serve the 
security of the life process’ (Arendt 1968a: 156). No ‘reckless optimism’—the 
‘superstition’ of progress (Arendt 1976: vii), the utopian vision for a new society that stands 
in absolute perfection—but knowledge concerning the fragility and vulnerability of the 
human world stands as the most important virtù of the vita civile. In short, the virtù of 
courage to ‘leave the protective security’ of our private realm (Arendt 1968a: 156), to let 
ourselves be seen, to ‘dare greatly’ (Brown 2012: 1), ‘is demanded of us by the very nature 
of the public realm … because in politics not life but the world is at stake’ (Arendt 1976: 
156).  In the end, hope (ἐλπίς) does not prevent us ‘from expecting the worst’ (Lasch 1993: 
14) since ‘the worst is always what the hopeful are prepared for’ (ibid).  
The time has come to sum up. This section began with a discussion revolving 
around the feebleness of economic (possessive) liberalism, around its impotence to 
effectively suppress the pathos for domination, id est., the greed and lust for possession. 
One way to tame pathos is through (political) action, through participation, through the 
dispensation of the Leviathan (political power) to the ‘common people’, who must obtain 
the courage and fortitude in order to join the political realm. This section shed light one of 
the main ingredients of action, on ethical memory.  Notice that ethical memory alone does 
not provide lasting immunity to hubris; as Chapter 1 clearly pointed out, memory and 
experience are subjects to interpretation (Mill 1998: 23). How one fashions the process 
whereby past experiences are interpreted in such a way that conclusions in line with the 






The genealogical analysis conducted in this chapter has highlighted conceptual 
connections between pessimism and optimism: both are concerned with the human pathos 
for endless possession and as a solution to the ‘condition of Warre of every one against 
every one’, in which ‘every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body’ 
(Hobbes 2006: 72) propose anti-populism. Both systems emphasise private well-being (as 
being the ultimate purpose of human happiness), proposing the handing over of all political 
freedoms to a central authority. Τhis authority should either be a coercive Sovereign (most 
preferably a monarch, according to Hobbes and Filmer) or the (supposedly) autonomous 
(independent of human action) rational and self-regulated market system, capable of 
guaranteeing economic progress, based on the widely accepted (during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries) perception that unlimited growth would provide ‘insurance of law 
and order, at minimum cost’ (Polanyi 2001: 122). Nonetheless, extensive emphasis on the 
increase of the number of private opportunities offered to the individual, deprioritise and 
marginalise the res publica (Pocock 1989a: 89-90). By devoting themselves to their private 
affairs, citizens would reduce their need for political participation (Lasch 1995a: 94).  
To avoid misunderstandings: this should not be seen as a polemic against economic 
liberalism. In fact, evidence suggesting that economic optimism, with its emphasis on the 
(ad infinitum) gratification of self-interest, has contributed to the amelioration of our living 
standards, must not be discounted. Consider, for instance, the gradual reduction of the 
levels of illiteracy in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Griffin 2013: 
165-168). On the other hand, ‘[i]t is not a correct deduction from the Principles of 
Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest’ (Keynes 
2009: 36). To a degree, the rise of our living standards could be attributed to the spread of 
populist political movements during the past few centuries, movements that pushed 
forward plans for top-down wealth redistribution. For example, the Chartist movement, 
according to Mill, put pressure on the upper classes, on those who had ‘“the physical force 
on their side”’ and ‘“wanted the organization, which they were rapidly acquiring, to convert 
their physical power into a moral and social one … that something must be done to render 
the multitude more content with the existing state of things”’ (quoted by Macpherson 1977: 




South for the achievement of political hegemony by businessmen’, writes Goodwyn (1976: 
610). But on the other hand, the Populists had already paved the way for serious structural 
reforms in society (537). Despite their failure to implement their radical economic and 
political program, a great deal of their popular demands had been partly satisfied by 
Roosevelt’s New Deal (Goodwyn 1976: 550-1; Taggart 2002: 37). ‘The populists served 
as markers of coming change’ (Taggart 2002: 37).  
At the same time, it may seem plausible to contend that economic liberalism in 
order to protect producers and manufacturers from a possible financial devastation must 
first and foremost implement measures through which the propensity of the production to 
endlessly expand is not disproportionate with the purchasing capacity of the consumer. 
Ways must be found in order to ensure the masses can access the ever-increasing supply 
before the latter spoils and perishes. Populist movements (like the American cooperative 
movement) by challenging economic exclusion pushed up the wages of low-paid workers 
and, gradually, improved their purchasing capacity. In this respect, populism (to a degree) 
strengthened economic liberalism. Populism ‘democratised’ economic liberalism as long 
as it opened pathways for the underdogs to access the market supply. Of course, this 
assertion does not refute my initial claim, that the primary objective of American Populism 
was paradigm shift, from economic liberalism to a model of economic and political 
democracy based on active and cooperative citizenship. However, due to its defeat only 
some of popular demands (pushed further by farmers and workers) have been satisfied, 
such as the improvement of their standards of living, which (paradoxically) made economic 
liberalism more sustainable. 
Seventeenth and eighteenth century liberal thinkers were (partially, at least) right 
to share the realist approach of human nature, the view of ‘man not as a highly rational and 
intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being’, to use Hayek’s (1980: 8) words again. 
However, their response to the problem of perpetual war (the consequences of our endless 
pathos for possession)  stimulates objections and controversies. More precisely, they 
considered our insatiable appetite for possession as a ‘powerful stimulus for economic 
development’ (Lasch 1991a: 13) and set out to put all human societies under a mechanism 
which constantly satisfies these desires, through the unlimited production and availability 




of this chapter argued, the market forces must never be left on their own, unrestrained and 
uncontrolled. They should be put under the control not simply of the state, as Keynes 
(2009) suggested, but of the citizenry, of the ‘common people’. Second, this chapter 
highlighted the reasons the optimism of economic (possessive) liberalism, with its rational 
social programming, instead of removing predicaments that supposedly obstruct the 
pathway towards endless betterment, in certain cases has generate conditions where all 
sorts of injustices had been effectively legitimised. This has been partially attributed to the 
dominance of pathos, to the prevalence of greed and self-interest over common decency, 
as the historical examples of the enclosures and the late nineteenth-century America made 
clear58. It is time to move to the next step, where the evolution of the optimism of 
possessive liberalism liberal optimism into what I have already called permissive liberalism 
will be examined. Briefly, by converting objects into fast-exchange commodities, 
permissive liberalism promotes a culture of rampant consumerism. This culture has led to 
dependency of the same idols (consumable goods) produced constantly in order to be 
consumed as fast as possible. Thus, permissive liberalism embraces the ‘idolatrous cult of 
economic growth and scientific technological progress’ (Genovese 1994: 34), promoting a 
vision of the world reduced to promiscuity, anonymity, self-indulgence, extravagant 
hedonism and pleasure (Lasch 1991b: 69). Permissive liberalism embodied the ‘belief that 
a human community can function in a coherent and efficient fashion without drawing the 
least support … from shared moral and cultural values’ (Michea 2009: 48). It emerged 
during the past century as a means of pseudo-liberation from ‘puritanical’ mores that had 
placed restrictions on individual self-actualisation and self-expression, favouring the 
community and the nation. In the following chapter, the rapid rise of right-wing populism 
during the past few decades will be viewed as a direct consequence of this cultural crisis 






58 More importantly, anti-populist solutions prevent the strengthening of ethical memory, whereby 




    Chapter 4 
The ‘Death of God’: From Optimism to Right-Wing Populism 
Introduction 
This chapter employs multiple theoretical perspectives in order to analyse cultural 
trends that contributed to the rise of permissive liberalism. The first section sheds light on 
social trends emerging due to cultural permissiveness. At the same time, it outlines the 
reasons such phenomena fueled social nostalgia. The second section digs into the nostalgic 
cast of mind, the ‘heartland’ of right-wing populism (to use Taggart’s terms). These 
cultural trends are products a) of the evolution of the ‘Lockean’ model of economic 
progress, b) of the consolidation of ‘mass culture’ and c) of the rapid spread of counter-
cultural movements emerging during the 1960s and the 1970s (see the first section of this 
chapter). As opposed to the productivist ethos of possessive individualism, permissive 
liberalism exalts hedonism, unrestrained pleasure and rampant consumption (Lasch 1991b: 
179); it is predicated on a culture within which all moral prohibitions are effectively 
removed (ibid), where everything is permitted, inasmuch as everyone can constantly gratify 
his/her fantasies of ‘exquisite comfort and sensual refinement’ (181). As opposed to the 
optimism of the ‘Lockean’ model, permissive liberalism is overwhelmed by a deep sense 
of pessimism, which should not to be confused with the political pessimism of absolutism. 
Instead, I am referring to an overwhelming feeling of sadness caused by consumerism and 
the loss of memory. As a matter of fact, studies (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, and Bodenhausen 
2012) have revealed strong links between consumerism and poor mental health in 
individuals. Those who are in a consumer-cue condition (addiction) report high levels of 
negative emotions (including sadness and melancholy), as well as selfishness and 
competitiveness.  
The consumerist and hedonistic ethos encourages isolation, undermining the public 
realm and the communal ties among individuals, the human interactions that impact on the 
steady and meaningful growth of human personality. According to Bauman (2000), 
rampant consumerism has liquidified culture and tradition; it has converted all common 
gestures, norms and ideas into ephemeral commodities, capable to be quickly produced, 




264 [Kondylis 2007: 264]). Liquid values have limited durability (Bauman 2000); they are 
impermanent and imprecise (Κονδύλης 2007: 65 [Kondylis 2007: 65]). In addition, the 
modern consumer prefers temporary enjoyment rather than possession of durable goods in 
a society surrounded by an infinite number of consumable objects (256). In this world of 
radical impermanence the human self ends up an empty vessel (ibid). As a consequence of 
this depersonalisation, there gradually develops a ‘narcissistic’ culture, to use Lasch’s 
(1991b) terms. Meaningful objects are eradicated from memory; our daily experiences are 
less and less shaped and defined by cultural and/or political interactions. Instead, they are 
influenced by the existence of consumable idols, which become objects of love, objects of 
lust and hedonism. This inevitably leads to the ‘cultural devaluation of the past’ (Lasch 
1991a: xvii) The ‘new experience of time as a pastless present’ (Deneen 2018: 66) and the 
loss of the sense of historical continuity (130), of belonging 'to a succession of generations 
originating in the past and stretching in the future' (Lasch 1991a: 5) go hand in hand with 
the loss of (mainly religious) concepts capable of binding individuals together, shaping 
their collective and personal identity by offering positive aspirations and meaning.  
Consider, for example, Nietzsche’s (2001) statement about the death of God and 
the ‘divine decomposition’ (120). From a contextualist point of view, this statement mirrors 
the social and cultural climate of Nietzsche’s age, the rapid disappearance (under the 
absolute dominance of industrial liberalism/capitalism) of the Christian (Biblical) 
archetypes that once shepherded Western nations, offering a sense of unity and common 
purpose (Frye 1992: xiii). Of course, Nietzsche considered metaphysical beliefs ‘not 
essential to human nature or well-being’ and he ‘settled into the conviction that we suffer 
nihilism’ (Taffel 2006: xii) due to the steady decline of religion and the absence of new 
moral principles to replace it (Fukuyama 1992: 304; Williams 2001: xii; xx). ‘Where are 
we moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not continually falling? And backwards, 
sideways, forwards, in all directions?’ (Nietzsche 2001: 120). Notwithstanding Nietzsche 
was an ardent sympathiser of the aristocracy, at the same time he believed that it was the 
aristocracy itself which had produced its own grave diggers due to its flirtation with 
Christianity. ‘The downfall of Christianity’, writes Nietzsche (2006: 3), was the outcome 
of the will to truth, of ‘the will not to deceive’, which (in fact) was the central principle of 




to ‘turn out to be our longest lie’ (201). More importantly, Christian norms spread the seeds 
that led to the growth of liberal revolutions across Europe, resulting in the collapse of the 
aristocratic order, followed by the rise of liberalism, which (in his thought) represents 
nothing but mere self-interest, lack of excellence, moral decay and social decadence 
(Fukuyama 1992: xxii; Cristi 2014: 191). In fact, it is irrelevant whether Nietzsche’s 
assertion—that Christianity, with its emphasis on truthfulness and ‘herd mentality’ led to 
the destruction of the aristocratic order—is valid or not. What concerns us here is the 
practical value, to use James’ (1978) terms, of Nietzsche’s approach. More precisely, 
belief systems (like Christianity, according to Nietzsche’s observations) may incorporate 
elements that gradually annihilate the same social reality they attempt to defend. Therefore, 
if ‘[economic] [l]iberalism has failed because … [it] has succeeded’, as Deneen (2018: 
179) argued, this is due to the same values economic liberalism itself encompasses, values 
that gradually put on pain of extinction the same foundations upon which the world it 
envisaged was predicated. In fact, economic liberalism incorporates elements that 
generated waves of social nihilism, leading to cultural decomposition. 
The Lockean model (as the previous chapter argued) laid the foundations of a 
society based on profit and individual gain as ultimate goals. This emphasis on profit and 
individual possession triggered nihilism and gradually wiped out the same foundations. As 
Williams (2001) argues, ‘melancholy’ (in Nietzsche’s works) constitutes a social 
pathology emerging as a direct consequence of ‘the collapse of traditional illusions’ (ii). In 
the same way, the increase in the supply of consumer goods gradually shaped social 
conditions that approximate the vision of Marquis de Sade, predicated on ‘unlimited self-
indulgence’ (Lasch 1991b: 69). As with Kondylis (2007 [Κονδύλης 2007]), mass 
culture/society is fast-changing and liquid; within mass societies differentiations are 
imprecise and the constant distribution of new roles knows no boundaries (Κονδύλης 2007: 
64; 267 [Kondylis 2007: 64; 267]). The liberal counter-cultures of the sixties and the 
seventies further intensified this tendency of mass culture; they boosted consumerism and 
accelerated the process of cultural decomposition. Mass consumerism annihilated all the 
interactions through which lasting bonding memories are created (as we will see in the first 
section of this chapter). As Bauman (2000) puts it, ‘“community” is these days the relic of 




of a better life shared with better neighborhoods all following better rules of cohabitation’ 
(92). This is similar to Weil’s (1987) concept of ‘uprootedness’, which means the 
destruction of all connections with one’s cultural past. Ιn our case it will be used in order 
to describe the consequences of nihilism, of the ‘death of God’, of the unravelling of 
memory, and the subsequent ‘loss of any sense of depth or significance to life’ (Williams 
2001: xiii). We will see how the reactionary paralysis of the populist right, which seeks to 
‘provide a clear vision of how society should change, namely returning to how it used to 
be before the social changes that have occurred in recent decades’ according to 
Steenvoorden and Harteveld (2018: 29)59, has capitalised on this pessimism, which 
instigated nostalgia for a past (32) where life is seen as being ‘in any important way better 
than life today’ (Lasch 1991b: xvii). This ‘life of the past’ corresponds to the decline of 
tradition and religion, to the de-composition of the national collectivity from which persons 
are ‘uprooted’. The nation ceased to function as a common world within which the same 
persons can interact. The nostalgic presumptions of the populist right, and more 
importantly, the propensity of the latter to ‘sanctify’ and idealise—in Arato’s (2013) 
terms—the past while disparaging the present, constitutes the ideological twin, the ‘mirror 
image’ of liberal optimism and progressivism (Lasch 1991a: 82-3).    
Permissiveness: the birth of Mephistophelian man 
1) Cultural revolution and its metharmōsis to American capitalism: from possessive 
individualism to permissive liberalism 
Mass democracy (or mass culture, in my terms) opened up pathways in higher 
education for a large number of excluded people. In effect, this led to the rapid increase of 
the number of students and shaped the appropriate conditions for the emergence of mass 
youth countercultural trends (Κονδύλης 2007: 272-3 [Kondylis 272-3]), triggering the birth 
and spread of the so-called Cultural Revolution. These movements altered the socio-
political landscape of a number of Western countries; it fertilised the soil for the further 
expansion of consumerism (276). Some counter-cultural trends drew on heritage and lore; 
they saw tradition (and more importantly the folk music of several isolated social groups) 
 




as a cultural/political weapon against racial segregation (Hale 2011: 105). They saw the 
past as a reservoir of inspiration and considered the loss of history as something that should 
be mourned rather than celebrated (96). But most socially liberal youth-led bohemian 
countercultures favoured cultural relativism, despised conformism, social discipline, 
tradition, historical continuance and the Protestant values of the old bourgeoisie (Lasch 
1991a: 507; Frank 1997: 15; 21; Brooks 2001: 33; 50-77; 226-43; Κονδύλης 2007: 272; 
279 [Kondylis 2007: 272; 279]). They despised the ‘detriment of traditional values’ of the 
white-working class ‘petty-bourgeois’, the work ethic, more precisely (Malliaris 2017a). 
The bohemian movements, as Brooks (2001) says, unleashed emancipatory forces, such as 
sexual freedom, which once was considered sinful and subversive (138; 191; 193; 226; 
260). They aspired not simply to emancipate the individual from structure and institution 
they deemed ‘oppressive’ (Μάλλιαρης 2017b: 189 [Malliaris 2017b: 189]) but to debunk 
the very idea of social hierarchy as an obstacle in the emergence of ‘free spaces’ within 
which spontaneity and creativity (aiming at individual self-actualisation) could take place 
(Κονδύλης 2007: 274 [Kondylis 2007: 274]). The bohemians, according to Hale (2011) 
and Goodman (1969), considered themselves ‘alienated’, estranged ‘outsiders’, deprived 
of any connection with the goals and aspirations of the American society. They ‘cut 
themselves free of their own social origins and their own histories’ (Hale 2011: 3); they 
opposed the ‘conventions and norms imagined as central to American life’ (16) and created 
their own common world ‘within which they could feel included’, a world that locates ‘the 
outsider in a specific place and time, a pre-modern, pre-capitalist historical moment when 
people made music for the pleasure of expression rather than for cash’ (87).  
Although the bohemians posited themselves as enemies of the bourgeoisie 
(Κονδύλης 2007: 269 [Kondylis 2007: 269]), expressing hostility towards the ‘puritanical 
conformity’ of the 1950s mass corporate culture (Frank 1997: 7), they received a warm 
welcome from the American business world (8). During the late 1950s and early 1960s 
advertisers and management thinkers developed critiques against their own industries, 
which ‘had much in common with the critique of mass society which gave rise to the 
counterculture’ (9). Individuals in advanced positions of the American business world 
(especially of the art industry and the show-business) shared the frustration of the young 




technocracy (9; 20). Hence, they viewed the quasi-carnivalesque appeal of these youth-led 
movements not as an enemy to ‘consumer culture but as a hopeful sign, a symbolic ally’ in 
their ‘struggles to revitalize American business and the consumer order generally’ (9). 
They followed the new values—diffused to a broad audience by these movements—and 
co-opted the gestures, discourses and fashions of the young insurgents (Lasch 1991b: 67; 
Frank 1997; 6-7; 55; Brooks 2001: 50), forming what Frank (1997) calls ‘hip capitalism’ 
(26). ‘[T]he relativist world of Madison Avenue’ (36) identified in the cultural relativism 
of the bohemians a common enemy: the Protestant virtues and the strict prohibitions of the 
old social order, which effectively ceased to ‘excite enthusiasm’ (Lasch 1991b: 53). They 
were deemed obsolete and unsuited to conditions of increasing abundance and economic 
progress. As a matter of fact, ‘[t]he demands of the mass-consumption economy’ writes 
Lasch (1991b), ‘have made the work ethic obsolete even for workers’ (73). 
As the previous chapter claimed, tradition and memory matter naught for capitalism 
(or economic liberalism); tradition and identity have always been deemed great obstacles 
to liberal economic principles (Fukuyama 1992: 325; Deneen 2018: 16-7; 30; 73) and, 
more importantly, to the desire for self-actualisation and immediate personal gratification 
(Κονδύλης 2007: 219 [Kondylis 2007: 219]; Deneen 2018: 39). One of the many 
definitions of liberty (given in the previous chapter) is the following: emancipation from 
cultural norms and traditions. The liberty of permissive liberalism advocates emancipation 
from all cultural norms that could effectively function as moral prohibitions against the 
pathos for self-actualisation. For the ancients, writes Deneen (2018), this liberty was 
synonymous with ‘misuse and excess’, with our natural proclivity ‘to use freedom badly’ 
as according to ‘the oldest stories in our tradition’, including the story of the Fall from Eden 
(115). Permissive liberty is an ardent enunciation of our pathos to transgress moral 
prohibitions, striving towards personal (and temporary) enjoyment (in my terms). 
Economic liberalism and consumer capitalism, which thrive ‘on the doctrine of liberation 
and continual transgression’ (Frank 1997: 6), fulfill this desire for unlimited self-
actualisation and hedonism (without moral prohibitions) through the unlimited availability 
of consumer goods. Hence, the countercultures emancipated capitalism itself from cultural 
weights (namely traditionalism and parochialism), seen as barriers against the tendency of 




consumers, capable of satisfying most of their desires and tastes through unlimited 
possession of goods (Μάλλιαρης 2017b: 190 [Malliaris 2017b: 190]; Κονδύλης 2007: 276 
[Kondylis 2007: 276]). Let us take as an example, the abolition of sexual taboos (in the 
name of liberation from the puritanical ‘hypocrisy’ of the Protestant weltanschauung). 
They permitted a myriad of sexual fantasies that consumer capitalism sought to gratify. 
Thus emerged the culture of permissiveness, ‘organized around the pleasures of 
consumption’ (Lasch 1991b: 178), extending ‘largely to expression of libidinal instincts’ 
(179).  
Thus, permissive liberalism  emerged as a metharmōsis of the cultural revolution to 
the demands of capitalism. Unlike the old bourgeois ‘Lockean’ model, permissive 
liberalism identifies ‘not with the work ethic and responsibilities of wealth’, with the work 
ethic (labour), ‘but with an ethic of leisure, hedonism and self-fulfillment’ (Lasch 1991b: 
221). Put otherwise, one of the characteristics of the changes in the structure of society, 
according to Lasch (1991b) is ‘the shifting emphasis from capitalist production to 
consumption’ (63). The bourgeois exaltation of self-interest, identified with the rational 
pursuit or profit and property accumulation, has been replaced by the unlimited pursuit for 
pleasure (69). The old Protestant values of ‘self-reliance’, ‘self-respect’ and ‘versatility’ 
(133) have given way to celebrity worship (86) and sexual promiscuity (188; 200).  
 In my terms, while the possessive market society exalts private time (work and 
labour) as the best solution to conflicts (Chapter 3), the present reality places essential 
emphasis on social time, which (as I outline in what follows) radically stimulates a desire 
for individual self-fulfillment through mass consumerism. According to Kondylis (2007 
[Κονδυλης 2007]), the old-fashioned bourgeois morality glorified individual gain. It 
acknowledged the pursuit for individual possession as the primary driving force for success 
and glamour (245). The present reality (framed by the rapid expansion of ‘mass culture’) 
values not the ‘lonely individualist’ but the effective ‘team worker’; it places emphasis on 
the ‘collective spirit’ (ibid), on collective efforts taking place within social (in the 
Arendtian sense of the term), rather than pubic, spaces and networks. Making sense of this 
rationale requires emphasis on Arendt’s distinction between isolation and loneliness. ‘I 
can be isolated—that is in a situation in which I cannot act, because there is nobody who 




‘concerns human life as a whole’ while isolation is concerned a) with the political realm 
(475), defined by action, through speech, hearing, dissent and disagreement, but also b) 
with other (non-political) aspects of the public realm. Thus, when someone is isolated 
without being lonely (474) he/she cannot act; he/she does not join a body politic as a 
citizen, arguing, judging and speaking within a group. In addition, he/she does not form 
robust and lasting relationships with others.  
While it is common to associate the age of affluence exclusively with loneliness 
and privatisation (Castoriadis 1997: 39; 2007: 69; 107), with the condition where everyone 
is totally absorbed by his/her private affairs, ‘surrounded not so much by other human 
beings, as they were in all previous ages, but by objects’ (Baudrillard 2016: 43), by 
elaborating on Arendt (1976) the present chapter claims the opposite: the modern narcissus 
is isolated. He/she is free to join networks and clubs, interacting with others. However, 
such networks do not promote interactions that revolve around political dissent or issues 
related to active citizenship and self-government. For example, shopping malls and (most) 
corporate work offices are not formally designed in order to incite political disagreements. 
They are indifferent to the civic arts. As Lasch (1991b) points out, in metropolitan districts, 
large shopping malls and fast-food chains have undermined public spaces like coffee shops, 
pubs and neighborhood hangouts, within which open conversations ‘on which democracy 
thrives’ take place (Lasch 1995a: 117-8). A fast-paced life has ‘neither time nor … places 
for good talk’ (118). According to Michea (2009), the ‘magic mechanism’ of the market 
enables millions of isolated individuals to flock around common spaces, coming ‘“together 
on a daily basis without any need to love one another, or even to speak to one another”’ 
(54). Most interactions taking place within such spaces promote imitation and uniformity 
of manners. These social spaces are ruled by behaviour (rather than action). While the 
political realm, claims Arendt (1998), is characterised by togetherness, individuality and 
contestation (41), the social tends ‘to “normalise” its members’, making them behave, 
‘excluding spontaneous action or outstanding achievement’ at the same time (40). In other 
words, the aim of these social networks is to to shape an attitude of conformity with the 
standards of mass society and mass consumerism, with the illusion that all new fashions, 
tastes, novel innovations and newly produced ephemeral goods (disseminated through 




actualisation and self-expression. 
The isolated modern narcissus is a drop in the ocean of a mass that blindly and 
passively follows the consumerist tide; he/she only sees holograms of millions of 
‘sleepwalkers’, of ‘[u]nthinking men’, as defined by Arendt (1978), who have lost their 
capacity to judge, passively following the flow (1: 191). The life of the ‘sleepwalker’ has 
no meaning and essence (ibid). In a liquid world with no solid values capable of stimulating 
public interactions through which memorable concepts are created and with no open body 
politic to keep the ‘common people’ in action, memory ends up an empty vessel. In other 
words, the loss of public interactions and the disappearance of the empirical world deprives 
personality and self-identification. Eventually, if ‘the public world came to be seen as a 
mirror of the self’ (Lasch 1991b: 28), it is because the social world, this pseudo-public 
world, is dominated by a myriad of consumable idols with which the ‘sleepwalker’ (or the 
narcissus), deprived of memory, meaning, and, therefore, of self-identity and personality, 
seeks identification.  
2) Idolatry, consumerism and hopelessness  
The implications of consumer capitalism can be grasped only by shedding light on 
patterns of psychical addiction by which it strives to substitute the loss of public happiness 
with hedonism and possession. This presupposes further analysis on friendship (with 
emphasis on idolatry). Both the fido amor (which stands in the middle of the hierarchy of 
friendship and points to the deeply sentimental or affectionate love) and the serene love 
towards the ‘common person’ (eucosmia) are directed towards living objects. Instead, 
idolatry signifies exaggerated love (lust) toward non-living (inorganic) objects, which are 
confined to the material world but offer no contemplative or ethical value. Etymologically 
speaking, idolatry derives from the Greek ειδωλο (idol)—‘[e]idolon, a thing seen, a 
symbol’ (Carlyle 2007: 77)—and λατρεία (latreia, translated as ‘extreme love’). The 
classical Christian perspective sees idolatry as ‘the worshipping of [such] dead Idols as the 
Divinity’ (ibid). For Weil (1987a) idolatry points to the latreia towards such inorganic 
objects (idols) which gratify our endless pathos for pleasure (122). Making sense of this 
rationale presupposes further analysis of friendship, coupled with the notion of wonder. 
First, as Aristotle (1993b [Αριστοτέλης 1993β]) argued, «φιλία δ’ οὐκ ἕστι πρός τα 




needs mutuality, founded upon justice, companionship and agreement (61). Mutuality and 
justice cannot exist between a man and a lifeless object (idol). In turn, justice requires 
interactions; it requires thinking and judgment, expressed through logos. Through judgment 
(as Chapter 2 claimed) one distinguishes between decency and injustice. Since idols are 
mute, incapable of speaking and thinking, Aristotle’s (ibid) assertion, that philia 
(friendship) is possible only between human beings, between speaking animals, leads us to 
the following assumption: idolatry is an ersatz friendship. Second, in Milton’s PL, 
according to Lasch’s (1991a) interpretation, God is a life-giving force that emanates vitality 
(15; 234; 276). As the medieval monk (Hildegard von Bingen) wrote, God is a ‘vital force’ 
that emanates life to the human flesh (Hildegard 1987: 145). He stated, ‘everything God 
does is life because it is alive in the nature it has from God (vitale in natura sua)’ (134). 
‘Jesus said … “Very truly I tell you, I am the gate for the sheep … I have come that they 
may have life, and have it to the full’ (The Bible, John 10: 7-10; emphasis added). In what 
follows, namely the exact reasons such a theological claim could be taken at face value in 
our analysis concerning idolatry and consumerism, will be explained. 
First, as David James Stewart (2014) argued (in reference to Jung), myths about the 
origin of man are always metaphors that describe the origins of human consciousness 
(512).  More or less, this is what Hildegard von Bingen (1987) (discussing the Book of 
Genesis) conveys in the following statement: ‘Adam was fiery in nature, full of 
understanding and vital’ (144; emphasis added). Hildegard’s notion of ‘understanding’, 
namely, of the ability to consciously discriminate between good and evil, according to the 
same author (2001: 7), is synonymous with judgment. If judgment presupposes thinking, 
and if thinking is identical to consciousness (see Chapter 2), it turns out that vitality (which 
is associated with judgment) and consciousness are inseparable. Furthermore, if 
consciousness is associated with thinking (as Chapter 2 argued) and vitality, and if thinking 
is (to a degree) associated with free will, we understand that this theological myth about 
the origin of consciousness is also a myth about the birth of free will in human beings. Put 
otherwise, free will is intertwined with thinking and judging, with the ability to choose 
whether to act consciously by weighting (judging) the possible outcomes of each 
move/choice or (instead) to seek pleasure in his/her own rampant desire (pathos) for 




judgment, choice and free will’ as opposed to behaviour which is unconscious, ‘automatic 
and reflexive’ (133). Thus, free will and consciousness (for Lasch) are intertwined: in order 
to be able to judge and decide, one must a) be aware of and responsive to the available 
choices and challenges and b) be capable of experiencing the consequence of his/her final 
decisions. Second, if free will is also inscribed to all human beings who are defined by 
vitality, it obviously follows that free will and vitality go hand in hand. In addition, idols 
(and all lifeless objects), as long as they lack free will (and consciousness), are incapable 
of thinking and judging. Hence, they are incapable of friendship with human beings.  
In chapter 2, by relying on Quint’s (2014) analysis of Milton’s PL I have argued 
that absolutism, deriving from Satan’s envy towards God’s kingdom, reflects our pathos to 
erect earthly kingdoms, placing ourselves permanently at the top of a social hierarchy (as 
a replica of God’s absolute rule in heaven) (130). We have seen that envy derives from our 
Faustian pathos to reign supreme, acting (on Earth) as God does in Heaven. Thus, the 
narcissus pretends that he/she can imitate God, the life giving force, emanating vitality 
(that is, consciousness) to non-living objects, to consumable goods (idols) in our case60. 
This vitality ostensibly constitutes such an object capable of offering affection. Seemingly, 
a sense of friendship (love) is developed between the narcissus and the idol. We call, 
nonetheless, this type of vitalisation imagined from the moment it does not occur in reality. 
It exists exclusively in the imagination of the narcissus. More precisely, consider Milton’s 
(2004) emphasis on the notion of free will: Adam was ‘Left to his own free will, his will 
though free’ (152). As opposed to Eve, who was possessed by Satan’s speech even ‘without 
her noticing it’ (Frye 2005: 87), and falls into the fatal temptation by eating the forbidden 
fruit, Adam consciously, and ‘Against his better knowledge, not deceived’ (Milton 2004: 
297), decides to eat from the same fruit.  
 
60  Since the mind of the narcissus creates illusions, by the same token, would not a materialist, 
who sees no practical value in metaphysics and religious myths, argue that the birth of the human 
race in the Garden of Eden is also an ‘imagined’ story, an ‘illusion’, invented by the Christian 
narcissus him/herself? As a matter of fact, the myth of human creation in the Genesis can be 
interpreted from different standpoints: of course, it could be regarded as an invention of the 
imagination of the Western/Christian narcissus, as an illusion that (supposedly) responds to 
unanswerable existential questions (the meaning and purpose of living). Or (as the previous 
paragraph explained) it simply constitutes an archetypal story whose practical value rests in its  




Furthermore, in Milton’s PL, argues Frye (2005), idolatry is ‘specifically associated 
with the forbidden tree’ and the forbidden tree with illusion (86). It is an illusion in which 
the devils are involved too ‘and we are told that every so often, in hell, they are compelled 
to climb up the branches of a tree … and eat the fruit of that tree, fruit which, like the apples 
of Sodom, is fair outside but dust and ashes inside’ (ibid). In the same way the myriads of 
consumable objects (idols) create the illusion that because they look ‘fair outside’ are 
precious and valuable but, in truth, they are ‘dust and ashes inside’ (to use Frye’s words 
again), that is, empty and soulless (lifeless). They provide no companionship and/or mental 
affection. In fact, since idols cannot transcend lifelessness, since idols cannot obtain free 
will and consciousness that would allow them to interact with human beings, they cannot 
offer strong affections and vivid reflections of our own (disappeared) self.  
These consumable idols create an illusory trap: They become means through which 
one senses snappy reflections of his/her disappeared self. As Freud (1937: 222) pointed 
out, each individual ego can be reflected through different objects. In sum, we have seen 
that idolatry leads a) to the creation of attachments with inorganic objects and, b) to fantasy, 
namely to the condition where individuals deceive themselves that through such lifeless 
objects their appetite for affection and self-fulfillment can be satisfied. But more 
importantly, it is the overt illusion of self-recognition that idolatry seeks to satisfy. Τhe 
contemporary narcissus feels his/her own Self is reflected through idols61. This problematic 
relationship he/she develops with the consumable idol impairs him/her from seeing the real 
image of the latter (as a lifeless object). Instead, his/her mind senses in the idol reflections 
of his/her own lost identity. Notwithstanding such objects are lifeless, as long as they 
(ostensibly) mirror our own Self, they end up ‘vitalised’. The mind conceives them as 
organic and conscious entities, capable to offer affection. Hence, when the consumer 
realises that none of these idols in his/her possession accurately mirrors his/her own Self, 
immediately seeks new ones, which (however) will soon be deemed as valueless as their 
precedent. In other words, the consumer’s desire for pleasure can only be temporarily 
satisfied through the possession of idols; when pleasure languishes, the same desire re-
 
61  As Lasch (1991b) explained, ‘[t]he narcissist cannot identify with someone else without seeing 
the other as an extension of himself’ (86). Incapable of identifying with parents (and other authority 




appears. A sense of sadness and pessimism is produced once the same person realises that 
he/she has fallen into a pitfall from where there is no escape. His/her psychical need for 
companionship and his/her pathos for self-fulfillment and self-actualisation can never be 
truly (and permanently) satisfied. Faust’s words, in Goethe’s (2007) play, that every time 
he struggles to satisfy his ‘desire with pleasure, then / In pleasure languish for desire again’ 
(103), point to this never ending circle of appetite and pursuit for affection (through idols) 
that leads to despair. In this work, Faust, who is attracted to a young woman called 
Margaret (also known as Gretchen), asks Mephistopheles to bewitch her mind in love with 
him. Just as Satan in Milton’s PL invades Eve’s mind and deprives her of judgment (Frye 
2005: 87), similarly in Goethe’s work Faust converts Margaret into an idol; Gretchen falls 
into ‘a love that was too blind’ (Goethe 2007: 144) (and too passive). Simply put, Gretchen 
has lost her vitality, her independence of thinking. She has no free will (or agency); she is 
forced to take Faust as a lover without being able to pass judgment, expressing with clarity 
and honesty whether she truly approves of him or not. Gretchen’s acceptance of Faust is 
not an expression of her own real feelings and desires. This leaves Faust’s personality and 
identity invalidated. Not being able to see his own self reflected through this woman-idol, 
allows emptiness and melancholy to overwhelm every aspect of his existence.  
So much for the rise of permissive liberalism (supported, mainly, by mass 
consumerism and narcissism).  It is time to shed more light on the way the idolatry of 
consumerism itself has contributed to the intensification of nihilism and cultural 
decomposition (or uprootedness), which gradually shaped  conditions within which right-
wing currents find suitable ground to spread in society. More emphasis will be paid on the 
process whereby permissiveness and consumerism intensified nihilism and cultural 
decomposition (or uprootedness). This will allow us to move into the next section, where 
the solutions right-wing populists are proposing (against the impasses of uprootedness) will 
be rigorously examined and evaluated.   
3) Nihilism, uprootedness and the destruction of the past 
In order to shed light on the reasons consumerism boosts nihilism, it would be 
necessary to elaborate further on the concept of idolatry. Let us  consider the second stage 
of idolatry itself, where the willing ego (pathos) instead of granting to an idol the 




idol gradually absorbs, digests and, finally, de-vitalises the human mind itself. More 
precisely, the mind is dominated by the excessive desire to possess idols: and, 
subsequently, looses its free will, its ability to choose (its vitality). First, as Weil (1987a) 
put it, vitality is synonymous with remembrance: the treasures from the past are stored up 
in our memory and they are ‘digested, assimilated and created afresh by us’ (49). To put it 
in my terms, valuable cultural objects are memorised but they are retrieved by our thinking 
ego, as Chapter 2 made clear. When the thinking ego dives into the reservoir of our 
memory, these objects are brought back into the present time (see Chapter 2 again). 
Simultaneously, our thinking ego ‘digests’ them (to use Weil’s terms), that is, it casts a 
critical eye upon them in order to produce value judgment, that is, a concrete understanding 
concerning the worth and meaningfulness each of these objects acquires.  But the 
consumerist ethos places less emphasis on the conservation of cultural objects capable of 
generating meaning. In this respect, the idolatry of mass consumerism is conducive to 
cultural oblivion. Let us elucidate further this assertion. As Baudrillard (2016) observes, 
‘[i]n a small group, needs, like competition, can doubtless stabilize. There is less of an 
escalation in the signifiers of status and the stuff of distinction. We can see this in 
traditional societies or micro-groups’ (65). To use a more vernacular language, in small 
traditional, robust and culturally coherent societies, the need for each individual member 
to distinguish him/herself from all other members, the need for self-actualisation (against 
assimilation) and the pursuit of a ‘personal status’, are less intense in comparison to large 
urbanised and impersonal consumerist societies. In comparison to traditional societies, 
urbanised cities are less coherent and their denizens seem to be more alienated and 
privatized. Thus, ‘in a society of industrial and urban concentration such as our own, where 
people are crowded together at much greater levels of density, the demand for 
differentiation grows even more quickly than material productivity’ (65-6). As Chapter 3 
argued, while elaborating on Arendt (1976), isolated individuals, absorbed by their private 
concerns, lose their ‘natural connection with his fellowmen’ and judge their ‘individual 
private life only by comparing it with that of others’ and, consequently, their personal 
relations with their fellowmen ‘take the form of competition’ (141).  
Furthermore, if cultural memory requires public interactions (as Chapter 2 argued) 




mentioned earlier) and competitive (rather than public), centered around the pursuit of 
private improvement, around the need to endlessly gratify our pathos for self-actualistion 
and self-identity through the myriad of consumable idols available, we end up at the 
following conclusion: consumer capitalism intensifies  cultural oblivion. Consumer 
capitalism unleashes dynamics that effectively slow down the process whereby cultural 
objects are either created or even preserved in memory, so long as they are not abandoned 
to vanish into oblivion and, instead, become frequently re-trieved by our thinking ego. It 
could be, therefore, argued that consumerism promotes social nihilism (cultural 
decomposition). Thus, it constitutes wonder incapable to reflect upon ‘meaningful 
treasures’, ‘digesting’ and ‘assimilating’ them, to use Weil’s (1987a: 47) terms again. If 
the destruction of memory renders thinking superfluous (so long as there exists nothing of 
real value to be retrieved from the storehouse by our thinking ego), and if judgment is a by-
product of thinking (Chapter 2), oblivion deprives judgment. In addition, if judgment is 
connected with free will (as I mentioned earlier) and if free will and vitality are one and 
the same, the deprivation of our ability to judge entails de-vitalisation. In Goethe (2017), 
Mephistopheles addresses Dr. Faust’s anger and disillusionment (due to his inability to 
obtain solace and happiness through idols) using the following words: ‘You’re quite a devil 
now – but mind / You keep your nerve; for there / Is nothing more deplorable, I find, / Than 
a devil who’s been driven to despair’ (107). As Faust resembles more and more 
Mephistopheles, in the same way the Faustian consumer-like type of being, blinded by the 
unlimited pursuit for and luxury through the ‘the various idols of the Heathen world’ to use 
Milton’s (2004: 23) words, through Mephistopheles (in other words), becomes one and the 
same with such idols (with Mephistopheles himself). Etymologically speaking, the word 
Mephistopheles is a compound of the following three Greek words: φως (phos, that is light) 
before the negation μή (me) and philos (the friend, the lover) (Black, Conolly, Flint, et al., 
2016: 423). As it turns out, consumer capitalism and its tendency to de-vitalise the self, 
while idealising the unlimited possession of idols as the only step toward self-fulfillment, 
can trigger the emergence of the Mephistophelian man/woman (the lover of the darkness). 
The Mephistophelian anthrōpos is absorbed by his/her own lust for temporary pleasure. To 
avoid misunderstandings, such a lust does not simply manifest itself through the 




and promiscuity.  
Finally, Nietzsche’s (2001) warning against the consequences of ‘[d]ivine 
decomposition’ (120) raises concerns about the current tide of narcissism, idolatry and 
nihilism, followed by full-blown pessimism, the consequences of the liquid modernity, 
where most meaningful concepts and common ideas holding individuals and societies 
together seem to be vanishing62. When [t]he holiest and the mightiest thing the world has 
ever possessed has bled to death under our knives’ (Nietzsche 2001: 120), when bonding 
memories disappear, in the Mephistophelian age of permissiveness, where temporary 
private pleasure sways over other public happiness, ‘[a]re we not continually falling?’ 
(ibid). As long as ‘thought begins with remembrance’ (Arendt 1990: 220), as long as 
thinking and memory are almost one and the same, the destruction of the latter implies the 
loss of our ability to think and judge. In other words, a life without a past (which, as 
mentioned earlier, is the type of liquid life encouraged by consumerism with its emphasis 
on emphmeral pleasure) is ‘a life without thinking’, a life that ‘fails to develop its own 
essence’, a life ‘not merely meaningless’ but ‘not fully alive’ (Arendt 1978, 1: 191). As 
Jung (1977) claimed, ‘[m]an cannot stand a meaningless life’, that is, a life plunged into 
existential uncertainty, struggling against ‘complete atomization’ and ‘nothingness’ (439). 
According to Tocqueville (1994), when ‘the past has ceased to throw its light upon the 
future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity’ (2: 331). Thus, the loss of historical 
continuity, a ‘supreme tragedy’, according to Weil (1987a: 114), and one of ‘the greatest 
of all crimes’ (49), signifies the eclipse of the empirical world (bonding and ethical 
memory) that creates a shelter against the forces of the underworld (pathos). As Chapter 2 
stressed, the mechanism of wonder is restless; wonder constantly seeks objects in order to 
reflect upon. The destruction of the past, that is, the gradual loss of an empirical world of 
common (mainly cultural) memories and, subsequently, the process of cultural 
decomposition, that is, the disappearance of such memories (cultural objects) which have 
the capacity to keep wonder preoccupied, increases the chances for the latter, due to its 
constant pursuit for objects, to resort to the underworld mind, approaching pathos. To avoid 
 
62  Consider, for example, the loss of religiosity and spirituality, and (more importantly) the 
dramatic decline of church attendance in Europe and North America from 1970 and onwards 




misunderstandings: such an empirical world is not fully sealed from the invasion of pathos 
itself (as the third section of Chapter 2 made clear). In short, pathos corrupts objects the 
mind stores in memory and, subsequently, re-trieves and reproduces. Hence, a common 
past, a common heritage, can incorporate ‘indecent’ elements, as chapter 6 will also 
explain, while reflecting on the case of racism in the American South and, simultaneity, on 
Martin Luther King Jr’s campaign. Therefore, the conservation of the past and the 
prevention of nihilism (or ‘uprootedness’) are surely valuable assets in every struggle 
against the hubris of pathos. But on the other hand, to acclaim the existence of the same 
past as the one and only remedy against the menacing forces of the underworld, a perfect 
recipe against pathos itself, would certainly be a critical error. The next section sheds more 
light on the implications of uprootedness, of the breaking of ‘the whole chain’ of historical 
‘continuity’ inasmuch as ‘[n]o one generation could link the other’, making human beings 
a ‘little better than the flies of a summer’ (Burke 1968: 193). Uprootedness (or cultural 
decomposition) has cultivated the soil for the rise of nostalgia, which has been capitalised 
on by right-wing populist orators.  
Pessimism, nostalgia and right-wing populism 
This section  acknowledges Weil’s (1987a) position on obligation, with the most 
notable being the obligation to be rooted (41), referring to the necessity of preserving the 
existence of a shared common empirical world, capable of generating meaning and a sense 
of common purpose. For Weil (1987a) the acknowledgment of the existence of human 
obligations is unquestionable; obligations are unconditional and eternal (3). They ‘stem, 
without exception, from the vital needs of the human being’ (7). They are connected with 
the impersonal realm, ‘situated above this world’ (4). Obligations, therefore, stem from 
God; they are part of the laws of nature, which cannot be transgressed. Since the destruction 
of the past and the loss of bonding memory, that is, the disappearance of an empirical world 
capable of ascribing meaning and orientation by constantly generating and reproducing 
memorable objects, lifts up all hindrances against any potential involuntary fall into the 
abyss of the underworld, we deem the existence of such a world as an unquestionable 
obligation (or necessity). In what follows I will examine the way the collapse of bonding 




cultural decomposition) leave human beings at the mercy of pathos. More precisely, 
nostalgia and mēnis, which are motivated by pathos itself, incite transgression and self-
deception, as exemplified by certain cases of right-wing populism. 
1) The soul’s yearning for roots  
Weil (1987a) identifies a series of physical obligations, such as the need for food 
and shelter. We can connect these obligations with the condition of labour. But at the same 
time, psychical needs (the needs of the soul) exist (9). These are, the need for order, the 
need for freedom of opinion, liberty, equality and risk, but also the need for security, 
obedience, hierarchism,  the need for responsibility, honour, private and collective 
property, et al. The most important among these needs is  the need to be rooted (41). For 
Weil, these obligations are ‘not founded in the earthly world’ (Kinsella 2014: 189). ‘They 
belong to a realm situated above all conditions, because it is situated above this world’ 
(Weil 1987a: 4). The need for order, the ‘first need of all’ (Weil 1987a: 11), protects us 
from social chaos and ‘spiritual violence’ (10). Obedience (not to be mistaken with servility 
or despotism) (13), honour (19-20) and hierarchism (18) inspire devotion to higher ideals 
and prevent social nihilism. A good balance of liberty and equality promote fairness and 
justice (12-13; 150-18). As we see, Weil acclaims these ‘obligations’ as indisputable truths, 
given once and for all. According to Kinsella (2014), The Need for Roots, was a work left 
unfinished (184) while most Weil’s works are ‘intimately rooted in her own experiences’ 
(189) of the loss of shared values and principles taken as benchmarks for measuring human 
achievements. Perhaps, this explains her emphasis on the need for order and hierarchism, 
that is to say, on the need for a stable world of meaning and common purpose (Weil 1987a: 
9-10) as well as on the need for ‘devotion towards superiors’ (Weil 1987a: 18), towards a 
set of common values deriving from realms situated above the human world and, for this 
reason, are considered objective. To a degree, Weil stresses what Nietzsche (2001), from a 
totally different angle, argued in his passages about the death of God, about the ‘empty 
space breathing at us’ (120), about a directionless world, swamped by nihilism. This has 
led Weil (1987a) to acknowledge the need to be rooted as ‘the most important and least 
recognized need of the human soul’ (41). A few centuries ago Rousseau (2005) had already 
argued that without roots,  without an empirical world capable of influencing and sheltering 




(ibid). For Weil (1987a), uprootedness is one of 'the most dangerous malady to which 
human societies are exposed' (41). From a contextualist point of view, Weil’s ‘[e]nigmatic 
and elliptical’ writings reflect ‘the fears of her time’ (190), the mass terror of totalitarianism 
and the cruelty of the Second World War. So does Arendt’s (1976) understanding of 
‘rootlessnes’, as one of the main incubators of totalitarianism (converging, thus, with 
Weil’s understanding). ‘The totalitarian movements’, argues Arendt (1976), aimed ‘at and 
succeed in organizing masses - not classes’ (308). ‘The masses emerged from the 
breakdown of the bourgeois-dominated class society’ (314) The ‘[m]asses are not held 
together by a consciousness of common interest and they lack that specific class 
articulateness which is expressed in determined, limited, and obtainable goals’ (311). They 
‘grew out of the fragments of a highly atomized society whose competitive structure and 
concomitant loneliness of the individual had been held in check only through membership 
in a class’ (317). Arendt’s analysis of uprootedness, namely, on the transformation of 
classes (or groups in general) into undifferentiated masses offers a more substantial (than 
that of Weil) view concerning the particular reasons uprootedness itself can be a dangerous 
(let us not assume it is the most dangerous) malady. The time has come to shed more light 
on the reasons uprootedness can incite nostalgia and mēnis. 
First and foremost uprootedness occurs 'wherever there is a military conquest' (42). 
Persons can be also deprived of their roots even without war; money-power, economic 
domination and the cosmopolitan nature of wealth may cause uprootedness (42; 47). Since 
Weil’s (1987: 6) list of psychical obligations are unquestionable and take the form of 
necessity (6), they can be placed in parallel with Arendt’s view on physical necessity, with 
poverty and hunger, which (if left unappeased) could fuel violence and enmity63. In the 
same way «[τ]οῦ διψῶντος ἂρα ἡ ψυχή, καθ' ὄσον διψῇ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἤ πιεῖν, και 
τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπί τοῦτο ὁρμᾷ» (‘the soul of a human being, as long as it remains 
thirsty, has no other desire but to drink’) (Πλάτων 2014: 314 [Plato 2014: 314]). This leads 
us to the following assumption: the soul of the uprooted knows no other appetite but to 
retrieve his/her lost roots. Of course, this rationale seems too ‘categorical’. In short, one 
could cast serious doubts on the validity of the assertion concerning the so-called desire to 
 




rediscover the lost roots as the only appetite the soul of the uprooted knows. Is there no 
possibility to withdraw in apathy or even to react with indifference? Does uprootedness 
drain all other appetites, including the appetite to learn and discover? Arguably, a) to 
assume that uprootedness does not unavoidably lead to the deprivation of all other 
psychical drives and b) to acknowledge the possible retreat into apathy and conformity 
does not automatically imply that uprootedness per se, that is, the loss of a common past, 
cannot incite a feeling of urgency to retrieve (or rediscover) the old lost common world 
and/or that this urgency (as Arendt and Weil supported) does not incubate demonic 
impulses (as I will further explain later on). Thus, by acknowledging Weil’s thought we 
can assume that anger can be fueled when this psychical need is left unsatisfied64, when 
«βιάζωνταί τινά παρά τον λογισμόν ἐπιθυμίαι» (‘the [judgemental] logismikon is shattered 
due to the dominance of such [unfulfilled] desires’) (Πλάτων 2014: 318 [Plato 2014: 318]) 
and thymos (mēnis, in my view) abruptly explodes (320). Uprootedness (or cultural 
decomposition/nihilism), by removing all valuable objects from memory, upon which 
wonder reflects and by opening up pathways to the underworld, instigates mēnis—the most 
irrational aspect of thymos (Chapter 2)—depriving judgment, eroding the boundaries that 
discreetly separate falsehood from truth.  
For Weil (2004), every void (this could also refer to the cultural void of cultural 
nihilism, insignificance or uprootedness) ‘produces hatred, sourness, bitterness, spite’ (16). 
Hatred, according to the same author, is usually directed against any source that provokes 
psychical (or physical) pain, and is accompanied by anger (49). Populist discourses strive 
to capitalise on generalised public  frustration, discontent, resentment and anger (Müller 
2016). Anger is usually accompanied by denunciations of injustice against the ‘status quo’, 
which (in the populist imagination) constitutes the main source of political and economic 
inequality. Very often populist reactions are advocates of hope in fairness and decency 
coming through political reforms, through the replacement of the existing office holders 
with political leaders whose main objectives are centred on the defence of the interests and 
 
64 Two results are the possible consequences of uprootedness for Weil (1987a): the one is 'to fall 
into a spiritual lethargy resembling death, like the majority of the slaves in the days of the Roman 
Empire, or to hurl themselves into some form of activity necessarily designed to uproot, often by 




liberties of the ‘common people’.  Populist anger can be also directed against the causes of 
uprootedness (or nihilism and cultural decomposition). Consider, for example, the attacks 
right-wing populists wage against globalisation and cosmopolitanism (Inglehart and Norris 
2016: 5; 15) and, more precisely, against consumer capitalism and social liberalism, 
conceived responsible for robbing traditional values (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 5; 15). As 
Müller (2016) writes, right-wing populists (in the US) capitalise on the growing discontent 
and anger against a fast-changing cultural change in society, which ‘to a certain percentage 
of American citizens’ is deemed ‘deeply objectionable’ (91). ‘[T]here is the increasing 
influence of, broadly speaking, social-sexual liberal values (same-sex marriage, etc.) and 
also concerns about the United States becoming a “majority-minority country” in which 
traditional images of the “real people”–white Protestants, that is–have less and less 
purchase on social reality’ (92).. Let us return to Fukuyama’s (1992) definition of thymos, 
referring to the pursuit of worthiness: ‘people believe that they have a certain worth, and 
when other people treat them as though they are worth less than that, they experience the 
emotion of anger’ (xvii). In other words, worthiness is synonymous with high self-esteem, 
whose deprivation triggers anger. When deprivation of worthiness and self-esteem comes 
as a consequence of our inability to identify with a set of concepts and ideas that shape a 
common world within which individuals see themselves included, anger becomes mēnis 
(see Chapter 2). In turn, mēnis incites self-deception (fantasy, as I will explain in what 
follows). Thus, in line with Weil and Arendt, one could safely claim that populist 
discourses, which often profit from the mēnis (instigated by uprootedness), often take on a 
menacing form. As Maier (2013) claims, in reference to Weil, ‘in a condition of 
uprootedness’ men and women are ‘susceptible to revolutionary and totalitarian ideologies’ 
(229). In my terms, men and women in a condition of uprootedness often end up gullible 
to political discourses, which notwithstanding do not necessarily advocate totalitarianism, 
capitalise on public anger (in the form of mēnis), ‘promis[ing] meaning but deliver[ing] 
only incoherent, frenzied activity’ (ibid; emphasis added). 
First of all, psychological studies have revealed the existence of 'strong linkages 
between the development of self-esteem and identity', whilst 'high self-esteem is linked 
with ‘‘high’’ identity status (achievement and moratorium) and low self-esteem with 




beings in order to obtain a (high) identity status must first and foremost identify themselves 
with the norms of a certain collectivity; these norms must become part of their daily routine. 
In other words, an identity is established when persons are rooted in a community; persons 
in order to be (self)recognized as A or B must associate themselves with the great variety 
of cultural (ethimika) objects that define the character and the temperament of the A or B 
community in which they feel rooted and integrated. These objects become attachments; 
they constitute 'the reality of the self which we transfer into things' says Weil (2002: 14). 
What the author conveys here is that human beings define themselves by associating their 
‘self’ with numerous attachments (in our case, with the cultural objects of their 
community). Oblivion and cultural decomposition signify the breaking of such 
attachments. Hence, the self also passes into uncertainty and consequently, definition and 
(self)recognition becomes an impossible task. In short, the inability of self-recognition 
denotes absence of identity. Low self-esteem and absence of identity incites sharp 
psychical pain, which (in turn) provokes anger against  the source considered responsible 
for causing uprootedness/decomposition or nihilism.  This rise of extreme anger could be 
also explained from a different theoretical angle: as Chapter 2 argued, wonder is restless 
and constantly strives to obtain new objects. Cultural decomposition, the liquidation of the 
empirical (common) world, in other words, and the gradual disappearance of such objects, 
allows wonder itself to intrude into the underworld, approaching pathos. In turn, pathos 
awakes mēnis, a dreadful and catastrophic type of thymos (as mentioned earlier). Mēnis 
interprets the symbols and archetypes associated with the same lost world in a way that 
could indulge its irrational momentum. In short, just as destitution creates a feeling of 
urgency to fulfill certain bodily needs, in the same way the pessimism and affliction of 
nostalgia, when accompanied by sharp psychical pain and by an urgency to retrieve   the 
old familiar and meaningful world (that has disappeared from our daily experiences) can 
lead to self-deception, delivering ‘incoherent [and] frenzied [political] activity’, to use 
words Maier’s (2013: 229) again,  I will further expand on this train of thought, in what 
follows. 
2) Nostalgia and the idolisation of the past  
From a different point of view; concepts and ‘ideas in the mind quickly fade, and 




characters of themselves, than shadows do flying over fields of corn’ (Locke 1978: 81). 
Therefore, if they are not repeatedly exercised and refreshed through real life interactions 
they will quickly wear out, as both Locke (1978: 81) and Arendt (1990: 220) explained. 
The longer a memory remains exposed to conditions that trigger forgetfulness, left idle 
without being regularly exercised, the more chances to lapse into the state of oblivion 
increase. When oblivion prevails, when the empirical world gradually fades and the mind 
becomes void of meaningful representations, the subsequent feeling of emptiness that 
(potentially) emerges is often exploited by pathos. Pathos, mēnis and nostalgia construct 
an imaginary world, by inventing archetypal images, capable of indulging this urgency to 
escape from the present state of hopelessness and melancholy. Such images usually depict 
a pastoral landscape ‘with its praise of simple country pleasures’ (Lasch 1991a: 83), with 
its familiar community settled ‘amongst a body of men and women who had known one 
another for a long time, from birth perhaps’, in Laslett’s (1965: 75) words. Far from 
representing the real motifs of country life, this pastoral charm incites a feeling of ‘childlike 
simplicity and security’, of ‘lost innocence’, of a dream world ‘free from toil, tasks and 
obligations’ (Lasch 1991a: 83). In fact, these feelings correspond to an exaggerated and, to 
an extent, corrupted version of the authentic modes of life that have disappeared. The 
nostalgic mind, writes Brown (2012), creates images of a past that has never actually 
existed (26). This imagined past is converted into a ‘political religion’, in Arato’s (2013) 
terms, attributing an undisputed meaning to the past itself whose restoration is seen as a 
means of salvation (implying, liberation from the current cultural impasses, which 
represent the realm of damnation, the realm of absolute moral degradation). The urgency 
to restore this idyllic lost world sets in motion the uprooted masses. This can be seen in the 
case of Trump’s slogan 'Making America Great Again', in its quasi nostalgic appeal 
(common among right-wing subcultures) to an imagined (but idealised) past idyllic world, 
resembling the ‘mythical Old South’ (Hale 2010: 55), where social corruption was 
unknown and modesty was prevalent in all aspects of social life (including sexual 
relations). Idealisation of the past implies that the past itself becomes sanctified, and it is 
converted into a love object, which, in Freud’s (1955) words, enjoys 'a certain amount of 
freedom from criticism' (112); it is converted into an idol, into an object of absolute value, 




and a blissful, untroubled and unspoiled way of life.  
To romanticise the past, however, to conceive it as a love object (idol) entails that 
the same past to an extent is idealised. As Freud (1955) observed, the tendency of 
‘idealization’ and ‘falsifies judgment’ (112). 'Under this condition the object is treated in 
the same way as our own ego' (ibid), as our own self (in other words). Nostalgia allows the 
past to become an object of delight, which simultaneously is understood as an extension of 
our ego. In short, this identification between the object and the ego (or self) entails that the 
latter passes into a stage of perfection; 'everything that the object does and asks for is right 
and blameless' (222). To convert the past into an object that fits the desire to obtain a high 
identity status, so that persons can reestablish their sense of worthiness (thymos), an 
exaggerated worthiness, nonetheless, product of pathos (mēnis), corresponds to what 
Arendt (1976: 352) calls as the tendency of the uprooted masses to revolt against reality. 
This revolt against reality and the tendency to reduce reality into our desires/pathos could 
also explain the rhetoric of many think tanks and information networks created by many 
supporters of right-wing populist doctrines (including a portion of Trump’s voters), which 
revolves around the perversion of real facts and the promotion of  conspiracy theories  
(Inglehart and Norris 2016: 5; Singh 2017: 6; 19). When this occurs the masses end up 
gullible to  propaganda that conjures up a lying world in absolute consistency with their 
mēnis and nostalgic longing, a world 'in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted 
masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real 
experiences deal to human beings and their expectations' (ibid). It should be made clear 
that the pessimism of nostalgia, as Lasch (1991a) pointed out, should not be confused with 
the 'reassuring memory of happy times' (82). This appeal to happy memories, which ‘link 
the present to the past' (ibid), provides a sense of continuity and does not view the past 
itself as an entity that 'stands outside time, frozen in unchanging perfection' (83). 
Continuity indicates that a specific (X) moment in history is subject to genealogical 
evolution, that is, to consecutive influences of other predeceasing events (A, B, C, et al.). 
The influences of these events are visible not only in the X but also in the present world. 
Genealogy also prompts us to examine whether the influences of the X moment (which 
could be a product of either the A or B or C, or both) are visible in the present. A past 




moment in history (118), as a ‘lifeless’ and non-evolving object. The ‘lifelessness of the 
past’ denotes that the nostalgic imagination has conceived this idealised moment (X) as an 
entity more or less incapable of exerting influences beyond its time, that is, of incubating 
the conditions which will permit X itself to gradually evolve into a different social reality 
in the future. Consider against Trump’s slogan , ‘Make America Great Again’, which (as 
noted earlier) points to a moment in history ‘frozen’ in unchanging direction. It ‘appeals 
nostalgically to a mythical “golden past”’ (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 16). This past is 
usually isolated from the present; the ‘nostalgic reaction’ that seeks a ‘bulwark against 
long-term processes of value change’ of ‘the “silent revolution”’, the cultural revolution 
(more precisely), ‘which has transformed Western cultures’ (13), often neglects the 
existence of the exact elements that influenced such cultural transformations in the same 
romanticised past world (as I will explain further below). 
Attempts that spot an existing genealogy between the present and the past, attempts 
that treat the present as a legitimate offspring (henkfurt) of the world we have lost, perceive 
the same world not as a ‘static’ and ‘frozen’ moment in history but as a living object, as an 
organic and self-evolving entity, characterised by bonding memories which alter 
themselves through time, by concepts and ideas that contribute to the gradual synthesis of 
a new reality. But when the mind, consumed by its own weaknesses (pathos) regards the 
past itself as a ‘frozen’ moment in time, entirely unlinked to the present, when the mind 
conceives a past social reality as a static entity, cast in stone, an entity that never evolves 
or alters itself (as all organic objects do), producing new realities, the vitality and liveliness 
of the same reality disappears. When this inorganic reality becomes a love object, an object 
of absolute value that stands in absolute perfection, it is loved as an idol. The idolisation 
and idealisation of the past, ardently expressed through the sentiment of nostalgia, 
undermines our ability ‘to make intelligent use’ of it (Lasch 1991a: 82; emphasis added). 
An intelligent use of the past employs judgment; by considering a given reality to be an 
organic, and hence, an evolving entity, one could identify within the same reality elements 
that cultivated the exact conditions which, in turn, contributed to the moral degradation of 
the present. In contrast, by identifying no genealogy, no connection between the past and 
the present and, more importantly, by projecting an idealised and idolised ‘static’ past 




fallible concepts of the same past—which are, in fact, the primary causes of the present 
reality, plumbed by such impasses—as remedies.  
Let us take as an example again Trump’s ‘nostalgic slogan ‘Make America Great 
Again’, whose only motive is to attract ‘societally pessimistic voters’, as Steenvoorden and 
Harteveld (2018: 29) put it. To a degree, right-wing populists accuse the cultural revolution 
of the sixties and seventies and its liberal values that diffused in the American society for 
being exclusively responsible for eroding this ‘greatness’, for annihilating this unspoiled 
idyllic image of the ‘old America’ and forcing the old system of value-structure that used 
to guarantee a sense of identity and self-recognition to disappear (Inglehart and Norris 
2016: 5; 16; Singh 2017: 5; Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018: 31). It can be true that 
certain trends emerging from the Cultural Revolution are responsible for accelerating the 
nihilistic Mephistophelian culture of permissiveness that caused uprootedness (as the 
previous section argued). Nonetheless, by idolising the pre-60s social order, right-wing 
populists attempt to square the circle; they blatantly overlook that within the same order 
they have so ardently idealised, which is the order they aspire to bring into existence, the 
exact forces considered partially responsible for uprootedness, for degrading of all relations 
that produce meaning and purpose, exalting private happiness at the expense of friendship 
and community, were also prevalent. As the previous chapter proved, the spirit of progress, 
which cultivated the soil for the emergence of the appropriate conditions within which 
cultural decomposition was made possible, was prevalent long before the normalisation of 
the standards the Cultural Revolution promoted. 
Lasch (1984) documents in the United States the spread of consumer culture in the 
twenties (28). For Kondylis (2015 [Κονδύλης 2015]), right-wing conservatives have many 
times backed reforms in favour of the expansion of material abundance, which (in their 
eyes) represents the advantages of the ‘free world’ against the totalitarian-run world of 
mass control, repression and indigence (40). Such has been the case of the Golden Era; a 
wide range of government measures (including the Employment Act of 1946) that made 
possible the spread of consumerism had been welcomed by conservative-minded voters 
and public intellectuals, who acclaimed widespread abundance was the most effective 
remedy against the spread of communism in society (Snyder-Hall 2012: 405-6). According 




just when mass culture consolidated its dominance; it came a consequence of the rapid 
technological expansion in mass production (225; 280).  
From a different angle, Arendt (1990) and Fine (2014) identify the first major 
turning point during the emergence of the United States as a sovereign nation, and more 
importantly in the creation of the American Constitution: the Bill of Rights by defending 
individual liberties defended the private sphere (Fine 2014: 225). While individual 
liberties, according to Arendt (1990), are important, since they impose necessary 
constraints upon government (135), ‘they are the results of liberation’ and ‘by no means 
[make up] the actual content of freedom’, which (as previously mentioned) is synonymous 
‘with participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm’ (32). The makers of 
the Constitution failed to incorporate the political spaces (like the town-halls) into it (237); 
instead, they adopted the concept of representation as an alternative to direct participation 
(Arendt 1990: 237; Deneen 2018: 163) and did not provide to the people more space of 
public action, to make their voices heard, apart from the ballot box (Arendt 1990: 253). 
According to Fukuyama (1992), the American Founding Fathers placed immense emphasis 
on the notion of right, considered (to a great extent) a ‘means of preserving a private sphere 
where men can enrich themselves and satisfy the desiring parts of their soul’ (xviii; 
emphasis added). If, as Arendt (1990) claimed, ‘[f]ree enterprise … only in America … 
has been   an unmixed blessing’ (217), to some degree this could be attributed to  the victory 
of liberalism against republicanism, according to Pettit (1997: (12), to the excessive 
emphasis on individual liberty (as opposed to freedom), on the emancipation of ‘the 
individual from interpersonal bonds and obligations, including those entailed by active 
democratic citizenship’ (Deneen 2018: 172). In addition, the expansion of the free market 
in America and the substitution of ‘public happiness’ with private happiness could be also 
attributed to the influence of powerful financial elites that took advantage the absence of 
controls, which  popular sovereignty could impose upon rampant economic individual self-
interest, pushing forward reforms in favour of free enterprise, through which they could 
maximise their personal gains65. Nor we should neglect the excitement with which the 
 
65 As I explain right at the end of the second section of chapter 6, the marginalisation of popular 
sovereignty coincided with the rapid expansion of banking profits in America, firing up political 




deeply-seated myth of the so-called ‘self-made man’ was and remains revered in America 
(perhaps due to the lasting influences of Puritanism)66. According to this myth, so ardently 
cherished by the Founders (Kloppenberg 2016: 394), a person is virtuous when he/she 
exploits the opportunities a capitalist economy creates, opportunities that lead to material 
prosperity and abundance (private happiness). However, according to Jefferson,  no 
individual can be truly happy ‘without his share in public happiness … without 
participating, and having a share, in public power’ (Arendt 1990: 255); nobody is truly free 
‘without his experience in public freedom’ (ibid). In his own words, the ancestors of the 
American republic left the British shores while seeking a ‘new habitation’, and established 
‘new societies’ in the New World, capable of preserving laws and legislation that would 
most likely ‘promote public happiness’ (Jefferson 1998: 65). To sum up: the ‘rapid and 
constant economic growth’, in other words, led to the rapid ‘expansion of the private realm’ 
(252), to the idealisation of private enjoyment at the expense of political and public time, 
family life and tradition. The countercultural movements of the 1960s and the 1970s (as 
the previous section explained) only accelerated this process of uprootedness and cultural 
decomposition.  
3) Right-wing populism; nostalgia politicised 
In general terms, we have arrived at the following preliminary conclusions: first, 
nostalgia, capitalised by the populist right, approaches the world through a pessimistic 
prism—as long as it disparages the present, which offers no sense of delight and/or 
happiness (Lasch 1991a: 82-3)—and (more importantly) is marked by intense incoherence. 
Right-wing populism strives to preserve structures that superimpose principles and 
bonding memories within which one finds elements of religion and tradition, elements that 
create and preserve robust and permanent cultural bonds, coexisting side by side with 
elements that promote rugged individualism, which—as Genovese (1994: 8) pointed out—
 
66 As with Kloppenberg (2016), ‘[t]he Puritans have remained central players in the frequently 
retold drama of the rise of capitalism’ (80). The Puritan/Protestant ‘ethic and the spirit of 
productivity, if not capitalism’ contributed to ‘the patriot’s cause’ (769), that is, to the gradual 
formation of the ideology behind the American Revolution. For more concerning the way the 
English Puritans influenced the American social imaginary from the sixteenth century and onward 




are a solvent to traditional communal bounds. Second (and more importantly), right-wing 
populism, by considering nostalgia as a response to the impasses of the present and, 
consequently, by idolising and idealising the past as a whole, degrades our ability to 
critically analyse the past itself and the way it influences the present and the future (Lasch 
1991a: 118). Nostalgia, by appealing to mēnis, deprives the logismikon, our ability of 
judging, of impartially approaching our individual and collective history; it prevents us 
from spotting and rejecting (in the same past it idealises) the exact elements that create 
nihilism and lead to uprootedness.  
Moreover, this romanticised past, this idyllic utopian world, conceived as blissful 
Eden, supposedly free from the sway that slowly set the ground for the ‘death of God’, 
ends up an ideal ‘model’ for implementation, a model that prefigures an unblemished 
society. The bringing of such a fanciful reality into existence is met with a fundamental 
prerequisite: the same (falsified) reality must be initially visualised collectively and must 
be converted into an ideal-object (idol). What could, however, enhance this visualisation 
is discourse; legein must construct the image of such a society. Discourse projects this 
idealised utopia as the common desire of the ‘pure people’ against the ‘corrupt elites’, 
expressed by the strong figure of a ‘father-leader’, with whom the masses can identify.  
As Weil (2013) argues, ‘[r]eason perceives and chooses what is just and innocently 
useful, whereas every crime is motivated by passion’ (5). Interpreting it on my own terms, 
judgment is ‘the “promised synthesis” or “solution” to an “impasse” (Fine 2007: 117), the 
ability to discriminate between good and evil, as opposed to pathos (whose by-products are 
mēnis, nostalgia and the reactionary paralysis). Political parties (as well as populist leaders) 
are machines that generate, whip up, or even capitalise on collective passions (Weil 2013: 
11). Top-down discursive articulation–employed by parties and leaders—becomes an 
instrument of unification, as I explained in Chapter 2; in our case, all nostalgic sentiments–
products of the collective pathos—are considered signs (or popular demands), to use 
Laclau’s (2005) terms, which are appropriated by populist discourses in order to form 
equivalential chains. These discourses strive to capture the imagination of social groups 
which desire to reverse the emptiness, hopelessness and despair of uprootedness. Through 
this process they aspire to bring these groups together, under a common banner. In other 




fading bonding memories. This visualised ‘lost world’ will (supposedly) come into 
existence through central planning; hence, a homo faber (the ‘father leader') must play the 
role of the 'silent creator' (Kalyvas 2008: 226). But while the discourse of the leader 
attempts to capitalise on fading memories, forming equivalential chains, aspiring to bring 
into existence a visualised reality, the non-rational (and unpredictable) aspect of collective 
institutioning—which renders all forms of planning and designing, according to an ideal 
vision of society, futile (if not utopian)—constitutes the implementation of this reality a 
difficult task.  
The impossibility of bringing into existence such an ideal reality social through top-
down measures resembling the quasi Arcadian life of the disappeared past is also 
highlighted in Lord Byron’s (1970) verses (taken from his poem Stanzas for Music): ‘Nor 
can we be what we recall, / Nor dare we think on what we are’ (100). In short, the past is 
unrecoverable; once it is ‘destroyed never returns’, claims Weil (1987a: 49). Nostalgia, for 
Byron (1970), is nothing but a ‘delusion’, considering that ‘[t]he future cheats us from afar’ 
(100), that the outcome of human affairs is never predictable and, hence, collective realities 
cannot be made to order. Additionally, if we integrate Byron’s (1970) verse ‘[n]or dare we 
think on what we are’ (100) to the concept of the vita contemplativa, if we interpret the 
verb ‘think’ as think, referring to the ‘liberating effect’ of the mind that produces judgment 
(Fine 2007, p.119), we may end up with the following conclusion: nostalgia, the pathos to 
retrieve the old lost world, is a ‘delusion’, to use Byron’s (1970: 100) words, that deprives 
our ability ‘to stop and think’ (Arendt 1978, 1, p.4) and subsequently to judge, that is, to 
identify and evaluate ‘what we are’ (Byron 1970: 100) and who we are. In fact, ‘we are’ 
nothing but the legitimate offspring of a world that produced its own grave diggers, of a 
world that created the exact conditions that caused uprootedness, undermining its own 
existence.  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the case of (Mephistophelian) permissiveness as a 
genealogical evolution  of the old Faustian model of economic liberalism which had 
idealised progress, the ‘secular utopia’ that would (ostensibly) ‘bring history to a happy 




1991a: 47). As the previous chapter argued, economic liberalism encouraged men and 
women to obtain meaning in social mobility. The original plausibility of the eighteenth 
century idea of progress, was ironically ‘derived from the more specific assumption that 
insatiable appetites, formerly condemned as a source of social instability and personal 
unhappiness’ (52). The destructiveness that ‘manifests itself in Will’s obsession with the 
future’ (Arendt 1978, 2: 178), in the pathos for unlimited possession, forces ‘men into 
oblivion. In order to will the future in the sense of being the future’s masters, men must 
forget and finally destroy the past’ (ibid). Permissive liberalism attacked memory and 
historical continuity without, however, emphasising the future; instead, it encouraged 
liquidity, to use Bauman’s (2000) terms, and accelerated the disappearance of attachments 
associated with the past. If, therefore, ‘Hobbes was right, though for the wrong reasons’ 
(Castoriadis 1997c: 146), that ‘continuall feare, and danger of violent death’ (Hobbes 2006: 
70) ‘is indeed the mainstream institution’, it is not ‘the fear of being killed by the next man 
but the justified fear that everything, even meaning, will dissolve’ (Castoriadis 1997c: 136), 
that all common memories will gradually disappear. As Weil (1987a) argued, the need for 
order is ‘the first need of all’ and it ‘stands above all needs’ (11). It refers to the ‘texture of 
social relationships such that no one is compelled to violate’ (9). Such relations create 
interactions and shape a common empirical world, which protects us from ‘spiritual 
violence’ (10), from the vices of the underworld. Eventually, the need for order and the 
need for roots are interrelated; the existence of bonding (civil or cultural) memory, of a 
common empirical world, creates a sense of order, a sense of solidity and stability, as 
opposed to the chaotic liquid world of nihilism and uprootedness.  
Lack of order, meaning and common purpose has allowed pessimism and nostalgia 
to shape the current political zeitgeist. In turn, nostalgia incited urgency for retrieving all 
the disappeared attachments of the lost old meaningful world. This urgency is synonymous 
with the pursuit for self-recognition, with a pervasive thymos (mēnis), in other words, 
associated with low self-esteem and worthlessness. Mēnis, the feeding nest of fantasy, 
falsifies and idolises the past. We have noted the parallels between mēnis with the condition 
of pauperisation and increasing misery. Going back to Arendt’s analysis of necessity, 
analogous to labour, which represents the most animalistic aspects of human condition, is 




bestial aspects of the human soul (pathos), emerging from the deepest strata of the 
underworld, putting constraints on the logismikon, on our capacity to think and judge 
impartially. We have already seen that right-wing populists exploit collective passions by 
capitalising on nostalgia, taking advantage of the rising tide of mēnis, of sentiments 
common among individuals who are members of collectivities experiencing uprootedness, 
promoting the construction of a social reality (in other words) that directly appeals to their 
nostalgic attitudes. Moreover, right-wing populist leaders show no desire of expanding 
democratic participation, despite their intense denunciations of the repression of popular 
sovereignty by the ‘corrupt elites’. Instead, they transfer all political powers to a centralised 
bureaucracy, which strives to shape this desired and visualised social reality (product of 
mēnis) into existence through a top-down process, through discourse and rhetoric. They 
see popular identities as top-down processes, within which the people themselves instead 
of being agents remain passive and silent67. 
Logos and narrative or agonal action create and shape a community by allowing 
personal viewpoints to be brought into the public sphere, instead of being suppressed by 
the process of homogenisation (through top-down discursive articulation). ‘To speak to 
someone’ adds Goodman (1970) ‘not only communicates but creates community’ (112). 
To speak to someone, as a political animal, to dispute, challenge and judge publicly ideas 
and perceptions, is to participate in a bottom-up process of identity shaping. Through this 
process, which leads to a synthesis of viewpoints and ideas, new collective identities and 
realities are shaped. Therefore, to suggest that pathos, nostalgia and mēnis entail the 
deactivation of the logismikon denotes that the same term (logismikon) has acquired a near 
different meaning from that originally given by Plato: logos constitutes the etymological 
root of the word logismikon. Moreover, logos (interpreted as speech) is not only 
synonymous with the Latin understanding of man as animal rationale (Arendt 1998: 47) 
but also with its capacity of reckoning ‘with consequences' (172). Consequently, to suggest 
that nostalgia deactivates the logismikon is to assert that nostalgia diminshes logos; thus, it  
 
67 According to the standards of the vita civile, which associates true populism with action, right-
wing populism, due to its emphasis on top-down construction, is inherently anti-populist. Its 
insistence on planning encourages passivity rather than active citizenship. Thus, it deprives the 




lessens narrative and (mainly) agonal action. From a different angle, nostalgia is a deep 
emotion and, like all deep emotions (see Chapter 2), hinders judgment, which is dialectical, 
deriving from ‘argumentative reasoning’ to use Arendt’s (1990: 87) terms, from dialogue 
and open contenstation (logos). The next chapter addresses the practical benefits of logos 





























 From logos and deliberative democracy to civil disobedience  
 
 Introduction 
The first section of this chapter focuses on logos, public reasoning, public judgment 
and agonal action in the political realm. Thus, ‘[t]he mental and moral, like the muscular 
powers’ writes John Stuart Mill (2008), are improved only by being used’ (59; emphasis 
added). Chapter 3 outlined the reasons political realms test and improve these ‘moral 
muscular powers’ through open participation, by allowing persons to amass moral capital 
(experience or ethical memory)68. However, there is no indication that experience alone is 
the perfect remedy for common decency. As Mill (2008) stressed, ‘[v]ery few facts are able 
to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning’ (23). Hence, ‘[t]here 
must be discussion’ which ‘show[s] how experience is to be interpreted’ (ibid). To explain 
further, through public discussion, through logos and public judgment, individuals strive 
to grasp the actual moral lessons of a particular event (or experience). On the other hand, I 
have already explained the process through which pathos, emerging from the underground 
to the empirical world, creates fantasy, deception and (more seriously) desire for arbitrary 
domination. In certain cases, hubris and fantasy affect large sections of a collectivity. The 
fragility of the empirical world (due to its constant exposure to the forces of the 
underworld) discourages anyone from acknowledging popular attitudes (id est, the views 
of the majority) as unconditional proofs of truth, beauty and justice. Eventually, logos 
and/or ethical memory cannot always substantiate conditions capable of sustaining high 
standards of common decency. In such cases, a populace becomes too licentious and action 
instead of safeguarding truth and justice, intensifies hubris (injustice and cruelty). The 
hubris of the demos can be denounced through civil disobedience69. The second and third 
sections of this chapter are exclusively dedicated to the practical benefits of civil 
disobedience and narrative action (in relation to religion and spirituality).  
 
68 While criticizing the anti-populism of economic liberalism, Chapter 3 emphasised the 
significance of ethical memory. It spoke of the resilience, of the ability to ‘dare greatly’ (Brown 
2012: 1) against the haphazardness of fortuna, against our inherent vulnerability.  




According to Machiavelli (1970), ‘if account be taken of all disorders due to 
populaces and of all those due to princes … and of all the glories won by populaces and all 
those won by princes, it will be found that alike in goodness and in glory the populace is 
far superior’ (256). When, however, the populace throws off restraint, the same populace 
becomes a tyrant (257). Albeit more virtue and fewer errors can be found in a populace 
that has thrown off prudence than in ungrateful kings (254) the hubris the former expresses 
can be equally terrifying with that of the latter. Once the insanity of hubris takes over, 
everybody is constantly harassed ‘and kept on edge by the interference of extraneous wills 
while the soul is left in cold and desolate Misery’ (Weil 2005: 79). But according to 
Machiavelli (1970), ‘a licentious and turbulent populace … can easily be brought to behave 
itself’ by a ‘good man’ (256)70 (or woman, in our age), who at the same time must be a 
‘good citizen’. As Arendt (1969b) clarified, the ‘good citizen’ (as opposed to the ‘good 
man’) does not disobey unjust laws simply out of conscience (65); he/she enters the public 
realm and projects his conscience as truth, challenging established perceptions and deeply 
rooted false appraisals (ibid). The ‘good citizen’, the civil disobedient (in other words), 
challenges established ideas and practices (ibid); his/her logos is diffused in the public 
realm (newspapers, broadcasts, marketplace, et al.) in order to incite intense debates 
(narrative action).  
Furthermore, instead of being a vanguard pioneer who exerts pressure upon the 
minds of those he/she aspires to influence and simply tells them what to do, this ‘good 
citizen’, this eloquent and trusted populist orator/leader, encourages his/her followers to 
take responsibility for themselves, as self-reliant, self-respecting and independent citizens. 
Such was Martin Luther King Jr’s case (Lasch 1995a: 83; Phillips 1998: 42), who sought 
to persuade large sections of the American society, striving to eradicate the hubris of 
racism, especially in the Old South. In the second section of this chapter King’s philosophy 
and ideas are further discussed in relation to the impersonal realm, to the notion of 
impersonality (and self-purification). If King’s leadership changed the attitude of many 
Americans, awakening their conscience to the evils of racial segregation (Colaiaco 1988: 
 
70  As with Milton (2004), the woes and sorrows that follow ‘man’s first disobedience’ which 
‘Brought death into the world’ will cease ‘till one greater Man / Restore us, and regain the blissful 




1; Phillips 1998: 1), it was ‘largely because he was able to dramatize [these evils] before 
the court of world opinion’ (Colaiaco 1988: 2). Driving the public’s attention to the 
suffering of African Americans, King sought to challenge rigid and fallible social norms 
and perceptions (Benhabib 2018), reactivating public judgment, inspiring hope that 
someday justice ‘will roll down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream’ (King 
1986: 219). Nonetheless, the animating spirit was King’s Christian agape, his unshakeable 
faith in the ‘common people’, which derives from his unconditional recognition of the 
sacredness and worth of human life, expressed through his deep seated belief in the 
capacity of each human being to contribute to the common good by transcending his/her 
proclivity for hubris and, above all, by repenting and rectifying his/her stance. In King’s 
case this intense belief served as a beacon of psychical enlightenment; it opened up 
pathways through which one connects him/herself with spheres of deep spiritual 
contemplation, capable of stimulating self-reflection, promoting clarity of thought, 
encouragement and vigour, in short, with the ‘anonymous’ ‘realm of the sacred’, to use 
Weil’s (2005: 75) terms, with the purifying impersonal realm. 
As mentioned earlier, this belief in the human potential for good (eucosmia) apart 
from being associated with impersonality, is also related to action; hence, it is coextensive 
to logos and public judgment, through which the ‘ordinary people’ can make common 
decency a real possibility. Logos and (agonal) action imply constant tug-of-war debate 
between opposite viewpoints. Through this process the mental muscular powers are re-
improved and public intelligence is made possible. Intelligence, as defined by Weil (1987a) 
stands for the ability of achieving and maintaining high standards of moral objectivity 
through free dialogue (22), protecting common decency against hubris and self-deception. 
Along with the ability to choose, for Weil intelligence implies also efficiency in working 
with technical problems. Intelligence can also ‘operate alone, separately from the other 
faculties, in a purely theoretical speculation where all questions of action have been 
provisionally set aside’ (ibid). Thus, intelligence is related to judgment; it is ‘practical 
intelligence and political good sense of the Americans’ attributed to ‘the long use which 




institution’ par excellence and ‘one of the forms of popular sovereignty’ (280)71. While 
reflecting on Weil, Arendt and Mill, the next section sheds light on the exact process 
through which logos, judgment and public appearance can make intelligence (and, hence, 
common decency) a real possibility. 
 
Agonal action and logos 
As with Weil (1987a), complete and ‘unlimited freedom of expression for every 
sort of opinion, without the least restriction or reserve, is an absolute need on the part of 
the intelligence’, of the ability to sense the consequences of a choice lying ‘before the will 
concerning the path to be followed’ (22; emphasis added). Public intelligence is correlated 
with the political realm, where a wide diversity of viewpoints are expressed (through 
logos), compared and juxtaposed. In the political realm, individuals can learn to evaluate 
ideas freely and no domain of (expressed) thought escapes examination. Logos (speech and 
hearing) and plurality of words, that is, of viewpoints and ideas, are the sine qua non of all 
political action (Arendt 1990: 175; 1998: 202; 220). Put otherwise, plurality of opinions, 
the diversity of perspectives, which is ‘inherent in freedom of thought and speech’ 
constitutes the essence of the political realm itself (Arendt 1990: 245; emphasis added). 
For Arendt (1990), this was the main characteristic of the Greek polis, of the ‘man-made 
space of appearances where human deeds and words were exposed’ and, subsequently, 
testified ‘and judged’ by the public (103). This process of public intelligence and judgment 
aims at what the ancient Athenians used to call as philokaloumen («φιλοκαλοῦμέν) and 
philosophoumen (φιλοσοφοῦμεν). Philo-kalo implies the love (philia) of beauty (kalo) 
(Arendt 1968a: 213) or (from a different translation) the love of ‘goodness’.. Kalo (καλό) 
is also translated as ‘the good’, which (in the classical republican tradition) is synonymous 
with the public (or common) good: According to Pocock (1975), civic virtue consists in 
‘placing the common good … above one’s personal profit’ (464), above one’s personal 
good (in other words). Philo-sopho stands for the love with sophia, with wisdom, with the 
 
71  In contrast, technological knowledge and theoretical contemplation in isolation do not require 
a plurality of opinions. They can function even in the most extreme forms of seclusion. Thus, they 
point to the intellect, to epistēmē and technē (see Chapter 3), whose contribution to politics (as 




active pursuit of (moral) knowledge (Arendt 1968a: 213; Καστοριάδης 2008: 245 
[Castoriadis 2008: 245]). To a degree, philo-kalia and philo-sophia are equivalent to 
common decency. These terms appear in Pericles’s Funeral Oration, as reported by 
Thucydides (2011 [Θουκυδίδης 2011]): «[φ]ιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ 
φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας» (262), ‘[w]e love the beauty within the limits of political 
judgment, and we philosophize without the barbarian vice of effeminacy [or cowardice]’, 
according to Arendt’s (1968a: 214; emphasis added) translation. It was the polis and 
‘politics’ that provided the means to love wisdom and to actively seek the truth by means 
of logos and dialogue, by means of public mediation (ibid). In another account, the word 
μετ' εὐτελείας points to the ‘absence of exaggeration’ (or hubris) (Καστοριάδης 2008: 245 
[Castoriadis 2008: 245]). Hence, Pericles’ phrase expresses what according to Castoriadis 
was central in Greek democratic thought, a modest (or prudent) love for truth and beauty, 
and a sense of μέτρον (metron). Metron, according to Pythagoras, is usually translated in 
modern Greek as μετριο-πάθεια, from the word (metriazo), that is, minimise, reduce, 
decrease the πάθος (pathos/passion). As opposed to the politis (πολίτης), the free-man of 
the polis (more precisely), who knew how to persuade others through his logos, the 
barbarian (according to the Greeks) was ‘ruled by violence’ and labour, which require no 
speech to be effective (Arendt 1968a: 23). The barbarians were ἅνευ λόγου [aneu logou]: 
‘they did not live with each other primarily by means of speech’ (ibid). In what follows, 
the practical contribution of logos and public reasoning to common decency, to philo-kalia 
(love for goodness or beauty) or philo-sophia (love for judgment, or intelligence), will be 
further examined, in juxtaposition to private reasoning (thinking in isolation). The former’s 
impotence to inhibit extreme forms of moral transgression will be also discussed. The 
limits of active citizenship will be outlined, in the course of reflecting on historical case-
studies. After identifying the impasses of logos and active citizenship in general, we will 
move onto the next step, where the practical benefits of civil disobedience, by combating 
extreme forms of hubris, are thoroughly evaluated.   
1) Logos, public reasoning and judgment 
According to Arendt (1976), not all manifestations of the mind require interactions 
and common appearance; thinking is possible in isolation since the mind 'needs neither the 




for example, (or intellect) and the basic rules ‘of cogent evidence, the truism that two and 
two equals four cannot be perverted even under the conditions of absolute loneliness' (ibid). 
‘[R]ational or mathematical truth’ argues Arendt (1978), like ‘the proposition that two and 
two make four’, presents itself ‘as self-evident to everyone endowed with the same brain 
power’ (1: 59). In contrast, factual truths ‘can never be witnessed by everyone who may 
want to know about it’ (ibid). Truths of a fact ‘are compelling only to those who are 
witnessing them with their own eyes’ and they cannot ‘reach those who, not having been 
witnesses, have to rely on the testimony of others, whom one may or may not believe’ 
(ibid).  
Consider, at this stage, the following hypothesis: certain aspects (say A, B, C) of 
an event (X) are taken as factual truths. But an individual has not witnessed A or B in order 
to understand what they are about. Unless he/she obtains some objective knowledge, 
his/her attempt to extract concrete conclusions based on these factual truths has no telos. 
Unable to conceive what actually occurred, his/her unstoppable tendency (of wonder) to 
reflect upon memorable objects, concepts or ideas may (even unintentionally) force his/her 
imagination to gamble on hypothetical scenarios, constructing conclusions based on them, 
conclusions that may have no substantial grounding in reality. In short his/her interpretation 
of A and B may have little to do with what these aspects (of the X event) truly stand for. 
In more serious circumstances, forces of the underworld (pathos) could prompt the 
observer to cherry-pick testimonies that buttress a desired conclusion (as we have partially 
seen with the case of nostalgia). Consider also the role of ‘belief bias’ in shaping fallible 
conclusions. According to Calvillo, Swan and Rutchick (2019), ‘belief bias occurs when 
individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than 
conclusions that are inconsistent’ (1). In other words, belief bias occurs when persons 
whose worldviews are rigid and inflexible often seek out testimonies from sources 
(newspapers, magazines, et, al.) that suit the exact ideology (or belief system) that has 
shaped their world-view. Moreover, studies reveal that most individuals ‘take longer to 
process information inconsistent with their [already shaped] beliefs’ (3)72. Thus, one in 
 
72  These studies mentioned by Calvillo, Swan and Rutchick (2019) measure responses on ‘policy 
issues such as affirmative action and gun control (3). It is revealed that most ‘participants show 




order to construct valid conclusions through ‘mathematical’ reasoning must first and 
foremost ensure that the premises (A, B and C for instance) are not products of ‘belief bias’ 
73.. 
As Carlyle (2007) asserted, ‘the nature of man’ is ‘to reckon his own insight as 
final, and goes upon it as such’ (77). However, empirical studies that have shed light on 
this propensity towards ‘belief bias’, which (as they reveal) tends to be more evident in 
syllogisms revolving around political issues (Calvillo, Swan and Rutchick 2019: 3; 5; 9-
10), do not specify whether such a proclivity derives from human nature or not. By 
asserting that pathos does have the capacity to force us into the fallible conclusions, we 
partially end up in agreement with Carlyle’s assertion. Nonetheless, apart from human 
nature we have to consider the ‘nature of isolation’ within which intellectualism and 
rational (or mathematical) thinking are allowed to function. Thinking in isolation often 
leads to conclusions that could be easily (and, most of all, falsely) taken as logical and self-
evident74. When fallible premises and conclusions are taken as self-evident truths and 
become productive, they gradually create their ‘own lines of “thought”’ (Arendt 1976: 477; 
emphasis added). When these ostensibly 'self-evident’ truths remain unchallenged and start 
to create their own ‘lines of “thought”’, the mind builds upon them theories and 
worldviews. This solitary activity of what we can call narrowed thinking, in extreme cases 
may justify criminal acts (Fine 2007: 121). For example, Castoriadis (2007a),  while 
discussing Euripides’ Antigone, mentions the phrase «φρονεῖν μόνος» (phronein monos), 
‘to be the only one who “thinks right”’ (13). However, in Euripides’ work the «φρονεῖν 
μόνος» is followed by the word «δοκεῖ» (dokei) from dokō and doxa, that is to have an 
opinion (Castoriadis 1997: 92); «ὅστις γὰρ αὐτὸς ἢ φρονεῖν μόνος δοκεῖ», ‘[f]or whoever 
believes he alone is capable of judgment’ (quoted and translated by Castoriadis 2007c: 13). 
 
disconfirmation bias by seeking counterarguments to evidence that is inconsistent with their 
beliefs’ (ibid). 
73  Premises are arguments that once we put them together we end up with a logical conclusion. 
For more see Chapter 1 (section methodology; logicism/syllogism). 
74 As also Calvillo, Swan and Rutchick’s (2019) studies claim, ‘in the context of syllogistic 
reasoning’ we may often take ‘ideologically-consistent conclusions as valid more frequently than 
ideologically-inconsistent conclusions’ and this invalid conclusion is often ‘taken as evidence for 




Castoriadis has not paid significant attention on the term dokei. As a matter of fact, Creon 
has been ‘inhabited by hubris’ since he insisted a) ‘on being monos phronein’, on 
considering only himself capable of passing judgments and making valid assumptions, 
scorning (therefore) the opinions of others instead of being ‘isos phronein’ or ‘hypsipolis’, 
that is, ‘high within one’s city’, from the word ύψος (hypsos), implying height (14), and b) 
on being monos dokei, on being apolis (the opposite of hypsipolis), the idiot who is 
indifferent to the common affairs, for the polis, and spends his/her life in (idion), ‘outside 
the world of the common’ (Arendt 1998: 38). The apolis who monos dokei relies on these 
assumptions in order to reach a conclusion. Creon, by acknowledging incorrect 
assumptions as self-evident truths made serious misjudgments. His insisted in phronei 
monos made him susceptible to hubris and allowed ‘the mē kalon, the opposite of 
beautiful/good to inhabit him’ (Castoriadis 2007c: 12). Creon could have rejected such 
conclusions if he had opened up his mind to viewpoints offered by others.   
Arendt (1968b) criticizes Heidegger whose withdrawal from the common everyday 
world led to devastating misjudgments (ix), 'if not evil’ due to ‘his engagement with 
National Socialism' (Fine 2007: 121). Orwell’s (2001) hostility toward the intellectual of 
his age—whom he likens not with real Socialism but, instead, with fascism, the ‘plausible 
travesty of Socialism’ (197)—exhibits similar scepticism concerning the limits of thinking 
in isolation (monos phronein and dokein). Having lost contact with reality, with the 
suffering that afflicts the world of humanity, the intellectual is totally consumed by his/her 
own trails of thoughts. Perhaps, one reason such intellectuals are inclined to conclusions 
built upon optimistic philosophical abstractions that predict a new dawn for humanity, a 
world emancipated from suffering and conflict, is their withdrawal from the public sphere 
(their insistence in monoi phronein and dokein). Being unable to conceive the 
imperfectness of the world from which they have cut themselves off, they  end up absorbed 
by their own Faustian pathos for perfection. As Orwell (2001) asserts, ‘with their eyes 
glued to economic facts they [the intellectuals] have proceeded on the assumption that man 
has no soul, and explicitly or implicitly … have set up the goal of a materialistic Utopia’ 
(199).   
Public reasoning, in contrast, instead of being mathematical is deliberative and 




of dialogue and conversation. Public dialogue involves understanding, namely, the taking 
‘into consideration the viewpoints of others’ (Fine 2006: 128), as well as their 
interpretations concerning existing testimonies of events. The more the availability of 
expressed (through speech) interpretations increases, the more the chances for aspects of 
the same event to be illuminated are multiplied. Subsequently, the possibilities for error 
and self-deception (the potential outcome of isolated thinking) decreases. Unlike the 
isolated individual, who is free to choose what to read (articles from newspapers, as an 
example, that match his/her already constructed views, articles that interpret testimonies 
from a perspective he/she approves), in a public-political realm the same individual is 
exposed to all the available (and potentially dissimilar) viewpoints and witnesses. 
Eventually, the probabilities to see his/her viewpoints challenged increase. At the same 
time, in the political realm opinions, viewpoints and interpretations are constantly judged 
by others and scrutinised. Individuals are constantly exposed to different viewpoints and 
arguments in real life. Through this process thinking is saved from the ‘Phantasms of the 
braine’ (Hobbes 2006: 346) and cemented (and potentially fallible) worldviews are 
shattered. As Mill (2008) put it, there is hope ‘when people are forced to listen to both 
sides’ (53), when they let themselves rise ‘out of the mire of private interest to the 
contemplation of virtue, and put a hand to the removal of “this evil from under the sun”’ 
(Harrington 1992: 17), the evil that exaggerates ‘into falsehood' if it is left unchallenged 
(Mill 2008: 53).  
Let us recall, at this stage, Machiavelli’s (1970) republican ideas regarding the 
benefits of popular governments. '[Ι]f account be taken of all the disorders due to populaces 
and of all those due to princes, it will be found that alike in goodness and in glory the 
populace is far superior' (256). For the same author, a well-ordered populace in power is 
stable, 'prudent and grateful, in much the same way, or in a better way, than is a prince, 
however wise to be thought' (ibid). On the other hand, 'a prince who condemns the laws, 
will be more ungrateful, fickle and imprudent than is the populace' (ibid). As opposed to 
the public-political realm of action, where individual opinions are contested with each 
other, the doxa of the one man (be it a prince who makes decisions on behalf of his/her 
subjects or a small group of experts) escapes public judgment. While a monarch cannot 




are not subject to public scrutiny and mediation; a monarch who monos phronei and monos 
dokei, has no political opponents who, out of dissent, could raise objections against his/her 
potentially fallible (proposed or already imposed) laws. Recall again Mill’s (2008) position 
against any prohibition of opinions considered false and pernicious: to forbid the 
propagation of false opinions would not result in banishment of error itself. In fact, 
‘[j]udgment is given to men that they may be use it’ (23); it comes through discussion, 
through logos and public appearance. Therefore, if ‘practitioners of face-to-face democracy 
become better citizens’, as Bryan (1995) noted by observing town meetings (in North 
America) ‘where decision making takes place in the context of communal interdependence’ 
(40), it is because discussion enables public intelligence; it activates nóēsis and judgement, 
through which, according to Mill (2008), erroneous ideas are aborted (23). Speech and 
hearing increase the chances for fallible conclusions (such as false interpretations of 
experiences based on falsified information, as previously mentioned) to be rejected. As a 
matter of fact, Mill’s philosophy was profoundly influenced by the democratic Town Hall 
meetings of New England (Magnusson 2015: 36). As Bryan (1995) observed (a few 
decades later), the people who attend public assemblies (in Town Hall meetings) ‘with 
some regularity ... learn a fundamental respect for the rule of law’ (40).  
To recapitulate: a ‘plurality of viewpoints between people, dissent and 
disagreements constitute productive tensions’ (Straume 2012: 379); logos magnifies the 
probabilities for judgment and public intelligence to triumph, improving the chances for 
fallible ideas to be aborted. As Bryan (1955) argued, practitioners of direct democracy have 
more chances to ‘learn about minority rights’ (40); they have more chances to strengthen 
their mental and moral muscular powers, to develop intelligence and common decency 
through dialogue and experience. However, to acknowledge logos and ethical memory as 
absolute remedies for common decency would be contrary to the basic principles of 
melioristic thinking, which reject optimistic pursuits, as utopian and unattainable. In fact, 
there is no assurance that the demos will always pick up the most truthful proposition (or 
interpretation of an event) brought up in the assembly, or that the assembly itself will 
always decide well. Consider, the Siege of Melos Island, which tells the story of one of the 
greatest monstrosities perpetrated by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. The 




men of Melos through the use of raw military force (Καστοριάδης 2011: 211 [Castoriadis 
2011: 211]). As Thucydides (2011 [Θουκυδίδης 2011]) recounts, the victory of Athens is 
followed by an orgy of massacres and mass enslavement of women and children (793). 
Such cases of demagogic manipulation and explicit moral transgression encourages further 
debates concerning the tragic nature of democracy per se, being always exposed to trickery, 
error, fantasy and hubris (Castoriadis 1997: 93; 2007c: 123), to the evil pursuits of a 
majority that has thrown off prudence.  
Logos, public judgment and intelligence are not fully shielded from demagogic 
infiltrations. Misleading discourses can ‘distort public debate and derail established 
procedures’ (Gustafson 2011: 152). For Weil (2005), ‘the power of words stands also for 
the power of illusion and error’ (96), for the power of demagoguery, deception and hubris. 
In the polis, writes Arendt (1990), ‘treachery and deceit and lying were possible, as though 
men, instead of “appearing” and exposing themselves, created phantoms and apparitions 
with which to fool others’ (103). Moreover, ‘[a] legally unrestricted majority rule, that is, 
a democracy without a constitution’, a democracy without a minimum of institutional of 
protection from unrighteous legislation imposed by a populace that has thrown off 
prudence, ‘can be formidable in the suppression of the rights of minorities and very 
effective in the suffocation of dissent without any use of violence’ (Arendt 1969b: 42). ‘A 
legally unrestricted majority rule’ for example, ‘that is, a democracy without a constitution 
can be formidable in the suppression of the rights of minorities and very effective in the 
suffocation of dissent without any use of violence’ (Ibid). Before moving to next argument, 
before discussing in depth the way civil disobedience and narrative action respond to these 
impasses, let us focus on case-studies of democratic political bodies (such as that of the 
Athenian polis) that had many times imposed strict legislation and measures in order to 
protect individuals and minorities from imprudent majorities, and thus discouraging 
demagogues from deceiving and manipulating the citizenry. This analysis would serve as 
a reminder that the vita civile values moderation and self-restraint; as opposed to optimistic 
types of populism, the former’s melioristic outlook is at odds with political initiatives 




2) Self-limitation: institutions and tradition 
Consider, for example, the institution of paranómōn graphē (γραφὴ παρανόμων)75. 
According to Castoriadis, the paranómōn graphē allowed Athenian citizens to prosecute 
those who had repeatedly attempted to manipulate the ekklesia, proposing laws deemed 
illegitimate, laws that could violate the well-being and safety of individuals or even the 
interests of the entire city-state (Castoriadis 1997: 93; Καστοριάδης 2007α: 92 [Castoriadis 
2007a: 92]); 2008: 201 [2008: 201]). The ἀπάτην τοῦ δήμου (apatin tou dimou, that is, 
‘corruption’ or ‘manipulation’ against the demos’) was another similar law; it allowed 
citizens to legally prosecute those who had attempted to deceive the ekklesia (2008: 206). 
Unlike ancient Athens, no legal institution was set up during the Revolutionary Era in 
America capable of limiting the ‘despotism of the majority’, to use Tocqueville’s (1994 1: 
271) words. Although the Revolution introduced freedom of expression (even in religious 
matters) and freedom of the press (Kloppenberg 2016: 492; Israel 2017: 7; Popkin 2019: 
158), Tocqueville (1994) mentions several cases where licentious majorities raised 
formidable barriers against free speech (1: 264-5). The only available means to put 
reasonable constraints against its arbitrariness was tradition and the so-called ‘notion of 
right’ (244). Consider the case of the American jury, a ‘pre-eminently … political 
institution’, according to the same author (1: 283). Just as the ancient Athenian jury 
(Αριστοτέλης 2008: 252 [Aristotle 2008: 252]), the American jury system involved open 
participation with citizens being chosen by lot ‘and invested with a temporary right of 
judging’ (Tocqueville 1994 1: 282). The jury, and more particularly, the civic jury, could 
‘communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all citizens’ (1: 284). This ‘public 
school’ as Tocqueville calls it, contributed ‘powerfully to form the judgment and to 
increase the natural intelligence of a people’ (1: 285) and taught the people not only how 
to rule but, more importantly, ‘how to rule well’ (1: 287). It made all citizens feel dutiful 
toward society and compelled them to ‘force their attention to other affairs than their own’, 
decreasing ‘private selfishness’ (1: 285). It inspired respect for ‘the thing being judged’ 
and for ‘the notion of right’, without which the freedom to act is consumed by all sorts of 
destructive passions (1: 284; emphasis added).  
 




However, as Weil (1987a) explained, rights are ineffectual by themselves, without 
being joined to the obligations to which they correspond (3). As stated in the Introduction, 
the notion of rights is subordinate to the notion of obligations. Thus, when Tocqueville 
talks about ‘respect’ for the ‘notion of right’ he indirectly points to obligation, to the virtue 
and duty of exercising tolerance towards those who are judged, of recognising and 
respecting (in other words) their own inalienable freedoms. ‘Obligations are only binding 
on human beings’ and those who seek to escape from them are ‘guilty of crime’ (Weil 
1987a: 4).  Weil’s assertion highlights the moral consequences of neglecting our obligation 
to acknowledge  responsibility towards others, the responsibility to repress our pathos and 
self-interest, which not simply can undermine someone’s rights, liberties and well-being 
but, at the same time, deprives our ability to recognise ‘what is needed for life and the 
means to satisfy’ others (Andrew 1986: 83). In other words, unrestrained pathos may lead 
to hubris. Tocqueville’s  (1994) view on this matter was quite similar: when passions ‘are 
excited … the authority of virtue is paralyzed’ (1: 246). In this respect, we could assert that 
in the New World, a strong ethos of obligation (in Weil’s sense of the term) inspired  self-
limitation and taught every man of the jury to avoid absolute power. In America, claims 
Tocqueville (1994), this attitude of obligation and responsibility derived straight from the 
tradition and heritage, from ‘the manners of the country’ (1: 262), as well as from ‘the 
public role of religion’, argues Kidd (2012: 245), whilst reflecting on Tocqueville. Religion 
teaches ‘the obligation of love toward God and man’ and holds ‘the possibility of 
engendering a benevolent republic in which the public good remained a serious priority in 
competition with private gain’ (247). Transcendent values were, therefore, a useful 
companion to freedom, in ‘all its battles and its triumphs’ (Tocqueville 1994, 2: 44). 
It goes without saying that the existence of institutions of self-limitation (like the 
paranómōn graphē) may not always guarantee protection from the possible unjust 
decisions of an imprudent majority. But on the other hand, the catastrophic consequences 
of the impasses of action and the limitations of institutional safeguards against 
demagoguery or against the hubris of an imprudent demos, by no means signify that  
absolutism (anti-populism) is a pragmatic and realistic antidote. According to Machiavelli 
(1992), no Earthly prince can prevent a degenerate and turbulent populace from 




‘some Princes have ... built fortresses, others have dismantled and destroyed them (58). 
The Prince who is afraid of his subjects must build fortresses’. However, ‘I shall applaud 
him who builds fortresses and him who does not; but I shall blame him who, trusting in 
them, reckons it a light thing to be held in hatred by his people’ (ibid). To use a more 
vernacular language: a prince, irrespective of how coercive, absolutist, or even self-
protective he is, cannot save himself from the anger and hatred of his subjects.  ‘A Prince 
[authoritarian or otherwise] ‘should inspire fear in such a fashion that if he does not win 
love he may escape hate’; he must never instigate condemnation and hatred (Machiavelli 
1992: 47). By suggesting that princes cannot effectively resist the mēnis of their subjects, 
indirectly Machiavelli makes a good case against absolutism and anti-populism. In fact, 
even extreme repression and coercion cannot protect individuals from a licentious 
populace, from the latter's slip towards insanity, fantasy and self-deception. Nothing can 
stop a public that has thrown off prudence from rebelling against the most draconian laws 
imposed in favour of vulnerable groups, minorities and individuals. Only a ‘good citizen’, 
in Machiavelli’s terms, a civil disobedient, who draws moral strength from the light of 
his/her inner self, can acquire the necessary clarity and objectivity in order to stand up 
against licentious publics, reversing conditions of extreme entropy and mass confusion, as 
we will see in the next section by reflecting on the life of Martin Luther King Jr. 
 According to Arendt (1969b), ‘even in the darkest of times we have the right to 
expect some illumination, and that such illumination may well come ... from the uncertain, 
flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and their works, 
will kindle under almost all circumstances…’ (viii). This uncertain, flickering, and weak 
light is the light of the ‘inner world of conscience, which is in constant rebellion against 
the outer world of nature’ (Niebuhr 1960: 52) is often discovered through religious 
practices, through mysticism and/or introspection.   The ‘introspective character’ of 
religion (59) can lead to psychical enlightenment and, as Niebuhr (1960) pointed out, to 
the contrition of egoism and the encouragement of love (60). The next section, by reflecting 
on King’s campaign, will shed more light on the way religious (Christian) resources and, 




attitudes (collective self-purification), inspiring common decency and civic friendship76. 
Of course, it is important to note (as Chapter 1 stressed) that non-Christian religions can 
also open up pathways for psychical enlightenment. More importantly, self-purification 
often comes from non-religious sources, including art and theater. Hence,  in what follows  
extensive analysis of  Weil’s, Jung’s and King’s philosophies will take place, with 
references to Mahatma Gandhi’s  principle of satyagraha, ‘a process of self-purification’ 
(Gandhi 2018: 706), self-sacrifice (426), self-restrain (511), reconciliation and non-
violence (717), ‘the guiding light’ of King’s ‘technique of nonviolent social change’ (King 
1986: 23). For Ashcroft (2018), ‘Gandhi’s influence can be seen both in King’s methods 
of organisation as well as his justification for civil disobedience, his uncompromising 
demand for nonviolent action’ (469). Emphasis will also be paid on the process whereby 
ancient Greek drama and poetry can encourage civil disobedience and collective self-
purification as well. Thus, we will have to set aside classical republican literature and ideas 
for the time being.   
Civil disobedience, eucosmia and collective self-purification 
This section begins with  an in-depth analysis of King’s understanding of the 
Christian love (agape), constituting a radical exponent of the anthropocentric 
weltanschauung of popular eucosmia (as Chapter 1 argued). Additionally, in works of 
ancient Greek drama one finds common moral injunctions with modes of being profoundly 
inspired by Christianity (as I will further explain by reflecting on Jung’s theories). As also 
Weil (1987b) claimed, in several pre-Christian works of Greek drama and poetry one sees 
‘intimations’ of Christianity. The pagan world of ancient Greece prefigures the Christian 
morality of love and forgiveness, a morality that remains anchored to the idea of human 
frailty and vulnerability nevertheless. Ancient Greek literature, to put it differently, 
promotes a worldview that (to a degree) constitutes an early allusion of the weltanschauung 
promoted by Christianity, especially when it comes to the latter’s emphasis on the 
devastating consequences of human sin (or hubris). It goes without saying that this 
particular weltanschauung (the realist approach on human nature, as I call it), has been one 
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of the main ideological hallmarks of despotic cosmosystems. As, however, this section will 
argue, in King’s philosophy (as well as in works of Greek drama), this emphasis on the 
innate human proclivity towards hubris, has also fashioned an anthropocentric morality of 
tolerance, forbearance and reconciliation, a morality of common decency77. Or to stress it 
differently, in classical works of ancient Greek drama and poetry (consider, for instance, 
Aeschylus Trojan Women or Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey), one can identify the same 
elements of eucosmia we have already spotted in King’s agape. As a matter of fact, these 
classical works during the Greek antiquity were used as means of public dialogue, inciting 
public judgment (Καστοριάδης 2008: 211 [Castoriadis 2008: 211]), encouraging publics to 
abort hubris, embracing common decency (in return). In what follows, more light will be 
shed on the quite similar procedures ancient drama and King’s politics of civil disobedience 
(through agape) follow in order to inspire collective self-purification. Let us begin this 
journey by elaborating on King’s case. 
1) Christian agape versus resentment 
Right after his university graduation (in the middle of 1950s) King (1986) began to 
question the ‘superficial optimism’ and quasi ‘sentimental’ liberal view of human nature, 
which overlooks the human inclination towards error and sin (36). This optimism had 
‘pervaded not only Rauschenbusch's social gospel but indeed all of the evangelical 
liberalism that George [Washington] Davis had suffused him with’ (Garrow 1986: 42). 
King’s encounter with Niebuhr’s ideas, ‘a prime influence upon his life’ (Branch 1988: 87) 
made him aware ‘of the complexity of human motives and the reality of sin on every level 
of man’s existence’ (King 1986: 36), of the innate human selfishness that Niebuhr 
considered to be one of greatest barriers to social justice (Garrow 1986: 42; Branch 1988: 
81; Lasch 1991a: 389). King shared the Christian weltanschauung, which considers error, 
sin, vulnerability and hubris deeply inscribed within humanity. According to the Christian 
Bible, ‘there is not a righteous man upon earth, that doeth good and sinneth not’ 
(Ecclesiastes 7:20). ‘The attitude of a group of Southern whites’, for example, ‘who lynch 
a [N]egro on the report that he has raped a white woman before they investigate the truth 
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of the assertion is a bestial exaggeration of [this] very natural human tendency’ (Mumford 
1959: 255) towards evil, of this ‘natural propensity’ to dominate and exploit, of the pathos 
to reign supreme (even by oppressing others). But for King (1986) ‘the person who does 
the evil deed’ is an object of God’s love like every sinner, id est., like like every man and 
woman (13) . Instead, he/she requires no vengeful punishment but rather agape and 
forgiveness (ibid). On the face of it, one could fairly raise objections against such a 
proposition, considering absurd (if not morally repugnant) any expression of sympathy 
toward individuals who consciously commit evil. But as King (1986) clarifies, ‘what Jesus 
meant when he said “love your enemies”’ was not to ‘like your enemies, because it is pretty 
difficult to like …  someone bombing your home’ (47). ‘When we love on the agape level 
we love men [and women] not because we like them, not because their attitudes and ways 
appeal to us, but because God loves them. Here we rise to the position of loving the person 
who does the evil deed while hating and despising the deed he does’ (8-9). Instead of 
‘ston[ing] one of our brothers because he has made a mistake … we in the spirit of Christ, 
follow the example of the loving and forgiving father’ (454), seeking to persuade the evil 
doer with words or deeds (103; 149). More to the point: for King, forgiveness, nonviolence 
and forbearance are means through which we respect ‘the dignity, indeed the sacredness, 
of the person’ (Raboteau 2017). Hence, they are the  basis of his (anthropocentric) love (or 
philia) of agape, of his deep respect and faith in the capacities of the κόσμος (of the ‘simple 
anthrōpos’, of the ‘ordinary person’), that is, of every potential sinner to rectify his/her 
stance, embracing the εὐ (the eu, that is, the ‘good’). Forgiveness could open up pathways 
for justice and racial reconciliation. . Thus, resentment, pathos for revenge, the outcomes 
of brutal racial injustices, had to be transmuted into a constructive energy that seeks to 
redeem the white segregationists (King 2000: 32).  
King (1986) criticised the worldviews of ‘armchair revolutionaries who insist on 
the political and psychological need for violence’ and ‘elaborately scorn the process of 
dialogue in favour of "tactics of confrontation"’, glorifying ‘guerrilla movement[s]’ while 
equating ‘revolutionary consciousness with the readiness to shed blood' (642-3). He 
opposed the actions of many Southern blacks who had slipped into a mentality of revenge 
and found ‘solace and security’ in ‘self-destructive’ black nationalist ideologies (King 




to throw ‘themselves into a politics of resentment’ (Lasch 1991a: 387), for King (1986) 
vengefulness and hatred could not result in racial equality, cooperation and reconciliation. 
He feared that revenge and violence would escalate ‘a frightening racial nightmare’ (297). 
Resentment and violencecould end up with a right-wing revenge and, consequently, ‘with 
a kind of right-wing takeover in the cities and a Fascist development, which will be terribly 
injurious to the whole nation’ (69).For King (1986), violence adds ‘deeper darkness to a 
night already devoid of stars’ and ‘[d]arkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do 
that’ (594). Or as Tolstoy pointed out, ‘Satan can never be driven out by Satan. Error can 
never be corrected by error, and evil cannot be vanquished by evil’ (16). ‘True non-
resistance’, that is, non-violent resistance, ‘is the only real resistance to evil’ so long as it 
‘extirpates the evil feeling’ (ibid). According to Niebuhr, nonviolent coercion and ‘the 
spiritual discipline against resentment’ is the best way to break the endless cycle of political 
violence, of the endless cycle of revenge and counter-revenge, which perpetuates social 
injustices ad infinitum (summarised by Lasch 1991a: 378). King drew on Niebuhr, who 
also praise Gandhi’s satyagraha, his religious and ethical methods of peaceful resistance 
(Niebuhr 1960: 244). As King himself (1986) stated, ‘Christ furnished the spirit and 
motivation [of civil disobedience] while Gandhi furnished the method’ (38), to ‘never to 
resort to violence’ (Gandhi 2018: 659). In a more specific fashion, during his trip to India 
(in Delhi, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay), King noticed Gandhi’s spirit of peaceful 
resistance being ‘very much alive’ in ‘almost every aspect of life’ (25). In India, writes 
King, ‘[t]he aftermath of hatred and bitterness that usually follows a violent campaign’ was 
replaced by ‘a mutual friendship based on complete equality … between the Indian and 
British people within the Commonwealth’ (ibid). In addition, King looked at the way non-
violent (Gandhian) cooperative movements for land reform (in India) succeeded in 
persuading large landowners to give up ‘millions of acres of land to cooperative 
management by small farmers’ (29). But King’s methods of persuasion (through agape) 
also aimed at the dramatisation of the injustices the policies of racial segregation had 
generated. In what follows I will explain how agape, ‘the love of God operating in the 
human heart’ (9), this serene emotion that springs from the impersonal realm, carries out 
‘the demands of justice’ (247).  




of neighbor’ (summarised by Doering 2010: 186; my emphasis). Agape encourages deep 
concern for our peers, and the willingness to redeem them from all sorts of indecent drives. 
It is not ‘a sentimental’ or an ‘affectionate sort of thing’ (King 1986: 13). It does not refer 
to sentimental types of friendship but to the simple common sense assumption that ‘a 
daybreak of freedom and justice’ (9) requires genuine devotion to humanity (eucosmia) 
and conscious understanding that ‘[t]he aftermath of violence is bitterness [while] [t]he 
aftermath of non-violence is reconciliation and the creation of a beloved community’ (12). 
Agape, which operates ‘through the Gandhian method of nonviolence’, the method of 
satyagraha, and constitutes ‘one of the most potent weapons available to the Negro in his 
struggle for freedom’ (16), activates the corrective and ‘redemptive good will’ (19). It 
advocates faith that wrong perceptions can be made right through persistent efforts, 
eloquence, and constant exposure of indecent beliefs that cause suffering, awakening what 
Protagoras (Πλάτων, Πρωταγόρας 2001: 94 [Plato’s Protagoras 2001: 94]) used to call 
«αἰδῶ τε καί δίκην». The term αἰδῶς (aidōs) stands for moral culpability; in turn, δίκη 
(diki) does not imply ‘punishment’ or ‘trial’, as the Oxford Dictionary holds (Watts 2008: 
55). Here Protagoras refers to the profound awareness of the importance of restoring justice 
and common decency, of living in accordance with the laws of nature. Far from referring 
to acts of humiliatation, aidōs seeks the amity and understanding of the opponent.  
According to Protagoras (2001 [Πλάτων, Πρωταγόρας 2001]) , Zeus asks Hermes «ἄγοντα 
εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καί δίκην ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καί δεσμοί φιλίας συναγωγοί» 
(‘to bring a sense of shame among men and women in order to make bonds of friendship, 
through which they can protect their cities’) from enmity and conflict (94). This 
understanding of shame (or moral culpability), instead of referring to abasement and 
humiliation, is associated with the conscious understanding of the reasons friendship 
constitutes one of the main safeguards against war and destruction (as also Aristotle 
believed), highlighting the need for prudence and self-limitation, inasmuch as pathos is 
effectively  restrained and the vices of hubris are kept under the supervision of moral 
decency. In the same way, for King (1986) the ultimate objective of moral culpability is 
not the humiliation of the white community (12; 87) since ‘the tension is not between races, 
but against the ‘forces of evil’ that some individuals [of the white community] are trapped 




all those ‘who had perpetrated this system [of racial inequality] in the past’ (12). Taken in 
their fullest sense, agape, aidōs and dikin are interrelated and interconnected. They are 
anthropocentric and stimulate eucosmia, so long as they highlight our unconditional 
obligation to acknowledge the reasons attitudes that scorn and deprive the worth and value 
of other human beings (irrespective of colour or religious creed) are moral transgressions 
and, for this reason, should be called into question.  
The process whereby eucosmia (either expressed through the Christian love, or 
agape, or through secular philosophical systems and worldviews) incites aidōs, dikin and 
collective self-purification, leading to common decency, will have to be further examined. 
In what follows we will focus on classical works of ancient Greek drama, theater and 
mythology. In the spirit of Iris Murdoch (1970), love (which is promoted through art, 
including theater), is capable of destroying our ‘biased self’ (85). Eventually, when art 
(ancient drama, in our case) is used as a means of political critique and disobedience, the 
artist after approaching an impersonal dimension, purifying his/her ‘I’ (to use Weil’s 
terms), becomes capable of depicting the reasons human groups throw off prudence. As 
we see, both the Christian and the secular morality of ancient Greek literature and drama 
could incite aidōs and dikin; both can incite self-purification, allowing us to discover links 
with the impersonal realm. Let us not disregard references made by Christian African 
Americans—from Frederick Douglass (1991) and David Walker (1993) to King (1986)—
to ancient Greek philosophers, historians and dramatists. 
2) Love, purification and ‘re-selfing’ in ancient drama 
Spengler (1961), in reference to Aristotle, identifies three effects of ancient drama: 
first comes the ruling impression of terror (φόβος), the violent disruption of spectator’s 
feelings concerning abrupt outcomes of fortuna (or pathos) in the life of one or more 
protagonists, followed by ἐλεός (pity), and katharsis (καθάρσις) (psychical purification) 
(174). To avoid confusion: the modern understanding of pity points to all the human 
sentiments that incite sympathy (or compassion) (Καστοριάδης 2008: 267 [Castoriadis 
2008: 267]). However, as Chapter 2 mentioned, compassion springs from the fido amor 
and uses a language which ‘consists in gestures and [sentimental] expressions of 
countenance’ (Arendt 1990: 86). But in ancient drama, a political institution according to 




οἴκτος) does not promote moral awakening by appealing to emotions (2008: 266). More 
precisely, compassion and pity were unknown to the ancients; the ‘worthlessness of pity’, 
writes Nietzsche (2003), ‘the most sinister symptom of our modern civilization … is quite 
a new phenomenon’ (5). Pity constitutes a degenerate empathy (Breithaupt 2019: 54) where 
the misery and the resentment of a guiltless victim are transplanted to a passive observer. 
The latter loses his/her own her ability to judge, to examine impartially the real causes of 
the former’s suffering. The passive observer, incapable of judging and evaluating, 
gradually (and almost unconsciously) absorbs (and habitually reproduces) as ‘standards’ 
the resentment of the victim with whom he/she feels emotionally attached (pathological 
confluence)78. For Arendt (1998) this view of pity has been introduced ‘into political 
theory’ by Rousseau (81) and has been utilised in order to mobilise vast numbers of people 
in support of the destitute and the oppressed. However, ancient drama has no need of 
emotional foundationalism in its struggle to inform and persuade spectators. More to the 
point: the aim of ancient drama is not to construct emotional bonds between victims and 
spectators (observers) but to ‘dramatise’ human suffering, that is, to incite pity (understood 
as ἐλεός) and fear (φόβος) by raising awareness concerning the devastating outcomes of 
the human propensity towards envy, lust for power and domination. Above all, the 
Ancient’s pity incites katharsis (Καστοριάδης 2007β: 151; 155 [Castoriadis 2007b: 151; 
155])79, through which individuals restore prudence, rejecting negative impulses. The main 
purpose of dramatisation, suggests Castoriadis (2007c) (while discussing Sophcles’ 
Antigone), was to raise awareness concerning the vulnerability and the ‘terrifying 
formidableness (deinotēs) [δεινότης] of anthrōpos [human being]’, of his/her capacity to 
provoke ‘awe, fear, terror … which reaches its summit and self-destruction in hubris’ (14). 
The primary objective of the poet or the dramatist is to project in the public a 
purified version of its collective self in juxtaposition with the already adopted (collective 
self), flawed by all sorts of vices. He/she must be capable to judge, that is, to address and 
expose all the ‘impure’ elements the same self has adopted, elements that instigate moral 
transgression (or hubris), leaving humans exposed to enmity. Homer's Iliad, according to 
 
78  For more concerning the process whereby compassion or pity leads to the so-called over-
identification (pathological confluence),  see Chapter 2 (see the third section). 




Weil’s interpretation, offers a good example of collective self-purification through 
dramatisation. As Vető (1994) stresses (discussing Weil), in The Iliad Homer manages to 
translate ‘the tragic truth of human condition into the matchless songs of his great poem’ 
(103). In order to recognise the terrors of the Trojan War, Homer pays attention to the evils 
of war per se and ‘the greatest of griefs that can come among men; the destruction of a 
city’ (Weil 1987b: 49). Thereupon he detaches himself, his own ‘I’ (Vető 1994: 103); he 
rises to impersonal dimensions and discharges his own ‘self’ from biases; subsequently, he 
adopts ‘a universal perspective from which he sees the suffering of others ‘as his own’ 
(ibid). Further on the poet implants this affliction in the mind of his reader; he brings his 
reader ‘at the center of a truth … in all its nakedness’ (Weil 1987a: 65). Here the poet 
strives towards ‘a direct understanding of the human condition revealed in the tortured 
existence’ of the victim (Vető 1994: 103). In turn, the reader seeks pity but not in order to 
comfort his/her (implanted) anguish. The poet offers ‘no misleading consolation’ but 
represents ‘horror as it is and in this way makes acceptance of universal necessity possible 
for the reader’ (ibid). Emotional reactions play an important role here. However, they 
remain austere and serene; they are not elevated above the logismikon, above the human 
capacity for thinking and nóēsis. The pity (ἐλεός and οἴκτος) incited here causes intense 
dismay and incites fear towards the consequences of human formidableness. Οἴκτος 
encourages the abandonment of all thoughts or raw sentiments (or bouleumata) that 
encourage human beings to embrace the hubris of war (Καστοριάδης 2007β: 151 
[Castoriadis 2007b: 151]).  
We should also consider Euripides’ Trojan Women, which (like most ancient drama 
plays) ‘promotes an experience’ that informs the audience—the Athenian demos—about 
the moral consequences of ‘future choices’ (Nussbaum 2013: 261). It depicts the demos as 
a dreadful monster, carried away by its own hubris, incapable of setting any limit to its 
deeds (Castoriadis 2007c: 123). From a contextualist point of view, The Trojan Women 
was written one year after the slaughter of the Melians (Καστοριάδης 2008: 211 
[Castoriadis 2008: 211]). Given that the attack against the Melians was democratically 
decided, Euripides in his work raises awareness concerning the potential catastrophic 
effects of the unrestrained human pathos; he highlights the necessity of human beings to 




[Τρωάδες] criticises the hubris of the Hellenes, who after the fall of Troy engaged 
themselves in an orgy of cruelty. Euripides (1992 [Ευριπίδης 1992]) depicts a city 
vanishing like smoke in the sky due to wretchedness (139), and scenes of temples ‘run red 
with blood’ (32), where ‘corpses of dead men lie naked beneath the temple of Pallas’ (80), 
‘multitudes of children cry in front of the Gates’ (121), and young adults are precipitated 
from the city-walls (123) while women and children are sold as slaves (139). Just like 
Homer, Euripides aims at katharsis, by exposing the hubris committed by the Athenian 
demos itself. 
As with Weil (1987a), ‘[i]n several Greek tragedies we observe a curse born of a 
sin transmitted from generation to generation until it strikes a guileless person who suffers 
all the bitterness of it. Then the curse is ended’ (Weil 1987b: 10). First, when the forces of 
the underworld infiltrate the empirical world, they create conditions inciting moral 
transgressions, leading to all sorts of injustices (as we already know). Second, once the 
same conditions that led to such transgressions are gradually adopted as normal, they 
become sublimated. Thereupon, they begin to propagate themselves unconsciously; they 
become curses (to use Weil’s terms), transmitted ‘from generation to generation’ without 
ever being challenged. When, however, works of drama depict the suffering of a ‘guiltless 
person’ in a way to incite pity (ἐλεός), a katabasis, a descent to the underworld, begins80. 
Or consider Ulysses’ katabasis to Hades, a hard place ‘for those that live to behold these 
realms’ according to Ulysses’ mother (Homer 1966: 397). In this lurid underworld Ulysses 
seeks Tiresias, the ‘soothsaying of the spirit of Theban’ (399). Tiresias advises him to resist 
temptation and deceit, in short to avoid eating the ‘goodly flocks of Helios’ (393), which 
was the main cause of his death. Here we can use Ulysses’ example symbolically; like 
Ulysses learns from Tiresias (who dwells in the underworld) the cause of the latter’s death, 
similarly (in drama) the katabasis of the spectator to his/her underworld allows the latter 
to identify in his/her mind the causes of suffering, namely the psychical forces (pathos) 
dwelling in this part of his/her mind that deceives human beings in order to commit 
injustices, fueling destruction and violent death. In other words, when pity (ἐλεός) incites 
katabasis, through this symbolic descent, the spectators, the demos, or part of the demos 
 




(like Ulysses), come into contact with pathos per se, with what has incited the hubris and 
suffering the guiltless victim has highlighted. By identifying which psychical forces caused 
this suffering and, therefore, should be repressed, the chances of the spectators to purify 
themselves and rectify their stance increase. The demos (as a spectator) understands the 
need to ‘re-self’, to adopt a new collective self, emancipated from bouleumata, from the 
hubris of pathos. Thus, dramatisation reveals the totality of human personality. More 
precisely, the spectator understands that human personality is not only shaped by the 
empirical order (logismikon), the order of knowledge, reason and memory, but 
simultaneously (and sometimes unconsciously) it is influenced by the forces of the 
underworld (pathos), the ultimate instigators of human formidableness (deinotēs).   
3) Love and self-purification in King’s Christian appeal 
King’s Letter from Birmingham City Jail, the ‘manifesto of the civil rights 
movement’ as Colaiaco (1988: 94) calls it, dramatises racial segregation inasmuch as ‘it 
can no longer be ignored’ (King 1986: 291). More to the point: King’s suffering and 
humiliation ‘inflicted by membership in a persecuted minority’ (Lasch 1991a: 391, ff.) and 
by ‘the full impact of [racial] segregation’, testified ‘his capacity for spiritual growth’ 
(393). According to Murdoch (1970), ‘[r]eligion provides devices for the purification of 
states of mind’ and prayers can ‘actually induce a better quality of consciousness’, 
providing ‘an energy for good action’ (81). The Christian notion of agape, the love that 
‘stands at the center of the cosmos’ but rests ‘deep inside us’, right in the deepest strata of 
our ‘inner self’ (King 1986: 11), was for King a fountain of psychical awakening that made 
possible the transformation of his inexorable suffering ‘into a creative force’ (41), into an 
‘energy for good action’ (in Murdoch’s terms). The light of agape dilutes the darkness of 
resentment and purifies the mind. Saint John’s Dark Night (1991) offers a similar insight: 
‘darkness and concealment’ depict the inexorable hardships the soul must confront upon 
its purification, upon its contact with the light of God, the light of love that ‘burned in my 
heart’ and guided ‘more surely than the light of noon’ (51). Jung (1960) compares the 
transformation of psychical emotions and energies with ‘the steam-engine conversion’, 
which transforms heat into pressure and, subsequently, ‘the pressure of steam’ into ‘the 
energy of motion’ (41). Thus, ‘psychical intensities or values’ are transformed ‘from one 




is, the negative psychical energies, are converted ‘by suitable means into other dynamisms’ 
(ibid). They are transformed into positive forces when one senses schisms of light (of our 
‘inner light’, more precisely) through which connection with the impersonal realm is 
established. The fiery dynamism of this light leads to impersonality, a condition where all 
negative psychical energies, all sorts of bouleumata (products of pathos)—like (for 
instance) the passion for revenge—are purged from the ‘I’. They are transformed into a 
positive force, into a deep yearning for brotherhood and common decency. ‘In the midst of 
outer dangers’, writes King (1986), ‘I have felt an inner calm’ that only ‘known resources 
of God could give’ (40). This inner calm is the light that leads us to the impersonal realm, 
to a high moral ideal (God). As King (1986) continues, ‘God has been profoundly clear to 
me’, God’s power transformed ‘the fatigue of despair into the buoyancy of hope’ (ibid).  
If agape can open up pathways to impersonality and if impersonality per se creates 
in the mind of the actor a purified and prudent populace, in turn, by projecting this imagined 
collectivity—emancipated by its own hubris—to the corrupt populace, the actor 
him/herself multiplies the probabilities for all spectators (individual members of the same 
populace) to eliminate petrified and unconsciously reproduced life patterns (products of 
pathos) that have led to the dispossession of those who were seen as predicaments to their 
own ideal, given, ‘closed [and] homogenous [social] totality’ (Žižek 1989: 127). In Jungian 
terms, ‘[t]he secret participation of the unconscious is everywhere present without our 
having to search for it’ (Jung 1960: 79). It follows, therefore, that if the collective 
unconscious incorporates negative possibilities, ‘characteristics of an entire group’ that are 
never totally conscious in individuals (Odajnyk 2007: 14), if (to use a different language) 
the collective unconscious is dominated by perceptions, among which some are products 
of pathos, and, finally, if these perceptions are indulged without being brought into the 
conscious in order to be evaluated and judged, they participate secretly in public life. 
Modes of being created in order to gratify these perceptions are passively reproduced. I 
have already explained that the social realm homogenises tastes and manners, grouping 
every individual member into an undifferentiated aggregate. In addition, the social realm 
is closely linked with ‘the concept of behaviour … [and it] is distinguished from the 
political by the absence of conscious determination’ and thinking (Lasch 1991a: 133). 




negative perceptions (or possibilities) are normalised and become ‘habits’, in Nietzsche’s 
(2003) terms. Their origins, however, are entirely ‘forgotten’ (10). They are ignored or 
untraceable and the same acts are repeated instinctively (ibid). Societies ‘that set a high 
value’ on habits and customs ‘take little interest in their own origins’, claims Lasch (1991a: 
131). In the social (behavioural) realm of customs, fallible patterns and ‘“already made 
up … preconceived ideas”’, to use King’s words (quoted by Garrow 1986: 30), (like racial 
superiority) are reproduced ritualistically (Chapter 2). They are adopted passively and 
unconsciously due to sheer thoughtlessness or ‘non-knowledge on the part of the subject’, 
as Žižek (1989: 21) would have put it.  
When dramatisation incites (φόβος) terror, in our case the terror of injustice and 
suffering of African Americans, members of the same collectivity begin to sense the matrix 
of this injustice in the underworld that exists in all human beings and perverts their deeds. 
Thereupon, a katabasis begins and the same individuals find themselves exposed to pathos. 
They recognise that racial injustice is a form of moral transgression, incited by pathos itself, 
not totally by their own pathos (or bouleumata), but (more severely) by the pathos of men 
and women of preceding generations, which at some historical moment consciously caused 
great suffering.  I am, obviously, referring to the moral transgression of slavery (especially 
in the American South), to the issue of racial injustice that has ‘been with us since our 
earliest beginnings as a nation’ and has ‘bred fears, myths, and violence over centuries’, 
according to Rustin (2020: 187). It is ‘deeper and sharper than the other points of 
contention’ and a ‘source of dark and dangerous irrationality … running through our 
history and dimming our brighter achievements’ (ibid). In Homer’s Odyssey Tiresias 
indirectly unveils to Ulysses the secret of his death, in the same way Agamemnon recounts 
how he ‘died by a most pitiful death’ (415) by the ‘guileful Clytemnestra’ (417), and round 
about him ‘the rest of … [his] comrades were slain unceasingly’ (415). Agamemnon is 
dead due to Clytemnestra’s viciousness (pathos). Thus, in order to learn about the real 
causes of his death one has to visit him in the underworld of Hades (the world of the dead) 
where he dwells. The allegorical interpretation of this myth prompts us to avoid looking 
for the real causes of an injustice solely in the empirical/material world. Instead, it 
encourages us to dive into the darkest pathways of the human mind, from where lies the 




‘formidability’ of human nature, to use Castoriadis’ terms.  
The sin of such injustices and the conditions of suffering are preserved since the 
same sin has been transmitted ‘from generation to generation’, in Weil’s (1987b: 10) terms, 
and has been embraced unconsciously as a ‘habit’ through the realm of society. Katabasis 
awakes the dormant collective thinking and nóēsis. First, the civil disobedient, by 
dramatising ignored injustices incites aidōs and dikin. Second, by projecting a new 
collective self (juxtaposed to the existing corrupt collective self, as mentioned earlier) 
public debates (narrative action) concerning how the same collectivity should be re-
instituted in order to abide with the standards of common decency, begin. Through such a 
process the chances for members of the populace to rectify its moral stance, by throwing 
off (katharsis) habitually reproduced biases (products of pathos), effectively increase. 
More importantly, through katabasis the same members understand that a human being can 
be δεινός—formidable, (or sinner)—as long as he/she has passions that force him/her to 
commit atrocities. Consider, finally, James Baldwin’s comments during his interview with 
Niebuhr on a New York television program (Sept. 22, 1963) (mentioned by Branch 1988: 
895): ‘[t]he suffering made Negroes [is] “the only hope this country has,” not because of 
their race inherent possesses virtue but because only in extremity do people “discover what 
they really live by”’ (ibid). In short the suffering of the African Americans raised awareness 
about what human beings ‘really live by’, what (in other words) human life is about: 
nothing but a constant struggle against our inherent deinotēs (formidability), whose 
consequences (hubris) in cases of extremity (and through dramatisation) emerge in the 
surface of collective life, inasmuch as it can be sensed (and condemned) by everyone.  
Leadership, narrative action and logos 
After examining the process through which Christian agape connects us with the 
impersonal realm, leading to individual and collective katharsis in return, we will continue 
reflecting on the practical contribution of civil disobedience to common decency from a 
slightly different angle. Instead of resorting to psychoanalysis, we will examine the impacts 
of  agape and forgiveness in making narrative action possible by minimising violence and, 
subsequently, by unleashing the power of logos from a phenomenological point of view. 




community even when one seeks to break it. Agape is a willingness to go to any length to 
restore community ... It is a willingness to forgive, not seven times but seventy times to 
restore community’ (20; emphasis added). The discoverer of forgiveness, claims Arendt 
(1998), ‘in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth’ (238), the creator of 
Christianity. The freedom of forgiveness (according to Jesus' teachings) was precisely ‘the 
freedom from vengeance’ (241), from what inspires the ‘victim with an intractable desire 
for vengeance, causing the spiral of violence to spin out of control’ (Doering 2010: 67) and 
puts both the victim and the predator into a relentless process, ‘which by itself need never 
come to an end’ (Arendt 1998: 241). Forgiveness breaks the chain of revenge. Through 
forgiveness, argues Lasch (1991a) (while elaborating on Arendt), action ‘finds its fullest 
expression’ (376). Speech and hearing become the most prominently available means, 
allowing individuals to come together acting in concert (Arendt 1998: 224). This 
conviction was, for the ancient Greeks the main foundation of ‘living together in a polis, 
[which] conducted their affairs by means of speech, through persuasion (πείθειν), and not 
be means of violence, through mute coercion’ (Arendt 1968a: 45). Demosthenes the orator 
knew very well that violence and coercion were means that suited only oligarchic 
governments. Republics, on the other hand, rested on the power of logos, that is, on the 
power of speech and persuasion (Πλούταρχος 1992: 40 [Plutarch 1992: 40]).  
As mentioned earlier, King’s leadership was not vanguardist or top-down. Instead, 
it was characterised by the ‘the art of listening’, according to Phillips (1998), and the ‘desire 
for lifelong learning’ (43). Effective listeners ‘take in everything they hear’ from the public, 
‘analyze it within the context of the environment’ (ibid) and return it back to the public (or 
political) sphere in order to be further discussed. Effective listeners pay attention (in Weil’s 
terms) to popular demands in order to analyse them. Having exposed themselves to a high 
moral ideal, having purified themselves from biases and all sorts of resentments, they 
become able to judge, to distinguish right from wrong; they, more precisely, understand 
which among these expressed demands and, more importantly, which among the proposed 
means that have to be employed (in order these demands could be met) are acceptable. 
Thus, during the Montgomery bus boycotts King by entrusting his ‘“inner voice” telling 
him what to do’ encouraged his audience to resist the evils of segregation through the use 




fences in any attempt seeking to create open spaces of public contestation, spaces of open 
meetings in churches and public squares (194), which were held frequently ‘[i]n order to 
keep the citizens informed and up-to-date’ (Phillips 1998: 39). King was not wrong in his 
belief that oratory could lead to enlightenment (Branch 1988: 206). Eloquent speech was a 
necessary means of narrative action, through which the issue of racial exclusion and the 
hubris of segregation could be dramatised and exposed. Violence, on the other hand, 
undermines public reasoning as long as it substitutes logos and persuasion with coercion 
and, inevitably, blocks communication through speech and dialogue. When violence rules 
absolutely, as for instance in the concentration camps of totalitarian regimes, not only 
laws … but everything and everybody must fall silent’ (Arendt 1969a: 18). For Weil 
(2005), ‘the nature of force’ converts ‘a man ‘into a thing’ (204) and leaves ‘no room for 
thought … no room either for justice or prudence’ (1987b: 34). ‘ 
In other words, ‘violence appears where [political] power is in jeopardy, but left to 
its own course it ends in power’s disappearance’ (56). Power (which in Arendt’s thought) 
‘arises out of joint action and joint deliberation’ (Arendt 1990: 269), is always destroyed 
by violence (Arendt 1969a: 53; 56; 1998: 202-3), for ‘out of the barrel of a gun grows the 
most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience’ (Arendt 
1969a: 53). Power is never the property of an individual. It belongs to groups, unions and 
peoples and ‘remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together’ (44). ‘[W]hat 
is a union of rational and intelligent beings who are held together only by bond of force?’ 
asks Tocqueville (1994 1: 245). A union of intelligent (that is, capable of argumentative 
reasoning) beings preserved by brute force is not a political union at all. In contrast, 
political unions and groups are preserved by power which ‘comes into being only if and 
when men join themselves together for the purpose of action’ (Arendt 1990: 175). King’s 
emphasis on forbearance and non-violence, opened up pathways for political engagement, 
where the power of speech (rather than force) dominates. Non-violence, as he held, creates 
‘room for everyone … to join up’ a movement that sees ‘no color distinction’ (King 2000: 
5), while political violence ‘scorn[s] the process of dialogue’ (King 1986: 642), the process 
of πείθειν (persuasion).  
In general terms, both Arendt’s republicanism and King’s Christian humanism 




‘agonistic discourse in politics’ (Ashcroft 2018: 470) and the substitution of brute force 
with plurality and logos. King insisted on the benefits of being exposed to a wide range of 
opinions; the wider the range ‘of opinions you hear, the better chance you have of 
extracting the truth’ (Phillips 1998: 193). Hence, if King’s ‘leadership transformed a 
degraded people into active, self-respecting citizens, who achieved a new dignity in the 
course of defending their constitutional rights’, to use Lasch’s (1995a: 83) words again, 
this is owed to endeavours aiming at the creation of the appropriate conditions within which 
African Americans could act ‘in concert with fellow Negroes’ aiming at asserting 
themselves a citizens (King 2000: 30), becoming political beings, that is free human beings 
‘endowed with the power of speech’ (Arendt 1990: 19). In the end, if ‘King’s leadership 
transformed a degraded people into active, self-respecting citizens, who achieved a new 
dignity in the course of defending their constitutional rights’ (Lasch 1995a: 83) this could 
be attributed to his insistence on non-violence as well as in the anthropocentric (and 
transcendent) morality of the Christian agape (King 1986: 20), which is directed towards 
both enemies and friends (19), indicating faith and trust in every single human being who 
(in spite of his/her natural inclination towards sin and hubris), holds the means of both 
celestial and worldly redemption and salvation. Of course eucosmia and common decency 
do not derive from Christian sources alone. One can draw anthropocentric ideas from other 
religions or from secular art too, as this chapter made clear by mentioning King’s 
influences from Gandhi’s satyagraha and by reflecting on ancient Greek drama and 
literature. 
In general terms, we have seen that non-violence, forgiveness and forbearance may 
be effective methods of civil disobedience, in struggles attempting to bridge (racially) 
divided communities. As, however, Rustin (2020) pointed out, social divisions are not 
always ‘the result of bad sentiment’ and, hence, will not be healed by the ‘[t]alk of 
brotherhood and “tolerance”’ (191). They are ‘reflections of vast and growing inequalities 
in our socioeconomic system—inequalities of wealth, of status, of education, of access to 
political power’ that ‘breed resentment and deep discontent’ (ibid). Here Rustin (2020) 
speaks of the ‘systematic exclusion of the Negro from the economic mainstream’ (191). 
As I explained in Chapter 2, by critcising Arendt’s view on action (contrasted with 




ideas, a genuine eucosmia (in other words), should be concerned both with political and 
economic participation. Rustin (2020) brings to the foreground aspects of King’s campaign 
that highlight the problem of economic exclusion of the African-Americans (191-3). In 
short, our emphasis on King’s agape, non-violence and forbearance must not give the 
impression that economic demands (economic justice and participation) in the Civil Rights 
Movement played a very minor role. King ‘was never indifferent to the importance of 
economic equality’ (Lasch 1991a: 401). King concluded that the only hope for American 
society would be ‘a radical improvement in the Negro’s socioeconomic position’ (Rustin 
2020: 192), to end political disenfranchisement as well as economic exclusion. As he 
claimed, ‘[o]ur needs are identical with labor’s needs—decent wages, fair working 
conditions, livable housing, old age security, health and welfare measures, conditions in 
which families can grow, have education for their children and respect in the community’ 
(King, quoted by Rustin 2020: 192). Thus, his activities moved to the North (Lasch 1991a: 
400), into urban centers plagued by black poverty. ‘It moved from public accommodations 
to employment, welfare, housing, education—to find a host of problems the nation had let 
fester for a generation’ (Rustin 2020: 192). In the ‘ghetto-trapped Negroes’ (190) of the 
North, King no longer addressed the importance of family and the ‘healing power of agape’ 
(Lasch 1991a: 400). He ‘tended to make poverty, not slavery, the central issue’ of his 
campaign, according to G. D. H. Cole (quoted by Lasch 1991a: 404). 
The Civil Rights Movement did not appeal exclusively to the South. In order to 
spread in the North its leaders had to recognise ‘the importance on ‘“public relations,” in 
King’s words’ (Lasch 1991a: 397), the importance of cooperation and open dialogue, of 
narrative action (in other words), that is, of public debates taking place within mediums of 
mass communication (such as press), where racial (as well as economic) injustices could 
be dramatised to the nation (ibid). The Civil Rights Movement ‘depended on public 
opinion’ (ibid). As King wrote in 1961, ‘[w]ithout the presence of the press … there might 
have been untold massacres in the South’ (quoted by Lasch 1991a: 397). ‘A 
‘“dramatization to the nation of what segregation was like”’ presupposed the presence of 
national news media, ‘to get across the nation the evils of racial discrimination’ (ibid). 
Through methods of mass communication, believed King, the hubris of segregation, the 




attention of the American public (Branch 1988: 227), stimulating collective nóēsis, 
judgment and katharsis (see the previous section). 
Conclusion         
While agonal action offers no absolute protection from fantasy and hubris (as the 
first section of this chapter argued), it can contribute towards public judgment and, hence, 
towards common decency. The pessimistic anti-populist theories (mainly those of Hobbes 
and Le Bon), which regard every group action susceptible to the irrationality that 
hypnotises its members, allowing unconscious and resentful (instinctual) impulses to 
generate intolerance and violence (Le Bon 2002; Freud 1991: 98-109), ignore that these 
phenomena take place (mainly) within passive groups. When collective engagement is not 
accompanied by speech and hearing, the members of a group instead of interacting, 
communicating and exchanging ideas, are converted into a mute and compliant mass. They 
end up a homogenous and uniform crowd, a submissive herd, acting as if they are in 
isolation. Under such circumstances indecent ideas can easily spread from one person to 
another unconsciously. On the other hand, the vita civile with its emphasis on common 
appearance and communication opens up pathways for truth (without which no justice or 
beauty can ever exist). According to Jefferson (1999), truth ‘is the proper and sufficient 
antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition 
disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate’ (391). In James’ (1978) words, 
‘we must talk consistently just as we must think consistently’ (102-3), for plurality of 
opinion and diversity of viewpoints allows us to recognise ‘all aspects of the truth’ (Mill 
2008: 57). Dialogue and public reasoning, ‘collision of adverse opinions’ (53), improves 
the mental muscular powers by constituting past events subjects to continuous public 
mediation; thus, it prevents pernicious thoughts to be acknowledged as self-evident. Errors 
cease being ‘dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them’ (Jefferson 1999: 
391).  
While ‘[d]emocracy provides channels for resolving conflict’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 
315), for dissolving negative prejudices and fallible norms, while intelligence is more 
common in ‘the ordinary people’ than in experts and technocrats, the possibilities for the 




valid and true (deception), is always possible. In short, democracy could also engender 
conflict, hubris and self-deception (ibid). However, as the second section of this chapter 
argued, an imprudent demos can emancipate itself from the hubris of pathos through acts 
of civil disobedience, through acts that inspire «αἰδῶ τε καί δίκην» (aidō and dikin). A 
‘good’ citizen, with ‘superior abilities’, who is part of the populace itself (Jefferson 1999: 
156),, who draws on (anthropocentric) ideas anchored to the notion of popular 
eucosmia,can can sow the seeds of common decency, empowering a popular to drive away 
the ‘darkness’ of hubris from itself.. In the second section of this chapter, by focusing on 
works of art and ancient drama we have seen how the purification of the self (katharsis) 
reveals to ‘us the world, our world and not another one, with clarity…’ (Murdoch 1970: 
63), enabling individuals to inspire a populace that has thrown off restraint. We have 
examined King’s case (the ‘good’ citizen) who draws hope from the belief that justice itself 
stems from ‘the love of God operating in the human heart’ (King 1986: 9) in order to 
challenge deeply rooted obscene public perceptions and customs. 
Finally, as Colaiaco (1988) stresses, it was the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) headed by King, which used the African American churches as 
alternative public spaces, where African Americans could hold protest meetings, 
discussing their grievances, praying and singing inspirational hymns (7). Let us be 
reminded again that meliorism stimulates action in order to eliminate evil, in order to 
increase human welfare by augmenting the probability for practical improvement, without 
offering assurances or guarantees. The melioristic mind takes issue with any idea or 
concept (including that of leadership) that aspires to redeem humanity from all sorts of 
falsehoods and moral transgressions once and for all. This impels us to abandon any 
‘hagiographic’ approach to King; it prompts us, as much as evidence permits, to identify 
negative aspects in his campaign and leadership. As Colaiaco (1988) explains, between 
1961 and 1963 not everyone ‘welcomed King in Albany’ (42) where ‘blacks engaged in 
massive nonviolent protests that rocked the community, disturbing civil order for almost a 
year’ (40). King ‘draws most of the publicity, and wins most of the credit’. According to 
SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] members: ‘“We plant the seed. Dr. 
King reaps the harvest”’ (42). Although such accusations cannot refute the positive effects 




even the most good-intentioned form of leadership carries the risks of abuse of power and 
manipulation. Although self-purification restores prudence by removing biases that hinder 
one’s capacity to think and judge, at the same time this process does not promise absolute 
protection from all temptations in every moment of life. Put starkly: justice, truth and 
beauty ‘are the image in our world of this impersonal and divine order of the universe’, 
claims Weil (2005: 98). A human being (a leader of civil disobedience, for example) can 
sense perfect justice by connecting him/herself with the impersonal realm. This assumption 
could easily push us to an acceptance of the quasi optimistic worldview that ‘constantly 
recurs in Christian thinking’, in mystical Christianity, more precisely, or in the philosophy 
of several Gnostic sects, according to Passmore (2000: 223), which believed that 
‘Christians could perfect themselves, if once they were prepared to withdraw from the 
world’ in order to cut themselves off ‘from whatever material … to mortify the body, 
and … to soar above the flesh’ (ibid), in short, to liberate ‘from the human body and the 
material world’ (Gray 2007: 15). This, of course, is disputed by several leading figures of 
Christianity: Martin Luther, for instance, believed that even if human beings ‘had 
succeeded in freeing themselves from the lusts of the flesh, they would still not be perfect’ 
(Passmore 2000: 135). For Thomas Aquinas, human beings can achieve only ‘some 
perfection’ (153), whilst ‘absolute perfection lies in the vision of God’ and ‘no man can 
achieve perfection in this life, however hard he tries and however much God helps him. 
The most man can do is to achieve that lower, “evangelical” perfection, which consists in 
loving God before all else and being free of all mortal sin’ (152). According to Gnosticism 
(see Manicheanism, Catharism and the Brotherhood of the Free Spirit) (123), material life 
is evil ‘and that, in consequence, men could perfect themselves by cutting themselves free 
from whatever is material’ (123). John Cassian, the semi-pelagian (145) ‘denies that men 
can be sinless’ (184) but, as he asserts, ‘perfect life and perfect virtue’ are ‘rooted in the 
contemplation of eternal goodness and in a fervor of love’ (John the Cassian 1985: 110). 
Perfection comes through monastic life (81), through the complete abandonment of the 
worldly (material) affairs, plagued by all sorts of temptations and lust (pathos) for 
possession. Moreover, the ‘civil disobedient’ writes Arendt (1969b) ‘never exists as a 
single individual’ and he/she ‘can function and survive only as a member of a group’ (55). 




aspires to influence. Irrespective of how deeply his/her mind in the state of impersonality 
is purified from selfish biases and negative prejudices, his/her purified self can be still 
corrupted. Upon re-entering the secular world, which is always influenced by pathos 
(Chapter 2), he/she finds him/herself exposed to all sorts of egoistic inducements, incited 
by his/her social environment. But though an eloquent leader (like King) is not entirely 
shielded from the vices of human pathos, his/her persistence, resilience, eloquence and 
moral sobriety, cultivate and fertilise the soil from which the exact conditions for 
democratic hope are effectively proliferated. The concept of leadership (in relation to 
populism) is further advanced in the next chapter, which discusses the French and the 
American Revolutions, as well as on the American cooperative movement which led to the 


























Meliorism, Eucosmia and Leadership  
Introduction 
This chapter is preoccupied a) with the French and the American Revolution, b) 
with the American cooperative movement (the People’s Party), and finally c) with the issue 
of slavery in the American South. By examining these complex historical events, I have 
identified a common problem. This problem revolves around the notion of eucosmia, which 
(as I explained in Chapter 1), is central to the idea of meliorism and, hence, to the project 
of the vita civile. More precisely, the first section discusses the main ideological trends 
behind the French Revolution and juxtaposes the optimistic aspirations of its leadership 
with the relatively ‘moderate’, according to Israel (2019: 258), claims of the American 
Founding Fathers. The main objective here is a) to shed light on the devastating 
consequences of optimistic populism when it seduces leaders and actors, and b) to 
emphasise the necessity for cultivating a melioristic populist ethic, anchored to the idea of 
human vulnerability. It will be also explain that the moderate (and relatively melioristic) 
expectations of the American revolutionaries derive from their deep concern ‘about human 
frailty’ (Kuttner 2019: 37), which (in turn) is partially owed to their mild secularism; unlike 
the French revolutionaries, the American Founding Fathers had not expelled religious 
beliefs and transcendent ideas from their thinking. As Nash Marshall (2003) put it, it was 
faith and belief in God, ‘in the inviolability and sacredness of humankind’ what saved 
America from ‘the excesses of the French Revolution’ (139). Parts of the first section are 
preoccupied with discussions revolving around this issue. 
The second section digs into the rise and fall of the cooperative movement (the 
Populists), which (to a degree) revived concepts of classical democratic/republican ideas 
(initially endorsed by the Revolution itself). Top-down appropriation, nevertheless, sent 
the movement to its doom. The aim here is to elaborate on the reasons leadership 
undermines democratic political initiatives when it appropriates populist discourses 
initially generated by ‘the people’ at the grassroots. Finally, the issue of slavery is outlined 
in the third section. In both three cases we confront a common problem, which in order to 




observations for one more time. The author traces the seeds of the anthropocentric 
cosmosystem81 in the homo hellenicus, that is, in types of being that incarnate aspects of 
the Greek antiquity (the democratic polis) as well as elements of the Hellenistic and 
Byzantine age (economic and democratic political participation)82. However, the 
disappearance of the homo hellenicus with the end of the Byzantine age signaled the 
disappearance of the anthropocentric weltanschauung (Κοντογιώργης 2020 [Contogeorgis 
2020]: 86). Anthropocentric ideas were partly revived during the Renaissance and the age 
of the Enlightenment. But for the same author (Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 2006; 2012), 
the Enlightenment has not fully challenged the imaginary of despotism, precisely due to its 
emphasis on political representation/centralisation, as opposed to direct democracy (or 
action)83. In other words, the Enlightenment was a result of a metharmōsis of the 
anthropocentric ideas of the polis to the Western European political environment, of the 
metakénosis of the latter to societies struggling to liberate themselves from the yoke of 
despotism. As Arendt (1990) pointed out, ‘liberation may be the condition of freedom but 
by no means leads automatically to it’ (29). ‘[E]ven the intention of liberating is not 
identical with the desire for freedom’ (ibid), that is, for action. In simple terms, liberation 
from absolutism/despotism may be a crucial step towards the revival of the anthropocentric 
democratic acquis of the Greek polis but does not automatically lead to it. The desire for 
limited government (as Chapter 3 argued) is not the desire for action. It could be, therefore, 
argued that the society envisaged by prominent Enlightenment thinkers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century (such as Locke, Montesquieu, Mill, Rousseau and Paine), who 
insisted on the idea of limited government and political representation/centralisation, are 
‘proto-anthropocentric’ societies (Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 2020: 49]). They 
understood democracy primarily in terms of popular consent (as opposed to direct 
participation). At this stage one might ask: how could the ancient Greek (Hellenic) world, 
in which slave labour and the exclusion of women from politics were considered (at least 
 
81   In regards to the term cosmosystem see the Glossary. 
82  For more concerning the anthropocentric character of economic participation see Chapter 2 
(second section). 
83  Discussions about the reasons some of the most influential figures of the Enlightenment 
proposed political centralisation (or representation) rather direct democracy will take place in the 




by many ancient Greek thinkers) sine qua non of the human existence (Αριστοτέλης 
[Αristotle] 1993: 50), could be called anthropocentric? First, Contogeorgis does not call 
the homo hellenicus ‘anthropocentric’ because of the way the entire Greek world was 
instituted but simply because he identifies in most of ancient Greek civilisations elements 
of ‘freedom’ (Κοντογιώργης [Contogeorgis] 2006: 31]). More precisely, Contogeorgis’ 
(2021) method of gnoseology (γνωσιολογία) is concerned with the way civilisations 
incarnate a set of knowledge, that is, a set of beliefs and ideas that gradually allow them to 
evolve. This freedom he identifies in the homo hellenicus is (to a degree) the freedom of 
(direct) democracy, the freedom to dispute, to call into question given norms and ideas84. 
In my view, this freedom (and knowledge) is best materialised through the ability of every 
anthrōpos to use his/her logos and judgment in order to master his/her own hubris or the 
hubris of others. Hence, anthropocentrism is expressed through the notion eucosmia. 
If the (melioristic)85 friendship of eucosmia is anthropocentric and stands for action 
and if eighteenth-century liberalism has not fully incarnated the classical Greek and the 
Hellenistic anthropocentric weltanschauung, we can assume that liberal leaders (populist 
or otherwise) who remain anchored to the political paradigm shaped by the ‘proto-
anthropocentric’ ideas of certain variants of the Enlightenment lack the eucosmia, that is, 
the faith that the simple κόσμος (cosmos), the ‘common people’, who is a zōon politikon, 
as a zōon lōgon ekhon ‘a living being capable of speech’, in Arendt’s (1998: 27) translation, 
and/or a living being capable of thinking. Thus, the collapse of the People’s Party in 
America can be attributed to the absence of eucosmia on the behalf not simply of its 
populist leadership but of the American republican worldview that  also characterises 
certain aspects of the philosophy of the Founding Fathers (as the first section will stress). 
The persistence of slavery (see the third section) also characterises the absence of eucosmia 
from the American mind. Let us not ignore Jefferson’s ambiguous stance on the institution 
 
84  Let us not neglect (as chapter 2 argued) that Contogeorgis ([Κοντογιώργης] 2006) considers 
not the paradigm of the Greek city-states but the Hellenistic and the Byzantine (cosmopolitan) age 
as more representative examples of anthropocentrism (50-1) precisely due to the supersedure of 
slave labour by free trade.  
85  Eucosmia is melioristic so long as it focuses on the capacities of every anthrōpos to overcome 
his/her proclivity towards hubris through action and self-purification. The existence of this 




of slavery. Initially Jefferson stood for equality by creation (as indicated in the Declaration 
of Independence), which (of course) implies the end of slavery (Kidd 2012: 146; Israel 
2012: 457; 2017: 58). In proposals he submitted to the Virginia legislature (1776) he called 
for the gradual abolition of chattel slavery (Kloppenberg 2016: 403; De Dijn 2020: 194-5), 
which (as he later on complained) had fallen on deaf ears (309). Nonetheless, his finances 
and means of living were utterly dependent on slave labour (Kidd 2012: 131; Israel 2012: 
457; 2019: 282; Breen 2019: 9). During the mid-1780s he began ‘to scale back the broad 
implications of the Declaration’ arguing that blacks and whites are fundamentally different 
races, have different capacities; the latter fit for liberty and the former not (Kidd 2012: 146; 
Israel 2017: 147). 
More to the point, as Chapter 4 mentioned, the men who framed the American 
Constitution had not incorporated the townships, the ‘elementary republics’ (Arendt 1990: 
250), where 'the voice of the whole people would be fairly, fully, and peaceably expressed, 
discussed, and decided by the common reason of all citizens’ (Jefferson 1999: 217). As 
Kloppenberg (2016) points out, the Revolutionary leadership were sceptical of direct 
democracy and open participation. Instead, it saw political representation as the only 
substitute (322-6; 334). Thus, the loss of public happiness due to the absence of eucosmia, 
due to the absence of faith in the ‘common people’ to become constituents, to gain the 
upper hand in the process of political decision-making (action), allowed the forces of the 
private sphere, the spirit of possessive individualism (more precisely), to dominate in the 
American national life (Chapter 4). Thus, Hartz (1955) was not wrong to assume that the 
‘Lockean’ philosophy, namely the philosophy of possessive individualism (see Chapter 3), 
‘dominates American political thought’ like no other political philosophy has ever 
dominated ‘the political thought of a nation’ (140). Let us see, at this stage, how this 
Faustian possessiveness can also tolerate radical forms of hubris, such as slavery. If the 
slave is a parcel of property (Hartz 1955: 170; Breen 2019: 52)86, and if the right to property 
is prioritised over other rights, eucosmia is expelled as long as the slave him/herself instead 
of being treated as a ‘citizen of the republic’ (Breen 2019: 52), as a thinking being, to use 
Locke’s (1978: 188) vocabulary again, or as a zōon politikon, capable of acting, thinking 
 
86  As David Walker, a African American abolitionist, in his Appeal (1830/1993) stresses, ‘[t]hey 




and judging, is considered a thing (in Weil’s terms), a living being destined to obey 
commands, capable only of satisfying his/her own biological needs (labour) as well as 
those of his/her master87. It is time to move ahead, digging deeper into the notion of 
eucosmia and meliorism. Initially, we will examine the French and the American 
revolutions. While the former issues a reminder to be chary of any form of ideological 
optimism (as mentioned earlier), the latter stresses the value of moderation and, 
simultaneously, allows us to establish a clear view concerning the need for eucosmia. 
 
Revolution and leadership: France and the New World (a comparative study) 
1) France: the case of optimistic populism 
As Tocqueville (2011) noted, the French Revolution was the outcome of ‘the 
culmination of a long labor … to which ten generations had contributed’ (Tocqueville 
2011: 27). The so-called ‘“leaders of public opinion”’ (Chartier 2004: 12), the leaders of 
the ‘revolution of the mind’, according to Diderot (Israel 2010: 228; Popkin 2019: 47), an 
all-powerful philosophical aristocracy (the philosophes) (Chartier 2004: 12) carried out the 
political education of the French people, shaping the French ‘temperament and disposition’ 
(Tocqueville 2011: 134). Their work was disseminated in theaters, salons and cabarets by 
literary circles through printed books, pamphlets, almanacs and clandestine literature 
(Chartier 2004: 68; 70; 77). ‘If the French of the late eighteenth century fashioned the 
Revolution, it is because they have in turn been fashioned by books’, claims Chartier (2004: 
68). Through published books and pamphlets the ‘men of letters’ took a leading role in the 
spread of social and cultural trends that caused rapid changes in viewpoints and perceptions 
(Chartier 2004: 11; Israel 2006: 21; 2010: 224) by ‘reworking the principles of morality 
and politics’ (Israel 2014: 924).  To avoid misunderstandings: the philosophes (with 
Rousseau being a notable exception) were not ‘optimists’ (let alone ‘populists’). 
 
87  To avoid misunderstandings: by attributing the justification of slavery in the New World to the 
‘Lockean’ prioritisation of right of property over other rights does not imply that all forms of 
slavery rely on ideologies that exalt and glorify the pathos for possession. For example, as 
Castoriadis ([Καστοριάδης] 2008) has many times stressed, slavery during the Greek antiquity was 
an institution passively accepted as a norm. We find no ancient Greek text offering moral 
justification to slavery (says the same author) apart from Aristotle, who in the Politics argues that 




Nonetheless, aspects of their thought had incorporated elements that contributed to the 
spread of revolutionary ideas predicated upon optimism (as I will explain in what follows). 
First, the ‘men of letters’ drew on Helvétius, Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire, 
Montesquieu, Locke, and other notable thinkers of the Enlightenment (Chartier 2004: 89; 
Israel 2010: 56; 225; 2014: 18-9; 279). These ‘leaders of public opinion’ undermined 
‘religion and government’ by injecting their ideas everywhere ‘via clandestine printed 
literature’ (Israel 2010: 103). They assailed religion and preached equality and secular 
democracy (Israel 2012: 924; Popkin 2019: 368). But even if this gestational period had 
not taken place, even if the philosophes had not contributed in the rapid dissemination of 
political ideas––which the leaders of the Revolution (and more importantly Marat, 
Robespierre, Saint-Just and Brissot) adopted and put into practice––the collapse of the old 
regime was inevitable. Perhaps, it would have not been torn down ‘with such a brutal 
suddenness’ and, instead, ‘would have continued to collapse piece by piece’ (Tocqueville 
2011: 27).  
As it seems, Burke’s (1968) rejection of the French Revolution as a series of tragic 
episodes, where bands ‘of ruffians and assassins’ (164) worked ‘with low instruments and 
for low ends’ (136), and Le Bon’s and Taine’s remarks about ‘[s]ocial outcasts’ (smugglers 
and dealers, prisoners and criminals, the rabble of the cities), about forces that ‘escape 
every kind of social rationality’ (quoted by Laclau 2005: 32) joined the howling mobs, 
resulting in a bloodbath (31; 34; 61), tell only part of the story. The populist orator Jean-
Paul Marat, claims Popkin (2019), the so-called ‘friend of the people’ (260; 301), was not 
an ‘assassin’, a bandit or a smuggler; he ‘was not at all bloodthirsty’ (Kropotkin 1971: 
450); Robespierre was ‘“incorruptible”’ (Scurr 2006: 6) and from his very early 
involvement in politics (55-69) until his final moments in the guillotine (288-325) no 
evidence indicates that he was indeed a madman or a bandit. As studies revealed, extremists 
and political terrorists ‘[i]n spite of this hateful calculus and the brutality of their deeds … 
are rarely coolly calculating agents of hate or mindless’ (Breithaupt 2019: 115). In the same 
way Robespierre is described as a modest looking man (Scurr 2006: 9), with no evidence 
that he was a sadist or a ‘“bloodthirsty charlatan”’ (6). Instead, his main ‘vice’ was his 
passive devotion to a cause inspired by profoundly optimistic philosophical doctrines, and, 




Revolutionary intellectual and literary circles and factions (Israel 2014: 21; Popkin 2019: 
97), disseminated through this powerful intellectual aristocracy during the past few 
decades. As Scurr (2006) stresses, Robespierre was ‘hopelessly utopian’ and ‘politically 
misguided’ (5). He ‘justified the Terror as … a necessary step on the path to the ideal 
society’ (ibid).  
 According to Chartier (2004), Rousseau’s thought ‘provided reading matter’ for 
plebeians, aristocrats’ as well as for members ‘of the commercial middle class, who took 
him for their maître à penser’ (84).   Israel (2014) claims, ‘“every part of the Revolution 
made some claim on the heritage of Rousseau’” (Israel 2014: 20). Mirabeau, like most 
radical Revolutionaries, rejected Montesquieu and celebrated Rousseau for his central role 
in the making of the Revolution (Israel 2012: 932; 2014: 21). In the Pantheon, ‘a secular 
monument to the memory of “great men” who had served the nation’ (Popkin 2019: 228), 
‘Voltaire and Rousseau—were glorified as grands hommes’ (Chartier 2004: 88).  In the 
beginning of the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1754/2004) Rousseau attacks 
Hobbes’s pessimistic theory. As he states, the most natural human sentiment is pity, ‘which 
the most dissolute manners have as yet found it so difficult to extinguish’ (2004: 20). Pity 
and compassion moderate ‘in every individual the activity of self-love’ (21), inciting 
mutual respect (22). ‘[T]he first movements of nature are always right’ and there is ‘no 
original perversity in the human heart’ (Rousseau 2007: 170). In the state of nature, in ‘the 
real youth of the [human] world’ (Rousseau 2004: 33), wants are moderate. Human beings 
do not covet more knowledge than the one required to survive (11) and there is no 
substantial knowledge concerning ‘what is to be good; for it is neither the development of 
the understanding, nor the curb of the law, but the calmness of their passions and their 
ignorance of vice that hinders them from doing ill’ (20). For Rousseau, in the state of nature 
there is only benevolence, reason and free will, claims Macadam (1989: 118). In their 
default position men and women are neither licentious nor virtuous (Rousseau 2004: 18). 
Licentious attitudes, the pathos for unlimited possession—which (for Rousseau) led to 
corruption and, subsequently, to rampant inequality and enslavement—do not ‘arise … 
from innate defects of human nature’ (Israel 2014: 19); instead, they are the real 
consequences of the constant deterioration of this original benevolence; corruption, wars, 




1979: 85; 2004: 27).  
 Human beings in their default position ‘live in peace’, claimed Saint-Just, inspired 
by Rousseau (quoted in Hampson 1983: 254). ‘Man is born for happiness and liberty and 
everywhere he is wretched and enslaved’, to use Robespierre’s words (quoted in Hampson 
1983: 232). Here Robespierre paraphrases Rousseau––while addressing the Convention on 
the constitution (Hampson 1983: 232). For Rousseau (2004), desire has corrupted reason 
and free will. Since human beings have exited the state of nature and joined the state of 
society, selfishness and egocentricity replaced compassion and benevolence (27). The state 
of society ‘is “contrary to the nature of man” and the wisest course is to renounce [it] 
altogether’ (summarised by Israel 2010: 57). In other words, society has forced us to 
neglect ‘that the fruits of the earth belong equally to us all, and the earth itself to nobody’ 
(Rousseau 2004: 27). ‘The example of the savages … seems to confirm that mankind was 
formed ever to remain’ in the state of nature (33). ‘[A]ll ulterior improvements have been 
so many steps, in appearance towards the perfection of individuals, but in fact towards the 
decrepitness of the species’ (ibid). Hence, for Rousseau, lust and self-perfection, which in 
the state of nature remain dormant, are awakened by civilisation, summarises Macadan 
(1989: 118). ‘[V]anity, avarice, envy, ambition, jealousy, shame, contempt, and misery are 
not innate but are characteristic of certain kinds of social relationships’ (116). In Emile or 
On Education (1762/1979), for example, Rousseau states the following: ‘[c]hildren raised 
in clean houses where no spiders are tolerated are afraid of spiders, and this fear often stays 
with them when grown. I have never seen a peasant, man, woman, or child, afraid of 
spiders’ (63).   
At this stage, let us examine how Rousseau’s notion of natural benevolence 
influenced Robespierre, Marat and other leaders). To a degree, Rousseau’s theory set the 
foundations of what Israel repeatedly calls ‘authoritarian populism’ (Israel 2014: 162; 198; 
249; 261; 375; 2019: 259), id est, the process whereby one leader or a group of 
revolutionaries) theologise (in Arato’s terms) the ‘pure’, ‘innocent’ and ‘incorruptible 
common people’, as if they are the only ones who understand what the populace itself 
desires, but go as far as to ‘repress political foes’ (Israel 2014: 217), following the logic of 
the despots whom revolutions aspire to depose (Müller 2016: 28). To avoid 




benevolence has contributed to widespread political violence and despotism, and that such 
an optimistic view of human nature can sometimes play a central part in a variety of highly 
problematic political attitudes (that range from native idealism to political extremism), I 
have no intention to encourage categorical assumptions, that (for instance) Rousseau’s 
natural benevolence will always, and without exception, empower individuals to commit 
political atrocities. Consider, for example, the moderate Girondins, led by Brissot, who 
were also influenced by the ethical philosophy of Rousseau (Hampson 1983: 84; 86-8; De 
Luna 2003: 163; 165), were among ‘the first to envisage tackling economic inequality’. 
Brissot (the leader of the Girondins), championed freedom of expression (Israel 2014: 712),  
condemned black slavery, fought for black liberation (De Luna 2003: 173; 177; Israel 
2017: 108; 134; 147; 150-3), despising antisemitism (De Luna 2003: 169). He ‘attempt[ed] 
to create a fairer society by constitutional, legal, and nonviolent means’ (Israel 2014: 478) 
while insisting on mass education (Israel 2017: 97), following Rousseau’s precepts, that 
‘children were made to read too much’ (Hampson 1983: 88). More importantly, the 
Girondins stood against the terrorism justified and glorified by the Montagnards (by 
Robespierre and Marat, more precisely) (Popkin 2019: 290-1). Nevertheless, their overall 
stance on political violence has not been always clear. Others questioned their loyalty to 
the ideals of Revolution (Kropotkin 1971: 106; 446; Burrows 2014: 857). Brissot was often 
accused of being a revolutionist only in name, an opportunist, a ‘police spy’ (Burrows 
2014: 844) and a royalist collaborator, whose condemnations of political violence were 
simply pretexts in favour of restoring the despotic ancien régime (De Luna 2003: 161-2; 
178). Others assume that such indictments were simply unprovable pretexts invented by 
his rivals (the radical and bloody-minded Montagnards) in order to justify their political 
terrorism against dissidents (181). It could be also that Brissot himself, a passionate 
Rousseauian, was too optimistic or ‘idealistic’ (Burrows 2014: 843) and put too much trust 
in the goodness and benevolence of men and women, id est, in the good intentions of his 
revolutionist compatriots (Robespierre, Dantone and Marat, more precisely), 
underestimating the possible slip of men and women to hubris, conflict and enmity, as well 
as their pathos for domination (at the expense of moderation and common decency)88..  
 
88  On the one hand the Girondins (led by Brissot) voted to send Louis XVI to the guillotine, but 




Like Brissot, Marat, was inspired by Rousseau’s natural benevolence and envisaged 
a quasi ‘primitive society, in which a sound constitution’ would be maintained by the virtù 
of the citizens, claims Hampson (1983: 110). Deviation from this primitive condition 
created the conditions which gradually devoured human beings in luxury, commerce and 
industry, leading to ‘competition, rivalship, or rather enmity’ (Rousseau 2004: 48). Inspired 
by Rousseau, Marat believed that everything in the state of nature was legitimate (including 
cannibalism), claims Hampson (1983: 126) Instead, ‘[s]ociety was the product not of a 
contract but of force’ (ibid). According to Pettit (1997), ‘Rousseau is … responsible for 
having given currency to … a populist view’ (30), an optimistic populist view, 
nevertheless. However, Rousseau himself had unflinchingly rejected populism and direct 
democracy, expressing doubts concerning the intelligence of the ‘common people’, id est, 
of their capacity to judge impartially (Kloppenberg 2016: 208; 232-3). Democracy was 
nothing but a regime appropriate only for angels (226). His followers ignored all these 
reservations and took the natural benevolence of man as a justification for a perfect 
egalitarian democracy, for a society emancipated from every kind of corruption and/or 
absolutist oppression. In fact, as Robespierre argued, the ‘fundamental terms’ of 
Rousseau’s SC were ‘written in heaven’ (Hampson 1983: 140). The SC envisioned a 
society ‘only suitable for gods’ (Camus 200: 81). His followers ‘took at his word and tried 
to establish the divinity of man’ (ibid), re-forming ‘the immortal chain that should link man 
to God … by destroying all the sources of oppression and tyranny’ (Hampson 1983: 141).  
 By considering the concept of the original/ancestral sin a tool of oppression, a 
‘fable’ that cripples human happiness, freedom, and ‘dignity of character’ 
(Wollstonecraft’s 1993: 306-7)89, by subverting  original/ancestral sin itself, considering 
 
Robespierristes, Dantonistes, Hérbersistes and Enragés accused Brissot of opportunism and 
corruption (De Luna 2003: 160) of ‘counterrevolutionary activity’ (178) as well as of treason and 
‘conspiracy’ against the people (De Luna 2003: 177; Israel 2014: 423, 449; 458). The Girondins 
(they asserted) defended ‘“some of the vices of the ancien régime in the new body politic’” (448), 
supporting the rich against the poor (433; 438). They were not as faithful as they should be to the 
cause of the principles of the Revolution. They moved against the dictates of the General Will, 
which (as Rousseau believed), is embodied in the people (I will shed more light on this later on).  . 
89  As the same author continues, ‘[w]e must get entirely clear of all the notions drawn from the 
wild traditions of original sin … on which priests have erected their tremendous structures of 




all human beings benevolent and compassionate as their default position, the French 
Revolutionaries, especially the ‘revolutionary vanguard beneath Robespierre and 
Danton’—which had orchestrated coordinated attacks against Catholicism and the 
Christian religion in general (Israel 2014: 483)—envisaged a society capable of unleashing 
this natural (and almost perfect) benevolence (Hampson 1983: 250; Scurr 2006: 51). By 
drawing on Rousseau, the leaders of the French Revolution pursued ‘the final liquidation 
of the principle of divinity’ (Camus 2000: 83), under the supposition that the world could 
be remodeled in a way that man’s angelic goodness would become a living reality, where 
‘“the tyranny and injustice of men shall have banished from the earth”’ (according to 
Robespierre, quoted by Hampson 1983: 144) and ‘all men would live as brothers’ (263). 
Thus, they ‘turned the revolution into a Second Coming’ (234), striving to establish a 
secular society that would ostensibly resemble the standards of divine perfection, pulling 
‘the Christian heaven down to earth’ (Hartz 1955: 41). 
Second, the idea of original/ancestral sin sin halts the desire for perfection 
(Kloppenberg 2016: 44). According to the Christian weltanschauung, sin refers to the 
inability of living according to God's standards of absolute purity and perfect goodness. 
Due to ‘man’s first disobedience’ (Milton 2004: 10) that led to the invasion of evil into the 
human mind, no individual on Earth can become righteous enough to avoid error and sin 
(The Bible, Ecclesiastes 7:20). In other words, every man and woman is imperfect, 
vulnerable and susceptible to wrongdoing. As, for instance, ‘Christian [Augustinian] 
theologians argue, ‘unless man can be sinless he cannot be perfect’ (Passmore 2000: 17). 
For Calvinists, corruption in men and women is too deep-seated in order to achieve 
perfection (155-7). Of course, a utopian vision can incorporate an awareness of human 
error and imperceptibility. Although the mainstream Christian thought is anchored to the 
idea of original or the ancestral sin, assuming that ‘no human institution can claim to 
embody good’ (Gray 2007: 48), several ‘perfectibilist heresies’ (Passmore 2000: 214) 
(partially mentioned in the previous chapter) sought to put to sleep and mortify the human 
pathos for possession and domination through monasticism and asceticism. Many of these 
heresies, however, through this process instead of striving for terrestrial perfection, aspired 
 
order to ‘“keep us under their yoke”, according to Jean-Baptiste Harmand, who directed church 




towards celestial perfectibility (27), absolute salvation ‘was promised only in the life 
hereafter’ (Gray 2007: 39). But others related individual (psychical/spiritual) perfection to 
social perfection (Passmore 2000: 220). Spiritual knowledge (in their view) is ‘thnatous 
āgan’, to use Aeschylus’s (1992: 72) terms, that is, excessive and capable to allow every 
mortal (human being) to overcome conflict once and for all, making earthly life quite 
similar to heavenly life90. Consider, for example, George Fox (Quakers), for whom human 
beings are corrupt and sinful by nature but, as he believed, can be reborn; they can acquire 
a new nature in order to achieve immaculate perfection (Passmore 2000: 204-7). 
Presumably, the realistic approach of human nature, anchored to the belief in ancestral sin, 
by raising awareness of our natural proclivity towards error, can allow a perception that 
deems utopian aspirations as unrealistic and dangerous to be settled into place more easily 
than Rousseau’s notion of original benevolence (notwithstanding it cannot always 
guarantee rejection of perfectibilism). By ignoring this tragic aspect of human existence, it 
might be concluded, the mind becomes more gullible to seductive utopian world-views, 
which appeal to the pathos for social perfection (discussed in Chapter 2), for the erection 
of a ‘crystal palace’, of a brand new society entirely emancipated from suffering. Consider, 
for example, the Cult of Reason and the worshipping of human intelligence by the 
supporters of the French Revolution; for them reason was simply ‘[t]he image of God 
implanted’ in human nature (Wollstonecraft 1993: 307); reason begun to spread ‘rapidly … 
promising to shelter all mankind’ (ibid). 
The abandonment of original sin and its replacement by the notion of perfect 
goodness, which (for Rousseau) is always corrupted by means of society, could lead us to 
the following assertion: the society organized by the ancien régime is the seed of 
corruption. ‘Influenced by Rousseau’s belief in innate human goodness’, writes Gray 
(2007), the Jacobins believed men and women had become corrupt by the repressive ancien 
régime (36) Consider, Saint-Justs’ assertion, that ‘man [is] naturally good’ and 
‘contemporary political institutions were a denial of men’s true nature’ (mentioned by 
Hampson 1983: 249). He had a settled conviction that French society ‘had been corrupted 
by centuries of unnatural government’ (253). In contrast, a natural society (for Saint-Just) 
 




should be fully egalitarian, free from crime and injustices (250). Robespierre at the Jacobin 
Club explicitly invoked Rousseau, ‘insisting that “only the people are good, just and 
generous,” and “corruption and tyranny are the monopoly of those who hold them in 
disdain”’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 512). ‘“[A]ny institution’” claimed Robespierre ‘“that does 
not postulate that the people is good … is vicious”’ (quoted by Popkin 2019: 332).  As also 
Rousseau (2004) believed, monarchy and/or aristocracy, being arbitrary forms of rule, have 
emerged out of the state of society, where eminent and rich individuals utilise their fame 
and wealth in order to topple the rest (46). To claim, however, that the institutions of the 
ancien régime corrupt and deprive man’s perfect goodness, inevitably allows someone to 
consider the defenders of the aristocracy—and even worse, those who were wrongly 
accused of siding with the aristocracy, as (for instance) the moderate liberal Girondin group 
(Israel 2014: 448)—not simply political opponents whose political objectives that brought 
exploitation and suffering should be called into question, not even ‘conspirators’ and 
‘“traitors”’ who mislead ‘the citoyens’ (453), but also ‘enemies of the human species 
(hostis generis humani) to use Jacobin terminology’ who have to be exterminated through 
brute force (Fine 2014: 220). Supporters of the old order of the ancien régime (real or 
imaginary) were not simply defenders of despotism and enemies of a more equal and fair 
(but imperfect, nevertheless) society, but foes of the human progress towards perfection, 
enemies of the absolute benevolence human beings could unleash, bringing prosperity and 
perfect brotherhood on Earth. For Robespierre, claims Gray (2007), ‘[a] higher form of 
human of human life was within reach – even a higher of human being’, but this required 
purification even by means of extreme violence (37).   
To avoid misunderstandings: by suggesting that the spread and the justification of 
violence is attributed to the ideological optimism of some influential ‘men of letters’ (or of 
the prominent leaders of the French Revolution) should not automatically exhort to neglect 
the contribution of other trends and factors. Consider, for example, the intolerance of a 
great percentage of the French clergy, their continuous efforts to obstruct popular liberal 
reforms (Israel 2010: 25; 2014: 182; Breen 2019: 59) or the ruthlessness of the French 
aristocracy in igniting public discontent, fueling popular resentment. In fact, while ‘one 
million one hundred thousand persons were officially declared to be beggars’ (Kropotkin 




peasants’ toil (Scurr 2006: 56). As Kropotkin (1971) stressed, the misery ‘in the country 
districts went on increasing year by year’ (30) and food scarcity in Paris (as well as in other 
big towns) had reached unbearable levels (149). Church tithes caused mass indignation in 
the countryside (39), where the peasants sought ‘to regain possession of the land and to 
free it from the feudal obligations which burdened it’ (97). In addition, protests were often 
repressed by force, followed by arrests, hangings and torture (Scurr 2006: 29). However, 
the aim of this section is to shed light on the way optimism fueled resentment and mass 
violence. To this we could also add the notion of compassion (or empathy) and the 
phenomenon of pathological confluence. Chapter 2 (see the third part of the third section) 
briefly discussed the process whereby compassion with the poor led to the justification of 
the violence of the latter. More precisely, compassion (or empathy) often ‘feeds into 
resentment’, claims Breithaupt (2019: 55). Extreme emotional identification with the 
victim fuels anger towards the (hypothetical or real) source of injustice and often leads to 
the obstruction of judgment, of the ability for the observer to identify whether the anger of 
the victim (against the predator) must end of not. Thus, the extreme sufferings of the poor, 
of the sans culottes, of the impoverished farmers (as a consequence of the despotism of the 
ancien régime itself) converted the latter into victims of ‘unfair’ or ‘unjust’ rule and, hence, 
into figures of empathy (or compassion) with whom an observer can identify. Thus, 
compassion could be taken as one factor that led to the justification of the violence of the 
poor. This justification was also strengthened by another factor: the optimistic and quasi 
‘millenarian’ according to Gray (2007: 20) trends behind the French Revolution, which 
assumed that men and women (as I have claimed in the previous paragraph), so long as 
they are benevolent by nature, are capable of perfection, of erecting ‘crystal palaces’, of 
transforming social relations in such a way that a perfect new world will be erected. The 
task of such a radical transformation, claims Bianchi (2017), had to be carried out by most 
of the revolutionary projects pushed forward by the Montagnards. In their mind, this brand-
new world of perfect brotherhood the ancien régime had sought to prevent from coming 
into existence while striving to protect and perpetuate its own despotic rule. We could, 
therefore, assert that pathological confluence, which leads to the blind justification of the 
extreme violence of the victim (the poor, in our case) with whom the observer over-




other) due to the impression that behind such major social upheavals, behind this rampant 
violence and ruthlessness there are good intentions and, of course, a promise for a brand 
new just and fair world (optimism).   
Furthermore, ‘[t]he reaction’ writes Kropotkin (1970), ‘was able to destroy … the 
political work of the Revolution; but its economic work’ (430-1), namely the abolition of 
serfdom, royal absolutism, and most of all, the abolition of the feudal rights, the 
redistribution land (Kropotkin 1971: 96; 457; 478 493; 577; Israel 2014: 72; 184; 2019: 
258; 288; Popkin 2019: 154; 156) and the end of Church tithes (Scurr 2006: 92; Popkin 
2019: 156; 187) survived altogether, even when the forces of reaction took the upper hand 
(Kropotkin 1971: 431). It would be more accurate to assume that reaction only gave the 
final blow to the political institutions created by the Revolution; instead the political realm 
was initially destroyed from within. First, it was the centralisation of power to the hands of 
a revolutionary government, it was (in other words) Robespierre himself who during the 
summer of 1793 seized power (Israel 2014: 420-49; 503; 2019: 259), obliterating the 
popular clubs that had been brought forward by the Revolution itself, clubs and public 
spaces within which people could read, talk, listen and make decisions as distinct 
individuals (Arendt 1990: 240-1; Disch 2011: 360-1; Israel 2014: 455; Popkin 2019: 172). 
Robespierre and the Montagnards suspended the Constitution (Israel 2014, p.506; De Dijn 
2020: 238), suppressing dissent (Israel 2010: 232; 2014: 459; 475; 510; 513); ‘By late 
1793, Robespierre wielded increasingly dictatorial power’ (503), striving to eliminate 
every opposition; summary executions of political opponents took place (Israel 2010: 232; 
2014: 503; 511-2). The Brissonites were ‘the Terror’s primary targets’ (Israel 2014: 699). 
In addition, intellectuals were incarcerated (530-1) including Paine, who was living in Paris 
during the height of the Great Terror (Israel 2010: 232; 2014: 535-6; 2019: 272). 
Robespierre's putsch effectively ended the virtually complete freedom of expression 
introduced by the Revolution itself (Israel 2012: 908; 2014: 429; 2019: 272). Second, and 
more importantly: consider again Rousseau’s view that goodness is always corrupted by 
means of society, an assertion effectively leading to the delegitimisation of the ancien 
régime as the source of corruption, of serfdom and mortification; nothing else could come 
out of it; no positive aspirations or meaningful convictions could inspire, tie and preserve 




institutions that had existed up to 1789 was … stigmatized as the ancien régime … with 
the implication that every aspect of the past had been unjust and irrational’ and, therefore, 
deserved to be destroyed, claims Popkin (2919: 155). ‘[T]he term ancien régime’ according 
to the same author, ‘was a powerful weapon that could be wielded against individuals, 
institutions, and even patterns of behavior’ that belonged to pre-1789 France (155). 
Nonetheless, as Chapter 2 argued (see the first section),  tradition (the existence of 
an empirical world) prevents the restless human wonder from approaching the underworld, 
awaking pathos. In the event, wonder becomes absorbed by pathos, anger is converted into 
mēnis and passion for revenge (see the second section of Chapter 2). . If as Nussbaum 
(2013) claimed, ‘institutions themselves embody the insight of emotions’ while ‘laws 
embody the insights of experiences of personal resentment, distilled by reflection and 
extended by sympathy to all’ (135), we could assert that the emotion of hatred, the feeling 
of resentment and the pathos for revenge (mēnis) unleashed by the Revolution, were 
embodied in the institutions and laws of the new regime. Thus, mēnis invaded the structures 
of the new regime and found representation in Robespierre’s rule (I will shed more light 
on this later on). Eventually, the political realm was initially eroded from within, from the 
Revolution itself.  
Finally, let us take into account Rousseau’s (1994) general will, ‘so widespread in 
eighteenth-century French political thought’ (Popkin 2019: 163). The general will is the 
expression of ‘what is best for all’ (Hampson 1983: 32); it is always for the common good 
(Rousseau 1994: 8); it ‘is always in the right’ (66) those who follow it never err (Hampson 
1983: 187). Hence, an ideal commonwealth is the one whose Sovereign conforms with the 
general will (63), which puts ‘the general interest ahead’ of every particular individual 
above all selfish desires (Popkin 2019: 54)91. Nonetheless, Rousseau (1994) was clear from 
 
91  In that sense, the general will is closer to my definition of common decency. As, however, 
Rousseau (1994) points out, when ‘the general will no longer the will of all … contradiction and 
argument arise, and the best opinion is not accepted without dispute’ (135). In contrast, for the vita 
civile contradiction and argument (logos) and experience is necessary for common decency, which 
is not always not to us a-priori. Rousseau’s General Will does not derive from dialogue and 
consultation. Hence, Israel’s assertion that the General Will per se could justify extreme 
particularism and intolerance (Israel 2012: 633), maximising collective instincts ‘for group 




the beginning: the general will ‘cannot be represented’ (127). Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès 
‘called this “an unfortunate phrase” and asked “why not”?’ (Israel 2012: 644). To take the 
optimistic belief in human benevolence and perfectibility for granted, to replace 
original/ancestral sin with Original Harmony, is to acknowledge the General Will as being 
embodied in ‘the people’; it requires, however, the appropriate conditions to set up 
institutions within which it will be unleashed92. If the General Will makes no error, and if 
the General Will itself is embodied in ‘the people’, represented by one the leader, the latter 
could easily end up ‘theologised’. Those who attempt to despise the leader are immediately 
deemed traitors to the nation (Müller 2016: 57), who should be led not by Reason but by 
terror (according to Robespierre, quoted by Hampson 1983: 238). By ‘invoking the 
nation’s general will’ he effectively ‘silence[d] everyone he declared counterrevolutionary 
and tied to aristocratic plots’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 708), in short, everyone who attempted 
to call into question his goals and aspirations.  
Of course, the French Revolution should not be only seen through the year-long 
period of Robespierre’s authoritarian populism. Earlier I mentioned the abolition of 
serfdom, the expansion of freedom of speech, in short, the spread of some proto-
anthropocentric values carried out by the Revolution itself. Let us not ignore that ‘in the 
midst of the French Revolution’ the ‘common (French) people’ went on to experiment with 
direct democracy, and (consequently) ‘one of the earliest nationwide referendums, in 1793’ 
took place, ‘when over 90 percent of French voters approved a new republican constitution 
(Matsusaka 2020: 82). Notice also how in Kropotkin’s (1971) writings  the ‘common 
Frenchmen and women’ who supported the revolution were not presented as a bloodthirsty 
mob and were not particularly keen for Robespierre’s and Marat’s ideological optimism. 
They seemed be relatively moderate in their aspirations. They set out to defeat despotism 
in the name justice (not, however, of some ‘perfect justice’) and were not hostile to religion 
per se, (ibid). It goes without saying that the anti-Christian zeal of the Montagnards and 
the Hérbersistes (to a degree) found justification by sections of the French populace, given 
the way the Catholic Church was deeply embedded into (hence complicit with) the socio-
 
92  For the vita civile, instead, common decency is not embodied in the people; it is not an inherited 
temperamental trait. It is acquired through knowledge, through deliberate acts that enhance 




economic, political and ideological structure of the illiberal Old Regime. However, 
according to Kropotkin’s (1971) view, the populace was more ‘inclined to free thought’ 
than to atheism or to some secular religion (like The Cult of Reason or the Cult of the 
Supreme Being) and the masses ‘by no means disliked the Catholic form of religion’ as 
such (7). ‘What they detested most was the Church’ as an institution (ibid). As also Israel 
(2014) confirms, the majority of the French condemned Robespierre’s authoritarian 
populism (Israel 2014: 452-3; 505) and opposed the policies of dechristianisation (497) 
carried out (mainly) by the Hérbersistes (Israel 2014: 497)93. Hence, during the events of 
1793 it was the ‘common Frenchmen and Frenchwomen’ who understood the need for 
prudence and moderation. Consider, finally, Disch’s (2011) critique on Arendt, accused of 
neglecting the way the Girondins supported ‘critical discourse – the “dialogic method” 
together with “polite conversation” and epistolary exchange’ (361). As opposed to those 
who accuse Brissot of suppressing the popular councils, for being exclusively a defender 
of ‘modern representative democracy’ (rather than a classical republican) (Israel 2014: 
478), for Disch (2011) the Girondins ‘turned to political representation’ only in order to 
strengthen ‘popular empowerment’ and not for the purpose of thwarting it ‘just as Arendt 
maintained it should be’ (366). Brissot designed a pyramidal federal government assigning 
to the revolutionary assemblies the primary role in legislating, then ‘moving to the 
Communal Assembly (a legislative body of three hundred)’ and finally ‘to the Town 
Council, a subset of the Assembly that would exercise executive power’ (362). The 
revolutionary assemblies could ‘supervise and comment’ on the policies of the Assembly, 
‘debat[ing] freely any concerns’ (363). It could be also argued that Brissot, from his long 
stay in north America (Israel 2017: 74-6), was inspired by the quasi moderate and relatively 
 
93  Robespierre and Saint-Just opposed the radical dechristianization of France (Israel 2014: 498; 
Popkin 2019: 383) as ‘ill-advised and wrongly conceived in principle’ (Israel 2014: 498). Clearly 
inspired by ‘Rousseau’s concept of civil religion that could bind society together’, he repudiated 
both the ‘fanatisme (fanaticism) of radical atheists’ as well as the ‘“priest-made religions”’ (Popkin 
2019: 404). A ‘true disciple of Rousseau’, Robespierre saw religion as ‘the pedestal of the social 
contract’ (Israel 2014: 498). As an antidote he proposed the secular religion of the Cult of the 
Supreme Being who ‘watches over oppressed innocence and punishes crime’ (499), who punishes 
‘“tyrants and traitors”’ assisting ‘“the unfortunate”’ and defends ‘“the oppressed”’ (Popkin 2019: 
404). His main aim was to invent a secular religion in accordance with the Rousseauian notion of 




more melioristic weltanschauung of the American Founders  (at least in comparison to that 
of Robespierre, Saint Just and Marat). Let us shed more light on the moderate 
republicanism of the American Revolution.    
2) Meliorism, moderation; active citizenship and proto-anthropocentric liberalism  
In the political realm, claims Arendt (1998), each person can ‘distinguish himself 
from all others’, demonstrating his/her ‘unique deeds or achievements’ (41). A democratic 
system, to put it another way, allows the people to freely ‘express their views on any 
problem of public life’ (Weil 2013: 10). This freedom inspired the leaders of the American 
Revolution, who ‘remained men of action from beginning to end, from the Declaration to 
the framing of the Constitution’ (Arendt 1990: 95). According to Wood (2003), the local 
committees and popular governments that begun to spread in the New World (as a response 
to the Parliament’s Coercive Acts of 1774) called for bottom up new political organization 
(47) and spoke in the name of the ‘common people’ (49), advocating the expansion of 
participation and control ‘of the elective assemblies’ (50). Hence, the revolutionary slogan 
‘all power springs from the people’ became synonymous with political power (in the 
Arendtian sense of the term) ‘embodied in all institutions of self-governance throughout 
the country’ (Arendt 1990: 167). Let us discuss further this particular understanding of 
(political) power.   
According to the dominant political perception shaped in the New World during 
the pre-Revolutionary age, power is not synonymous with physical force but with the 
monstrous passion to dominate over others (Bailyn 1976: 56). For the Americans, power 
was compared to a ‘great river’ capable of bringing destruction when ‘it overflows its 
banks’ (57, ff.3). Power was the gravest enemy of liberty (58). In turn, liberty was 
associated with the ‘“natural power of doing or not doing whatever we have a mind” so 
long as that doing was “consistent with the rules of virtue and the established laws of the 
society which we belong”’ (77). This (natural) power was an indication of acting according 
‘to the laws which are made and enacted by the consent of the PEOPLE’ (77). As Arendt 
(1990) explained, ‘only “power arrests power”’ destroying it, without putting impotence in 
the place of power’ (151). Liberty was, therefore, this (natural or good) power which 
‘arrests’ the monstrous power, the power of absolutism and oppression. An important note: 




government based on a minimum of popular consent. Instead, it points to ‘continuous 
consent’ (Bailyn 1976: 173), which presupposes public judgment, that is, active popular 
approbation of disapproval of public measures (imposed by a central government). This 
procedure involves continuous dissent, namely, constant discussion, disagreement and 
exchange of ideas. As Arendt (1969a) put it, the most ‘extreme form of [the good] power 
is All against One’ and the most extreme form of violence ‘is One against All’ (42). The 
monopolisation of power by a small caste of experts, representatives or even monarchs and 
princes is, in fact, a form of violence (Arendt 1990: 151); it points to the monstrous power 
as opposed to the ‘good’ and ‘natural’ power, the power of liberty that springs from ‘the 
people’ who join forces (B. J. Smith 1985: 256), belongs to the same ‘people’ and remains 
in existence only so long as the same ‘people’ (as a group) keeps together (Arendt 1969a: 
44).  
In other words, the ‘good power’ springs from the political realm and remains in 
existence so long the political realm remains potent. It is the power of active citizenship, 
of ‘the human ability not just to act but to act in concert’ (ibid), widely practiced in the 
New World before and during the Revolution. In that sense, when the Americans 
revolutionaries spoke about liberty they indirectly conveyed not just ‘liberation’ but 
freedom. Government limited by (minimal and passive) consent, does not involve direct 
participation, as Chapter 3 explained. Minimal consent points to the legitimised power of 
‘few’, in short, to the legitimisation of their violence against the ‘many’ (Arendt 1990: 
151). Passive consent refers to legal frameworks that effectively prevent this ‘legitimised 
violence’ of representative governments to become arbitrary, inasmuch as property and 
individual liberty are never trespassed. Active (and continuous) consent, as we have seen, 
is synonymous with popular approbation through deliberative means (logos and dissent).    
The democratic republicanism of the American revolutionaries, according to Disch 
(2011), was both representative and participatory (352): each political representative had 
to maintain close connections with his local electors, with the ‘common people’ (in other 
words) (Wood 2003: 41). In addition, representatives should be residents of the localities 
and the people (of the localities) have the right to instruct them (ibid). This increased public 
scrutiny and, potentially, the chances for impeachment. Hence, the power of the 




(good) power of ‘continuous consent’ (Bailyn’s 1976: 173). But the American 
revolutionaries, instead of firmly anchoring themselves to the Lockean idea of consent94, 
accountability and limited government, went one step further: the ‘common people’ (they 
believed) should enjoy sufficient levels of autonomy in the process of decision making 
(Bailyn 1976: 173; Gustafson 2011: 45). They should have the freedom and the power to 
create their own laws, ‘step by step and point by point … acting in the conduct of public 
affairs’ (Bailyn 1976: 173). Consequently, power became synonymous with deliberative 
processes, in short, with action and freedom (not just with liberty)95. The driving force 
behind the Revolution, claims Breen (2019), was the idea that ‘ordinary Americans’ could 
‘negotiate power with other ordinary Americans, people who insisted that they were as 
good as any other member of civil society’ (13). In contrast, the leaders of the French 
Revolution conflated power with force: when Robespierre, the ‘friend of the common 
people’ (Popkin 2019: 322), insisted that all power derives from the citoyen, he confused 
power with some ‘“natural” force’ which ‘in its very violence had been released by the 
revolution and like a hurricane had swept away all institutions of the ancien régime’ 
(Arendt 1990: 181). But in the New World, by making power synonymous with action, the 
‘common people’, the citizens, set up political associations, constituent bodies, federated 
units, the so called ‘elementary republics’, independent from the higher orders. Within 
these bodies, they could act as distinct individuals, by shaping public opinions and by 
making public judgments (Arendt 1990: 267; Disch 2011: 352). As Gustafson (2011) 
claims, during the Revolution, deliberative bodies were set up in the State House of 
Massachusetts, where the Congress opened ‘many of its proceedings soon after it was 
founded’, drawing large audiences in debates before the Supreme Court (21-2). The spread 
of such deliberative bodies, accessible by everyone, men, women as well as foreign 
visitors, transformed the chamber floor of the Capitol Hall ‘into a unique type of stage 
where real-life political dramas were enacted’ (Gustafson 2011: 22). Finally, ‘[t]hose who 
 
94  The idea of government limited by laws had been disseminated to Americans through Locke’s 
writings, writes Miller (1959: 170). The Americans took Locke’s ideas presented in the Second 
Treatise (through which Locke himself sought to justify the English Revolution, glorifying the 
supremacy of the Parliament against the Crown), and applied this doctrine to the dispute between 
Britain and the colonies (ibid). 




received the power to constitute, to frame constitutions’, writes Arendt (1990), ‘were duly 
elected delegates of constituted bodies and ‘received their authority from below’ (166).  
Let us return, at this stage, to the assertion concerning power as being partially 
synonymous with aggressiveness (according to the pre-Revolutionary Anglo-American 
school of thought, power). Although power was the primary cause of evil (Bailyn 1976: 
58), it was not the nature of power itself as much as ‘the nature of man––his susceptibility 
to corruption and his lust for self-aggrandizement’ what turns ‘power into a malignant 
force’ (59; emphasis added). As we see, Anglo-American republicanism in comparison to 
French republicanism, seems much less optimistic and more moderate in character. Even 
Jefferson (1999), located in the most optimistic wing of the American revolutionary 
thought, who at times blindly bestows faith in the moral capacities of human beings to 
expel all injustices from the Earth (590), stressing at the same time that man’s natural 
harmony and benevolence would constitute governmental authority and coercion 
superfluous (Wood 2003: 95; 105-6), elsewhere questions the overt enthusiasm of those 
who believe in the endless advancement of the human condition, which (in their view) 
could one day approach the state of absolute perfection, inasmuch as there will ‘no longer 
be pain or vice in the world’ (Jefferson 1999: 293). In the wake of the havoc caused by the 
French Revolution he explicitly admitted ‘that the people are capable of horrible excesses’ 
(Kloppenberg 2016: 7). But on the other hand, he always remained faithful to the 
unshakable belief in ‘improvement’ on all matters of ‘government and religion’ (Jefferson 
1999: 293). As Arendt (1990) observed, the idea that the American political thought of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century developed an insight premised on ‘the perfectibility of 
man’ rests on a series of grave misunderstandings (174). John Adams’s ‘commitment to 
popular sovereignty’, according to Kloppenberg (2016), was accompanied by a steadfast 
‘awareness of human fallibility’ (385). This, to a degree, is owed to the persistence of 
Protestant Christianity, which rendered American political thought relatively immune to 
the extravagances of optimism. According to Bailyn (1976), the American Revolutionary 
movement ‘is comprehensible only in terms of the continuing [Christian] belief in original 
sin and the need for grace’ (vii; emphasis added). The American revolutionaries, writes 
Hartz (1955), were not ‘secular prophets like Robespierre’ (39); they had rejected the idea 




revealed to be an angel’ (Arendt 1990: 95). 
On the other hand, by refuting Arendt’s (as well as Kloppenberg’s) interpretations, 
Israel (2017: 15-6) sees the American Revolution as a secular event, hostile to religion and 
spirituality. Israel’s deep appreciation for Spinoza is evident in his Radical Enlightenment 
(2006) as well as in the Democratic Enlightenment (2012). The author acknowledges 
Spinoza’s secularism as the basis of the entire European Enlightenment project. In the 
Revolutionary Ideas (2014), in The Expanding Blaze (2017) as well as in The 
Enlightenment That Failed (2019)—works constantly cited in this chapter—he interprets 
major historical events (including the French and the American Revolution) from this 
highly secular point of view; at times, he neglects the positive contribution of religion (as 
I will reveal in what follows). As he explains, the revolution weakened ecclesiastical 
authority and challenged obsolete science, rooted in scholasticism and Platonism (1; 9; 71); 
it ended ecclesiastical supervision in education (95) and grounded the Republic’s 
constitutional laws on reason and philosophy (70). Jefferson, more importantly, curtailed 
theology and replaced the latter with a system based on science and republican principles 
(99). His aim was to secure freedom of religion (86) and to protect personal liberty, 
particularly from the ‘enforced Sunday observance’ (89). Furthermore, the American 
Constitution was finalised without making references to God, separating church and state 
and disempowering ‘the religious test or oath for holding office in the government of the 
United States’ (85). However, Israel’s heavy emphasis on the secular aspect of the 
American Revolution downplays the religious influences behind the philosophy that led to 
the uprising of 1776. According to Kidd (2012), in the New World religion played a pivotal 
role in precipitating a revolutionary spirit, supplying spiritual propulsions to the Patriot 
movement (59; 94). Furthermore, as the Declaration writes, human beings ‘are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’ (US 1776; emphasis added). Consider 
also James Madison’s thought which, as Kloppenberg (2016) points out, ‘saw no 
contradiction between reason and religion’ (377); as Madison asserted in his Memorial, 
‘“[b]efore any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered 
as a subject of the Governor of the Universe”’ (quoted by Kloppenberg 2016: 378).  
Eventually, the main objective of the American Revolutionaries was not the 




to prevent a potential slip towards theocracy, protecting the political realm from the 
usurping tendencies and influences of a number of Christian churches and organisations. 
In other words, they only sought to erect barriers against a possible return to religious 
absolutism (or theocracy). As Nash-Marshall (2003) explained, theocratic regimes violate 
the basic principles of Christian morality (47). Simply put, theocracy is a form of arbitrary 
rule and requires absolute obedience to worldly kings. Hence, it constitutes a form of 
transgression (see Chapter 2). More importantly, theocratic regimes indirectly assume that 
human beings can obtain the omniscience that would allow them to set up commonwealths 
in absolute consistency with God’s will, in short with the standards of some (divine) 
perfection (46-7). Thus, theocracy goes against the most central point of the Christian 
world-view, that sin, error, frailty and vulnerability are essential aspects of human nature, 
constituting earthly perfection unattainable. Furthermore, if theocracy is sacrilegious (47), 
contrary to genuine Christianity, we can assert that the secular reforms of the Revolutionary 
leadership and their willingness to curb the influence of certain religious institutions in 
politics, protected the Christian religion itself from becoming a means of political 
expropriation, serving particular interests.  
While the French sought to replace Christianity with the Cult of Reason, in the New 
World the ‘proportion of Americans claiming to be members of a church … rose steadily 
after independence’ (Kaufmann 2010: 9). Great Awakenings, taking place during 1725-50 
and 1800-1840 played a crucial role (ibid). They brought forward new forms of spirituality, 
which (along with classical liberalism and republicanism) contributed to the expansion of 
religious freedom, breaking up inflexible belief structures and developed new egalitarian 
models of church community (Gustafson 2011: 88-9; Kidd 2012: 33; 39). The American 
Revolutionaries did not strive to de-Christianise the populace as their French 
counterparts—and more importantly the Hérbersistes (Israel 2014: 497)—did by uprooting 
religious traditions with zeal and ‘fanaticism’, suppressing freedom of worship (Popkin 
2019: 367), attacking and destroying churches, even by means of group vandalism (Israel 
2014: 485-492; 495), or by inventing secular religions (as substitutes to Christianity). Of 
course, in the New World (unlike in France) neither the Catholic Church nor the Protestant 
and Anglican churches had ever acquired the upper hand in most aspects of  political and 




(and ideologically justify) the hatred towards Christianity in general their French 
counterparts would have espoused a few decades later. The views of the American 
Founding Fathers were not as ‘anti-theological … and anti-Christian’ as Israel (2019: 268) 
believed. ‘[T]heir thinking was not secular’ (Breen 2019: 55). To a degree, they were 
themselves unorthodox, undogmatic and probably non-denominational Christians/deists 
(Kloppenberg 2016: 16). They had ‘adopted what were regarded at the time as 
enlightened … views on religion’ (Breen 2019: 55) and refused to embrace the ‘unlimited 
humanism’ of the French Enlightenment (Hartz 1955: 39). Benjamin Franklin, for instance, 
valued reverence and humility: ‘[t]o Franklin humility meant trying to “follow Jesus and 
Socrates,”’ but not in a literal sense, id est, towards ‘sacrificial death’, writes Kloppenberg 
(2016: 258), while making references to his Autobiography.  Instead, he refers to Christ’s 
ability of daring greatly, in Brown’s (2012) terms, to his courage of standing up for truth 
and justice. John Adams’s speeches in support of popular government make constant 
references to the ‘“indefeasible laws of God and nature’” (Kloppenberg 2016: 292). For 
Adams, ‘atheism was incompatible with popular government’ (471). In addition, ‘[t]he 
laws of nations’ he believed, are ‘grounded in God’s will [and they] authorize people to 
defend themselves against tyranny’ (304).  Jefferson, who had strong reservations about 
Christianity and rejected the divinity of Christ, the miracles of the Bible and the Holy 
Trinity, kept these beliefs to himself (Kidd 2012: 233). His supporters defended his 
religious convictions, assuming that Jefferson was ‘the candidate of religious freedom and 
was not an enemy to religious establishments’ or to Christianity generally (237). In fact, 
Jefferson (1999) viewed Christianity as ‘the most sublime and benevolent, but most 
perverted system that ever shone on man’ (Jefferson 1999: 571). Although he had never 
invoked Jesus publicly, his constant references to God signals ‘the religious sensibility he 
shared with those who would read the Declaration and embrace it’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 
339). As Arendt (1990) claims, the American Founding Fathers could afford to ignore ‘the 
French revolutionary proposition … that man is good outside society, in some fictitious 
original state’ and remained faithful to the Christian belief that all human collectivities are 
‘composed of “sinners”’ (174)96. As a matter of fact, John Adams ‘never had an optimistic 
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view of human nature’, claims Wood (2017). But instead of retreating to absolutism, 
justifying arbitrary rule under the pretext of security from the threats of rapacity incited by 
the so-called ‘sinful’ nature of man, the American revolutionaries, echoing Paine and 
Milton, considered absolutism and centralisation the most vivid manifestations of  original 
sin (Kidd 2012: 7). Their rejection of the idea of human perfectibility had not halted their 
belief in ‘improvement, and most of all, in matters of government and religion’ since ‘the 
diffusion of knowledge among the people is to be the instrument by which it is to be 
effected’, to use Jefferson’s (1999: 293) words. As Miller (1959) claims, the American 
Revolutionaries rebelled against mercantilism, established churches and all the heavy 
goods of European absolutism (xvii), which in Paine’s major works are constantly despised 
as demonic and treacherous. Consider, for example, his iconoclastic pamphlet Common 
Sense (1775/1995), one of the most influential treatises of the entire revolutionary era 
(Bailyn 1976: 286; Wood 2003: 55; Israel 2012: 471; 2017: 47-50; 2019: 260; 264; 
Kloppenberg 2015: 321) and the ‘hottest blast of patriot propaganda’ (Miller 1959: 468). 
In this work, as well as in The Letter Addressed to the Addressers on the Late Proclamation 
(1792/1995), Paine makes references to I Samuel 8 and 9, where God orders from the 
Israelites to distrust kings for being envious, abusive and self-interested.  
Apart from Paine’s revolutionary pamphlets so intensively quoted today, more 
influential was the role of a number of American priests in broadcasting political discourses 
that justified popular government on biblical grounds (Breen 2019: 59-60; 72-3). Their 
calls for armed rebellion against Britain echoed the stories of the Old Testament, which 
spoke a language the ordinary American could understand (14; 71). The clergy achieved 
to transform ‘words into action’ by equating political passivity with sin’ (84). In their mind, 
the Americans were ‘in a real sense modern Jews’, struggling not against Pharaoh's 
bondage, but against the bondage of political absolutism (74). As mentioned earlier, 
absolutism (according to the Christian-republican weltanschauung) is a form of 
transgression since God alone is the only king humans are allowed to obey (Kidd 2012: 
88). ‘Evangelicals and Patriots both went over the heads of leaders to the people 
themselves, exhorting them to obey God and not men’ (77). Just as Jefferson and Adams, 
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they shared Paine’s views, essentially his desire for independence from Britain, but at the 
same time rejected his optimistic view of human nature (Bailyn 1976: 5;) as well as his 
‘post-millenialist belief that the world could be transfigured by human action as an 
Enlightenment faith in progress’ and that ‘a divine being could be demonstrated by the use 
of reason’ (Gray 2007: 153). Adams, more precisely, ‘deplored Paine’s excessive optimism 
and recalled this, writing to Jefferson in 1815’ (Israel 2017: 21). Eventually, Wood’s 
(2003) assertion that most American Revolutionaries believed in some natural virtue that 
makes human beings ‘ideally suited for republican government’ (95) rests on a series of 
misunderstandings. As we see, in the philosophical foundations of the movement lies the 
melioristic belief that human beings can escape the pitfalls of pathos by means of 
citizenship and active membership in public life. In the New World, writes Arendt (1990), 
prior to the nineteenth century, optimistic doctrines that speak about man’s natural 
goodness as a pretext for political action were considerably unpopular (174). In contrast, 
the dominant republican idea revolved around the necessity of ‘checking human nature in 
its singularity by virtue of common bonds and mutual promises’ (175). 
As it has been already stressed in chapters 1 and 4, the success of the Revolution 
was undermined by the same actors (the Founders of the American republic) who emerged 
from these spaces of public deliberation and framed the first American Constitution. 
According to Arendt (1990), the Constitution gave no formal recognition to the townships 
and the town-halls (the political realms); ‘[t]he political importance of the township was 
never grasped by the founders’ (235), for whom direct political action was deemed 
impractical and unworkable. The parliament (they believed) could not host large numbers 
of citizens and, hence, all political decisions should be taken by elected representatives 
(236; 241). Paine and Adams, favoured the appointment of the decision-making to a group 
of elected representatives as the only solution to the constant expansion of American people 
(Kloppenberg 2016: 320; 324; 332; 390, 510; Israel 2017: 22). The representative assembly 
‘“should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large”’ said Adams (quoted by 
Kloppenberg 2016: 326) and the public voice should be expressed through the 
representatives of the people, who in Madison’s (2007) view, are more reliable for the 
public good than the populace itself (272). For Madison democracy should be confined to 




turbulence and contention … and they have been as short in their lives, as they have been 
violent in their deaths’ (408). In the same way, Hamilton considered direct participation a 
ticket to ‘“error and instability”’ (Kloppenberg 2016: 334). In response, Madison (1993) 
proposed ‘[a] republic … in which the scheme of representation takes place’ (408). 
Madison’s (2007), remedy for the overcoming of factions, conflicts and malfunctions of 
the state government was the appointment of one body of chosen (elected) citizens, ‘whose 
wisdom may best discern the true interest of the country, and whose patriotism and love of 
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations’ (672).  
As with Rousseau (1994), ‘[t]he people of England believes itself to be free; it is 
quite wrong: it is free only during the elections of Members of Parliament. Once they are 
elected, the people is enslaved, it is nothing’ (127). If we interpret this axiom from an 
Arendtian standpoint, we arrive at the following conclusion: the people of England are free 
only during the day of the elections, only when they become active citizens, bestowing to 
themselves the responsibility of making decisions by exercising judgment while having to 
choose who among the available representatives should be put in the highest position of 
power. Thus, action and freedom are interconnected and interrelated, when action 
disappears, slavery returns. Representation, claimed Rousseau (1994), ‘came from 
feudalism, that unjust and absurd form of government which degrades the human race and 
under which the name of man was dishonourable’ (127). In my terms, representation 
without active citizenship deprives and dishonours the worth and dignity of man. Hence, it 
undermines eucosmia, so long as it undervalues the ability of every individual to act for 
the common good in the political realm, making positive contributions through logos and 
memory, through experience and virtù (resilience, courage and radical persistence). It 
could be, therefore, argued that the shift towards centralisation and representation, as 
opposed to direct participation, halted the spread of anthropocentric ideas, and (for that 
reason) the American Revolution remained anchored to the proto-anthropocentric 
worldview (e.g., limited government, free elections, the rule of law and freedom of speech) 
that variants of the Anglo-American seventeenth and eighteenth-century liberal (mainly 
Lockean) philosophy projected as an antidote to the barbarity of absolutism. 
Furthermore, following Wood’s interpretations, Disch (2011) considers the process 




the new state constitutions had granted their legislatures’ (356). The Federalists (Madison, 
Hamilton, et al.), used a popular language in order ‘to curb the populist forces the 
Revolution had released’ (Wood 2003: 163) and demanded each single state to conform to 
the standards of the national (federal) government (159). In their view, centralisation was 
not a move that would devour popular sovereignty, claims Arendt (1990). Sovereignty, 
they believed, would have remained with the people; representation was only ‘a temporary 
and limited agency of the people … a short-term, always recallable loan’ (161). While the 
American Founders, drawing on Roman republican ideas, called on the people to remain 
the only constituent sovereign (Canovan 2005: 28), the Federalists insisted on withdrawal 
of the people from the political realm; they defined the people exclusively as voters, whose 
power was ought to be expressed through its elected representatives (Pocock 1975: 517; 
Canovan 2005: 28-9). In fact, the Federalists ‘had no wish to extend the reach of popular 
participation in political life’ (Israel 2017: 79); their main aim was to allow the existing 
political elites to maintain control (ibid). Hence, the initial formula ‘“government of the 
people by the people” was replaced by the formula: ‘“government of the people by an elite 
sprung from the people”’ (Arendt 1990: 277), or even by an elite supposedly springing 
from the people. As Israel (2017) explains, the pressure for a strong central government, 
for banking and trade regulation, ‘had by 1787 become intense’ (79), the year when the 
Federal Constitution was created (73). Reactions to the dominance of the banking system 
and to the idea of centralisation and representation (as opposed to participation), has always 
been at the heartland of populism in US politics, claims Taggart (2002: 25), in his 
examination of the rise and fall of the People’s Party. In the next section the American 
populist movement (which sought to promote anthropocentric ideas, that is, political and 
economic participation, rather than limited government) and the role of the People’s Party 
will be further explored.  
American populism: the democratic promise and the «εν δήμω δομημένη  
οικονομία»97.  
The cooperative movement was ‘until the civil rights movement five decades later, 
the most significant democratic movement in American history’ (Clanton 1991: xiv). Ιn 
 




response to humiliation due to economic depression, internal migration and resettlement 
(Goodwyn 1976: 25-30; Canovan 1981: 18; Taggart 2002: 6; 25) the farmers, the ‘plain 
people’, ‘[t]he American sansculottes’ in Postel’s (2007: 65) terms, set up ‘their 
cooperative commonwealth, in their “joint notion of the brotherhood,” in their mass 
encampments, their rallies, their long wagon trains, their meals for thousands…’ 
(Goodwyn 1976: 543). ‘Throughout the South and West’, claims Clanton (1991), ‘farm 
families traveled miles and miles over primitive roads on horseback and in wagons and 
buggies to hear and practice the Gospel of Populism’ (166). Their deep disdain towards 
large corporations turned them against the Democratic Party, which (in their own eyes) had 
been taken over by industrial capitalists, serving the interests of railroad corporations (69; 
178). During the early 1870s and on, ‘farmers and their allies’, writes Clanton (1991), came 
together ‘in hundreds of local organizations to talk about the situation they confronted’, 
formulating also ‘demands and strategy’ (14). Thus, ‘a united community was created, and 
ferment escalated into what has been aptly called a movement culture’ (ibid), which begun 
to spread across the South and the West, demonstrating how people ‘of a society containing 
a number of democratic forms could labor in pursuit of freedom’ generating their ‘own 
culture of democratic aspiration’ (Goodwyn 1976: 542). The Farmers’ Alliance federation 
and its grassroots sub-alliances, which ‘rapidly emerged as an organizational power 
stretching from coast to coast’ (Postel 2007: 13) brought hundreds of thousands of rural 
men and women together. Alliance-men and Alliance-women invoked Jackson’s 
opposition to industrialisation, modernisation, favouritism, centralisation and large 
property ownership, which turned into a financial monopoly, corrupted democracy, 
destroyed political equality and suppressed civil freedoms (Goodwyn 1976: 373; 382; 386; 
414; Canovan 1981: 48).  As the Populist orator Mary Lease spoke in the Kansas City Star, 
‘“Wall Street owns the country … It is no longer a government of the people, for the people, 
by the people, but a government of Wall Street, for Wall Street, and by Wall Street. The 
great common people … are slaves, and monopoly is master’ (quoted by Clanton 1991: 
44).   
By establishing systems that could guarantee financial self-reliance and self-
management (of their own products and lives) and by owning cooperatively their means of 




Southern states’ (Taggart 2002: 31) and was dominated by the influence of a ‘self-
interested banking community’ (Goodwyn 1976: 563). The lien system allowed farmers to 
‘purchase the means of their living even in hard times’ and to ‘produce cotton by the stores 
who would give them credit based on the promise of the next year’s harvest’ (Taggart 2002: 
31), and to set up a large scale cooperative economy («εν δήμω δομημένη») rooted in the 
efforts of the ‘common people’98. Instead of suffering in isolation, the farmers worked 
together in a shared hope (Goodwyn 1976: 195). ‘Perhaps this, at root, was what Populism 
was’ (ibid), an aide-mémoire that the actual conditions for for political and economic 
justice (common decency) are extant, but in order to become fully accomplished, persistent 
common efforts are necessary. ‘Never before’, writes Clanton (1991), ‘had ordinary people 
been so involved in politics’ (41), in nonviolent direct action, standing up to their creditors 
who controlled the market and the nation’s credit and currency (Goodwyn 1976: xvii; 29; 
46; 90; 208; Canovan 1981: 25; Taggart 2002: 27). The pauperised farmers, from helpless, 
excluded and abandoned people became protagonists in economic and political life 
(Goodwyn 1976: 74; 135; Canovan 1981: 50), setting up public spaces (narrative action) 
and networks of education, networks of internal communication (Goodwyn 1976: 50), with 
theoreticians, lecturers, scientists, educators, economists, mechanics, artists and 
agriculturalists travelling to impoverished areas in order to help the participants at the 
grassroots, providing material to read (editorials, diaries, newspapers and letters) 
(Goodwyn 1976: 74; 88; 224; Lasch 1991b: 219; Postel 2007: 4; 46).  
‘Hundreds of thousands of rural men and women took part in Alliance education, 
coming off their farms to attend Alliance lectures’ with ‘regular biweekly or weekly 
meetings of the suballiances, often held in the local schoolhouse’ (Postel 2007: 50). The 
Alliance had always been an educational institution, claims McMath (1992: 148); it was 
an ‘educational movement’, according to Postel (2007: 15). It was a school in which the 
lecturers were the teachers, the ‘suballiances the classrooms’ and the Alliance newspapers 
the textbooks (McMath 1992: 148). These popular schools sought a) to spread scientific, 
economic and technical knowledge to agrarian people (Postel 2007: 45-7; 56; 63), b) to 
create a new political perspective, by ‘recruit[ing] and energiz[ing] a grass-roots army 
 




capable of capturing both the state and federal governments’ (McMath 1992: 149), and c) 
to shape a culture that would challenge the dominant orthodoxy of political economy in 
which Americans had been instructed (ibid). ‘Both goals would be pursued by means of 
the written word and a kind of Socratic dialogue within the schoolroom of the local 
Alliance’ (ibid). Such processes (of narrative action) generated a new interpretation of 
politics across the nation (Goodwyn 1976: 88; Canovan 1981: 51; Lasch 1991a: 219).  
The farmers produced their own poets, cartoonists ‘and a fairly elaborate folklore’ 
(Clanton 1991: 167). The ‘fraternal order’ of the Knights of Labor, a federation of workers 
and artisans ‘held together by principles of fraternalism and religion’, being ‘complement’ 
to the Farmers Alliance (McMath 1992: 62), conducted rural assemblies and gave hope to 
millions of rural Americans (McMath 1992: 83; Postel 2007: 209). ‘In community after 
community the Alliance was … a vehicle for social solidarity [and[ a focal point for 
economic cooperation’ (136). ‘In 1887 the Texas-based Farmers’ Alliance’ mobilised 
‘rural people into churches, lodges [and] schools’ (91) (narrative action). The Kansas 
Alliance, claims Goodwyn (1976), ‘initiated widespread cooperative programs and the 
momentum of the effort had begun to produce a noticeable increase in the political 
awareness of the state’s farmers’ (182). ‘[T]he street parades of rustic humanity’ the 
speeches in schoolhouse debates and picnics in Kansas during the months of 1890 (195), 
the ‘horse-drawn parades, and open-air meetings for discussion of public affairs’ (McMath 
1992: 125), served as vehicles of psychical encouragement for thousands of voiceless who 
escaped from the margins of social life, performing ‘specific political acts of self-
determination’ (Goodwyn 1976: 196), gaining ‘what Martin Luther King would later call 
“a sense of somebodiness”’ (xv). Such as King and the Civil Rights Movement dramatised 
the inexorable suffering of the segregated African Americans ‘before the court of world 
opinion’, to use Colaiaco’s (1988: 2) words again, in the same way the ‘[t]he social life of 
the suballiances spilled out into the open in ways that dramatized’ …in the larger 
community’ the hardships of rural men and women (McMath 1992: 125; my emphasis).  
This allows us to integrate this historical example with our earlier theoretical 
discussions concerning the forms of populism I call the viva civile.  Let us consider the 
following propositions: 




and reason [the logismikon] ally’ («σύμμαχον τῶ λόγω γιγνόμενον τον θυμόν τοῡ 
τοιούτου») (318). As Arendt (1969a) argued, rage (or anger) are not always 
‘automatic’ (63), viz. unconscious (or irrational). Only, when there is a reason to 
assume that conditions could be changed, conditions that offend ‘our sense of 
justice … do we react with rage’ (ibid). As opposed to the anti-populist state of 
mind—and in agreement with Arendt (ibid)—I argue that such a reaction is not 
necessarily irrational or conducive to violence. Rage against injustice and suffering 
does not obstruct judgment. It would be more accurate to associate this ‘rational’ 
rage (or thymos) with what Fukuyama (1992) called isothymia, namely the demand 
of an individual to be treated as an equal (182; 295). Etymologically speaking, 
isothymia is a compound of the following Greek words: isos (ίσος, equal) and 
thymos. This type of thymos (anger), far from being one and the same with mēnis 
(which eroded and de-activates the logismikon, as Chapters 2 and 4 explained) is 
consistent with prudence and self-limitation. Furthermore, isothymia corresponds 
to dignity, which is synonymous with αξιοπρέπεια (axio-prepeia)—from the words 
aksios (worthy) and prēpon (to be obliged)—implying the unconditional 
recognition of the obligation to honour those who are worthy or virtuous. 
B. It is ‘logos what soothes the excessiveness of thymos, just like a shepherd bids his 
dog to bark no more’ («κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παῥ αὑτῷ ἀνακληθείος 
πραϋνθῇ») (Πλάτων 2014: 318 [Plato 2014: 318]). It has been already made clear 
that logos (λόγος) should not be associated exclusively with the capacity of making 
rational calculations; it also confers to reason, which derives from speech and 
hearing (Chapter 4). With this in mind, we could interpret Plato’s phrase as follows: 
speech (and hearing), or action (in other words), prevent thymos from becoming 
mēnis.  
A and B lead to the following conclusion: when logos disappears thymos and the 
pursuit of dignity (iso-thymia, the rational anger) is easily corrupted by pathos, by its 
tendency to blind judgment, permitting all exaggerated desires and irrational appetites to 
reign supreme. Without logos and public reasoning thymos (in spite of its rightfulness) is 
converted into mēnis, inciting revenge, violence and destruction. Additionally, logos (the 




action, those who have fallen into the abyss of despair can (re)discover beacons of hope. 
Action brings human beings together in joint effort and encourages them to set up shared 
spaces of public mediation, producing and promoting meaningful aspirations for all those 
who are members of this newly re-created common world. Thus, action creates a sense of 
what McMath (1992) called ‘ordinariness’ (125). It ‘bestows upon the assembled members 
a sense of community’ (ibid). It prevents intrusion to the underworld. The manifesto of the 
Kansas’ People’s Party (November 1891), for example, stressed an ‘appeal to reason and 
not to prejudice ... “Come and let us reason together”’ (quoted by Clanton 1991: 75). It 
emphasised public reasoning (action) and community; ordinariness and togetherness made 
these ‘public meetings’, these rural gatherings and assemblies, ‘so important’ (McMath 
1992: 125), bestowing a sense of meaning and common purpose. Perhaps, this explains the 
reason Populism triumphed, generating ‘a spirit of egalitarian hope, expressed in the 
actions of two million beings’ and a ‘culture of collective dignity and individual longing’ 
(Goodwyn 1976: 542).   
The phrase ‘[c]ome now, and let us reason together’ derives from the Bible (Isaiah 
1:18). It has been cited by a number of contemporary political advocates, for whom ‘faith 
was more than compatible with dialogue’ (Gustafson 2011: 20). When this passage is 
approached through such a (republican/deliberative) prism, the message it conveys is the 
following: come now, and join our common efforts, in common open spaces where we can 
act together, where we can speak with each other, judging ideas and viewpoints, identifying 
which among those expressed doxas contain elements of truth. Through such deliberative 
processes resentment is converted into a creative force. Mēnis gives way to isothymia. In 
turn, our ‘self-esteem’ and our ‘sense of possible’ are restored (Clanton 1991: 166). In 
Goodwyn’s (1976) words, the Kansas sub-alliances created environments for the farmers 
‘to think in’ (185; emphasis added). As a result, their ‘self-respect and self-confidence as 
individual citizens grew’ (ibid). In public meetings and gatherings, the farmers participated 
not simply ‘as Alliancemen, but as citizens, because politics is for the citizen’ stressed 
Charles William Macune (quoted by Goodwyn 1976: 147), the main architect of the 
cooperative/sub-treasury plan (Goodwyn 1976: 310; Clanton 1991: 22; McMath 1992: 84-
5). The aim of the subtreasury plan was to ‘democratize the marketing and financing of 




1992: 109). In the end, the revolt challenged the conforming modes of thought (Lasch 
1991a: 219; Clanton 1991: 115), ‘altered the political consciousness’ of the American 
people (Goodwyn 1976: xviii), making the average American aware of the social ‘structure 
of economic power’ (Canovan 1981: 50).  
The main aim of the farmers was to emerge into politics without blindly following 
professional politicians (Canovan 1981: 34; Argersinger 1974: 9). William Alfred Peffer, 
a populist leader in Kansas, stressed the importance of ‘local self-action’, arguing that ‘the 
people should participate in social and political decisions’ (Argersinger 1974: 8) ‘“without 
being subjected to party discipline or to suspicions of treason to their particular political 
party”’ (10). Organisation is successful ‘only if the people and not the politicians arrange 
it’ (8). He argued against all forms of centralised power, calling for a radical reform of the 
Republican Party (the largest party in Kansas during the post-Civil War era). But when his 
hopes to convert the old parties were gradually extinguished, the creation of a new party 
was deemed necessary (23-4). In response, the People’s Party––created in July 1892 in 
Omaha (Canovan 1981: 17; Taggart 2002: 27), as a result of the decline of the Alliance 
(Goodwyn 1976: 348) seeking to represent and express the voices of the farmers in the 
national elections—adopted most of their demands. The Omaha Platform challenged the 
‘prevailing capitalist, so-called free market system at its core’ (Clanton 1991: 82) and 
campaigned for public referendums, the eight-hour day (83; 131), and for a popular 
government based a philosophy that ‘recognizes human brotherhood’ and protection for 
‘the weak’ (106). It campaigned for women’s suffrage and direct democracy as South 
Dakota became ‘the first state to adopt the initiative and popular referendum—as part of a 
constitutional amendment drafted while the Populist Party held the governor’s office. For 
the first time, state voters had the power to propose laws themselves and to reject laws 
passed by the legislature’ (Matsusaka 2020: 122).  
In other words, ‘[t]he Gospel of Populism’ sought to defeat the Gospel of Wealth, 
the Gospel of ‘competitive individualism’, aspiring to ‘reshape the nation in such a way 
that human relationships would mirror “the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of 
Man in spirit, and according to the teaching, of Jesus Christ”’ (166). As Goodwyn (1976) 
claims, apart from Jefferson, Lincoln and George, ‘Jesus Christ’ was also ‘cut to the 




‘produced perhaps the highest volume of democratizing reforms in the country’s history’ 
and, consequently, ‘mov[ed] the country even farther from the Founders’ framework’ 
(121), even farther from proto-anthropocentrism of American liberalism. Sectionalism, 
however, proved one of the most significant predicaments for the movement to spread 
further, beyond the South and the West, beyond the High and the Great Plains; in 
Goodwyn’s (1976) words, the urban-rural split, a ‘clash of urban and agrarian radicalism’ 
(Clanton 1991: 113) became ‘a cultural challenge of enormous dimension’ (Goodwyn 
1976: 310); the leaders of the People’s Party had never managed to articulate a solid 
political theory, capable of speaking not only in support of the rural farmers but also for 
the millions of the ‘plain people’ in the big cities (ibid). ‘[T]he Alliance organizers looked 
at urban workers and simply did not know what to say to them – other than to repeat the 
language of the Omaha Platform’ (ibid). The financial crisis of 1893 (known as the Panic 
of 1893), intensified political and cultural cleavages; bi-metalism (free silver) was popular 
in the Deep South and West where the People’s Party was performing strongly, but not 
among the farmers of Northeast or among the urban industrial workers (Clanton 1991: 
160). The Populists believed that free silver would sufficiently stabilise the dollar (121). 
Thus, having failed to mobilise urban working classes under their own banner, they allied 
with the Democratic Party in order to keep its disaffected voters away from the Republicans 
(the main advocates of the Gold Standard) (149). During the 1896 elections—almost fully 
dominated by the metal issue (ibid)—William Jennings Bryan, an eminent Populist leader 
(and ardent supporter of the silver cause), in his Cross of Gold Speech, urged the financial 
power-holders not to ‘crucify mankind upon a cross of gold’99. He was nominated as the 
Democratic presidential candidate, receiving financial aid from an ex-banker who also ran 
as vice-president (Taggart 2002: 34-5). The collapse did not come as a surprise. On the one 
hand (as Chapter 2 explained), under the context of mass culture populist leaders often 
articulate discourses in the name of a people’s movement, in the name of political equality, 
striving to gain popular traction. They capitalise on the growing popular discontent in order 
to ascend into power. As a matter of fact, Bryan’s Cross of Gold has correctly addressed 
political injustices and inequalities; Bryan spoke in the name of political equality, in the 
 
99  Quoted by the Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, held in Chicago, 




name the ‘innocent people’, in the name of the masses of the pauperised farmers and 
labourers; he condemned the ‘corrupt elites’ with which he, nevertheless, had joined forces. 
On the other hand, this alliance, this chain of unity (equivalence) between differentiated 
groups the Populists strove to set up through top-down means of campaigning was proven 
impotent against the predicament of sectionalism created by intense cultural 
differentiations and cleavages in the population. Thus, the Populist leadership took the 
wind out of the sails of the People’s Party, which ended up entirely absorbed by Democrats. 
Collaboration with the Democratic Party gradually diluted the radical Populist programme, 
as the People’s Party moved away from the Omaha Platform, putting an end to the efforts 
of Populism to break the Democratic monopoly in the South (Lasch 1991a: 218; Taggart 
2002: 35).  
One can clearly see that the initial pursuit of the movement—‘“[c]ome and let us 
reason together”’, let us share equally the power of making ‘mutual promise[s] or 
contract[s]’ (Arendt 1998: 245)—conflicted with its anti-political (in the Arendtian sense 
of the term) turn after the betrayal of 1896, after the shift from grassroots’ self-government 
to top-down administration. The power of logos, through which individuals remain 
active—by seeing each other and speaking among themselves, while thinking and judging 
in their pursuit of decency—eclipsed once the cooperatives disappeared. Hence, the 
Populist impetus was lost, signaling the greatest single defeat of a unique opportunity to 
break the two-party hegemony, pushing forward reforms that would regenerate American 
democracy according to the principles of direct participation that the movement initially 
had endorsed. Thus, faded the ‘culture of hope and self-respect among the voiceless’ 
(Goodwyn 1976: xxii) and the ‘breathtaking new perspective’ generated by Populism itself 
(139).  
Overall, the movement served as a ‘corrective’ to American democracy that (as its 
main representative figures diagnosed) had become too remote from the ‘common people’. 
It also served as a reminder that the promise for justice, the promise for common decency, 
is neither a vision from some distant utopian world nor a certainty. It requires persistence 
and faith in the capacities of every anthrōpos to overcome impasses through action, 
through common effort, through political and economic participation in the community. 




expectations. Its insistence on ‘“artisanal republicanism”’, or (as the Populists often called 
it) ‘“producerism”’, referring to ‘the simple idea that the producer deserves the fruits of his 
or her work’ was often justified on biblical grounds (McMath 1992: 51): ‘the workman is 
worthy of his hire’ (The Bible, Luke 19:7). Consider also reports made by secretary of the 
Falling Creek Alliance (North Carolina) in Leonidas Polk’s newspaper The Progressive 
Farmer: the populist experience spread “a kindred feeling … among us. We really seem 
more like the human beings that God made in his own image. Bless the name of the 
Alliance, long may it continue to grow in strength, it is next to religion with us”’ (quoted 
by McMath 1992: 123). Furthermore, the Omaha platform ‘“recognize[d] Almighty God 
as the rightful sovereign of nations … from whom all just powers of government are 
derived, and to whose will all human enactments ought to conform’ (Clanton 1991: 37). It 
was ‘deeply and without apology influenced by the idea that human rights derive from 
some force superior to mere mortals––a divine spark so to speak’ (ibid). It obviously 
borrowed this language from the Declaration, in which the so called ‘inalienable rights of 
man’, exist ‘above the [human] law and [therefore] stand as the measure of the law’s 
validity’ (Bailyn 1976: 230). Or with Jefferson (1999), ‘[n]othing is unchangeable but the 
inherent and unalienable rights of man’ (386); they are unchangeable and unalienable as 
long as they are not mere human inventions but divine attributions, and have been ascribed 
to human beings by God, their own Maker (Arendt 1990: 231; Nash Marshall 2003: 136). 
Second, the cooperative movement, apart from stressing the benefits of free (but fair) 
competition, championed equality, justice and common ownership, challenging the 
mentality of the laissez faire doctrine (Goodwyn 1976: xiii; Clanton 1991: 72). As The 
Jeffersonian of Alabama, a journal sympathetic to the movement, once put it, ‘“any nation 
that holds property rights above human rights” is practicing “barbarism”’ (quoted by 
Goodwyn 1976: 373). As we see, the movement promoted a new understanding concerning 
‘the great battle for human rights’ that is, the great battle ‘for better conditions, happier 
homes, and a higher civilization’ (Postel 2007: 85).  
As we have seen, while reflecting on Weil (Chapter 1), the notion of obligation is 
superior to that of rights; a right is effectual only ‘in relation to the obligation to which it 
corresponds’ (Weil 1987a: 3). The discourses articulated and disseminated by influential 




‘respect’ the human need (6) for freedom, the liberty and dignity, to reckon the underdog 
and the disenfranchised as equal (iso-thymia), to dignify his/her capacity for action, to treat 
(in other words) every human being as zōon politikon, capable to serve the common good 
through his/her logos and judgment. This particular understanding of obligation constitutes 
a robust enunciation of the anthropocentric eucosmia, which the deceitful Populist 
leadership dishonored by effectively demobilising the farmers, shifting the focus from 
grassroots’ action to top-down means of representation. In contrast, the understanding of 
rights as superior to obligations is a manifestation of the liberum arbitrium, of the pathos 
to legitimise the entitlement for unlimited accumulation of property, even at the expense 
of human dignity and isothymia. More extensive discussions concerning the notion of 
rights and their connection to the pathos for unlimited accumulation of property (proposed 
by Locke’s theory of possessive individualism as a solution to the problem of scarcity and 
conflict), will take place in the next section (in relation to the notion of eucosmia).  
Slavery and the value of eucosmia  
1) Pathos, possessiveness and the ‘right to property’ 
 As Locke (1998) claimed, ‘every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no 
Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, 
we may say, are properly his’ (287-8). ‘[P]ersonal talents and productive abilities’ in 
Locke’s mind, belong to the labourer (Andrew 1986: 65) or to the worker (in the Arendtian 
sense of the term); they are his/her ‘unquestionable Property’ (Locke 1998: 288) and, 
therefore, extensions of his/her personality. But since a human being is an ‘absolute Lord 
of his own Person and Possessions’ (350), he/she is free to sell his/her property. Thus, he 
is free to sell or alienate his/her person at will, just as he/she ‘is free to part with any other 
asset at his’ (Andrew 1986: 65). For Locke, only what is not private property, namely life 
and liberty, cannot be alienated (ibid). As Weil—contra Locke—claims, ‘[r]ights … are 
personal possessions’ and the language of rights is incapable ‘of expressing the demands 
of justice’ (Andrew 1986: 60). Instead, obligations (as mentioned earlier) spring from the 
impersonal realm, from ‘what is deep, sacred or inviolable in humanity’ (64). Hence, the 
rights considered inalienable confer to the realm of obligations, ‘eternal’, ‘sacred’ and 




equivalent to "it is right that I have the X”’ (Andrew 1986: 66-7). Therefore, rights ‘are 
simple moral permits for the commercialization of life’ (65); ‘Hobbes's and Locke's 
advocacy of rights … fostered commercial society’ (70). The notion of rights primarily 
derives from the Roman definition of property as jus utendi et abutendi (Weil 2005: 82); it 
is affiliated with the things ‘the property owner had the right to use or abuse at will were 
for the most part human beings’ (ibid). ‘T]he Greeks had no conception of rights. They had 
no words to express it’ (ibid). ‘[S]o also it is alien to the Christian inspiration’ since 
‘nobody can ‘imagine St Francis of Assisi talking about rights’ (p.83).  
For Weil (2005) the notion of ‘rights’ primarily derives from the Roman definition 
of property as jus utendi et abutendi (82). It is affiliated with the things ‘the property owner 
had the right to use or abuse at will were for the most part human beings’ (ibid). On the 
other hand, ‘[t]he Greeks had no conception of rights. They had no words to express it’ 
(ibid) Furthermore, ‘[o]ne cannot imagine St Francis of Assisi talking about rights’ (p.83). 
In short, the notion of rights according to Weil has ‘a commercial flavour’, summarises 
Andrew (1986: 77). Weil’s thought sheds light on the way the notion of rights could be 
interpreted in such a way that the ‘right to have’, the rise to posses, the right for unlimited 
acquisition (of property)–through which the instantiate pathos (the ‘I-will’) is gratified (as 
the Lockean model of possessive individualism proposed)–could be given full priority over 
the right to life and liberty, over the obligation to respect the worth and value of others. As 
also Chapter 2 argued, the ‘I-will’ points to the will-for-power, to the will for oppressing 
others (Arendt 1968: 162; Fine 2007: 123). Hence, does not (to some extent) the 
prioritisation of the right to (unlimited) acquisition of property (over other rights) open the 
back door for the justification of one’s selfish pursuits (of his/her ‘I-will’), resulting 
(potentially) in oppression, injustice and, subsequently, in the alienation of someone’s 
‘inalienable’ right to liberty and life? Was not the hubris of slavery, whose ‘wretchedness 
and miseries’ only the pen of ‘a Josephus or a Plutarch’ could ‘enumerate and explain’ 
(Walker 1993: 21), one of the most vivid manifestations of such an alienation, caused 
(partially) by human selfishness, that is, by the ‘right’ for boundless possession beyond 
moral self-limitation? Abraham Lincoln would of course agree: slavery, he argued, is  one 





Of course, to say that ‘Lockean’ lines of thought have many times justified 
(implicitly or explicitly) extreme exploitation (including slavery)–as we are going to see in 
what follows, by examining the socio-political landscape of the ante-bellum American 
South–should not automatically lead us to assume that the Southern defence of slavery was 
exclusively attributed to Locke’s theory of property. Other prejudices (possibly endorsed 
simultaneously) include: a) the idea that some human beings are born to be slaves and 
others to rule as masters (appeal to nature), b) the paternalistic assertion that slavery 
benefits the slave him/herself, and finally, c) the belief that slavery protects the structure 
and the coherency of society. The first factor (appeal to nature), is found in Aristotle’s 
Politics (as I explained in the Introduction of this chapter). This justification (of slavery) 
belongs to the pre-modern world of ancient Greece. Some pre-modern Christians 
(Catholics and Protestants alike) have also based their pro-slavery credentials to quite 
similar remarks (as I will explain in the second part of this section, where I will also 
elaborate on the second factor, on the appeal to social paternalism). While similar 
justifications were not absent in the ante-bellum American South, by shedding light on the 
way this peculiar institution (in the Old South) found justification on Lockean grounds we 
could acquire a more holistic conclusion concerning slavery in the American context. 
Let us dig deeper into the viewpoints expressed by intellectuals100 who have been 
inspired by Southern traditions and sought to defend them by any means necessary, if we 
follow Hartz’s observations (1955), we could identify a metharmōsis of ‘Lockean’ 
liberalism to reactionary traditionalism (148). Reactionary movements in Europe despised 
the philosophy of the Enlightenment, striving to restore the old feudal order that liberalism 
had wiped out. But in American liberalism had not been built upon the ruins of feudalism 
(Hartz 1955: 20; 30; 150; Israel 2012: 463; Κονδύλης 2015: 48 [Kondylis 2015: 48]). It 
had destroyed nothing (apart from the society of the Indians, which the Southerners had no 
intention to restore). Thus, traditionalist sensibilities found no real reason to denounce it 
altogether (Hartz 1955: 152). After all, America’s liberal past had been too good for the 
 
100  These are John C. Calhoun, Richard Weavers, and George Fitzhugh et al., often described as 
‘Southern Agrarians’ (Genovese 1994). They are also labeled as ‘Tory socialists’, ‘Tory anarchists’ 





populace (47) and Locke had been proven ‘too empirical, too historical in America to 
attack’ (153). Eventually, the Southern intellectuals––who drew on Benjamin Disraeli, as 
well as on Carlyle and de Maistre (165), aspiring to transform the American social and 
political life beyond the sway of ‘liberal capitalism’ (180)––reproduced a philosophy, 
namely ‘the philosophy of a feudal world’, that America had never experienced (150). 
Being unable to transcend the same ‘liberal past out of which they came’, they accepted 
several proportions of it, like (for instance) the doctrine of free trade (180-1) as well as the 
notion of limited government (165). In short, their Romantic (ethnic, or racial) anti-liberal 
nationalism remained anchored to liberal ideas, and more importantly to the right for 
unlimited acquisition of property and personal wealth. 
Their insistence on the doctrine of states’ rights was aiming to limit the prerogatives 
of the federal ‘Leviathan state’ (Genovese 1994: 56) in order to defend ‘the South against 
the North’ (Hartz 1995: 165)101, that is, to protect the ‘Peculiar Institution’ (slavery) against 
the Northern model of political liberalism and centralisation. For Hartz (1955), this 
insistence on states’ rights (against federal centralisation)  echoes Locke’s insistence on 
limited government. At the same time, the traditionalist spirit of the Old South, according 
to Genovese (1994), points to Edmund Burke, ‘who has long been a hero to southern 
conservative [intellectuals]’ (27). The same intellectuals had scorned Paine (46) and 
thoroughly rejected the ‘philosophical extravagance of the French Enlightenment’ (23). 
Instead, they ‘followed principal figures of the Scottish Enlightenment’ (ibid). Hence, the 
worshipers of Disraeli and de Maistre, by clinging on the idea of economic competition 
and unrestricted free trade and by denouncing the ‘greedy’ and ‘Yankee moneymaking’ 
North at the same time (Hartz 1955: 190), counterposed a mixture of liberal capitalism and 
reactionary traditionalism; their feudal dream was, in fact, an absurd synthesis of two 
explicitly antinomical (if not mutually exclusive) social philosophies. Their profound 
detestation for the Northern model of centralised capitalism and ‘wage-slavery’ went hand 
in hand with their apparent defense of chattel slavery, with their intense support for the 
idea of ‘property in man’ (180; 193). For the Southerners private property (including 
 
101 Eventually, a few Southerners became truly attached to Romanticism in order ‘to give up 
constitutional apologetics’ (Hartz 1955: 164-5). Their ethnic nationalism was reformulated in 




‘property in man’) constituted the basis of society’s spiritual and moral well-being 
(Genovese 1994: 79). According to Richard Weavers, who wrote ‘in the spirit of 
eighteenth-century British political theory’, property was ‘“the last [remaining] 
metaphysical right”’ in a highly secularised world (ibid). In his mind, the capitalist North 
represented a clear ‘“violation of the very notion of proprietas”’, of the most important 
‘foundation for individual freedom’ (81).  
From a different angle, when ‘the slave regime underwent consolidation’ and when 
the legal system of the Western world began to adjust itself to the standards ‘of the 
bourgeois idea of private property’, the Southern slaveholders invoked certain principles 
of the same idea in order to justify the existence of pre-modern institutions (including 
slavery and ‘property in man’) (Genovese 1974: 45). Adam Smith (2012), for example, 
considered slave labor expensive, unprofitable, coercive and violent (382; 384; 387). 
Overall, if the South by ‘assailing Locke, found itself going back to the hierarchical world’ 
that Locke himself was ought to destroy (Hartz, 1955: 170), it was due to the metharmōsis 
of his theory to the slave-holding regime. Put otherwise, it was partially due to the practical 
implementation of a particular interpretation of economic liberalism concerning the right 
for unrestrained accumulation of wealth, even at the expense of the ‘inalienable right’ to 
liberty Locke’s and other eighteenth-century liberals had so ardently defended. Locke 
(1998) had rejected obedience ‘to the inconstant uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of 
another Man’, which—in his view—equals to ‘Slavery’ and ‘is nothing else, but the State 
of War continued, between a lawful Conqueror, and a Captive’ (284; emphasis in the 
original). For Locke (1998), obedience ‘to the inconstant uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary 
Will of another Man’, equals to ‘Slavery’ and ‘is nothing else, but the State of War 
continued, between a lawful Conqueror, and a Captive’ (284; emphasis in the original). 
Walker’s (1993) comments, ‘[s]ee your Declaration Americans!!! Do you understand your 
own language?’ (95), the language of liberty and equality by creation, point to this explicit 
contradiction between the liberal rejection of all arbitrary powers as illegitimate and the 
acceptance of slavery (Israel 2017: 141) ‘in this REPUBLICAN LAND OF LIBERTY’ 
(Walker 1993: 22; capitals original). To conclude: the ‘I-will’, the ‘will-to-oppress’ (in 
Arendt’s vocabulary), the right (and pathos) for domination, found solid justification in the 




‘property in man’).   
Furthermore, as Weil (1987a) claimed, the conflation of property with profit and 
capital acquisition has been established by a system ‘which made money the focus of all 
possible motives’ (34). The equation of property with wealth and with the unlimited 
accumulation of riches or consumable goods is a modern fabrication (Arendt 1998: 61; 
Klein 2014: 863). In the classical republican––especially in the Aristotelian––tradition, the 
aim of property was not profit but stability and leisure; most of all, property allowed access 
to popular assemblies (Pocock 1976: 390-1); it was ‘a self-evident condition for admission 
to the public realm’ (Arendt 1998: 64)102. In Aristotle’s (1993a, [Αριστοτέλης 1993α]) 
thought, private property safeguards friendship, ‘the most significant good for the life of 
the polis’ («φιλίαν τε γάρ οἰόμεθα μέγιστον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν») (114). 
Additionally, it causes «ἡδονήν ἀμύθητον» (‘indescribable delight’) (120). However, the 
same thinker opposes unlimited acquisition, through which individuals become greedy and 
selfish (φιλοχρήματον and φίλαυτον)103, and recognizes in return the importance of shared 
ownership. He, nonetheless, prioritises private property over «κτήσεις κοινάς» (shared 
ownership) (ibid) and reckons the latter impractical and unrealistic. Property should be 
never shared in common involuntarily; instead it should be distributed through acts of 
charity and hospitality, through which men become generous (ἐλευθεριότης) (122). «[Ο]ὔτε 
γάρ ἔσται φανερός ἐλευθέριος ὤν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾱξιν ἐλευθέριον οὐδεμίαν· ἐν τῇ γάρ χρήσει 
τῶν κτημάτων τό τῆς ἐλευθέριότητος ἔργον ἐστίν» (‘When there is common ownership there 
is no generosity, and nobody can perform generous acts. Generosity finds expression only 
through the use of private property’) (ibid)104. In the classical republican tradition, private 
 
102  A quick note: this paragraph may seem unrelated to the preceding ones. Nonetheless, when it 
comes to property ownership, it adds an important distinction between the vita civile and a) the 
ideology of unlimited possession (advocated by economic liberalism) or b) the anti-propertarian 
weltanschauung of communism, on the other hand. The populism of the vita civile, following the 
footsteps of classical republicanism, in line with the French and the American Revolution (Nelson 
2006: 204-5; Popkin 2019: 392) and the cooperative movement, the movement of ‘proprietary 
democracy’ (Lasch 1991a: 15), rejects both the boundless appetite for possession and the total 
abolition of private property. Instead, it relies on small property ownership.  
103  From the Greek φιλῶ (philo), to love, (See Chapter 2) and a) αυτός (self) or b) χρήμα (money).  
104  In other words, nobody can express his/her generosity, sharing part of his/her wealth with 




property anchors ‘the individual in the structure of power and virtue, and liberated him to 
practice these as activities’ (Pocock 1975: 391)105.  
More precisely, as Arendt (1978) stressed, the identity of an object is best defined 
by the process of making clear distinctions between the characteristics of the same entity 
from that of all others (altereitas) (1: 183). In other words, when we attempt to describe 
‘what a thing is, we must [initially] say what it is not…’ (ibid). Eventually the existence of 
the public-political realm presupposes the existence, identification and preservation of the 
characteristics of the plurality of all other existing secular realms. Hence, it is the realm 
which secures private property (the private realm) that distinctly stands as the ‘necessary 
other’. Simply put, without private property there is no public realm; in turn without the 
public (and the political) realm the pursuit of ‘public happiness’ is unattainable. On the 
other hand, since private property is necessary, since we recognise in everyone the ‘right’ 
to possess something ‘more than the articles of ordinary consumption’ (Weil 1987a: 33), it 
is important to acknowledge the unconditional obligation for this right to be exercised 
within bounds, instead of offering moral justifications for unlimited acquisition, which 
triggers the ‘will-to-oppress’. Moral hindrances against unlimited possession are provided 
by transcendent norms (religion). It is time to move forward, examining the process 
through which religious ideals broke the paternalistic culture of the Old South, whose 
ultimate objective was the protection of the legal and social structures upon which slavery 
itself came to rest. The same culture depicts the slave-owner as a ‘generous’ and 
‘affectionate’ nobleman. Let us not forget that the belief in the ‘benevolence’ and 
‘generosity’ of the master (towards his slaves) was ‘grounded in the notion that only a 
“property” right in another man can make one truly care for him’ (Hartz 1955: 186-7).  
2) Christian hope, eucosmia and freedom  
The paternalistic society of the American South ‘grew out of the necessity to 
discipline and morally justify a system of exploitation’ (Genovese 1976: 4). In order to 
 
105  To avoid misunderstandings: this does not imply that slave labour and small proprietorship 
are mutually exclusive. In fact, classical Greece is a fine example that proves the opposite. 
Nonetheless, it was unthinkable for a classical Greek to justify (morally) slavery upon any ideology 
that exalts the right to property, let alone the right to unlimited acquisition of wealth (see the 




protect the existing class paradigm, it shaped a culture of conformity; it relied on methods, 
which—apart from cruelty and violence—could impose and secure obedience through 
relatively non-coercive means (ibid). More precisely, by creating environments within 
which a black slave could ostensibly feel safe from hunger and physical deprivation (as 
well as from lynching and mob attacks), the slaveholding regime cultivated in the former’s 
mind a perception of inferiority; the servant’s feeling of helplessness and defenselessness 
in the absence of master’s protection and charity, consolidated a form of dependency upon 
which the ground for the moral justification of racial exploitation was preserved (48; 76). 
Proslavery argument ‘helped to mold a special psychology for master and slave alike’ (86) 
and emphasised the ‘reciprocal duties within which the master had a duty to provide for 
his people and to treat them with humanity’ (144). It bit by bit shaped a perception of 
noblesse oblige, crystallised through the claim that emancipation would inevitably drop the 
blacks ‘to the bottom of the social scale as unwanted and improvident unskilled workers’, 
incapable of surviving in the antagonistic ‘cutthroat world of the capitalist marketplace’ 
(163).  
According to Breen (2019), religious leaders, ministers and clergy members 
(especially in New England and the Middle States) considered slavery an insult against 
God and, simultaneously, condemned the overt hypocrisy on behalf of those who 
condemned the British Parliament for oppression but turned a blind eye to the brutal 
treatment of African Americans (81). For Israel (2017), the American Revolution with its 
emphasis on equality by creation, applied universally to all human beings, ignited the first 
flame against slavery (140; 144; 146); it opened energies of ‘popular religiosity’ (Wood 
2003: 134) for the illiterate, the lowly, and the dependent’ (133). Long before the 
Revolution, writes Kidd (2012), the First Great Awakening (1730-1740) had ‘introduced 
common people to an exhilarating new world of spiritual possibilities’, helping African 
Americans and Native Americans to join forces (22), while during the Second Great 
Awakening (1790-1820), the Methodist Church denounced slavery in toto as ‘“contrary to 
the laws of God”’ (Israel 2017: 149) and the Society of Friends (Quakers) made opposition 
to slavery a condition of membership (Kloppenberg 2016: 310; 407). This ‘popular 
religiosity’ led to the spread of numerous revivalist sects that Christianised large numbers 




opportunity and relied on religious customs in order to assure the obedience and docility 
of their slaves (Genovese 1976: 7; 30; 189; Kidd 2012: 197). Historically speaking, literal 
interpretations of the New Testament (as well as of the Hebrew Bible) justified slavery and 
subordination (Kloppenberg 2016: 310). As Israel points out, Christians had for centuries 
endorsed slavery on religious grounds (Israel 2012: 473; 2017: 149; 2019: 731). They had 
accepted slavery per se as being ‘ordained by the “natural law” which God had devised for 
man’s sinful state’ (Niebuhr 1960: 76) (appeal to nature). Consider also Saint Paul’s 
ambivalent stance: when he speaks in the Corinthians (1:24) about the Commandments of 
God he ‘stresses that God calls (καλέω, κλῆσις) each person’ to remain in his/her given 
position (Huttunen 2010: 44); in his letters to early Christian communities he advises slaves 
to obey their masters in everything and the masters, on the other hand, to treat their slaves 
fairly (Kloppenberg 2016: 42). Nonetheless, in another letter Saint Paul counsels his friend 
Philemon ‘to embrace his runaway slave Onesimus, now that both had become Christians, 
and treat him “no longer as a slave, but … as a brother”’ (ibid).  
In the ante-bellum South, ‘a literal reading of scripture’ offered moral justification 
to property in man (Hartz 1955: 168); as many pro-slavery interpretations (of the Bible) 
advocated, the black was not predestined to work for him/herself; only ‘the white man’ was 
allowed ‘to boss’ (Genovese 1976: 244). Slaveholders had pushed the idea that ‘in making 
slaves of others’ they were ‘merely acting under the authority of God’ (79). For them it 
was not the Christian bodies but the souls that are equal (Israel 2017: 149; 2019: 731). In 
fact, many slaveholders who had developed deep affection for their own servants, 
introduced to them Christianity, through which they believed the latter would have saved 
their souls (Hartz 1955: 170). Hence, Nietzsche’s (2003) view of Christianity as a 
dangerous and hazardous narcotic (94), a ‘slave-faith’ (1967: 24) that sacrifices ‘all 
freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit’, encouraging ‘subjection, self-derision, and 
self-manipulation’ (25), carries an element of truth. As, for example, Frederick Douglas 
(1993), write, ‘I have met many good religious colored people at the south, who were under 
the delusion that God required them to submit to slavery and to wear their chains with 
meekness and humility’ (77). Genovese (1976) reports numerous cases of African-
American slaves, who developed strong emotional love-ties with their masters and, even 




whom they made them suffer (81; 98; 109; 112; 128; 145). For example: ‘Elisa Frances 
Andrews noted in her diary for January 16, 1865, that the most well-behaved and docile 
blacks became increasingly unruly as Yankee troops got close. On May 27, she celebrated 
the loyalty of her own servants, whom she called “treasures”: “I really love them for the 
way they stood for us”’ (102). Consider also the case of Bill Simms, an ex-slave from 
Missouri who ‘loved his old master and willingly return to work for him after the war’ 
(135). Or according to the Louisiana planter, John Sergeant Wise, his own servants had 
repeatedly told him that they ‘loved “old Master” better than anybody in the world’ (111-
2; emphasis added). A high amount of responsibility for the apparent docility African-
Americans, according to Genovese (1976), rests in their religious education (91). The 
‘profoundly Christian ability to love their enemies … [had] surrendered their manhood’ 
and propelled them to accept ‘their masters’ world view’ (282). If love instead of referring 
to the serene emotion of eucosmia (as it is expressed through the notion of agape, 
accompanied by aidōs and dikin, by a sense of care and duty to restore common decency, 
appeals to the fido amor, leaves very little room for persons ‘to stop and think’, in Arendt’s 
(1978, 1: 4) terms. This absurd love of slave towards his/her master reminds us the case of 
the Stockholm Syndrome, as described by Breithaupt (2019: 37). We are propelled to the 
phenomenon of pathological confluence (see chapter 2) again, to the process whereby an 
objective-perceptive-empathetic observer develops emotional attachments with his/her 
predator, inasmuch as his/her ‘self’, that is, capacity to ‘judge, [to] show strength, [to] lead 
[and] act’ is lost. This process is described, by same author (43), as ‘depersonalisation’. 
One factor that prompts a victim to excuse the deeds of his/her predator, deeds that cause 
great suffering, is the empathy the former expresses for the predator, due to the latter’s past 
unfair treatment, which (potentially) prompted him/her to resort to violence and aggression 
against others106. The victim, the ‘depersonalised’ individual, is therefore reduced to 
‘something of a slave’, claims Nietzsche (1967: 142). He/she is ‘only an instrument … in 
the hand of one who is more powerful’ (140). Likewise empathy can cultivate a ‘false’ and 
‘absurd’ love (as the previous chapter called it) for the ‘oppressor’, in the event the latter 
acts in such a way that his/her oppression is masked through deeds that ostensibly portray 
 




him/her as an ‘affectionate caretaker’. Consider, for example, the words of Adeline 
Johnson, a South Carolina slave: ‘In slavery, us have all de clothes us need, all de food us 
want, and work all de harder ‘cause us love de white folks dat cared for us’ (Genovese 
1976: 307; emphasis added). To make a long story short, the blind sentimentalism of the 
fido amor substantiates an absurd and demeaning form of love for both the oppressor and 
the conditions he/she creates and imposes, instead of respecting the latter only as an 
individual, a ‘sinner’, capable of redeeming him/herself from his/her grave sins.  
Proslavery arguments were constantly championing the ‘“gratitude, affection, and 
good-will”’ of the slaves (145). Nonetheless, ‘gratitude implies equality’ while 
‘paternalism rested precisely on inequality’ (146). What, therefore, best describes Southern 
paternalism is precisely its apparent success in producing perceptions capable of generating 
conditions within which the subordination of individuals could be achieved simply by 
sentimentalising human relations, that is, by constituting minds incapable of judging, 
incapable of distinguishing hubris from decency. In fact, the slaveholding regime could not 
engender in the slave’s mind the humiliating desire for servitude and blind obedience 
without crippling his/her inability of thinking and judging, and hence, of taking his/her life 
into his/her own hands. More importantly, if thinking, nóēsis and judgment are among the 
most essential prerequisites of public life, which is synonymous with action, and if the 
raison d'être of action per se is freedom, we understand that the real aim of slavery is not 
simply the alienation of someone’s ‘right to liberty’ but the complete alienation of his/her 
freedom, of his/her capacity as a thinking human being to serve the common good. 
Walker’s (1993) words, that those who consider blacks an ‘inferior race of beings’ consider 
them ‘incapable of self-government’ (85; my emphasis) depict the real objectives of the 
hubris of slavery: a human being ceases being a political animal. Instead, he/she becomes 
a thing.  
Returning to the discussion of religion: for Israel (2019) it was the philosophes of 
what he calls ‘radical Enlightenment’ who initially called for the emancipation of African 
slaves rather than Christianity per se (730-1; 735). The influences of the philosophes in the 
destruction of slavery are, in fact, undisputable. However, to neglect the way through which 
religious archetypes and symbols point to the impersonal realm, to high moral ideals, that 




underdogs (the African Americans, in our case) need in order to resist dehumanisation and 
humiliation, would be serious neglectful. As Niebuhr (1960) puts it, ‘[r]eligion is always a 
citadel of hope, which is built on the edge of despair’ (62); the religious imagination can 
develop moral capacities in individuals (51). As the previous chapter explained, the high 
moral ideal is seen as a standard of comparison, a benchmark for good judgment and a 
means for individual and collective self-purification. The religious experience, in other 
words, provides a basis ‘of moral conduct and an explanation for the existence of evil and 
injustice’ (Genovese 1976: 163). While initially Christianity had shaped a paternalistic 
culture of conformity to the standards of the white ruling elites, it gradually ended up a 
weapon of resistance for the blacks (116). It drove into the soul of the slaves a deep 
awareness concerning the immorality of submission (165) and taught ‘them to love and 
value each other, to take a critical view of their masters, and to reject the ideological 
rationales for their own enslavement’ (6). The Christian faith ‘forbade slaves to accept the 
idea that they had no right to judge their masters; it made judgment a duty’ (282; my 
emphasis) and helped them to escape the savagery of depersonalisation, invigorating their 
free will, through ‘faith in God and faith in each other’ (244). ‘[I]t strengthened the slaves’ 
sense of belonging to the world’ (248); it shaped their own common culture and enhanced 
their sobriety (644), offering protection against hedonism, excessive materialism and moral 
degradation (574; 580).  
While the white South attempted to shape ‘the religious life of the slaves’, the slaves 
themselves fought to reshape the same culture, providing ‘a vantage point’ from which 
they could judge the dominant systems of values (162) Thus, drawing on religion, they 
turned the model of Southern paternalism upside down (5; 30). In the end, religion ended 
up an instrument ‘in their determined effort to take care of each other in a painful common 
struggle to live decently’ (118). Through songs that became ‘hymns of joy’ (249) and 
‘breaths of hope’, the slaves strengthened their roots, their sense of belonging to a common 
physical and spiritual world (248; 623), which kept ‘the people together with faith in 
themselves’ (273). Songs of joy that ‘turned to satire’ (318) served as instruments of public 
judgment, of ‘political criticism’ (and self-criticism at the same time) (318; 582); they 
became instruments of narrative action, of the ‘ubiquitous’ logos upon which ‘all life 




their art and satire the African Americans ‘asserted their rights as men and women to the 
fullness of the Lord’s earth’ (Genovese 1976: 584). Τheir Christian faith, ‘which implied a 
sense of a higher organic order in the universe’ and the existence of a Truth ‘far above the 
claims of temporal relations’ (264) reaffirmed their own ‘personality and worth’ (265).  
To sum up: the religious experience postulates the strengthening of ‘the moral 
capacities of individual men’ (Niebuhr 1960: 51) by allowing them to access impersonal 
dimensions, enhances psychical enlightenment, discouraging resentment and revenge (as 
we have also seen in King’s case). Religion, writes Douglas (1973) lightens the burden of 
suffering and relieves the heart, offering a ‘new light’ and a great concern ‘to have 
everybody converted’ (82-3), to repent the slaveholder from his/her sins ‘and be reconciled 
to God through Christ’ (82). Christianity, therefore, encouraged the slave to love his/her 
master as a fellow sinner, urging him/her to reject the entitlement of arbitrary rule through 
human ownership (Genovese 1976: 264). It elevated hopes for racial fairness and 
deliverance (189) without including ‘an implication of perfection and the Kingdom of God 
on Earth’ or embracing any form of ‘militant millennialism’ (optimism, in other words) 
(272). ‘Religion’, wrote Walker (1993), ‘is a substance of deep consideration among all 
nations of the earth’ (55).  
It is true that Christianity’s message of agape and forgiveness has long been an 
important reservoir of inspiration for pacifist thinkers (or leaders): ‘Paul’s declaration that 
God “hath made of one blood” all nations of the world is more anthropological fact than 
religious poetry’, argues King (1986: 121). In the same way, the fear of divine retribution 
(in Christianity) can discourage moral transgression, inciting common decency. Walker’s 
Appeal (1830/1993), for example, calls black and whites ‘to engage in critical self-analysis 
and social reform’ according to the Christian principles of equality by creation (Gustafson 
2011: 141). If white Americans refuse to reform ‘God will accomplish it’ even through 
punishment (Walker 1993: 50). Certainly, Walker was neither the liberal orator Douglas 
was nor a pacemaker like King; if King’s calls for agape and reconciliation reverberate 
with God’s kindness and generosity, as it mainly enunciated in several passages of the New 
Testament, Walker’s powerful jeremiad surely echoes the divine punitive judgement of the 
Old: ‘I warn you in the name of the Lord … to repent and reform, or you are ruined’, he 




among you, I am awfully afraid will drag down the vengeance of God upon you’ (65) and 
‘unless you speedily alter your course, you and your Country are gone!!!’ (59), bring us in 
symmetry to the Miltonic weltanschauung, that whoever aspires to exercise self-assertive 
powers upon others, sins in the face of God. Like Satan’s army was thrown ‘to the 
bottomless pit’ (Milton 2004: 207), in the same way sinners, oppressors and tyrants will 
meet God’s wrath: ‘God will dash tyrants, in combination with devils’ (Walker 1993: 91, 
ff.). After all, it was Lincoln himself who ‘saw the Civil War as fulfilling divine purposes’ 
(Kidd 2012: 251). Certainly, one does not have to accept this quasi chiliastic belief as such; 
one does not need to bestow faith on the idea that some form of divine Providence will 
always be ready to punish oppressors and tyrants, emancipating mankind from all evils, as 
(for instance) the French Revolutionaries believed (Hampson 1983: 141). It is, nonetheless, 
reasonable to highlight the possible consequences of hubris (moral transgressions), namely 
the triggering of mēnis, which (in turn) fuels resentment and, potentially, wars and 
conflicts. In other words, we can argue about a simple cause and effect relation between 
oppression and insurrection. However, given the magmatic mode of collective 
institutioning (Chapter 2), which renders the outcomes of human acts unpredictable, one 
could object to this assertion that oppression (the cause) deterministically ends in war and 
destruction (the effect). Eventually, while we refute the case for absolute causality, we can 
speak of probability; the likelihood, the chance, the possibility for strife, conflict and 
wretchedness increases when the conditions (the causes) fostering anger (mēnis) and 
resentment remain extant. As Aeschylus (2007: 104 [Αισχύλος 2007: 104]) wrote in 
Agamemnon: «φιλεῖ δὲ τίκτειν / Ὕβρις μὲν παλαιὰ νεά / ζουσαν ἐν κακοῖς βροτῶν» (‘an 
ancient hubris sooner or later, human passions will excite, bringing a new hubris forth’) 
and «Ὕβριν τότ᾽ ἢ τόθ᾽, ὅτε τὸ κύριον μόλῃ φάος τόκου, δαίμονά τ᾽ ἔταν, / Θράσος μελαίνα 
μελάθροισιν, / Ἄτα...» (‘in turn, hubris sends Thrasos, the untamable and unholy demon, 
and the curse of moral blindness, unto the households...’ (ibid; my translation)107. 
Conclusion  
 So far, we have been looking at the main ideological trends behind the French 
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Revolution, paying essential emphasis to Rousseau’s model of ‘original harmony’, which 
(together with his radical egalitarianism) legitimised the idea of human perfectibility (as 
the first section explained). The spread of this optimistic idea (by the so-called ‘men of 
letters’) led to the establishment of conditions within which enmity, violence (justified and 
glorified), and idolatry swamped the entire nation. This self-destructive violence 
annihilated the political realm. To avoid misunderstandings: this estimation does not negate 
the existence of several additional factors undermining the success of the Revolution. 
Consider, again the controversial role of the Girondins, and more importantly, a) the 
accusations of proletarian leaders against them for rising food prices (Israel 2014: 438), b) 
their collaboration with the Royalists when the latter marched against Paris (Kropotkin 
1971: 446; 453; Popkin 2019: 307), c) their insistence on the doctrine of property, order 
and security (Kropotkin 1971: 106; 343; 476; 485) and d) their demands for the immediate 
dissolution of all ‘large communes and the communal municipalities, and the creation of a 
third and new series of bureaucratic bodies – the directores du canton’ (472), in order ‘to 
“beat down anarchy”’ (359). On the other hand, the more moderate (in character) American 
Revolution tells a different story; it was not the work of some vanguard intellectual 
aristocracy, ‘the result of “bookish” learning or the Age of the Enlightenment’ (Arendt 
1990: 219). It is true that Paine’s fierce attack on King George III blew away pro-royalist 
sensibilities (Miller 1959: 469; Israel 2012: 451-7; 2017: 54). His Common Sense had an 
unprecedented impact at persuading the colonists for the necessity of independence (Israel 
2017: 49-50), the only way to protect the autonomy of the ‘elementary republics’ from the 
abuses of monarchy. But neither Paine’s (nor Locke’s) influential treatises and pamphlets 
nor the profound interest of the Revolutionary leadership for classical Greece and Rome 
(Bowers 1954: 5; Gustafson 2011: 1; Israel 2012: 446) explain the birth and spread of such 
a large democratic movement. It could be true that ‘the enlightenment of society … 
necessarily requires comprehensive revolution’ that is, ‘a revolution of ideas’, a ‘revolution 
of the mind’ (in other words), and then ‘a revolution of action’ (Israel 2010:197-8). 
Nonetheless, when it comes to the American Revolution, it would be a serious mistake to 
claim that before Common Sense there was no radical philosophical thinking, given that 
democratic and republican ideas had already strong roots in the New World (Kloppenberg 




origin’ had been practiced for almost a century and a half before the major outbreaks of 
1776 (Israel 2012: 445). According to Arendt (1990), the American Revolution was the 
outcome of a series of ‘practical experiences of the colonial period, which all by themselves 
gave birth to the republic’ (219). ‘[I]t was the common people who impelled and sustained 
the Revolution, enabling the leaders to secure the Declaration of Independence’ (Israel 
2019: 283). Deeply enshrined in the American collective memory, in the American 
collective conscious and unconscious, republican ideas were revived and brought back into 
the political foreground during the emergence and spread of Populism.  
Discussions concerning the genealogy of these major historical events, concerning 
the significance of civic bonding memory in democratic mobilisations, will be postponed 
until the first section of the next chapter. For the moment let us return to the mutually 
exclusive relationship between optimism and the vita civile, characterised by humility in 
ethics, in conjunction with awareness about life’s tragic dimensions, about ‘the history of 
humanity’ as ‘the history of hideousness’ (Καστοριάδης 2000: 126 [Castoriadis 2000: 
126]), about the ‘question of mankind’ as a question of ‘hubris’ (2007: 123), stigmatised 
by endless moral transgressions, indecencies as well as by paradoxes and contradictions. 
The case of the American Revolution is a stark example of such a contradiction, given the 
coexistence of the passion for freedom, self-governance and political empowerment 
(anthropocentric elements) with worldviews and perceptions offering concrete justification 
to the hubris of slavery (elements that belong to the despotic ‘cosmosystem’, in 
Contogeorgis’ terms)108. The Revolution, claims Wood (2003), destroyed ‘old structures 
of authority’ (133) and ‘had a powerful effect in eventually bringing an end to slavery in 
America’ by putting an end to the intellectual hegemony upon which the justification of 
slavery for thousands of years rested (127). But despite outlawing slavery in several 
Northern and New Territories (Kloppenberg 2016: 402; 407; Israel 2017: 151; 153), the 
Southern elites, and their insistence on maintaining the right to property above the so- 
called ‘rights of man’ (Miller 1959: 498), derailed plans for the total eradication of 
legislation that provided legal support for slavery itself, forcing the Northern elites to cave 
in to their demands. Furthermore, as McMath (1992) writes, the Emancipation 
 




Proclamation may have thrown away the bondage of slavery, but paternalism, racial and 
economic exploitation in the Old South remained intact: ‘[t]he system of land tenure’, 
which ‘came to dominate the plantation districts by the end of Reconstruction was 
sharecropping’ (31). The land was ‘subdivided into small plots to be worked by families’, 
most of them black freedmen, who ‘were paid with a share of the marketable crop … rather 
than in cash’, while ‘[t]itle to most of the land’ was owned by white planters, who created 
and enforced their own laws against the sharecroppers (ibid). Many thought sharecropping 
to be a new relationship between masters and slaves, fully adjusted to the standards of 
Northern capitalism (32). Whites, who joined the ranks of sharecropping, found themselves 
‘in the same ditch’ (33). The crisis of 1893, which led to the rise of the People’s Party, hit 
the sharecroppers severely (whites and blacks alike). 
Thus, coextensive with the ethic of common decency is the tragic vision, the 
explicit acknowledgement of the inherent human hubris and vulnerability. The tragic 
vision, deeply rooted in the philosophical and ontological underpinnings of the vita civile, 
adds an anti-utopian bent to human efforts for common decency. It discourages perfection 
and, instead, promotes meliorism. It advocates eucosmia in leadership, emphasising 
everyone’s need to ‘dare greatly’, in Brown’s (2012) terms, everyone’s contribution to the 
struggle against hubris through action, through logos and memory. The previous chapter 
looked at the process whereby logos (agonal action and plurality of opinions) multiply the 
chances for moral lessons incorporated within past experiences to be discovered and, 
subsequently, to be brought into the foreground of political debates. The next chapter will 
focus on the relationship between logos and bonding memory. More precisely, it is argued 
that logos and common appearance (public time) vitalises bonding memory, preventing 
idolatry and aggressive nationalism; through deliberation and open conversations, given 
norms become subjects of discussion and re-evaluation, instead of being reproduced 










Does Tradition Deserve to Survive?  
Introduction 
This chapter addresses a major contradiction emerging from previous theoretical 
discussions. As Chapter 1 argued, active participation and engagement with politics is 
unthinkable without the existence of a common world, shaped by (common) bonding 
memories, by a collective identity, which provides to heterogeneous groups a reason for 
existence and a sense of common purpose, allowing them to function as a people, as a 
political entity. In addition, Chapter 4 spoke about the threats of the so-called ‘cultural 
decomposition’, of the loss of collective identity (or uprootedness) as a consequence of the 
nihilism of permissive liberalism. Cultural decomposition led to the destruction of the 
common world and, subsequently, to the emergence of nostalgia and idolatry (Chapter 4). 
The annihilation of common ideas, the annihilation of the common world, creates cracks 
in the inner walls of our mind, walls that protect the logismikon from the forces of the 
underworld. In the absence of a common world that could keep the restless human wonder 
preoccupied with meaningful objects (see Chapter 2109), the pathways for the latter to 
intrude into the underworld of dark passions (pathos), awakening mēnis and hubris. 
Eventually, pathos capitalises on the urgency to retrieve the lost roots and invents an 
imaginary (and idealised) past. The nostalgic mind shapes images of a past that never 
actually existed (Brown 2012: 26), and strives to resurrect this past, this utopian lost world 
supposedly emancipated from the cultural impasses of the present. Furthermore, Chapter 
2110, by bringing to the discussion the problem of the passive (habitual) reproduction of 
negative prejudices (incarnated within a popular culture) and Chapter 5, while examining 
Martin Luther King Jr’s campaign against racial segregation in the American South, 
warned that collective identities are liable to slip over into jingoism, racism and/or 
nativism. Collective identities often become theologised, to use Arato’s terms (2013); they 
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and judgment). 
110  See the second part of the second section: Tradition and bonding memory: the construction 




incite idolatry, ‘the error which attributes a sacred character to the collectivity’, one of ‘the 
commonest of crimes, at all times, at all places’ (Weil 2005: 76). To summarise: collective 
identities (and bonding memories) are necessary a) for bringing political bodies into 
existence (without which action is never possible), and b) for protecting communities and 
individuals from the threats of uprootedness and nihilism. How, nonetheless, could they be 
emancipated from negative prejudices and from ‘warlike instincts’, to use Weil’s (1987a) 
words? In order to respond to this impasse the following sections discuss further the 
distinction between the Aristotelian concept of ethesi (or memory) and custom (a 
distinction initially discussed in Chapter 2). They elucidate the process whereby public 
judgment, logos, eucosmia and active participation (the populism of the vita civile) assign 
to collective identities changeable symbolic meanings and prevent them from becoming 
mere habits or even idolised objects that satisfy egoistic pursuits. 
When it comes to the importance of bonding memory in action, Arendt has brought 
to our attention two Latin verbs, agere and gerere. The first is synonymous with leading, 
with constituting, with setting something into motion, with beginning and archein (άρχειν) 
(Arendt 1968a: 165; 1998: 177; 189). The second, gerere (from gero), means to endure 
(Cicero 1961: 189; 347; Arendt 1968a: 165; 1998: 189) and, most of all, to memorise. 
Thus, gerere often connotes heritage, ‘obligation to one’s predecessors’ (B. J. Smith 1985: 
58, ff.58), or ‘durability and continuity’ (Arendt 1990: 95). Ιt connotes ‘continuation of 
past acts whose results are the res gestae, the deeds and events we call historical’ (Arendt 
1968a: 165); ‘[f]or it is true that all thought’ and hence, all forms of action (agere) ‘begins 
with remembrance’ (Arendt 1990: 220). According to B. J. Smith (1985), Arendt in her 
effort to save action, downplayed the principle of agere (58, ff.58). By discarding gerere 
altogether, adds the same author, Arendt discarded a set of crucial concepts revolving 
around this principle (ibid). To a degree, gerere is linked to genealogy; it refers to tradition 
and memory, to concepts of the past that still have value for us, to ideals that continue 
influencing our words and deeds. In fact, populist outbreaks and revolutions have always 
drawn vigor and sustenance from the past, from ‘the myth or memory of a golden age’, 
widely echoed in the aims and pursuits of those who are directly involved in such events 
(Lasch 1991b: xvii). As Craig Calhoun (2007) claimed, ‘[p]eople put the culture they have 




As a matter of fact, we have already spotted behind the cooperative movement certain 
ideals of American republicanism, which began to spread in the New World during the 
‘golden age’ of the Revolution. 
The first section of this chapter elaborates further on the genealogy of 
anthropocentric ideas of classical republicanism initially emerging during the Greek and 
Roman antiquity until the American Revolution (see the previous chapter), and from the 
Declaration to King’s campaign for peace and reconciliation. Some of these ideas 
(enshrined and conserved in the civil memory of the collectivity of ‘the American people’) 
to a degree, had been invoked by King during the Civil Rights Movement: the ‘thousands 
of Negro students who have challenged the principalities of segregation’ wrote King 
(1986), [t]heir courageous and disciplined activities’ that came ‘as a refreshing oasis in a 
desert sweltering with the heat of injustice’ had taken ‘the whole nation back to those great 
wells of democracy which were dug deep by the Founding Fathers in the formulation of 
the Constitution and Declaration of Independence’ (103). King’s exposure to the religious 
spirituality of the black church—a product of a long tradition that had given, to many 
Southern African Americans during the antebellum era, strength and reason to hope—
formulated a synthesis of American republicanism and Christianity, which influenced 
decisively the course of the whole movement. To make a long story short, the main purpose 
of this analysis is to emphasise the value of ‘pastness’, the importance of remembrance, of 
collective identity and culture (as means of gerere) for action (agere). Simultaneously, this 
analysis (which continues in the second section) highlights the practical fruits of public 
judgment, namely, of the ability to identify within the same culture the: a) obscene elements 
that must be rejected, b) concepts, ideas, gestures and norms that have to be re-evaluated 
in order to be amended and, c) all these elements we deem valuable and, consequently, are 
ought to be cherished and conserved. The third section sheds new light on the process 
whereby public judgment is stimulated by eucosmia, which highlights the practical benefits 
of action and logos. In turn, logos constitutes common values and concepts (bonding 
memories) subjects to public mediation, to open debates and dialogue. In the political 
realm, the ‘common people’ can re-examine, re-evaluate and re-define the significance of 
these (common) concepts; they can determine whether or not these bounding memories 




and dissent emancipate collective identities and cultures from indecent elements, 
dissociating the need for roots, the need to acknowledge the value ‘pastness’ and heritage 
(bonding memory), from the passive endorsement of (morally) indecent norms a particular 
heritage potentially embodies, we should examine the gravity of the past itself in the 
process of shaping present attitudes.    
 
Why memory matters 
1) American Populism: the genealogy of a concept 
According to the method of genealogy, a certain historical moment (X) constitutes 
a 'pedigree' of other past events; genealogy traces the influence of these events in the X 
(Chapter 1). Thus, in all forms of political action elements of the deep past directly (or 
indirectly) find expression. Action is always historicised. It is a product of gerere, of 
bonding (civil or cultural) memory, which is also subject to historicity. Bonding memory, 
in other words, is reflected within the identity of each collectivity. It is shaped by 
perceptions that consecutive (historical) events and experiences have created (civil bonding 
memory), or by concepts, gestures and traditions (cultural bonding memory) created 
spontaneously in dissimilar moments in the history of a community from the beginning of 
its existence until the present time. Bonding memory is always internalised; it manifests 
itself in the public realm and creates new events (through human interaction). These events 
generate their own experiences and ideas. In turn, all these new ideas and experiences will 
be memorised and internalised. They will manifest themselves in public mobilisations and 
will generate new ideas and/or experiences. This process repeats itself ad infinitum. Let us 
elaborate further on the concept of (bonding) memory (from a genealogical point of view).  
As Chapter 2 claimed, objects removed from sight are stored in memory; they 
remain vivid reflections in our imagination (Hobbes 2006: 9). Unseen objects are also 
retrievable through narration. At this stage, let us divide bonding (civil and cultural) 
memory into two groups: physical and immaterial, to use Nora’s (1996) terms, collective 
memory. Physical (or material) collective memory immortalises historical events and 
popular folkways. It is physical since it is made up by artificial objects, such as books, 
photographs, paintings, and as Nora (1996) observed, of statues, monuments, buildings and 




these objects allows those who have not witnessed such events to acquire knowledge about 
them. Consider, at this stage, the following assertion: according to Plato ‘even the walls of 
the city educate children and citizens’ (mentioned by Castoriadis 2007c: 176). In short, the 
walls of the city, or even its monuments and buildings, are ‘artificial objects’ within which 
aspects of a common past is immortalised. These objects contain valuable (and often 
educational) information concerning past events to those who have not experienced them.. 
Furthermore, narration enunciates these events and transforms them into immaterial 
objects. They become immaterial so long as they do not exist anymore physically. In short, 
they become stories and function as an immaterial collective memory. As the individual 
thinking ego is always in contact with the reservoir of our memory (where perceptions, 
concepts and ideas are stored), in short, with memorised objects which define our identity 
and constitute an integral characteristic of ‘who we are’, shaping and determining our 
personal and collective mode of being, likewise the collective thinking ego retrieves from 
the storehouse of the immaterial collective memory such (immaterial) objects. Since (as 
mentioned earlier) the sum of these objects find expression in most public manifestations 
(including mobilisations), we understand that the past co-exists with the present and 
remains constantly alive. With this in mind, we will discuss further the rise and fall of the 
Populist (cooperative) movement. 
As Taggart (2002) pointed out, the movement had ‘embodied, articulated and 
mobilized embedded populist motifs that run deeply through US politics’ (26). According 
to Canovan (1981), the ‘bucolic’ farmers of the impoverished hinterlands, those who gave 
birth to the Alliance and helped the People’s Party raise to the top, were ‘heirs of a culture 
that stresses independence, self-help, and the ability of a man … to get on in the world by 
enterprise and effort’ (18). They were heirs of a democratic tradition, partially reverberated 
through these populist motifs, being essential aspects of the American national psyche. 
More precisely, such ‘motifs’ are reflections of what Anthony Smith (1991) called 
‘common historical myths’ (14), deeply enshrined within a national memory (Canovan 
2005: 30), the (physical and immaterial) memory of the ‘American people’ (in our case). 
This bonding (civil) memory lies in the underpinnings of the American collective identity, 
shaped by the republican ideas of the Revolution, for which ‘the plain people’ must always 




cooperative movement appealed to a common heritage (Goodwyn 1976: 614). It appealed 
to ‘the original ideas of the American Revolution as creating a republic of self-governing 
farmers’ (Taggart 2002: 37). It incorporated elements of anti-monopolism and artisanal 
republicanism (or producerism), which were essential ‘part[s] of the cultural heritage of 
antebellum farmers and artisans’ (McMath 1992: 7). It re-discovered the republican values 
of civic virtue, the Protestant moral tradition (McMath 1992: 112; Postel 2007: 7) and 
elements of classical liberalism, attempting ‘to fashion an alternative modernity’ suitable 
to the interests of the farmers (Postel 2007: 4). As Müller (2016) argued, ‘Thomas Jefferson 
from the start’ constructed a producerist and republican discourse ‘that would be revived 
by many political rhetoricians defending the rights of the hardworking majority’ (86), such 
as the Populists themselves. Furthermore, the Populist fears towards unregulated capitalism 
echo the fear many early American Revolutionaries shared, the fear that unrestrained 
capital accumulation in the hands of an oligarchy would undermine American freedom 
(Miller 1959: 502). As many American Revolutionaries claimed, financial monopolies 
would put American farmers and workers (once victorious against British absolutism) 
under the yoke of new despots (Miller 1959: 502). According to McMath (1992), during 
the late nineteenth century Henry George and Edward Bellamy articulated discourses 
appealing to the ‘common sense of many ordinary Americans’ who felt that the initial 
principles of the Revolution were being undermined by industrialisation, uncontrolled 
capital accumulation and large property ownership (111). As with Henry George (2006), 
‘[i]n many places today, a Washington, a Franklin, or a Jefferson could not even get into 
the state legislature’ (291). George (2006) sought to revert ‘the [popular] idea that land is 
the common right of the people of a country’ (255). This idea, he believed, would have 
wiped away ‘repressive governments’ and ‘standing armies’ (ibid); in turn, the American 
nation would have approached ‘the ideal of Jeffersonian democracy’ (ibid). 
From what we already know, Foucauldian genealogy rejects the idea of ursprung 
and, instead, proposes herkunft (Chapter 1). It prompts us to trace the roots of political 
concepts and projects that decisively influenced the philosophy of the American Founding 
Fathers to cultural and political realities emerging a few centuries before the events of 
1776. In other words, the (proto-anthropocentric) thinking behind the American Revolution 




and modes of being enshrined in the collective civil (immaterial) memory of the American 
colonists (gerere). First and foremost, we should note that in comparison to most modern 
revolutionary movements, which sought ‘to give political form to the human capacity for 
beginning anew’, the American Revolution was a remarkable exception (Fine 2014: 220); 
the latter did not strive to emancipate mankind from the social ills of the old order once 
and for all (as the previous chapter made clear). This was perfectly ‘exemplified by the 
French revolutionary calendar in which the year of the execution of the king was counted 
as Year One’ (ibid). Instead, the American Revolution ‘has always seemed to be an 
unusually intellectual and conservative affair’ (Wood 2003: 58). Its relative conservatism 
‘lay[s] in its refusal to partake in the pathos of novelty’ (Fine 2004: 224). In contrast, the 
French revolutionaries by destroying libraries, churches and religious emblements on the 
high roads (Kropotkin 1971: 519-21) attacked physical bonding (cultural and civil) 
memory. By uprooting old religious norms and old traditions (B. J. Smith 1985: 230; Weil 
1987a: 86-7; 103; 105), by annihilating physical bonding memory they attempted to 
destroy the national ‘bond of union’ in its ‘ancient edifice’ (Burke 1968: 106) and ‘the 
whole original fabric of society’ (192). Far from expressing interest for ‘new things’, 
instead of making a radical ‘break with the American past’ (Miller 1959: xvii) the 
American Revolutionaries aspired to recover ‘old rights and liberties’ (Arendt 1990: 141), 
preserving a line of political heritage they thought was severely undermined by the British 
aristocracy (Wood 2003: 58) and (more precisely) by the Coercive Acts (passed by the 
British Parliament in 1774), ‘designed to curtail popular participation in normal political 
affairs’ (Breen 2019: 35). As a matter of fact, ‘the British government had repeatedly 
intervened in the colonies to save the aristocracy from the common people’, from the 
‘“giddy-headed multitude”’, the ‘“damned villains”’, the ‘“loud unlettered orators of the 
republican tribe”’ (Miller 1959: 499).  
More to the point: democratic republicanism in America begins with the Mayflower 
Compact; the Pilgrims, who arrived to the New World from England sought to escape the 
clerical oppression of the British Crown (Bowers 1954: 4; Hartz 1955: 3; Arendt 1990: 
167; 230; 319; Kloppenberg 2016: 92) and ‘drew up a code’, recognised as ‘the bill of 
rights’, written as early as 1636 (Bailyn 1976: 194). According to Kloppenberg (2016), the 




remarkable autonomy’ from the British Parliament (93); in New England ‘they developed 
their own practices of popular government’ (92); they followed the principles of English 
nonconformity (81) and, more specifically, the Christian ethic of love, equity and 
reciprocity, ‘on which they based the institutions of self-government they created’ (88). 
The ‘fundamental principle of this most British colony in America’, claims Tocqueville 
(1994) was the development and spread of a democratic tradition that emphasised the 
sovereignty of the people. This form of popular sovereignty was practiced in the townships 
of New England, ‘constituted as early as 1650’ (1: 40). The townships ‘Tocqueville 
discovered in 1830’ were a ‘natural product’ of small communities dominated by a class 
of ‘independent farmers’ (Magnusson 2015: 35), which Revolution later put in the forefront 
(Taggart 2002: 37). More importantly, the townships embodied a local tradition premised 
on self-governance’ (Gustafson 2011: 6) and ‘gave scope to the activity of a real political 
life, thoroughly democratic and republican’ (19). In the town of New Haven, founded in 
1643 by the London minister John Davenport, the colonists experienced direct democracy; 
freemen elected twelve individuals for magistrates and, later on, selected seven by lot 
(Kloppenberg 2016: 85). As Magnusson (2015) points out, the autonomy of the English 
villages ‘was continued in northern American colonies under conditions that encouraged 
democratization’ (Magnusson 2015: 35). In New England ‘the law of representation was 
not adopted’, writes Tocqueville (1994), and ‘the affairs of the community were discussed, 
as at Athens, in the marketplace, by a general assembly of citizens’ (1: 40). According to 
Wood (2004), several ideas from the classical antiquity—revived by the Renaissance 
writers (particularly Machiavelli)—had been carried into seventeenth-century English 
thought’ (92) as a henkfurt. They survived through books, pamphlets, or through popular 
folkways and oral tradition (physical memory). From the middle of the eighteenth century, 
Bishop Berkeley’s conventional idea that the ‘western cycle of empire from the Middle 
East to Greece, from Greece to Rome, from Rome to western Europe, and from western 
Europe across the Atlantic to the New World’ (metakénosis, in my terms) was set forth 
(97). Jefferson and his heirs praised Demosthenes, Cicero, ‘the supreme orators of 
antiquity’ (Bowers 1954, p.5) and (of course) Machiavelli, the ‘father of American 
populism’ (Pocock 1989a, p.98). They scorned Plato for his ‘continued popularity on elitist 




Back to the agrarian movement: apart being a synthesis of (classical and modern) 
republicanism, of Jeffersonian democracy and Christianity, it incorporated (and further 
promoted) elements of Southern (paleo)conservatism (Clanton 1991: 40). Southern 
conservatism opposed progressivism and rejected the liberal and industrial lifestyle of the 
American North, which they considered solvent to family, community and tradition 
(Genovese 1994: 12; 31). Southern (paleo)conservatives invoked the Burkean ‘resistance 
to innovation’ that presented ‘the stamp of our forefathers’ (Burke 1968: 181). Let us bring 
to our mind again to the notion of public judgment, referring to the critical re-evaluation of 
given social conventions and institutions, in short, to our capacity of identifying and 
aborting those we deem morally ‘indecent’. The more public judgment fades, the more 
laxes our ability ‘to make intelligent use of the past’ (Lasch 1991a: 82), to evaluate and 
abort inherited (morally indecent) norms and values, consolidated within a framework of 
cultural conventions. As Chapter 2 argued (while reflecting on Lasch’s TTOH), this 
Burkean insistence on the ‘stamp of our forefathers’, in the passive reproduction of 
inherited norms and customary values (a process Burke himself thought to be protective 
for nations against internal divisions), may lead to the uncritical acceptance of all sorts of 
cultural ‘indecencies’, such as white supremacy, whose persistence in the post-bellum 
South is visible through an emerging nostalgia for the Lost Cause, as recorded by Paul 
Outka (2008), through a persistent belief that life under the slave-holding agrarian regime 
was in many ways superior to that introduced by the industrialised liberal North. 
Notwithstanding the victory of the Union and the end of slavery might suggest radical 
changes, Outka’s (2008) observations concerning the way literary works (mainly novels 
and poems) of great popularity, produced by Southern whites, works depicting the latter’s 
‘antebellum trauma’ through a mood of intense nostalgia for the Lost Cause and 
romanticise the old plantation as a sunny blissful Eden (85; ; 91-2; 95), reveal that the racist 
sentimentality in the South was salvaged. In the old plantation ‘everyone knew their place 
and was happy in it, where the magnolia- and rose-scented land around the gracious big 
house produced bountiful harvests, wise masters, beautiful mistresses … and childlike 
“servants”’ (85). The ‘lands around the plantation were preternaturally lush and fertile, and 
that slaves liked being slaves’ (86). Outka (2008) speaks of the ‘trauma contagion’, of the 




as an aristocratic racial Eden’ (83), were spread through ‘chain[s] of transmission’ and 
found acceptance in wide audiences in the South and the North (84).  
As we see, white supremacy remained deeply engraved in the customs and the 
institutions not only of the Old South but almost in every ‘sector of American society’ 
(Goodwyn 1976: 276), ‘[N]o region of the country was insulated from a slowly 
consolidating attitude that was overtly anti-black’ (ibid). In what follows I elucidate the 
reasons this persistence of white supremacy prevented the spread of American Populism. 
We will return to the discussion concerning the way custom, as opposed to memory (or 
ἔθεσι), could mitigate public judgment.  
2) Custom, memory and ἔθεσι 
In order to avoid unfair and biased conclusions, we must initially make references 
to the positive contribution the Populist movement had for racial desegregation and 
reconciliation. The Alliance and the People’s Party ‘represented a politics of hope, not one 
of hate, and thus ‘appealed to the best instincts of the voter rather than the worst’ (Goodwyn 
1976: 285). The Alliance sought to bring together black and white farmers. Alliancemen 
and alliancewomen built up networks of interracial cooperation. They encouraged white 
farmers to learn ‘their radical lessons’, moving away from the party of the Confederacy 
(279). Black and white Southern Populists made efforts to ‘unite “the people” across racial 
lines against “the monopolies”’ (Canovan 1981: 55). The biracial Knights of Labor united 
black and white farmers (McMath 1992:87; Postel 2007: 39). The leaders of the People’s 
Party campaigned for ‘a free government … built upon the love of the whole people’ 
(quoted by Clanton 1991: 2), against ‘the prejudices from the Civil War along partisan 
lines’ (Argersinger 1974: 10). The Omaha Platform, which later on became ‘the bible of 
the movement’ (Clanton 1991: 82), appealed ‘to reason and not to prejudice’ (75) and 
called for ‘“every passion and resentment which grew out of it to die with it”’ (quoted by 
Clanton 1991: 2). ‘“[W]e [black and white farmers] must be in fact … one united 
brotherhood of freemen’ (ibid), fighting for a common interest (Goodwyn 1976: 284-94; 
297; Canovan 1981: 29).  
Tom Watson, one of the key founders of the People’s Party in the state of Georgia 
in early 1892, ‘the first native white Southern leader of importance to treat the Negro’s 




‘appealed for justice for the eight million oppressed black citizens’ (Clanton 1991: 133). 
He believed that blacks and whites had been conditioned to ‘hate each other because upon 
that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of financial despotism which enslaves you 
both’ (quoted by Woodward 1938: 220). Racial antagonisms, he claimed, perpetuate ‘a 
monetary system which beggars both’ (ibid). For Watson, ‘to “make lynch law odious to 
the people” … should be the object of the Populist Party’ (Woodward 1938: 221). William 
Alfred Peffer (a populist leader in Kansas) stood against legislation ‘motivated by sectional 
hatred’, by white supremacy (more precisely) and ‘maintained that the Kansas Alliance 
and Populists made no racial distinctions’ urging the Southerners to act likewise, ‘realizing 
that the interests of the oppressed transcended color’ (Argersinger 1974: 90). R.M. 
Humphrey, of the Superintendent of the Colored Farmers Alliance, argued that ‘the colored 
people are part of the people and they must be recognized as such’ (Goodwyn 1976: 290). 
Rueben Kold, an ardent Jeffersonian, favoured the ‘protection of the colored race in their 
political rights’ (295). Henry Vincent attempted to create a multi-sectional front, uniting 
blacks and whites, rural and urban populations (411-12). In Kansas, more specifically 
‘Populist interracial efforts’ sought to keep alive ‘the Abolitionist sympathies of many of 
the old-time Greenbackers’ who had joined the party (304). ‘Never before or since have 
the two races in the South come so close together as they did during the Populist struggles’, 
claims Woodward (1938: 222).  
Nonetheless, the issue of race, although being ‘irrelevant to the massive problems 
the nation confronted in industrialization … because of their emotional content’ 
(Argersinger 1974: 305) and because of their persistence in the Southern tradition (as 
mentioned earlier) could ‘mobilize electorates’ (Argersinger 1974: 306).  A significant 
portion of the white population never stopped to associate ‘corruption’ with ‘the mere 
presence of blacks in the structure of government’ (Goodwyn 1976: 278).  The dedication 
of many Southern whites to the Democratic Party, the party of white supremacy (Clanton 
1991: 61), erected a formidable barrier to the People’s Party, once the former  defended 
popular requests (free-silver) already pushed forward by the latter (see the previous 
chapter). Thus, Southern whites and white Alliance leaders found in the party of the 
Confederacy, the party of ‘The Lost Cause’ (39), a political voice in support of their 




8; Clanton 1991: 39). Simultaneously, they saw the Democratic Party itself a ‘safe haven’ 
for their white racial sensibilities. Thus, white supremacy and free silver formed a chain of 
equivalence, to use Laclau’s terms111, between the People’s Party and the Democrats. This 
resulted in the gradual expansion and consolidation of the latter’s dominance and 
hegemony in the entire South. 
The persistence of white supremacy, which led to the collapse of the collapse of 
Populism, highlights the reasons heritage and tradition should be better understood as a 
sum of (bonding) memories, rather than customs, passively reproduced. ‘The behavior of 
the person of custom is, by and large, habitual. To the question “Why?” he is part to respond 
simply, “This is the way it has always been done” (B. J. Smith 1985: 15). Instead, memory 
treats the past and the inherited norms as means of gerere. When the thinking ego retrieves 
from memory stored representations and ideas, wonder reflects upon them: this condition 
(nóēsis) could hinder the passive, unconscious (behavioral) and/or aggressive (due to the 
dictates of mēnis) endorsement of such representations. Therefore, as Lasch (1991a) 
claimed, memory is ‘dialectic’ (131). It is capable of judgment, of identifying the exact 
cultural elements that incite hubris, and defy the basic principles of common decency and, 
for this reason, must be thrown away once and for all. Thus, to recognise the value of 
certain elements deriving from the Southern tradition, like the notion of individual 
responsibility, the simplicity of manners, the explicit abhorrence to centralisation 
(Genovese 1994), so long as they incorporate elements required for the emergence of 
democratic political bodies, does not come at the price of embracing white supremacy, an 
enormity that deserves to perish once and for all. 
Let us recall, at this stage, King’s (1986) famous speech, in which he evokes a 
vision of ‘the sons of former slaves and sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit 
down together at the table of brotherhood’ (219), a vision that could be ‘realised only when, 
those descendants, black and white, can meet with mutual respect and appreciation for the 
greatness, as well as the evil, that has gone into the making of the South’ (Genovese 1994: 
xii). The task of bringing together the finest elements not only of the Southern tradition but 
also of the entire American nation (bridging bonding memory, let us call it), was among 
 




the highest priorities of King’s campaign for decency and reconciliation: ‘[w]e will win 
our freedom because the sacred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God are 
embodied in our echoing demands’ (King 1986: 301; my emphasis). King was constantly 
making references to the ‘Founding Fathers’ of the American nation, rejecting, at the same 
time, the separatists and black nationalists who had ‘lost faith in America’ (King 2000: 
100). To avoid misunderstandings: this form of ‘sacredness’ has nothing to do with 
political theologies—in Arato’s (2013) terms—that attribute godlike powers to ‘the people’ 
and ‘the nation’, ascribing to these entities proportions which can never be called into 
question. Instead, it refers to the ‘sacred’ yearning for roots, as among the most vital needs 
of the soul (Weil 1987a: 4; 41; 49; 79). This transcendent attribution to the yearning for 
belonging does not have to be accompanied by some absolutist ideology operating as a 
hidden God behind ‘the nation’ and ‘heritage’. God can be only used here as a symbol of 
order, ‘the first of the soul’s need’ (Weil 1987a: 9). The need for order and the need for 
roots are correlated. The former requires a solid and stable empirical world for individuals 
to feel ‘naturally included’, a world that also protects the human soul from ‘spiritual 
violence’ (10) by impeding wonder from meddling with the underground mind, from 
wandering ‘in obscurity’, to use Tocqueville’s (1994, 2: 331) words again. Order is shaped 
and preserved by interactions, by ‘a texture of social relations’ (Weil 1987a: 9) that erect 
fences against the menace of uprootedness (see Chapter 4), of what King (1986) had called 
as ‘a degenerating sense of “nobodiness”’ that African Americans were experiencing, 
‘living constantly at tiptoe stance never quite knowing what to expect next, and plagued 
with inner fears and outer resentments’ (293). 
 King’s emphasis on the need to be rooted, on the need to be ‘recognised’, to have 
‘natural participation’ in the life of a community which ‘preserves in living space certain 
particular treasures of the past’ (Weil 1987a: 41) is evident in many of his speeches and 
sermons. He often makes reference to memory and tradition ‘by quoting in full the famous 
song “America,” or “My Country ’Tis of Thee”’ (Nussbaum 2013: 238). King denounced 
the white segregationists who did not represent ‘our beloved Southland’ (King 1986: 292) 
and honoured ‘the best in the Southern heritage’, insisting that ‘“we Southerners, Negro 
and white, must no longer permit our nation and our heritage to be dishonored before the 




Negro?’ asks King (2000: xii). ‘[H]ad their forebears done some tragic injury to the nation, 
and was the curse of punishment upon the black race? … Had they shirked in their duty as 
patriots, betrayed their country, denied their national birthright? Had they refused to defend 
their land against a foreign foe?’ (ibid). King articulates a discourse of civic patriotism, 
‘foregrounding the best values to which America may be thought to be committed, and also 
deeply and explicitly critical, showing that America has failed to live up to her ideals’ 
(Nussbaum 2013: 239). He understood very well that a political movements in order to 
succeed must make  references to the nation as a common space, as ‘a particularist home 
base’, to use Canovan’s (2992: 34) words, and as a source of action (gerere). Extensive 
commentary on the way common spaces (nations) can offer a solid basis for interactions 
that also create common ties, will take place in the next section. The process through which 
eucosmia, with its emphasis on action and logos, makes a collective identity subject to 
public judgment, breaking (therefore) rigid attachments that often stir up collective 
egoisms, will be extensively discussed. 
Gerere, collective identity and eucosmia 
1) Time and space and bonding memory 
Memory and thinking require a texture of prolonged communal relations that create 
memorable events which, later on, become reference points (gerere) for all sorts of action. 
All such events ‘take place in time and space and we have only sense and memory to tell 
us of their occurrence’ (Pocock 1989a: 155). As Kant (2007) puts it, time is not only ‘a 
necessary representation that underlies all intuitions’, a source that ‘determines the relation 
of representations in our inner state’ but also ‘the formal a priori condition of all 
appearances in general’ (67). As our intuition ‘is always sensible, no object can ever be 
given to us in experience which is not subject to the condition of time’ (Kant 2007: 70-71). 
Both time and space constitute the two ‘sources of knowledge from which a variety of 
synthetic knowledge can be drawn a priori’ (73). For James (1980), ‘[m]emory gets strewn 
with dated things—dated in the sense of being before or after each other’ (270). However, 
the exact date of an event is conceived as an interval between two other events; it is, in 
other words, ‘a mere relation of before or after the present thing or some past or future 




between let us say, England ‘as simply to the eastward’ of Charleston which is ‘lying south’ 
(ibd). We date an event ‘by fitting it between two terms of a past or future series explicitly 
conceived, just as we may accurately think of England or Charleston being just so many 
miles away’ (ibid).  
Consider, at this stage, the following assertion: part of the lifespan of an individual 
(person A) may coincide with the part of the lifespan of another (person B); but it is 
possible for both individuals to be born and die at a slightly different time, but they can 
share a certain amount (of time) together. There is, hence, a simultaneity that either refers 
to the coincident time or to common time:  
1) In coincident time there is no interplay between person A and B, and hence, no 
common images and representations are created, as long as these persons are not 
members of the same community (they may also be located in different parts of the 
world), and do not exchange physical contact or interaction, neither share the 
memories. The actions of A have no impact in the B’s life.  
2) Common time: which involves a) direct interaction between two (or more) groups 
and persons, or b) indirect, when persons (or groups) A, B, C (et al.) absorb and 
share the same sum of empirical knowledge, notwithstanding these individuals do 
not exchange contact on a daily basis. Imagine that two or more persons (or groups) 
experience the same war. In the event they have joined the same battle (even in 
opposing camps/ideologies), we could assume their interaction is direct. However, 
when these individuals (or groups) experience the same war but do not fight against 
each other in a battlefield, we could call this interaction indirect. Consider, for 
example, a Confederate and a Union supporter, one located in New York and the 
other in Mississippi. Both are Americans. Presumably, they share different 
worldviews, different ways of life and vote for political candidates whose 
objectives are dissimilar (if not diametrically opposite). Their moves and choices 
could affect the general direction of their nation. However, in the event these 
individuals are not acting (even against each other) within a space, sharing physical 
contact, we can speak of indirect interaction. Common (or public) time creates 
images and memorial objects, which the thinking ego retrieves from the storehouse 




So to return to James’ analysis, we can assert that the perception of commonness 
through time is made by considering the existence of time-intervals, namely the existence 
of time-boundaries that separate two or more events. In turn, this process requires 
classification. More to the point: by identifying between two past (political or otherwise) 
events (A and C) another (event B) and by asserting these events are the outcome of direct 
or indirect interactions, the consequence A, B and C is perceived as a historical line within 
which groups of individuals find meaningful and bonding concepts. But as it seems, 
common time is unthinkable without a space of common interactions; space is ‘well suited 
to contain memories—to hold and preserve them’ and hence memory becomes attached to 
the same space ‘wherein the past can revive and survive’ (Casey 1987: 186). While it is 
self-evident that the acknowledgment of time-intervals ascribes to time itself a sense of 
tangibility, a sense of realness, perceptibility, and therefore measurability, this realness is 
purely a discovery of the mind. To an extent, Spengler’s (1961) assertions that time (unlike 
space) ’cannot be thought of categorically’, that civilisations which have reached a stage 
‘of mechanical Nature’ are capable of measuring time and, finally, this measured image of 
time is comprehensible only within spatial limits (93), seems valid. Time always remains 
‘an abstract product of measurement … as opposed to space which can be empirically 
experienced directly through our senses’ (ibid). For Kant (2007), in order ‘certain 
sensations [to] be referred to something outside me … the representation of space must 
already be at the basis. … Space is, subsequently, regarded as the condition of the 
possibility of appearances…’ (73). In other words, ‘[s]pace is nothing but the form of all 
appearances of outer sense; i.e., it is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which 
alone outer intuition is possible for us’ (64). 
Thus, physical spaces constitute the primary basis upon which communicative 
interactions (common time that is, public or political time) can occur. What we call 
‘tradition’, an ‘essential feature of society’ (Pocock 1989a: 233), is a summary of 
memorised concepts and ideas generated through these direct interactions (public time), 
which include celebrations, events concerning civic education, religious worship and other 
customary practices. These memorised concepts convert such spatially defined territories 
from vague geographical places without substantial meaning into ‘mnemonic 




linked ideas and concepts (like democracy and justice) to such physical (mnemonic) 
landscapes; in the end of his legendary ‘I Have a Dream’ speech when he mentions the 
‘Stone Mountain of Georgia’, ‘the mighty mountains of New York’, the Mississippi river, 
the ‘hilltops of New Hampshire’ (King 1986: 220); he ‘moralize[s] geography’ (Nussbaum 
2013: 238); ‘the mountains of New York are now not just mountains, they are sites of 
freedom’ (ibid). 
Since memory and place intersect, it is common for the sum of meaningful concepts 
ascribed to the former to be conceived as being one and the same with the latter. To put it 
another way, the mind understands the landscape as a solid representation of the meaning 
produced by such concepts and ideas, as well as by the interactions that have produced the 
same ideas. Through common (or public) time ‘indefinite series of repetitions of an action’ 
are performed ‘on the assumption that [they] has been performed before’ according to the 
same author, providing ‘the grounds for assuming that [they] had a predecessor’ (Pocock 
1989a: 237). Nations, according to Nora (1996), or even cities, small towns and villages, 
as Winter (2006) pointed out112,  can be sources of such (a common) space of ‘shared 
communications about the meaning of the past’ (Kansteiner 2002: 188) obtained through 
direct and, most likely, indirect interactions, through agonal and narrative action. 
Consider, for example, Benedict Anderson’s (1983) views on the way members of a nation, 
of an ‘imagined community’, do not exchange direct contact with their each other, do not 
‘meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
community’ (15). Through such indirect interactions the character, the temperament and 
the identity of ‘the people’ (of the sum of all persons inhabiting within such a common 
space), is shaped and meaningful concepts are created, absorbed,  reproduced and ascribed 
in their perceptions and gestures. These concepts are immaterial memorable objects, 
adopted and shared by all those who are considered part of the nation, part of ‘the same 
people’, of the same collective entity. They are cultural artifacts capable of creating deep 
attachments (14). But while the existence of such common spaces (nations, for example) 
is vital for the conservation of a common identity, premised on bonding memories (without 
which no ‘people’ and, hence, no public-political realm can emerge), at the same time ‘the 
 




brutal character of the behaviour of all human collectives, and the power of self-interest 
and collective egoism in all intergroup relations’ (Niebuhr 1960: xx) has legitimised fear 
and apprehension for particularism (Lasch 1991a: 376). In what follows this issue will be 
further discussed, elucidating the prospects of the vita civile to promote a ’sophisticated … 
understanding of nationhood’, to use Canovan’s (1992: 31) words, emancipated from 
collective egoisms.  
2) Eucosmia, logos and ‘dignity’ 
We return to the antithesis between idolatry and eucosmia. Chapter 4 discussed the 
way nostalgia creates illusory images of a past world; nostalgia conceives this lost world 
not as an organic (and self-evolving) entity; it obsessively disparages the present instead 
of acknowledging it as a henkfurt, as an evolution of the past. It converts the latter into an 
idol, ‘stand[ing] outside time, frozen in unchanging perfection' (Lasch 1991a: 83). 
Eucosmia resists idealisation and idolisation so long as it advocates action, which (through 
logos) has the capacity to alter the identity of a human collectivity. Changeable objects 
(including human collectivities) are not static (or frozen) entities. They are organic and 
self-evolving. They are subjects to what Heraclitus (Ηράκλειτος 2020: 190) called as 
«μεταβολῆ» (metavolē), implying the constant self-alteration of things (192).  «[Π]άντα 
χωρεῖ και οὐδέν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ροῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὢς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτόν 
ποταμόν οὐκ ἄν ἐμβαίης» (‘everything flows and changes just like a river and,  thus, nobody 
can step twice into the same water stream’) (192). Although the river flows and changes it 
still remains a river. Thus, objects experiencing metavolē do not fully alter themselves; 
they retain aspects of their previous identity. Hence, despite the changes human 
collectivities undergo, simultaneously they are ‘felt to be mystically the same’, to use 
Orwell’s (1984: 76) words; they partially retain their already ascribed identities. 
Collectivities are neither static, fixed or immutable, nor fully liquid (to us Bauman’s terms) 
and hence undefinable, incapable of shaping a solid world of common meanings (due to 
the speediness of their self-modification). To return to my initial point: the chances for 
idolatry increases when the mind fails to perceive a popular identity as an organic 
(changeable) object, and instead, acknowledges the entire collectivity as a static entity, cast 
in stone. Public and political realms enhance the vitality of a collectivity as long as they 




creates the appropriate conditions for such identities to be mediated, reassessed, shaped 
(and reshaped), in short to be judged interminably. Commonly accepted norms and ideas, 
within which supremacist/egoistic perceptions (products of pathos) are incorporated, by 
being subject to public judgement, are constantly re-evaluated. Eventually, the chances for 
such perceptions to be ended effectively increase. However, dialogue presupposes 
differentiation and plurality of doxas, of opinions that come together and compete against 
each other. This plurality is better preserved when viewpoints and ideas are fractured down 
to the level of the individual. Let us dig deeper into this assertion:  
Consider, at this stage, Weil’s (2002) idea of metaxu (from the Greek μεταξύ, in-
between): ‘[t]wo prisoners whose cells adjoin communicate with each other by knocking 
on the wall. The wall is the thing which separates them but it is also their means of 
communication … Every separation is a link’ (145; emphasis added). In the same way, 
two (or more) individuals in a public space meet and discuss face to face. Disagreements 
(deriving from different worldviews, experiences, etc.) separate them. An invisible wall 
between them is erected. It is this particular wall, these intense disagreements, what links 
these individuals, what holds them together. For example, if person A disagrees with 
person B, this disagreement motivates further discussions. This separation/disagreement 
links brings them together until they reach a consensus. Since this disagreement is 
expressed through logos, we understand that the latter can be a means through which 
judgments and counter-judgments are enunciated. More importantly, logos preserves the 
existence of the common space, of the public-political realm, which links these two (or 
more) persons. In order to make better sense of this rationale we could introduce to the 
discussion the concept of auto-poietikos (or self-functioning) logos.  
The word autopoiesis is a compound. It derives from the word poiesis, meaning 
‘creation and ontological genesis’, that is through saying and representing at a certain 
moment in time (Castoriadis 2005: 3-4). Creation or poiesis is ‘“case of passage from non-
being to being”, that which “leads to a former non-being to a subsequent beingness 
(ousia)”’ (Castoriadis 2005: 197). The theory of autopoiesis has been developed by Chilean 
biologists, such as Francisco J. Varela, Humberto R. Maturana and Ricardo B. Uribe. It 
refers to the condition where living organisms (like cells) recursively via interactions create 




shape, define and determine the space within which both themselves, as well as the same 
networks, can exist (Καρκατσούλης 1995: 325-6 [Karkatsoulis 1995: 325-6]).  Thus, it 
makes itself capable of creating (poiein), of generating (and preserving), the (ontological) 
conditions within which a public or a political realm (as a space proper) can emerge. In 
addition, public-political realms are networks of interactions that generate further 
discussions. Thus, logos is able to procreate the means (the public-political realm) through 
which it can be reproduced perpetually. In that sense, logos is auto-poietikos. For example: 
in a political assembly (agonal action) or in a conversation taking place within spaces of 
narrative action, in taverns, cafés and salons or even in semi-public spaces (in gatherings 
between families), a speaker expresses a view that triggers responses. Those who challenge 
the speaker’s point could prompt the latter to express his/her disagreement with the 
counter-opinions expressed by those who stood against him/her. In turn, this could trigger 
further reactions and, thus, a chain of discussion is developed. In order for such discussions 
to continue the physical space within which such individuals could interact, a specially 
designed space that could host public assemblies, a public-political realm, in other words, 
must preserve its existence. However, when violence invades the political realm, that is, 
when the general rules that oblige all members of the assembly to rely on speech and 
persuasion rather than force, which for Arendt (1998) is a pre-political way of dealing with 
people’–a ‘characteristic of life outside the polis’ (26-7), or of cosmosystems, 
Contogeorgis (Κοντογιώργης 2006; 2020]) has called ‘despotic’–the self-perpetuation of 
logos is prevented. More precisely, the pathos for domination may prompt groups or 
individuals (members of the assembly) to usurp power in order to gratify their own 
ambitions. Considering they have successfully hijacked the political realm (in order to 
emerge into power), breaking all the rules of equal participation, they may have to resort 
to despotic means of repression against popular resistance. Central governments can also 
suspend public assemblies in the event they deem it necessary, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter while reflecting on the American and, more importantly, on the French 
Revolution. 
As we see, the concept of auto-poietikos logos allows us to shed light on the process 
whereby public-political realms can maintain their existence through disagreement,, which 




to metaxu,  to  ‘the [distance] in-between which always exists in human intercourse’, 
(Arendt 1990: 85), that is, to to the distance in-between opinion A and opinion B (or C, D, 
et al.), the in-between ‘worldly … space by which men are mutually related’ and is 
preserved by ‘power’ (175), by auto-poietikos alogos. Human beings in order to be 
separated (and linked, at the same time) must appear in these public spaces as distinct 
individuals. Opinions ‘never belong to groups but exclusively to individuals, who “exert 
their reason coolly and freely”’ … Opinions will rise wherever men communicate freely 
with one another and have the right to make their views public’ (227). Moreover, ‘no 
formation of opinion is ever possible where all opinions have become the same’ (225). 
Disagreements and differentiations could keep such discussions perpetuating. Consider, 
for example, the issue of abortion (in the United States), on which compromise is 
seemingly impossible (Lasch 19915a: 111; Matsusaka 2020: 7; 163). In the event these 
public discussions reach a consensus, there is yet no indication that such a compromise will 
necessarily prevent disagreements and disputes. For example, a public assembly may end 
up to the X conclusion and most of its members come to an agreement concerning the 
validity of this particular conclusion. They do not, however, impose restrictions against 
future disagreements.  
Before going over shedding light on the way autopoietikos logos (in relation to 
eucosmia) and disagreement creates fissures that open up spaces for popular identities to 
be altered gradually (instead of being conceived as static–inorganic–idols), we will have to 
apply a critical approach to Weil’s (1987a) view for a French patriotism predicated on 
compassion (proposed as an antidote to uprootedness). The reasons the fido amor (from 
where compassion derives) could possibly hinder action and individuality (in the same way 
as idolatry does), so long as it appears susceptible to the threats of ‘emotional 
foundationalism’ (see chapter 2), will be elucidated by elaborating on the dependent (or 
upeksousios) logos. In other words, logos is not simply autopoietikos. Upeksousios logos 
refers to the form of speech or language that, as Weil (1978; 65; 68) and Hauser (Chomsky 
2002: 76), diagnosed (from different angles), conveys thoughts (instead of being merely a 
means of communication). Thus, we find language (logos) under the authority of thinking 
and judging. 




(162) patriotism, seemingly free from any sort of ‘warlike energies’ (163). ‘Compassion 
for our country is the only sentiment which doesn’t strike a false note at the present time, 
suits the situation in which the souls and bodies of Frenchmen actually find themselves’ 
(165). It is ‘all the more tender, all the more poignant, the more good one is able to discern 
in the being who forms the object of it, and it predisposes one to discern the good’ (ibid). 
Compassion ‘strongly motivates altruism’ (Nussbaum 2013: 209) and observes ‘both the 
good and the bad’, seeking to find in each ‘sufficient reasons for loving’ (Weil 1987a: 165). 
This fraternal feeling of love keeps eyes ‘open to injustices, cruelties, mistakes’ (ibid) and 
crosses frontiers’, extending ‘itself over all countries in misfortune … without exception’ 
(166).  As mentioned above, upeksousios logos presupposes judgment, that is a critical 
evaluation of concepts and ideas received from our empirical world, upon which we can 
reflect and/or intuit, constructing axioms that will be phonologically transferred from the 
silent world of the human mind to the world of common appearances. In this respect, the 
deprivation of the logismikon by the forces of the fido amor (by the love of compassion), 
that is, the obstruction of our capacity to judge, could render logos impotent and 
superfluous113. Of course, as Chapter 2 argued–in agreement with Breithaupt (2019)–to be 
‘against’ compassion (or empathy) ‘would be simplistic’ (8). Therefore, one does not have 
to embrace overly categorical claims, assuming that compassion always (and almost 
automatically) feeds into ‘emotional foundationalism’ (deep emotions), crippling judgment 
and logos once and for all. However, ‘to uncritically embrace empathy without caveats’ 
 
113  At this stage one might ask: if logos is upeksousios—from the Greek upo (υπό), translated as 
‘under’ (Oxford New Greek Dictionary, Nikki Watts 2008, 1: 206) and eksousia (εξουσία, that is 
power/authority) (71)—placed under the authority of the mind (judgment), would it be self-
contradictory to assume it is ‘self-functioning’—that is, capable to function without being under 
the sway of an external authority—at the same time? Let us look again at the theory of auto-poiesis. 
Just as a cell is dependent on water, oxygen, or another substance, without which it cannot sustain 
itself, in the same way logos cannot exist without judgment. Cells require primary ingredients in 
order to subsist; once they feed, they become able to function autonomously (Καρκατσούλης 1995 
[Karkatsoulis 1995]). Likewise, judgment constitutes the prime ingredient of logos; in turn, logos 
becomes a means through which judgment is enunciated. At the same time, instead of being a mere 
instrument, logos constitutes a ‘living organism’; it has its own substance and character, through 
which collective realities are constituted. Logos auto-poietikos constructs realities that could 
guarantee peaceful interactions, as long as it precludes violence and coercion. Without peaceful 
interactions, the networks (public-political realms) within which thoughts and judgments find 




(ibid), neglecting that compassion (or empathy) ‘can lead to self-loss’ (17), to 
depersonalisation (Nietzsche 1967: 140), which effectively puts constraints on the human 
capacity for judgment while ‘delivering aesthetic pleasure to the empathizer’ (Breithaupt 
2019: 17) would be equally problematic. ‘Studies have proven that empathy, bit by bit, 
does the work to solidify hasty judgments’ (99). Therefore, if compassion deprives the 
logismikon, if (in other words) emotional foundationalism cripples judgment and if logos 
is upeksousios, that is, depended on thinking and judging, we end up at the following 
conclusion: the patriotism of compassion can erect fences against logos itself. Furthermore, 
if logos apart from being upeksousios is also autopoietikos, which relies on individuality 
(dissent and differentiation), it might be concluded that the patriotism of compassion may 
stand as an obstacle to the internal differentiations logos autopoietikos has need of, 
differentiations that can prevent the shift towards extreme forms of collective 
homogenisation Hayek (2007) himself feared and abhorred, a homogenisation that 
suppresses dissent.   
More extensive discussions concerning logos and individuality will take place later 
on. At this stage we could elucidate on another reason the patriotism of compassion 
(proposed by Weil) is not emancipated from ‘warlike energies’. Prima facie, let us return 
to Niebuhr’s (1960: 91) assertion that collective bodies often regard the latter’s collective 
will as an expression of their personal will (pathos, in my terms). When this occurs their 
individual ego is reflected through the collective ego. If pathos fosters competition between 
individuals, and since an individual self finds its true reflection through this idolised 
collective self, we can assume that competition between individuals can take the form of 
competition between collectivities (including nations). In other words, the pathos inciting 
elevation over others, are extended from the individual level to the collective. Therefore, 
the antagonism between two or more individuals can often end up a competition between 
two or more idols, between two or more ‘collective selves’ (nations). On this occasion, 
‘patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism’ (ibid). This 
antagonism between collective ‘selves’ reflected through such idols and static images 
(nations) refers to what Fukuyama (1992) calls as ‘megalothymia’ (182), implying the 
desire/pathos to be recognized as superior to others (184-5; 304) that on certain occasions 




many cases corresponds to the will-to-power, to the pathos for domination we identify in 
the moral character of authoritarian and/or totalitarian leaders (304-5). The exact 
translation of the word megalothymia would be ‘a great passion for recognition’. It derives 
from the Greek word megalos (μεγάλος) and thymos. However, one should note that 
Fukuyama has made up a word whose meaning (in Greek) is not the same as the one he 
attributes; for megalothymia (or else megathymia) refers to «πρᾷον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον 
[megalothymon] ἦθος» ([Πλάτων 2014: 151 [Plato 2014: 151]), translated as ‘lionhearted’, 
brave and/or magnanimous (Δημητράκος 2008: 4509 [Dimitrakos 2008: 4509). Hence, it 
would be more accurate to replace megalothymia with what I have already called ‘hubris’ 
(or pride, or supremacy), which refers to the most exaggerated versions of mēnis. In fact, 
analogous to what is hubris (or excessive pride) for shame is optimism for pessimism.  
 It is dignity and isothymia (as the previous chapter explained) what stands in 
alliance with hope and eucosmia, with common decency and action. Hubris, deriving from 
the pathos for domination, assigns to this collective self a meaning that indulges our pathos 
for domination. In contrast, the dignity of nations corresponds to the recognition that all 
peoples and nations (individually) are capable of serving the ‘universal good’, of 
benefiting, in other words, all of humanity. If the subversion of one’s capacity to 
objectively assess a given reality in order to obtain conclusions through analysis according 
to impartial standards applied (judgment) is one of the principal effects of many 
relationships that rest on the fido amor, and since the deprivation of impartiality (due to the 
deprivation of the logismikon, of the judgmental mind) by the emotional foundationalism 
of the fido amor itself directly or indirectly force us to accept as true assumptions that 
gratify our intense sentiments (including the sentiment of pathos), we can assert that the 
patriotism of compassion is not fully capable of halting sentiments of national 
egoism/supremacy (pride or hubris).  Therefore, significant revisions of Weil’s approach 
must be made if we aim to employ its practical value. Can there exist a form of patriotism 
that crosses frontiers, keeping eyes ‘open on injustices, cruelties, mistakes’ (Weil 1987a: 
165)? Can there exist a patriotism whose emphasis on collective solidarity does not 
suppress free spaces for individual self-expression, which is the type of patriotism 
Nussbaum (2013: 218) supports as well? Certainly, this would not be the ‘patriotism of 




and logos, on individuality and open participation.  
As we already know, the anthropocentric aspects of eucosmia can find expression 
through the Christian love (or agape, in King’s terms), through the ‘the transcendent worth 
of … human personality’ (Niebuhr 1960: 59). One could also borrow anthropocentric 
insights, capable of approaching the notion of eucosmia, from non-Christian worldviews, 
like (for instance) from the ‘cosmopolitan’, according to Jahanbengloo (2020), Hinduism 
of Gandhi, or even from secular philosophical systems, from the cosmopolitan thinking of 
the Stoics, more precisely (Κοντογιώργης 2014: 265 [Contogeorgis 2014: 265]). Insights 
that lead to eucosmia share the unflattering faith in the capacity of the κόσμος (cosmos), of 
the ‘ordinary anthrōpos’, of the ‘common people’, to sense objectivity and prudence, in 
halting its hubris (incited by pathos)  by means of persuasion. Eucosmia (as I am going to 
explain in what follows) can lead to isothymia and dignity (aksio-prepeia). It is 
unambiguously committed to the idea that all human beings are capable of renouncing 
aggression, of passing judgments so long as they are capable of speaking,  thinking and 
acting. It might be argued, accordingly, that eucosmia addresses Weil’s expectations more 
accurately than compassion. In other words, we could take eucosmia (rather than 
compassion itself) as the most effective stimulus that prompts persons to observe ‘both the 
good and the bad’, while keeping an eye ‘open to injustices, cruelties, mistakes’, in Weil’s 
(1987a: 165) words. Let us pursue this rationale further. 
Logos auto-poietikos, as previously mentioned, in order to create and preserve the 
network (the public-political realm) within which discussions (arguments and counter-
arguments) take place, requires disagreements (metaxu): disputes and debates, in turn, 
presuppose the existence of a plurality of doxas, whose expression provoke re-evaluation 
of one’s ideas cemented in the brain. Therefore, dialogue re-activates judgment and critical 
observation, which finds expression through speech. Thus, the public (or the political) 
realm substitutes violence and competition by physical force (which leads to the Hobbesian 
war of all against all) with competition of doxas. This ‘uninterrupted contest of all against 
all, of aein aristeuein’, was the most characteristic aspect of the ‘agonal spirit of the Greek 
city-life’ (Arendt 2005: 16), where orators were ceaselessly striving to persuade others, 
promoting their individual doxa as the most excellent (Καστοριάδης 2007α: 239 




polis everyone could distinguish himself from all others by persuading the audience about 
the superiority of his point of view (1998: 41). This antagonism of opinions, this constant 
challenge of perceptions, allows each participant to endorse a certain opinion 
(individualism), without conforming to a unified mass. 
If eucosmia stands for (agonal and narrative) action, for logos, eloquence and 
persuasion, and if agonal (or narrative) action per se and individuality are 
interconnected—in fact, nobody can persuade someone to rectify his/her stance if both are 
unbending towards each other—we arrive at the following conclusion: individuality is 
intensified by the public-political realm due to its emphasis on persuasion. Individuality is 
in tandem with dissent, differentiation and disagreement, with the constant clash of 
competing doxas in the public-political realm, guarantee interactions, constituting a 
community subject to changeability. To crystalise this point: through this process of public 
interaction and mediation, through such an environment of dialogue and dissent, a chance 
for members of a collectivity to call into question cultural elements (deeply seated within 
the customs of their group) that redound to hubris and megalothymia, to selfish 
particularism and nationalist (but also racial and/or ethnic) aggression, is potentially given. 
It might be, therefore, argued that the vita civile itself offers a glimmer of hope against the 
‘warlike energy’ of pride and opens up pathways for members of other groups and 
collectivities (including nations) to be recognised as equals (isothymia or dignity/aksio-
prepeia). The sacredness and worthiness of each individual is valued, irrespective of 
his/her membership to a collectivity (nation, town, village, et al.) or a (racial and ethnic) 
group. Members of a group have a chance to improve their decency (εὐ – eu) towards other 
groups and towards the κόσμος (cosmos), towards peoples and nations of the entire world, 
in general. Thus, collectivities can acquire the same dignity. They are valued and respected. 
Hence, it is eucosmia what ‘crosses frontiers’, what could soften collective attachments, 
without on the other hand discarding particularism altogether. As noted earlier, the 
existence of a (common) space (the public or the political realm), capable to cause 
metavolē to itself (through public mediation), could hardly be brought into existence 
without conserving cultural (bonding) memories, which ascribe to a community a 
particular identity (gerere) and allows the same collectivity to come out as a political agent 




3) ‘Neolithic’ conservatism, metavolē and the ‘world’s tide’ 
Public and grassroots political realms of open participation (as aforementioned) 
constitute collectivities subject to metavolē. Certain fashions and gestures are replaced by 
new ones. If, for example, the England of 1940 is not the same as the England of 1840, 
according to Orwell (1984: 13), this could be attributed to the multiple transformations that 
resulted in the alteration of perceptions and principles which define Englishness. Consider, 
at this stage, how metavolē occurs in relation to an individual who ‘has a stock of old 
opinions [in mind] already, but … meets a new experience that puts them to a strain’ (James 
1978: 34). The mind seeks to modify ‘his previous mass of opinions’ with ‘a minimum 
disturbance’ (35). It saves past experiences (ibid) and utilises them in order to synthesise 
new ideas and concepts. Additionally, let us take into account Emily Brontë’s poem 
Remembrance (1846/1992): The poem opens by describing a girl weeping near the ‘dreary 
grave’ (8) of her lover. ‘[F]ifteen wild Decembers’ have passed since his death, so the girl 
begins to wonder whether time has melted away her love or not. Thereupon she adds, 
‘[s]weet Love of youth, forgive, if I forget thee’ since ‘the world’s tide is bearing me along; 
/ Other desires and other hopes beset me’ (9; emphasis added), since new mundane hopes 
are constantly created.  
In order to crystalise this rationale, let us take further the concept of auto-poietikos 
(self-functioning) logos. The process through which logos procreates the networks within 
which it can be reproduced perpetually presupposes the existence of (let us say) dialectical 
objects, the existence of one or more issues, topics, inquiries, concerning disputes about 
public matters, upon which discussions and deliberations can be made in the public-
political realm. Through such deliberations potentially new dialectical objects are brought 
into existence. More precisely, in Chapter 3 we examined the way human action brings 
into existence ‘newborn’ (and, to a degree) ‘unseen realities’, whose emergence and 
content could have never been predicted before. Likewise, dialogue is subject to fortuna. 
When logos expresses ideas stored in memory (which is always historicised, as previously 
mentioned) the same ideas appear within the real world; they are mediated through public 
conversation; they are compared and contrasted with the ideas and views of others. Out of 
this friction new topics are created, new dialectical objects and ideas emerge. These new 




called ‘world’s tide’ (ibid); they are the outcomes of the constant interaction between 
individuals (in narrative and, more importantly, agonal action). These ‘new idea[s] [are] … 
adopted as the true one[s]’ but simultaneously most ‘of the older stock of truths’ are 
preserved with ‘a minimum of modification’ (James 1978: 35).  
Furthermore, the same old ideas could be another outcome of a synthesis of older 
ideas. ‘[F]or in this matter of belief’ adds James ‘we are all extreme conservatives’ (ibid).  
The word ‘conservatism’ derives from the word ‘τήρησις’ and ‘τηρέω’ (to protect and 
preserve), ‘which Epictetus used in order to describe the divine law’ (Huttunen 2010: 45), 
the ‘physical cosmic agent, which “forms” and “keeps” … all there is’ (Harrill 2010: 128), 
the ‘existing community bonds’ that ‘are destroyed at peril’ (Goodman 1970: 192). This 
‘neolithic’ conservatism, to use Goodman’s (1970) term, is willing ‘to give up everything 
else to conserve community bonds’ (192), to preserve the treasure of old memories. But 
this appeal to a common past is expressed as a form of ‘gratitude’ towards old concepts 
and ideas (Lasch 1991a: 90; Theodosiadis 2019: 116-7). Gratitude, instead of disparaging 
the present, idealising the past as a symbol of lost innocence ‘no longer accessible’ (as is 
the case of nostalgia) (ibid), or converting a collectivity into a symbol that indulges the 
hubris of nationalist idolatry, does not turn a blind eye on the ‘world’s tide’ (to use Brontë’s 
terms) or metavolē, on the process of constant re-creation of new ideas and concepts. 
Consider, in addition, the Japanese/Buddhist notion of wabi sabi, which may also shed 
further light on the serene and warm feeling of gratitude. According to this notion, objects 
are often considered to be manifestations of mujo, that is, of transience, changeability and 
impermanence (Juniper 2003: 162). Objects of mujo are ‘vehicles for … contemplation’ 
(10), vehicles for thinking. In the same way, memorable (cultural or otherwise) objects can 
be manifestations of mujo, of a changeable (rather static) reality. Hence, they are vehicles 
for judgement, often stimulated through agonal and narrative action (see chapter 5). For 
Juniper (2003), wabi sabi is ‘associated with this quality, and as such mujo forms a defining 
aspect of wabi sabi objects’ (10). Furthermore, wabi sabi objects can ‘bring about, within 
us, a sense of serene melancholy and a spiritual longing’ (ibid). Likewise, common bonding 
(cultural or civil) memories could bring a sense of serene melancholy, or (to put it in my 
terms) a serene emotional appeal to ‘the reassuring memory of happy times’, in Lasch’s 




challenges of the present (83; 90-1)114.  
As mentioned earlier, public deliberations and debates (action) could constitute 
inherited norms and past ideas (essential aspects of a common identity) subject to public 
judgment. I have explained how this process of public mediation causes metavolē to the 
same identity. Does this, however, exclude the possibility for action, for public debates, to 
conclude in favour of conserving and protecting such norms and ideas?  Here we could 
argue that even in cases where public deliberations converge in favour of defending and 
conserving the status quo, such decisions are products of judgmental moves, rather the 
outcome of pathos, which could theologise and instrumentalise the same common identity. 
Individuality, to put it differently, allows everyone ‘to believe what is true for [their] 
private heart is true for all men’ (Emerson 2000: 132) without conforming to ‘badges and 
names, to large societies and dead institutions’ (135), to customs and commonly accepted 
beliefs (Mill 2008: 59; 70). To avoid misunderstandings (1995a) this view of individuality 
must not be conflated with the neoliberal understanding of individuality, with the idea that 
persons can ‘learn to speak for themselves  … in a world in which there are no values’, in 
Lasch’s (1995a: 97) terms. While action and (autopoietikos) logos requires individual 
autonomy, at the same time, the individual mind presupposes the existence of a collectivity 
to function as a source of memorable objects for wonder to reflect upon. Although the 
process of altering a collective identity (shaped by the sum of bonding memories, of 
internalised ideas and concepts) requires interactions, that is community and public action, 
at the same time, this collective identity must be internalised in the collective conscious 
and unconscious; it must live in the sum of the individual minds of those who are members 
of the same collectivity. This internalised identity becomes a form of gerere. It can find 
expression in the public-political realm, within which plurality of dissimilar and individual 
doxas are disclosed as distinct from others; in the public-political realm it is mediated and, 
out of this process of public interaction, new dialectical objects are created.  
 This, in fact, is the main difference between the rugged individualism of eighteenth 
 
114  Lasch’s view on gratitude and courage (from memory), his rejection of nostalgia or of similar 
reactions that stimulate idolisation of the past, is the outcome of his reflection on William 
Wordsworth’s Prelude: ‘We will grieve not, rather find / Strength in what remains behind’ (quotes 




century economic liberalism (also called possessive individualism)115, and the ‘responsible’ 
individualism of the vita civile. The former rests on a positive assessment of the 
unrestrained self-interest and often (implicitly) justifies selfish pursuits as a hallmark of 
progress, of endless industrial expansion and material abundance (Lasch 1991a: 45; 53). 
As also Tocqueville (1994) asserted, ‘[s]elfishness is a vice as old as the world … 
individualism is of democratic origin’ (2: 98). Selfishness ‘saps the virtues of public life’ 
and it ‘leads a man to connect everything with himself and to prefer himself to everything 
in the world’ (ibid). Civic virtue, according to Pocock (1975), consists in ‘placing the 
common good … above one’s personal profit’ (464). But as opposed to extreme forms of 
collectivism, where individuality is sacrificed in toto (Hayek 2007: 175), for the vita civile 
the life of the state is not superior to the life of the individual. While the individual is 
connected with his/her peers and recognises that he/she has unconditional obligations 
toward them, at the same time, his/her individual worth, free will and logos are highly 
valued and respected; they are means through which the common good is better served and 
conserved. Put in rather stark terms, while individuals can exist as autonomous thinkers 
and actors, their self-reliance must never encourage selfishness and, more importantly, 
must not undermine their allegiance to community (Scruton 2007: 24-5). Mill’s insistence 
on individuality must not go as far as to declare tradition ‘the enemy of human liberty … 
and progress’ (Deneen 2018: 145) that deserves to ‘be overthrown so that those who seek 
to live according to personal choices’ are free to do so (144). For Deneen, tradition 
(bonding memory), rather than administrative directives and bureaucratic apparatuses, 
should control individual attitudes, and restrain individual greed (38; 62). Rugged 
individualism ‘demands the dismantling of culture; and as culture fades, Leviathan waxes 
and responsible liberty recedes’ (88). Without culture and community, without a common 
space within which direct and indirect interactions take place, neither the public-political 
realm nor the individual (as a thinking individual) can exist. If thinking presupposes 
memory, on which our thinking ego lives in order to identify objects, a thinking sovereign 
individual is the one who relies on his/her memories in order to evaluate (nóēsis) 
internalised concepts and ideas, as opposed to the rugged individualist, who claims 
 




emancipation from the past and understands happiness only in relation to his/her own 
ephemeral private enjoyments. In the end, as Brontë (1992) put it, ‘[f]aithfull, indeed, is 
the spirit that remembers’ (9), the spirit that recognises the significance of memory 
(gerere), refusing to adopt the doctrine of progress, the doctrine of liberal optimism, 
accompanied by rampant innovation and excessive individualism, breaking up collective 
attachments, fostering oblivion and uprootedness.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter highlighted the merits of the modest patriotism advocated by the vita 
civile, of the patriotism of eucosmia, grounded on action. This nuanced and ethical 
patriotism suggests a middle path between the twin perils of ‘national selfishness’, to use 
King’s (1986: 29) terms, and the nihilism of uprootedness (discussed in Chapter 4), of the 
so-called cultural de-composition and social nihilism. More precisely, the patriotism of 
eucosmia relies on (autopoietikos and upeksousios) logos, on dialogue, openness and 
dissent, on ‘publicness’ and individuality. In the public-political realm a great plurality of 
viewpoints come together and conflict with each other. This constant chain of arguments 
and counterarguments requires individuality (as the third section of this chapter made clear) 
and, for this reason, has the capacity to prevent collectivities from becoming unanimous 
bodies. As Canovan (1996) puts it, ‘when we use the term [‘people'] in a collectivist sense 
to refer to a nation we give it a plural verb’ (20; emphasis added). Consequently, to suggest 
that ‘the Scottish people demands independence’ (ibid) is to approach the ‘Scottish people’ 
per se as a unanimous collectivity, as a national society (in the Arendtian sense of the 
word), rigidly identified by a common voice. In contrast, the plural verb, ‘“the Scottish 
people demand independence” (ibid; my emphasis) refers to the ‘people of Scotland’ as a 
multivariate national community (or society), consisting of several interacting groups, sub-
groups and individuals. Action, which incorporates individuality and dialogue (auto-
poietikos and upeksousios logos) leads to public judgment; it gradually alters collective 
identities, erecting fences against nationalist idolatry. The patriotism of eucosmia, the 
patriotism of the vita civile, extends the idea of individual worth from the individual to the 
collective level (to the nation, in other words), melting down national egoisms. This 




egoism in every instance. However, it bestows hope for decency and dignity; it encourages 
iso-thymia, the brotherhood of man, to use a more vernacular language, which does not 
rest on some ‘abstract idea of universal human rights’ (Lasch 1991a: 36) but on man’s 
‘common weakness and frailty’ as King’s Christian universalism advocates (390). 
This cosmopolitanism, however, still bases itself on the merits of a modest 
particularism, on the need for roots, on some mild attachment to ‘specific people and 
places’ (Lasch 1991a: 36), without which no public realm can be ever brought into life. In 
the end, as Burke (1969) put it, ‘[a] state without the means of some change’, that is without 
being capable of reforming itself, ‘is without the means of its conservation’ (106). A 
constitution in order to be preserved must be flexible and open to alterations (ibid). 
Likewise, a collective identity, in order to be conserved, must be open to public mediation; 
it must be subject to new influences, to steady and gradual (or organic) metavolē. Under 
such conditions collectivities ‘whether racial, national or economic’ can ‘achieve a degree 
of reason and sympathy which would permit them to see and to understand the interests of 
others as vividly as they understand their own’, to borrow Niebuhr’s (1960) words, and ‘a 
moral goodwill which would prompt them to affirm the rights of others as vigorously as 
they affirm their own’ (xxiv). ‘[T]he desire to conserve is compatible with all manner of 
change, provided only that change is also continuity’ (Scruton 2007: 11) and does not wipe 
out the entire collectivity. As Frye (1982) pointed out, ‘real freedom is something that only 
the individual can experience’ (87). But as opposed to the rugged individualism of 
eighteenth-century economic liberalism, which treats personal autonomy as an ultimate 
end in itself, according to Kondylis (2007: 220-1 [Κονδύλης 2007: 220-1]), for the vita 
civile the individual is only a cog in the machine of public life; ‘[t]he individual grows out 
of society like a plant out of its soil’ and never breaks ‘away from it’ (Frye 1982: 87). In 
addition, a ‘public world’ ‘[is] a world structured by traditions, and that such a world could 
come into and remain in existence only if there was a “continuum of public and private 
memories’ (Arendt 1990: 267). In heritage cultural elements (symbols of a common 
heritage, images and folkways of a common life, lodged in our physical collective memory) 
create and preserve an empirical world within which individuals feel naturally included. 
This world not only offers ‘a kind of refuge, a place to which a people may repair for 








This dissertation begun with a critical reflection on Lasch’s TTOH and, more 
importantly, on his emphasis on the distinctions between optimism and hope. For Lasch 
(1991a), optimism refers to the eighteenth-century liberal idea of progress, of ‘steady 
improvement with no foreseeable ending at all’ (47) and ‘with the modern discovery of 
[material] abundance’ (55). Hope, on the other hand, does not approach history through the 
angle of ‘progress’, advocating permanent improvement, on ‘confidence’ in the future 
(113). In Lasch’s (1991c) worldview, hope is associated with democracy and, in turn, 
democracy with populism, a type of populism that draws on classical republicanism, 
nevertheless. The primary aim of this dissertation was to expand Lasch’s analysis (his view 
of hope, as opposed to optimism). Thus, it addressed a set of basic problématiques 
revolving around the key arguments upon which the defenders of (liberal) optimism, as 
well as the defenders of pessimism, justify their position. In addition, it cast a critical eye 
on the impasses of the practical implementation of political projects that rely on pessimistic 
and/or liberal optimistic philosophical axioms. Finally, it examined the possible responses 
alternative political philosophies could offer, and, more precisely, the republican 
philosophy of Arendt, which has been one of the main influences for Lasch. In order to 
identify the key arguments upon which schools of political pessimism rest, I took into 
consideration Hobbes’ and Filmer’s absolutist (pessimistic) theories, coupled with 
theoretical viewpoints offered by crowd psychologists (such as Le Bon and Taine). The 
reason behind this emphasis on the pessimism of Anglo-American absolutism (over other 
strands of political pessimism) rests primarily on the genealogical connections between 
Hobbes’ thought with liberal optimism. As Chapter 3 stressed, one of the main objectives 
of Hobbes’ absolutism was to secure peace (against the dread of perpetual war, the possible 
consequences of the insatiable human desire for possession), even through the expulsion 
of the ‘common people’ from decision-making, from political action (in other words). 
Likewise, Locke’s contractarian theory, revolving around the idea of limited government 
and consent, which genealogically follows Hobbes’ absolutism, is indifferent to action. As 




whereby active citizenship becomes a real possibility. Having expelled action, 
contemporary analysts who draw on Locke’s theory of limited government, have  
substituted the absolute rule of the Sovereign with the rule of the market, which although 
it permits dissent and freedom of expression to a certain degree, remains intrinsically anti-
populist. This anti-populism is masked with an overt optimism that standards of living will 
improve simply through the rapid and boundless expansion of the market forces. It has 
been also commented that the dominance of capitalism, that is, of the endless expansion of 
production (and consumption), in conjunction with the prevalence of the rule of law 
(against despotism) would be the final point in mankind’s history, one of the greatest 
achievements of humanity (Fukuyama 1992). The psychoanalytic viewpoints developed in 
Chapter 2 challenged the panacea of economic liberalism—the total subjection of societies 
and individuals to the market (as the only means of salvation from the vices of human 
nature)—by emphasising the non-rational (tragic) way through which human collectivities 
institute themselves. 
In response to the third problématique, we have examined the way melioristic 
populist projects, like the populism of the vita civile, create conditions for common decency 
to spring and flourish. To summarize: the vita civile relies on action, on the direct 
involvement of the ‘common people’ in public affairs. Action is also synonymous with 
ethical memory and logos, and requires virtù, the courage and resilience through which the 
appetites of fortuna, the consequences of ‘tragedy’ (Chapter 2), are restrained. Courage is 
indispensable in the political realm (Arendt 1968a: 156), which is never fully sealed from 
the arbitrariness of fortuna, from the devastating outcomes of human pathos. Thus, the 
populism of the vita civile is intrinsically anti-utopian and anti-optimistic. It derives from 
a democratic tradition that, in Lasch’s (1991a) words, ‘offers no panacea for all the ills that 
afflict the modern world’ (532). Genealogically speaking, this tradition begins with the 
Greek polis, and–as both Arendt (1998) and Contogeorgis (Κοντογιώργης 2014; 2020) 
argued–to a lesser degree in the Roman republics. . It encompasses anthropocentric 
elements, which (in the western world) have re-emerged (partially as a henkfurt or a 
metharmōsis) in the Renaissance and, more importantly, in democratic revolutions inspired 
by the project of the Enlightenment, like the proto-anthropocentric French and the 




during the American cooperative movement (Populism) and, finally, in the eucosmia of 
Martin Luther King Jr.  
When it comes to King’s anthropocentric philosophy, consider the following 
famous phrase from his ‘I Have A Dream speech’: one day ‘my four little children will … 
live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by content of 
their character’ (King 1978: 219). Centrist intellectuals (Pluckrose and Lindsay 2018) often 
quote this phrase in order to portray King as a liberal individualist, whose worldview 
conflicts with the logic of ‘identity politics’ spotted in several contemporary left-wing 
trends. As they assert, the latter’s focus on (black) identity intensifies divisions (ibid). It 
‘goes against the most common sense of fairness and reciprocity’ so long as it considers 
society a battleground between privileged and unprivileged groups (ibid). This exclusive 
focus on identity and ‘victimhood’ perpetuates tensions instead of promoting friendship 
and reciprocity (ibid). The threats of white supremacy could be combated through the rule 
of law, which treats every individual man and woman, irrespective of race or sex, according 
to her/her achievements (ibid). As Chapter 6 argued, such an interpretation points to the 
proto-anthropocentric weltanschauung of American liberalism. A more rigorous 
examination of King’s philosophy (see Chapter 5) could lead us to a different conclusion 
concerning his philosophy: King had faith in the value of the human person, black and 
white, who does not simply have equal rights and responsibilities by law. Every individual 
is ‘made in God’s image’ and is ‘a person of sacred worth’ (Raboteau 2017; emphasis 
added). Even if a person is an enemy, he/she should be treated as a potential ally (ibid), 
because ‘[t]he worth of an individual does not lie in the measure of … his racial origin, or 
his social position. Human worth lies in relatedness to God’ (King 1986: 122), to a 
transcendent force ‘whose infinite love embraces all mankind’ says King (1986: 515; 
emphasis added), while reflecting on Tolstoy's Confessions. We have seen that this 
particular love (agape) can be a manifestation of the friendship of eucosmia, for which 
every individual is an intelligent unique being, capable to use his/her logos and judgment, 
contributing to the common eu (good). In turn, intelligence (as Chapter 5 claimed) is 
manifested through the virtues of democratic participation the Civil Rights Movement, 
according to Lasch (1991a: 404; 1995: 83) and Raboteau (2017) attempted to put into 




interpretation of King’s agape does not exclusively lead us to the conclusion that the Civil 
Rights Movement was only about equality before the law. King’s eucosmia could lead us 
to the following assumption: African-Americans had also to win their dignity, their axio-
prepeia, their recognition and self-worth as democratic citizens and, therefore, as 
intelligent persons, capable of acting, of using their logos, their thinking and judgment (in 
the eyes of the white majority).  
Of course, there are more historical examples worthy to be studied be taken as case-
studies for further research, while examining the re-emergence of democratic 
(anthropocentric) ideas or even the way self-organised communities are (self)instituted (to 
use Castoriadis’ terms). For example, the English villages (briefly mentioned in Chapter 3) 
and the process whereby modernisation and industrialisation deprived their autonomy, the 
plethora of self-organised communes during the European Middle Ages, are additional 
cases. In addition, we have several times mentioned Contogeorgis’ view concerning the 
Byzantine age as among the main cornerstones of anthropocentrism in the Hellenic world. 
This prompts us to dig deeper into the hitherto published scholarship concerning the 
potential contribution of the Byzantine millennia in democracy and action. This analysis 
will take place in another dissertation, which will also attempt to shed light on the way 
deliberative democracy could also arise from non-western philosophical roots, as in the 
work of Amartya Sen (for example). We could, thus, broaden our perspectives on action 
and eucosmia, which (to repeat once more) constitutes a more melioristic (in comparison 
to that pursued by Contogeorgis) interpretation of anthropocentrism per se. 
In addition, meliorism (or hope) rejects the optimistic belief in ‘the limitless 
capacities of human intelligence’ (Lasch 1990: 13) and does not rely exclusively on the 
moral capacities of logos and ethical memory. Chapter 6 (by examining the case of the 
French Revolution) has shown that populist trends and revolutions inspired by the 
Rousseauian optimistic view of human nature, incubate threats as they systematically 
neglect the inherent human proclivity towards hubris, or at least, the possibility for such a 
tendency to exist and to manifest itself in the public sphere abruptly and almost without 
our knowledge (fortuna). In that sense, Canovan (1998) was right to assert that Arendt’s 
action recommends ‘a life of heroic action’ (xiii). Action is exposed to hubris and ‘sets off 




contingent and has unforeseeable consequences, even at odds with those initially intended 
(Lasch 1991a: 133; Arendt 1998: 176; Straume 2012: 373; 375).  
As, however, Castoriadis (2015 [Καστοριάδης 2015]) argued, democracies in order 
to minimise the effects of hubris, require enhanced constitutional provisions, capable of 
protecting individual freedoms from the arbitrariness of an unrestrained majority (103). 
Nonetheless, such institutional safeguards will never cease being subjects of dispute by 
certain individuals; they can, eventually, be called into question at any time by a social 
majority which, in the midst of a breakdown, may decide to push reforms toward a direction 
that cancels all these legal prohibitions against the violation of ‘inalienable’ liberties and 
freedoms for certain groups or individuals (103). ‘The idea of a non-modifiable constitution 
is a legal and factual absurdity’ (Castoriadis 2007c: 123). In the worst case scenario, if 
political representatives deny constitutional reforms based on the demands of a majority 
(irrespective how imprudent this majority can be), nothing stops the latter from pursuing 
such objectives through violent means (popular unrest and insurrections) (Καστοριάδης 
2015: 103 [Castoriadis 2015: 103]).  
 The fourth problématique this dissertation addresses revolves around discussions 
concerning the impasses of action in general and, simultaneously, highlights the practical 
insufficiency of all legal provisions and restrictions (like, for instance, the paranómōn 
graphē and the apatin tou dimou)116 to protect permanently a populace from its own hubris. 
With regard to such matters, Arendt’s (1968a) position is of particular interest: fearing the 
consequences of thoughtlessness she spoke in favour of civil disobedience and backed the 
idea of incorporating civil disobedience within the political institutions of the United States 
(including the Constitution), providing legal recognition (and protection) to acts that 
condemn and expose abuse of power, alienation of freedoms (49-102). Such a move would 
not only offer legal recognition to the right of opinion, but (more importantly) would oblige 
certain institutions to acknowledge the objections of dissenting groups. Only under these 
conditions the fruits of the ‘unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible 
opinions’ (Mill 2008: 52) could be really tasted. Chapter 6, by examining Martin Luther 
King Jr’s campaign, emphasised the importance of civil disobedience in relation to the 
 




concept of self-purification, which creates the conditions within which moral 
transgressions are (potentially) ended and resurrects the dormant collective nóēsis, 
boosting the collective ‘nill -will, paving the way for beauty, truth and justice. Collective 
self-purification (collective katharsis) requires dramatisation and, hence, a genuine appeal 
to our serene emotions. However, collective katharsis comes through individual self-
purification. In turn, individual katharsis presupposes connection with the anonymous 
dimensions of the so-called impersonal realm, a transcendent realm ‘situated above this 
world’ (Weil 1987a: 4). It is a sacred space within which no collectivity can intrude (Weil 
2005: 75). The impersonal realm connects us with a high moral idea which it highlights the 
moral boundaries between hubris and common decency (the eu-prēpon). It emancipates 
the ‘I’ from negative prejudices (products of pathos).  
It follows, therefore, that common decency cannot be entrusted to secular 
republicanism alone. As a matter of fact, the relative success of the American Revolution, 
the abolition of slavery and the democratic hope the cooperative movement inspired to the 
‘common people’ owe much to religion and spirituality (Chapter 6). For this reason the 
previous chapters highlighted the significance of a new Great Awakening to accompany 
projects inspired by classical republicanism. Furthermore, religious ideas could offer 
primary motivations for individuals to pursue what Milton believed a true revolution within 
the human mind (Frye 2005: 110); it is the revolution against the pathos for unbridled self-
interest and unlimited material possessions. Eventually, Weil (1987a) was right to argue in 
favour of a spiritual revival as a potential solution to France’s cultural and political decay; 
such a move, she argued, would not only reduce the devastating effects of uprootedness, 
allowing the French to rediscover their rich cultural past, but (more importantly) it would 
cultivate a sense of belonging emancipated from the hubris of nationalist idolatry. Α 
patriotism in harmony with the principles of eucosmia (discussed in the previous chapter),  
allows us to appreciate the value of particularism, that is, the value of bonding (civil and/or 
cultural) memory, without discarding cosmopolitanism, id est., the significance of nations 
and peoples to be ‘good’ (eu) with the κόσμος (cosmos, the world), with other nations and 
peoples, valuing their dignity (axio-prepeia)117. More importantly, by considering the 
 
117  In fact, by examining the case of nostalgia, in Chapter 4, we have seen how the collapse of 




existence of such transcendent dimensions, we open up ourselves to spheres from which 
the mind could grasp new modes of interpreting secular life. Thus, apart from impersonality 
and purification, the impersonal realm becomes a source of infusion of radical ideas, which 
could help us to identify falsely established perceptions and appraisals (upon which most 
liberal modern societies have been instituted).  
Thus, a new perception concerning so-called ‘inalienable rights’ could be 
promoted, by emphasising obligation, from where the right to life and freedom (not just 
liberty) derives. Consider, for example, the Bill of Obligations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Duties; in the catalogue of human obligations we can prioritise the 
duty to respect in each human being the capacity for freedom (the raison d'être of action), 
which appears absent from Weil’s catalogue of needs, as outlined in The Need for Roots 
(1952/1987a). Instead Weil retreats to the idea of limited government: liberty, as she 
argues, is interpreted as the ‘ability to choose’ (p.12). More importantly, in order to avoid 
licentiousness, liberty must be limited by ‘sufficiently sensible and sufficiently 
straightforward’ rules (ibid). These limitations must derive ‘from a source of authority 
which is not looked upon as strange or hostile, but loved as something belonging to those 
placed under its direction’ (ibid). ‘[O]bedience, to established rules’, another essential need 
of the human soul, ‘presupposes consent’, or obedience itself gradually degenerates into 
absolutism (p.13). Liberty (see Chapter 3), a proto-anthropocentric concept, has very little 
to say about active citizenship. Neo-republican thinkers, like Pettit (1997), juxtaposes 
liberty (the so-called ‘non-interference liberty’) with the liberty of ‘non-domination’. ‘I 
may be dominated by another—for example, to go to the extreme case, I may be the slave 
of another—without actually being interfered with in any of my choices. It may just happen 
that my master is of a kindly and non-interfering disposition’ (22). Slavery, in other words, 
is a matter of ‘domination’ rather just interference. Debates concerning the flaws of ‘non-
domination liberty’ should take place in separate research. Here, we can briefly assert that 
the liberty of ‘non-domination’ is trapped within the same weltanschauung that lies in the 
 
intrude into the underworld, permitting pathos to take over all human incentives. To a degree, 
Hobbes (2006) was correct to defend the existence of a common power to keep everyone in awe in 
order to avoid the chaos of war (70). It is not, however, his extreme statism (the absolute Sovereign) 





underpinnings of the ‘non-interference’ liberty; it barely escapes the pursuit of self-
actualisation at all costs, even at the expense of commitment to culture, tradition 
(ethimikon) and to the civic life of the political realm. More importantly, non-domination 
liberty does not incite action. In contrast, action is strictly associated with the concept of 
eucosmia and with the notion of freedom as it has been interpreted by Arendt, which Pettit 
dismisses as ‘populist’ and ‘communitarian’ that promotes homogenisation, precluding 
plurality and dissent (8).  
To conclude, ‘hope “is confined to this life and to purgatory, and has no place either 
in heaven or in hell”’ (Bockmuehl 2012: 15); hope achieves its significance and meaning 
in opposition to the other ‘two false and perverse substitutes’, the belief that assured 
happiness is totally ‘under our control’ (p.18), or the withdrawal to a state of deep 
desperation, conformity and passivity. As King (1986) put it, ‘something in the universe 
unfolds for justice’ (14); ‘in the struggle for righteousness man has cosmic companionship’ 
(40). According to John Steinbeck (1976), ‘[i]t isn’t that the evil thing wins—it will never 
will—but it doesn’t die’ (221). Evil does not win as long as our belief in hope remains 
strong, which in turn ‘demands a belief in justice’ (Lasch 1990: 13), a belief in (political) 
action, and faith in ‘the common people’ (eucosmia), who can tame their inner lions of 
pathos, by joining forces in the pursuit of intelligence and public happiness. From a 
contextualist point of view: Steinbeck’s (1976) phrase is taken from his letter to Pascal 
Covici, written in January 1941, right in the midst of the Second World War (221); King’s 
words are extracted from his texts on non-violence written during the late 1950s, during 
the culmination of fight against the Jim Crow laws. In times of great misfortune a belief in 
the idea that in cosmic companionship (King 1986, p.20), a belief in ‘some kind of 
underlying justice in the universe in spite of evidence to the contrary … that would justify 
cynicism and despair’ (Lasch 1991c) is necessary for individuals to remain active, to avoid 
the pitfalls of desperation and melancholy. Such a belief should not be conflated with the 
reckless belief in optimism. King, indeed, ‘had seen too much suffering to embrace the 
dogma of progress’, that is, the ‘theories of … “false” [and] “superficial” optimism’ (Lasch 
1991a: 391). In his view, the conviction that justice exists ‘in the order of being [derives] 
from something “deep down within”’ (ibid), from the inner light, from the saintly love 




does not die; pathos is an integral aspect of human existence, an essential ingredient of the 
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